Opinion

Shelley Soniat v. Texas Real Estate Commission, et

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
May 9, 2018
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Civil Rights
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.4%

The opinion

Case: 17-40637 Document: 00514464709 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/09/2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 17-40637 FILED

Summary Calendar May 9, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

SHELLEY SONIAT,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

TEXAS REAL ESTATE COMMISSION; TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF

REALTORS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-166

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The district court dismissed the pro se complaint filed by Shelley Soniat

against the above defendants, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and that

Soniat had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. She now

moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, appointment of

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 17-40637 Document: 00514464709 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/09/2018

No. 17-40637

counsel, and a remand accompanied by an order recusing the district court

judge.

By moving for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, Soniat challenges the

district court’s certification that her appeal is not taken in good faith. See

Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into her good

faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their

merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th

Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review de novo

a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and a dismissal for failure to state a claim

for relief. Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016),

cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1339 (2017).

The district court properly dismissed Soniat’s claims against the Texas

Real Estate Commission (TREC), a state agency, for lack of jurisdiction.

“Federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits against a state, a state agency, or a

state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its sovereign

immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.” Bryant v. Texas Dep’t of Aging

& Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Congress has not clearly abrogated state agencies’

sovereign immunity from suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989), or “from suits brought

under the Fair Housing Act,” McCardell v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,

794 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2015). Further, Texas, through TREC, “plainly has

not consented, as it has moved to dismiss the suit.” Hirtz v. State of Tex., 974

F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir. 1992).

The district court also properly dismissed Soniat’s claims against the

Texas Association of Realtors (TAR) and the National Association of Realtors

(NAR) for lack of jurisdiction. “Article III of the Constitution limits the

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No. 17-40637

jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). Standing to sue is a doctrine

rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy. Spokeo, Inc.

v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). “To establish Article III standing, a

plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likel[ihood] that

the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at

2341 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although Soniat argues that she experienced housing discrimination and

was sanctioned by a state court for attempting to vindicate her rights, she has

not demonstrated a sufficient causal connection between her injuries and any

conduct of TAR or NAR. She has also not demonstrated that TAR or NAR

violated any provision of the Fair Housing Act, violated her right to fair

housing, or otherwise discriminated against her. Thus, she has not met her

burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction existed in the district

court over her claims against TAR and NAR. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556

U.S. 49, 60 (2009); Peoples Nat. Bank v. Office of Comptroller of Currency of

U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004).

Despite the district court’s lacking jurisdiction, Soniat asks us to remand

her case so it can be heard by a different district court judge. She argues that

the district court judge lacked impartiality because he once worked as a law

clerk for a judge she unsuccessfully sued in an earlier case. She also complains

of the actions of the magistrate judge.

“[R]ecusal is not warranted absent specific instances of conduct

indicating prejudice against a defendant.” United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d

1153, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985). Nothing in the instant record suggests that the

district court or magistrate judge lacked impartiality. That the district court

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No. 17-40637

judge once worked as a law clerk for someone who is not a defendant in the

instant action would not “cause a reasonable person, knowing all the

circumstances, to harbor doubts about the court’s impartiality.” Id. at 1165-

66.

Soniat has failed to show an error in the district court’s certification

decision and has not established that she will raise a nonfrivolous issue on

appeal. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202; Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. Soniat’s motions

for leave to proceed IFP, appointment of counsel, and a remand to the district

court for a recusal are DENIED, and her appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous.

See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

This is now Soniat’s third appeal relating to her alleged housing

discrimination. Soniat is hereby WARNED that filing repetitious, frivolous, or

otherwise abusive pleadings will invite the imposition of sanctions, including

dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on her ability to file pleadings

in this court and any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction. If she continues

to file frivolous actions or appeals, she will be subject to increasingly severe

sanctions, including monetary penalties. Soniat is ORDERED to review all

pending matters and move to dismiss any that are frivolous, repetitive, or

otherwise abusive.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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