Opinion

Joseph Perrone v. United States

  • 889 F.3d 898
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
May 14, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Barrett
On the bench
Wood, Hamilton, Barrett
Nature of suit
prisoner
Cited by
113 cases
Authority
More cited than 90.4%

explaining that a habeas peti- tioner may invoke the “actual innocence exception, which permits a petitioner to assert a defaulted claim if he can demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a habeas peti- tioner may invoke the “actual innocence exception, which permits a petitioner to assert a defaulted claim if he can demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
  • stating that habeas petitioner may invoke the "actual innocence exception, which permits a petitioner to assert a defaulted claim if he can demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
  • finding no prejudice sufficient to overcome procedural default of Rehaif argument where defendant admitted in the context of his plea that he had previously been convicted of a felony
  • noting that “the Court’s habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 16-2437

JOSEPH PERRONE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:14-cv-00281-DRH — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 14, 2018

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BARRETT,

Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Terry Learn died after Joseph Per-

rone injected her with 7.5 grams of cocaine. Perrone pleaded

guilty to a single count of unlawful drug distribution and

stipulated that his distribution of the cocaine had caused

Learn’s death. In accordance with Perrone’s plea agreement,

the district court applied a statutory sentencing enhance-

ment that mandates a twenty-year minimum term of impris-

2 No. 16-2437

onment if unlawful drug distribution results in death. The

Supreme Court has since clarified that this provision re-

quires a defendant’s drugs to be a but-for cause of the death,

not merely a contributing cause. Perrone filed a petition for

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that the Court’s

narrowed interpretation of the enhancement reveals that he

is actually innocent of causing Learn’s death. In addition, he

asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise

him of a Seventh Circuit case decided on the day before his

sentencing that interpreted the “death results” enhancement

the same way that the Court ultimately did. He claims that if

he had known that the enhancement required the govern-

ment to show that his cocaine was the but-for cause of

Learn’s death, he would have sought to withdraw his plea.

The district court denied Perrone’s petition, and we affirm its

judgment.

I.

At approximately 4 a.m. on April 17, 2008, Terry Learn

and her coworker Madonna Narog went to Narog’s hotel

room, where they did heroin and cocaine for several hours.

They left the hotel around 8 a.m. to purchase more cocaine,

about fifty dollars’ worth for Learn and twenty-five dollars’

worth for Narog. They returned to the hotel and did cocaine

until close to noon, when Learn left for her shift at Roxy’s

Night Club. Narog saw Learn again around 2 p.m., when

Narog went to the club to pick up some money, and again at

8 p.m., when Narog was beginning her shift and Learn was

ending hers.

After her shift, Learn met her boyfriend, Joseph Perrone,

and went back to his home. According to Perrone, the two

made a suicide pact. After watching Learn inject herself with

No. 16-2437 3

a mixture of cocaine and water, Perrone told her that she had

not taken enough to kill herself. He then prepared and in-

jected 7.5 grams of cocaine into Learn. Perrone later told the

police that Learn convulsed, fell to the floor, and died im-

mediately after he injected her for the last time. He did not

specify the time at which he administered the final injection,

but he said that it happened on April 18th. It was therefore at

least four hours after Narog saw Learn at the shift change

and at least twelve hours after Narog last saw her do any

drugs not distributed by Perrone.

Perrone moved Learn’s body to her apartment. He wiped

his fingerprints off the syringe and put it into Learn’s hand.

As he stipulated in his plea agreement, he aimed “to create

the false impression that Terry Learn had died alone in her

own residence.” The body was not discovered until April

26th, when a concerned neighbor flagged down police to re-

port that she had not seen Learn in several days. Police offic-

ers discovered Learn’s body in her apartment. According to

the coroner’s report, the cause of death was “[c]ombined tox-

icity with cocaine, ethanol and opiates.”

Several months later, Perrone was arrested on an unrelat-

ed firearms charge. He chose that time to confess to police

that he had killed Learn, describing what he had done as

“premeditated murder.” During this interview, he told the

police that he gave Learn one injection of an unspecified

amount of cocaine; during a second interview a few weeks

later, he said that he injected Learn with 7.5 grams of cocaine

in three separate injections of 2.5 grams each.

The government obtained an indictment against Perrone

for distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). The indictment specified

4 No. 16-2437

that Learn died as a result of Perrone’s distribution, which, if

proved, would enhance his statutory sentencing range under

§ 841(b)(1)(C). That provision mandates a twenty-year min-

imum sentence if “death or serious bodily injury results

from the use” of the unlawfully distributed substance.

Perrone pleaded guilty. In his plea agreement, he admit-

ted that his conduct had violated the “death results” provi-

sion—namely, he stipulated that “the ingestion of the con-

trolled substance distributed by the Defendant caused the

death of another person.” He also signed a stipulation of

facts admitting that he “injected Terry Learn with a syringe

containing cocaine” and that she “died immediately after

receiving the injection.” At his plea hearing a few weeks lat-

er, Perrone stated that he had read the documents, that he

understood them, and that they were accurate.

On the day before Perrone was sentenced, the Seventh

Circuit decided United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.

2010), which held that the “death results” enhancement re-

quires the government to prove that “ingestion of the de-

fendants’ drugs was a ‘but for’ cause of the death[].” Id. at

948. Hatfield rejected jury instructions that used vaguer, less

demanding language to describe the necessary causal rela-

tionship; it said that the district court could not summarize

the “death results” enhancement as requiring the jury to find

only that the illegal drugs “played a part” in the victim’s

death. Id. at 949.

At sentencing the next day, the district court applied the

“death results” enhancement and sentenced Perrone to 240

months’ imprisonment. Before imposing the sentence, the

district judge said that he had reviewed Perrone’s Stipulation

of Facts to see “what impact, if any, the Rex Hatfield case

No. 16-2437 5

was going to have on this case.” Perrone’s attorney did not

engage this point with the judge, nor did he inform Perrone

about Hatfield. Instead, he once again agreed that the sen-

tencing enhancement applied. Perrone did not appeal his

sentence. He eventually received an 80-month reduction of

his sentence for assistance to the government, a possibility

contemplated by the plea agreement and that Perrone and

the district court had discussed at his sentencing hearing.

Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Burrage v.

United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), which effectively ratified

Hatfield’s standard of causation. The Court held that the

“death results” enhancement ordinarily requires the gov-

ernment to prove that the victim would have lived but for

the unlawfully distributed drugs. Id. at 888. In Burrage, the

victim died with multiple drugs in his bloodstream, includ-

ing metabolites from heroin that had been distributed by the

defendant. Although morphine, a heroin metabolite, was the

only drug present at a level above the therapeutic range, the

government’s experts could not say whether the victim

would have lived if he had not taken the heroin. They testi-

fied only that heroin was a “contributing factor” to a death

caused by “mixed drug intoxication.” That testimony dove-

tailed with instructions requiring the jury to find “that the

heroin distributed by the Defendant was a contributing

cause of [the victim’s] death.” Id. at 886. The Court said that

the statute requires the government to show more than that

the distributed drug contributed to the victim’s death. The

enhancement applies when “death or serious bodily injury

results from the use of [the distributed] substance,” which

means that the substance must be a “but for” cause of the

death. Id. at 887–88.

6 No. 16-2437

Within a month of Burrage, Perrone filed a petition to va-

cate or alter his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His

initial petition asserted that the new interpretation of the

“death results” enhancement announced in Burrage renders

him actually innocent of causing Learn’s death. In his reply

brief below, Perrone added a claim that his attorney had

been constitutionally ineffective for not telling him about

Hatfield.

The district court dismissed Perrone’s claims with preju-

dice. We granted a certificate of appealability on three ques-

tions: whether Perrone was actually innocent of his sentence

under Burrage, whether Perrone’s sentencing counsel had

been constitutionally ineffective for failing to address the is-

sue of causation in light of Hatfield, and whether Perrone’s

plea was knowing and voluntary. Perrone presses only the

first two of these arguments on appeal.

II.

Perrone’s strongest argument is that he is actually inno-

cent of the “death results” sentencing enhancement. He

claims that when he entered his plea agreement and pleaded

guilty, he did not know that the enhancement required but-

for causation. Since then, Burrage has made the standard

clear, and under it, he says, there is insufficient evidence to

show that Learn’s death resulted from the cocaine he gave

her. Although Perrone generally waived his right to raise col-

lateral challenges, the waiver excludes collateral attacks

based on “any subsequent change in the interpretation of the

law” by the Supreme Court that is declared retroactive and

renders Perrone innocent.

No. 16-2437 7

A.

The government contends that Perrone procedurally de-

faulted his Burrage claim by failing to raise it on direct ap-

peal. McCoy v. United States, 815 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2016)

(“A claim cannot be raised for the first time in a § 2255 mo-

tion if it could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.”).

In response, Perrone has invoked the “actual innocence” ex-

ception, which permits a petitioner to assert a defaulted

claim if he “can demonstrate that he is ‘actually innocent’ of

the crimes of which he was convicted.” Id. Perrone’s invoca-

tion of this exception means that “actual innocence” does

double duty in this case: it is both what Perrone must show

to overcome procedural default and the standard he must

satisfy to prevail on the merits of his Burrage claim.

Perhaps because of this overlap, both parties assume (as

did the district court) that the “actual innocence” exception

to procedural default is available to Perrone. That assump-

tion is doubtful. The point of the exception is to ensure that

“federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarcera-

tion of innocent persons.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404

(1993). The Supreme Court has flagged the possibility that

actual innocence might be enough to justify collateral relief

in a capital case on the theory that the execution of one who

is actually innocent violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at

405. Apart from that potential exception, however, the

Court’s “habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of

‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but in-

stead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must

pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim con-

sidered on the merits.” Id. at 404. This is a problem for Per-

rone. He does not ask us to determine that he is actually in-

8 No. 16-2437

nocent so that we can consider a claim of constitutional er-

ror; rather, his innocence of the “death results” enhancement

is the error he asks us to correct.1

The government, however, has not made this argument.

Instead, apparently believing that default and the merits will

rise or fall together, it has treated Perrone’s assertion of the

“actual innocence” exception as functionally no different

from his claim on the merits to be actually innocent of the

“death results” enhancement. Procedural default is a wai-

vable defense, not a jurisdictional bar. We treat the govern-

ment as having waived the defense and analyze Perrone’s

petition on the merits.

1 Perrone’s petition for a certificate of appealability appeared to con-

nect his Burrage claim to a constitutional argument insofar as he sought

review of the question whether his plea was “knowing and voluntary.”

Cf. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (holding that petition-

er could seek relief on his otherwise procedurally barred claim that his

guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent if he could demonstrate his

actual innocence of the offense to which he had pleaded guilty). But Per-

rone abandoned that argument on appeal as a separate ground for relief.

He mentions it only in the context of his claim that he received inade-

quate assistance of counsel; he contends that if his lawyer had told him

about Hatfield, he would have been able to withdraw his plea as not

knowing and voluntary. His ineffective-assistance claim is not the consti-

tutional claim for which “actual innocence” serves as the gateway, be-

cause that claim is not procedurally defaulted. Vinyard v. United States,

804 F.3d 1218, 1227 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has definitively

held that ineffective-assistance claims need not be presented on direct

appeal to preserve them for collateral attack under § 2255….”).

No. 16-2437 9

B.

Perrone’s petition claims that the Supreme Court’s nar-

rowed interpretation of the “death results” enhancement

renders him actually innocent of causing Learn’s death. The

Supreme Court has held that when a subsequent statutory

interpretation narrows the elements of a crime, revealing

that the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced for “an

act that the law does not make criminal,” the petitioner has

suffered “a complete miscarriage of justice” that justifies re-

lief under § 2255. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346–47

(1974). We have extended the reasoning of Davis to mandato-

ry sentencing enhancements. In Narvaez v. United States, 674

F.3d 621, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2011), we held that when a peti-

tioner’s sentence is increased by application of an enhance-

ment of which he was actually innocent, the petitioner has

suffered a “miscarriage of justice” cognizable under

§ 2255(a). See also Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir.

2013) (holding that a claim identical to the one raised under

§ 2255(a) in Narvaez “constitutes a miscarriage of justice cor-

rigible in a § 2241 proceeding.”). Thus, regardless whether

we treat Perrone’s petition as challenging his conviction or

his sentence (a choice that bears on the standard of review,

as we explain below), Perrone has stated a claim under

§ 2255.

The parties agree that Perrone has a cognizable claim,2

but they disagree about the standard we should apply in as-

2 While the government concedes that Perrone’s claim is viable un-

der our precedent, it invites us to overrule that precedent. We decline the

invitation.

10 No. 16-2437

sessing whether Perrone is actually innocent of causing

Learn’s death. Perrone argues that the standard should be

the one that Schlup v. Delo provides for determining “actual

innocence” in the context of procedural default. In Schlup,

the Court held that “a petitioner must show that it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995). The government, in contrast, says that Perrone

must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable

judge would have found him guilty by a preponderance of

the evidence. The government’s insistence on a “preponder-

ance” standard is grounded in its belief that we must treat

Perrone’s petition as asserting innocence of a sentencing fac-

tor rather than innocence of an element of the crime.

The government stresses that when Perrone pleaded

guilty and was sentenced, the “death results” enhancement

was treated as a sentencing factor that a judge could find by

a preponderance of the evidence. That changed with Alleyne

v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), which held that any fact

that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime

is an element of a crime that must be submitted to a jury and

found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, however, is not

retroactive on collateral review. Crayton v. United States, 799

F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2015). The government reasons that

this means that we must evaluate the sufficiency of the evi-

dence supporting the application of the enhancement to Per-

rone as the issue would have been resolved at the time Per-

No. 16-2437 11

rone was sentenced: through the eyes of a judge and by a

preponderance standard.3

The government’s position is inconsistent with our hold-

ing in Krieger v. United States, 842 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2016).

There, in holding that Burrage announced a substantive rule

that applies retroactively on collateral review, we described

the “death results” enhancement as the Supreme Court did

in Burrage: as an element of the crime. Krieger, 842 F.3d at 500

(“[T]he rule announced in Burrage altered the range of con-

duct that the law punishes.”); Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887 (char-

acterizing the “death results” enhancement as “an element

that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a rea-

sonable doubt”). Had we thought ourselves bound by Al-

leyne’s non-retroactivity (which we acknowledged) to treat

Burrage as changing only the scope of a sentencing factor, we

presumably would have relied on Narvaez when we held

that Krieger’s Burrage error was cognizable under § 2255. In-

stead, consistent with Burrage’s treatment of the enhance-

ment as an element of the crime, we relied on the progeny of

Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974) to hold that Krieger

3 The government also asserts that Perrone’s petition described his

challenge as going to his sentence rather than his conviction and that this

is another reason we should treat it that way. Gov’t Brief at 24 (quoting

Perrone’s petition, which provided that “the Petitioner[’s] sentence ex-

ceeds that which is otherwise authorized by law and Perrone, in light of

Burrage, supra, should be resentenced accordingly”). Putting aside

whether that is a fair characterization of Perrone’s pro se petition, we are

not bound to accept a party’s characterization of a question of law. Krieg-

er v. United States, 842 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Of course we are not

bound to accept the government’s concession [that Burrage is retroactive]

when the point at issue is a question of law.”).

12 No. 16-2437

could assert her claim. Krieger, 842 F.3d at 497–500. It is

worth noting that the government itself conceded in Krieger

that “Burrage is substantive because it defines an essential

element of a federal crime….” 842 F.3d at 497. And even in

circuits that maintain—contrary to our approach in Nar-

vaez—that a challenge to a mandatory sentencing enhance-

ment is not cognizable on collateral review, Burrage claims

are cognizable precisely because they go to the validity of a

conviction rather than to the validity of a sentence. Compare

Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2011) (en

banc) (holding that an error under the mandatory guidelines

was not a miscarriage of justice because the petitioner’s sen-

tence remained “within the statutory maximum authorized

for the offense”), with Ragland v. United States, 784 F.3d 1213,

1214 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that a petitioner’s challenge un-

der Burrage is “a challenge to the validity of his conviction”).

To be sure, Krieger did not address the standard of review

that would be applicable when a court collaterally reviews

whether there is sufficient evidence to support application of

the enhancement according to Burrage’s standard of but-for

causation. In that respect, Krieger technically leaves the

standard-of-review question open. Yet it would be in signifi-

cant tension with Krieger’s treatment of the enhancement as

an element of the crime to review Perrone’s claim under the

regime previously applicable to sentencing factors.

We thus reject the government’s attempt to slice Burrage’s

characterization of the “death results” enhancement (as an

element of crime) away from its definition of what applica-

tion of that enhancement requires (but-for causation). Be-

cause Alleyne is not retroactive, Perrone could not get relief

on the ground that the “death results” question went to a

No. 16-2437 13

judge rather than jury. Once he is before us with a cognizable

claim, however, there is no reason for us to describe his

claim as something it is not. Burrage, unlike Alleyne, is retro-

active, and it makes clear that Perrone’s claim goes to his in-

nocence of a crime, not a sentence. Whether the government

has proven an element of the crime is always a question for

the jury. That means that Perrone’s burden is to show that it

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of causing

Learn’s death. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

C.

This dispute is about causation, so we will begin by clear-

ly stating what “but for” causation requires. It does not re-

quire proof that the distributed drug was present in an

amount sufficient to kill on its own. The Court explained in

Burrage that death can “result[] from” a particular drug

when it is the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.”

134 S. Ct. at 888. As the Court put it: “if poison is adminis-

tered to a man debilitated by multiple diseases, it is a but-for

cause of his death even if those diseases played a part in his

demise, so long as, without the incremental effect of the poi-

son, he would have lived.” Id. Here, then, the fact that other

substances in Learn’s bloodstream played a part in her death

does not defeat the government’s claim that her death result-

ed from the cocaine Perrone gave her. A jury could have

found him guilty of causing her death if it concluded beyond

a reasonable doubt that Perrone’s cocaine pushed her over

the edge.

In Burrage, the Court left open the possibility that the

government could prove causation another way: it said that

strict “but-for” causation might not be required when “mul-

14 No. 16-2437

tiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, pro-

duce a result.” 134 S. Ct. at 890. In other words, the “death

results” enhancement might apply to a defendant who dis-

tributes a lethal dose of cocaine to a person who also con-

sumes a lethal dose of heroin. The government suggests that

a jury could have found Perrone guilty on this theory as

well, because Perrone gave Learn a lethal amount of cocaine.

We need not decide whether this second theory is viable,

however, because there is sufficient evidence to have permit-

ted a jury to find Perrone guilty on the first.

Perrone admitted that he distributed 7.5 grams of cocaine

to Learn in a deliberate attempt to kill her, that he personally

injected Learn with cocaine intending to kill her, and that

she convulsed and died immediately after he injected her.

That in itself strongly supports the conclusion that Learn’s

death resulted from the cocaine Perrone administered. It also

distinguishes Perrone from the defendants in Burrage, Hat-

field, and Krieger, none of whom stated that they had distrib-

uted the drug to the user with the intent to kill.

The best evidence on Perrone’s side is the coroner’s re-

port, which listed the cause of death as “[c]ombined toxicity

with cocaine, ethanol and opiates.” This, Perrone says, is the

kind of evidence the Court found insufficient to establish

causation in Burrage. There, a state medical examiner testi-

fied that the drug user died of “mixed drug intoxication,”

with a number of substances, including the heroin distribut-

ed by the defendant, all playing a “‘contributing’ role.” Bur-

rage, 134 S. Ct. at 886. And the two medical experts who testi-

fied at the defendant’s trial stated that they could not say

whether the drug user would have lived had he not taken

the defendant’s heroin. Id. at 885–86. So here, Perrone says,

No. 16-2437 15

the coroner’s report indicates that cocaine combined with

other drugs to cause Learn’s death. And when the coroner,

Dr. Raj Nanduri, testified before the grand jury, she never

expressly opined that Learn would have lived if she had not

consumed the cocaine Perrone gave her.

Before the grand jury, the government seemed focused on

eliciting testimony that the cocaine Perrone distributed was

independently sufficient to kill Learn. Nanduri repeated the

conclusion she reached in the autopsy report: that Learn’s

cause of death was the combined toxicity of cocaine, ethanol,

and opiates.4 When the prosecutor followed up with a ques-

tion about which substance was “primarily responsible for

her death,” Nanduri clarified that “if she just had cocaine in

her system and the other two drugs were not present, then

cocaine would be the toxic agent that killed her.” The prose-

cutor returned to this point a few minutes later, saying “I

don’t mean to beat this into the ground, but it is a very im-

portant point for us. It is your testimony under oath that to a

medical certainty this quantity of cocaine found in this

woman’s blood would have killed her all by itself?” Nanduri

replied “yes.” Nanduri repeated several more times before

the grand jury that the cocaine in Learn’s bloodstream was a

lethal dose. She did not, however, testify that alcohol and

morphine in Learn’s system were not lethal. She said that the

alcohol was not at a level she would expect to be fatal, but

she expressed uncertainty about the role the morphine had

played in Learn’s death. Although Learn’s morphine level

4 Nanduri testified that she used the term “opiates” because heroin

and other opiates are metabolized into morphine, which is what Nanduri

identified in Learn’s blood.

16 No. 16-2437

was low, Nanduri explained that whether such a low dose

could kill a person depends on numerous factors, including

the person’s past history of using opiates. She also said that a

person’s morphine level might be deceptively low if the per-

son became comatose and continued metabolizing the mor-

phine before dying.

Nanduri’s testimony thus does not establish that cocaine

was the but-for cause of Learn’s death. But the government

has testimony from another expert, Dr. Chris Long, who did

expressly state that Learn would have lived but for the co-

caine. Long prepared a toxicology report on Learn’s body in

2008. After reviewing his report in 2014, he confirmed that

the alcohol would not have killed Learn “absent the cocaine”

and that “[t]he opiate is of no significance.” A reasonable ju-

ror could credit Long’s testimony.

Perrone’s best response is to say that even if cocaine

caused Learn’s death, the cocaine that killed her was not the

cocaine he gave her. Learn had, after all, done a fair amount

of cocaine with Narog the day before. And given her pattern

of cocaine use, it is at least possible that Learn did some co-

caine during her shift at work. Perrone may have injected

cocaine into a woman with an already-lethal amount of co-

caine in her body.

This evidence helps Perrone, but only a little. There is no

evidence that Learn acquired or took any cocaine between

starting her shift at noon and meeting up with Perrone

sometime after the 8 p.m. end of her shift, and Narog testi-

fied before the grand jury that it was not usually possible to

take drugs while at work. Furthermore, even if Learn took

some cocaine between noon and whenever she met up with

Perrone, a rational factfinder could easily conclude that she

No. 16-2437 17

would have taken only a nonlethal dose. Narog testified be-

fore the grand jury that Learn was a practiced drug user who

was very particular about the amount of cocaine she injected

and rarely varied. That evidence paints a picture of a woman

who met up with Perrone while she was still on track to sur-

vive the night.

That Learn arrived at Perrone’s without enough cocaine

in her system to kill her is bolstered by what happened

when she got there. Perrone said that the two had a suicide

pact, which suggests that they both thought Learn needed to

consume more drugs if she wanted to end her life. And after

Learn injected herself with a dose of cocaine, Perrone himself

made the judgment that what she had taken was not enough

to kill her. According to his own statement, he gave Learn an

additional 7.5 grams of cocaine because he concluded that

she would not die unless she had more. He told the police

that Learn convulsed and fell to the floor immediately after

he injected her, and he later characterized what he did as

“premeditated murder.” In his stipulation of facts, Perrone

admitted that Learn died “immediately after receiving the

injection.”

Given this evidence, Perrone cannot carry his burden of

showing that it is more likely than not that no reasonable ju-

ror would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. He is thus not entitled to relief on the ground that he

is actually innocent of causing Learn’s death.

III.

Perrone also argues that his sentencing counsel was con-

stitutionally ineffective for failing to tell him about (and pos-

sibly not even knowing about) Hatfield. Had Perrone been

18 No. 16-2437

aware of Hatfield, he says, he might have sought the court’s

permission to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was

not knowing and voluntary. Because he did not know that

the “death results” enhancement required the government to

show but-for causation, he did not correctly understand

what he was pleading to when he stipulated that he

“caused” Learn’s death.

To prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, Perrone

must show both deficient performance and prejudice. Strick-

land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). On the perfor-

mance prong, he “must overcome the ‘strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason-

able professional assistance.’” Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d

455, 458 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

On the prejudice prong, he must show that “but for counsel’s

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result would

have been different.” United States v. Graf, 827 F.3d 581, 584

(7th Cir. 2016). In the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner

demonstrates prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reason-

able probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to tri-

al.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). As with the first

prong, there is a presumption that the petitioner has not suf-

fered prejudice. Graf, 827 F.3d at 584–85.

Even assuming that Perrone could show “deficient per-

formance” on the part of his counsel, it is unlikely that he

could satisfy the “prejudice” prong. The evidence of causa-

tion was strong and his plea agreement gave him the oppor-

tunity to obtain a sentence reduction for cooperating with

the government. The fact that he wants to withdraw from

the agreement now—after he has already received an 80-

No. 16-2437 19

month reduction—does not mean that he would have want-

ed to do so before he received that benefit. The problems of

proof he would face at resentencing make it doubtful that he

would have put his deal at risk even if he had known about

Hatfield. They also make it doubtful that the district judge

would have permitted him to withdraw his plea. See United

States v. Underwood, 174 F.3d 850, 852–54 (7th Cir. 1999) (not-

ing that “[n]o defendant has an absolute right to withdraw a

guilty plea” and that the utility of plea agreements would be

undermined by allowing a defendant to renege based on his

“reevaluation of his trial prospects”).

At the end of the day, however, any difficulties Perrone

has on the merits do not matter because his claim is barred

as untimely. Although he was not required to bring his inef-

fective-assistance claim in his direct appeal, Massaro v. United

States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003), he was still required to com-

ply with § 2255(f)’s statute of limitations. Under § 2255(f)(1),

Perrone had to bring his claim within one year of his convic-

tion becoming final, which means that his window closed in

2011.5 He did not file his § 2255 petition until 2014. Other

claims in Perrone’s 2014 petition may have been timely based

on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burrage, but § 2255’s

statute of limitations runs separately for each claim. Davis v.

United States, 817 F.3d 319, 327–28 (7th Cir. 2016). One claim’s

timeliness cannot cure another claim’s untimeliness.

5 Although § 2255(f) offers several different starting points for the

one-year statute of limitations depending on the situation, no party con-

tends that any starting point applies other than the day Perrone’s convic-

tion became final.

20 No. 16-2437

Perrone does not dispute that his claim is untimely. In-

stead, he attempts to escape the bar by contending that the

government forfeited its statute-of-limitations defense. Per-

rone raised his ineffective-assistance claim before the district

court for the first time in his reply to the government’s re-

sponse brief. He faults the government for not asserting the

limitations defense in response, but the district court’s local

rules prohibited the government from filing a surreply. True,

the district court chose to treat Perrone’s reply brief as an

amended petition, so it appears with the benefit of hindsight

that the government could have filed a new response. But

the filing was denominated as a reply brief, not as an

amended petition; it did not reproduce the claims that had

appeared in Perrone’s original petition; and Perrone had re-

peatedly told the district court that his court-appointed

counsel was not authorized to amend his petition. It was

therefore reasonable for the government to conclude that it

lacked the ability under the local rules to respond to the

newly raised claim of ineffective assistance. And even if this

were forfeiture, we would find it excused due to the under-

standable confusion in the district court. See Wood v. Milyard,

566 U.S. 463, 471 (2012) (allowing a court of appeals to con-

sider even sua sponte “a nonexhaustion argument ‘inadvert-

ent[ly]’ overlooked by the State in the District Court”). Be-

cause Perrone filed his petition after § 2255(f)’s statute of lim-

itations had run, he is barred from raising that claim now.

IV.

The district court also correctly denied Perrone’s motion

for an evidentiary hearing on his claims. A petitioner under

§ 2255 is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the mo-

tion and the files and records of the case conclusively show

No. 16-2437 21

that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

When the record before the district court allows it to resolve

the petition without such a hearing, the petitioner is not enti-

tled to one. Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 986–87

(7th Cir. 2002) (affirming the denial of an evidentiary hearing

when “[a] hearing would not have aided the district court”).

Because Perrone has not raised any claim whose resolution

requires an evidentiary hearing, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Perrone’s request.

V.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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