Daniel Jackson v. Shawn Curry

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 17-1898

DANIEL JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHAWN CURRY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 16-cv-1054 — Sara Darrow, Judge.

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ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2017 — DECIDED APRIL 19, 2018

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Before BAUER, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Daniel Jackson spent time in

custody on a wrongful murder conviction. He sued Shawn

Curry and Keith McDaniel, the police officers who

interrogated him, for coercing his confession. The officers

moved for dismissal on qualified immunity. The district court

denied that motion, and the officers appeal. Lacking

jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal.

2 No. 17-1898

I. Background 1

On the night of August 29, 2009, Clifford Harvey, Jr., and

Easton Eibeck walked through Peoria, Illinois. Eibeck was

high. Four men confronted Harvey and Eibeck. When one of

the four reached for his waistband, Harvey and Eibeck ran.

Eibeck heard a gunshot and kept running. The shooter killed

Harvey. At the scene, police found the body, bullet fragment,

and a screwdriver, but no weapon, shell casing, or

eyewitness. Eibeck could generally describe, but not

positively identify, the shooter to Curry the next day.

About six months later, Curry conducted a photo line-up

and Eibeck identified Jackson. This led to Jackson’s

warrantless arrest. He had consumed alcohol and drugs

before his arrest. Curry and McDaniel interrogated Jackson

for about two hours, on video. Jackson was high and woozy

during the interrogation. He said he was not at the shooting.

McDaniel, who is black, told Jackson if he remained silent

he would still be charged with murder. McDaniel told Jackson

he would not receive a fair trial because he is a young black

man, and the biased jury would convict him based on

prejudice regardless of the facts. The officers allegedly lied

about the evidence, falsely claiming multiple witnesses

identified Jackson as the shooter. The officers suggested

Harvey threatened Jackson with a screwdriver and he shot in

self-defense. The officers fed Jackson details and allegedly

pressured him to make false inculpatory statements. During

1

We draw the facts from Jackson’s complaint. See generally Veseley v.

Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2014). As this case comes to us at

the pleadings stage, we “add the usual caution that these are just

allegations.” Catinella v. Cty. of Cook, Ill., 881 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2018).

No. 17-1898 3

the interrogation, Jackson showed signs of intoxication and

diminished capacity, including slurred speech and

uncoordinated movements. About two hours and fifteen

minutes after the interrogation began, Jackson collapsed and

fell to the floor. He did not respond to initial revival efforts.

Jackson told responding paramedics he felt dizzy and his

head had hurt for a couple hours. He went to the hospital.

Jackson stood trial. The State presented Eibeck’s

identification of Jackson and video excerpts of Jackson’s

interrogation. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder,

and the judge sentenced him to 65 years in prison.

But Jackson claims he had nothing to do with the murder.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction,

concluding the police lacked probable cause to arrest Jackson.

People v. Jackson, 22 N.E.3d 526, 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).

Jackson sued various Defendants for constitutional

violations. All Defendants moved to dismiss. The only claim

at issue here is Count II, which claims the officers coerced a

confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The officers

moved for dismissal of Count II based on qualified immunity.

The district court denied that motion. The officers appeal.

II. Discussion

The threshold issue is whether we have jurisdiction. See In

re Ortiz, 665 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2011). We have jurisdiction

over appeals from “final decisions” of district courts. 28

U.S.C. § 1291. A denial of a motion to dismiss is generally not

immediately appealable because it is not final. See United

States v. Michelle’s Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 1994),

abrogated on other grounds by Kaley v. United States, 134 S.Ct.

1090, 1095 n.4 (2014).

4 No. 17-1898

But the collateral-order doctrine provides a limited

exception. An interlocutory order is immediately appealable

if it “(1) [is] conclusive on the issue presented; (2) resolve[s]

an important question separate from the merits of the

underlying action; and (3) [is] effectively unreviewable on an

appeal from the final judgment of the underlying action.” Doe

v. Vill. of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The collateral-order doctrine

permits an immediate appeal of the denial of qualified

immunity at the pleadings stage because “qualified immunity

is immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,

and is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go

to trial.” Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Qualified

immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is both a liability

defense and a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or face

the other burdens of litigation … .” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 526 (1985).

But the exception providing jurisdiction over denials of

qualified immunity is limited to pure legal questions. Hurt v.

Wise, 880 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). We only have

jurisdiction when “the issue appealed concerned, not which

facts the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether

or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly

established law.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, defendants cannot

immediately appeal factual determinations regarding

qualified immunity. Id. at 307. “The appeal is limited in scope

No. 17-1898 5

for the same reason it is permitted: the question of qualified

immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the

plaintiff’s claim that his rights have been violated.”

Armstrong, 786 F.3d at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted).

At this stage, the qualified-immunity defense only

presents two legal questions: “first, whether plaintiff has

alleged a violation of his constitutional rights, and second,

whether the violation was clearly established in the law at the

time of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). If the district court’s order

denying qualified immunity turns on a pure legal issue, then

it (1) conclusively determines defendant must bear the

burdens of discovery; (2) is conceptually distinct from the

merits of plaintiff’s claim; and (3) would prove effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Mitchell, 472

U.S. at 527–30. Such an order is a “final decision” within the

meaning of § 1291. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). In

other words, if the officers accept the facts and reasonable

inferences favorable to Jackson for purposes of the qualified-

immunity inquiry at this stage, and argue those facts and

inferences do not establish a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right, then we have jurisdiction to entertain that

argument. Hurt, 880 F.3d at 839.

So we must decide whether the appeal raises any pure

legal questions regarding the denial of qualified immunity.

The officers raise three broad issues on appeal. First, they

claim the district court erred by declining to review the video,

which they claim shows Jackson did not manifest intoxication

or unique susceptibility and the officers did not use any

clearly unconstitutional tactics. Second, they claim the district

court erred by applying a highly generalized formulation of

6 No. 17-1898

the law to McDaniel’s comments regarding race, and they

argue these comments did not clearly violate the Constitution.

Third, they claim the state court’s admission of the confession

into evidence at trial was a superseding cause entitling the

officers to qualified immunity. We address whether we have

jurisdiction over each issue in turn.

A. Video

The district court declined to review the interrogation

video to make factual determinations about the officers’

alleged intimidation tactics and Jackson’s demeanor. Instead,

the district court did what district courts normally should do

at this stage: it accepted all well-pleaded factual allegations in

the complaint as true, drew all reasonable inferences in favor

of Plaintiff, and determined whether the claims plausibly

suggest entitlement to relief. Generally, a district court cannot

consider evidence outside the pleadings to decide a motion to

dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary

judgment. See Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002).

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision

not to watch the video at the pleadings stage. That decision

itself does not involve a pure legal issue regarding qualified

immunity, i.e., whether the officers violated Jackson’s clearly

established constitutional rights.

Moreover, the further-removed issues about what the

video shows are fact issues. The officers claim the video

shows Jackson did not manifest intoxication or unique

susceptibility. But this is a fact issue over which we lack

jurisdiction, and an issue the video cannot conclusively

resolve anyway. The video is bound to be subject to varying

interpretations about how Jackson presented, and cannot

No. 17-1898 7

conclusively establish or eliminate all indicia of impairment

customarily relied on by officers, such as any odors

emanating from Jackson or the details of his eyes. The officers

argue the controlling question is: in light of the claim and

video, are there any salient facts to be developed by

additional litigation? The answer is yes.

The officers also claim the video shows they did not use

any single tactic, or combination of tactics, that were clearly

unconstitutional. But again, the video is bound to be subject

to varying interpretations. Besides, the district court did not

conclude that any single tactic in a vacuum, or even any

combination of tactics in a bigger vacuum, were plausibly

clearly unconstitutional. Rather, as required by qualified-

immunity jurisprudence and the Fifth Amendment, the

district court properly considered the totality of the

circumstances, with deference appropriate at this stage, and

concluded the officers plausibly violated clearly established

rights. The video cannot show the totality of the

circumstances, and it cannot resolve all fact questions.

The officers argue the principle mandating the earliest

feasible resolution of qualified immunity plus the admonition

to view facts “in the light depicted by the videotape,” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 373, 381 (2007), required the district court to

review the video before rejecting qualified immunity. But the

video here is distinguishable from that in Scott, where the

video “quite clearly contradict[ed]” respondent’s story. Scott,

550 U.S. at 378. Scott involved a high-speed car chase that

ended when an officer’s vehicle pushed respondent’s vehicle

off the road. Respondent claimed that during the chase he

remained in control of his vehicle, and posed little, if any,

actual threat. The Eleventh Circuit adopted respondent’s

8 No. 17-1898

view. Its description of the chase gave “the impression that

respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was attempting

to pass his driving test … .” Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–79. But the

Supreme Court recognized “[t]he videotape tells quite a

different story.” Id. at 379. The video definitively contradicted

the essence and essential details of respondent’s account.

But here, the officers do not claim the video completely

belies Jackson’s claims. See Hurt, 880 F.3d at 840 (“The video

evidence of [the] interrogations does not portray the kind of

uncontestable facts that were before the Court in Scott.”).

Rather, the officers claim their interpretation of the video

contradicts Jackson’s claims: “Indeed, what Plaintiff describes

as factual disputes about the interrogation are, in view of the

videotape, actually mere differences in the parties’

characterizations of the same evidence.” (Appellants’ Reply

Br. at 8.) The officers want to spin the facts shown by the

video. And they do not account for the fact that the video does

not show everything. It does not show everything the officers

knew or should have known about Jackson. As noted, it does

not convey smell or show ocular details. It does not show

what the officers knew when they brought Jackson in. And

what it does show is open to interpretation. After all,

“differences in the parties’ characterizations of the same

evidence” are the essence of fact disputes, over which we

presently lack jurisdiction.

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision

not to watch the video at this stage because that decision does

not fit within the narrow exception to the general rule that

only final orders are appealable.

No. 17-1898 9

B. Comments regarding jury bias

The officers claim the district court erred by applying a

highly generalized formulation of the law to the comments

regarding race, and they argue these comments did not

clearly violate the Constitution. They argue the right to be free

from a psychologically intimidating interrogation or from the

tactic of exaggerating the consequences of not confessing are

highly generalized formulations that cannot defeat qualified

immunity. They maintain there is no case law barring

McDaniel from giving his “view of an unfortunate reality

check on the inherent injustices of the criminal justice

system.” (Appellants’ Br. at 27.) They argue there was no

closely analogous, particularized precedent placing the

unconstitutionality of the statements beyond debate. The

issue of whether these comments violated a constitutional

right clearly established by particularized precedent seems

like a pure legal question regarding qualified immunity,

susceptible to our jurisdiction.

The problem for the officers, however, is the district court

did not do what they say it did. The district court did not

conclude the comments regarding race, in isolation, violated

a clearly established constitutional right. Rather, the district

court concluded these comments, combined with all the

alleged circumstances, including Jackson’s impairment and

susceptibility, plausibly violated clearly established rights,

thereby defeating qualified immunity, at least for now.

The Fifth Amendment protects people from coerced

confessions: “No person … shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself … .” U.S. Const. amend.

V. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth

Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause applicable against

10 No. 17-1898

the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The

government violates the Self-Incrimination Clause by using

coerced confessions at pre-trial hearings or trials in criminal

cases. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (trial);

Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–27 (7th

Cir. 2006) (pre-trial hearings). The evaluation of whether a

confession is coerced involves consideration of the totality of

the circumstances to determine whether the suspect

confessed voluntarily, of his own free will, or whether the

police overrode his volition. “The voluntariness of a

confession depends on the totality of circumstances,

including both the characteristics of the accused and the

nature of the interrogation. If those circumstances reveal that

the interrogated person’s will was overborne, admitting the

resulting confession violates the Fifth Amendment.” Hurt, 880

F.3d at 845 (internal citation omitted).

Contrary to the officers’ assertions, the district court did

not conclude the race comments, in isolation, plausibly

violated Jackson’s clearly established rights. Instead, the

district court considered the totality of the circumstances

alleged: Jackson was under the influence of alcohol and

drugs, and was unwell. He repeatedly told the officers he was

not at the shooting. They refused his requests to call his

family, ignored his attempt to invoke Miranda, and employed

lies, psychological intimidation, and false promises of

lenience. He was particularly susceptible to these tactics, and

his condition was so bad he collapsed, fell out of his chair, and

did not respond initially to revival efforts. At the time of the

interrogation, it was well established that someone under the

influence of alcohol or drugs might be especially susceptible

to coercion. See United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th

Cir. 2001). In the context of the totality of these circumstances,

No. 17-1898 11

McDaniel allegedly delivered a long soliloquy in which he

exaggerated the consequences of not confessing and told

Jackson the jury would be prejudiced against him and would

convict him because he is a young black man, regardless of

the facts. The district court considered all these circumstances.

In sum, the district court did not conclude McDaniel’s

comments regarding race, in a vacuum, violated a clearly

established right, but rather considered the totality of the

alleged circumstances. So even if in a vacuum the race

comments do not violate such a right, the district court

committed no error because it did not hold they did. As the

district court made no conclusion here raising a pure legal

issue regarding qualified immunity, we lack jurisdiction.

C. Superseding cause

The officers argue admitting the confession into evidence

at trial was a superseding cause entitling them to qualified

immunity. But, as the officers admit, we have not accepted

this argument in the context of a Fifth Amendment coerced-

confession claim. We presently lack jurisdiction over the

superseding-cause issue as it is not a pure legal question

related to qualified immunity.

III. Conclusion

We lack jurisdiction regarding the decision not to watch

the video at the pleadings stage, and regarding fact issues

about what the video shows. We lack jurisdiction regarding

the race comments because the officers do not appeal any

pure legal issue regarding a conclusion actually reached by

the district court about these comments. We lack jurisdiction

regarding the superseding-cause issue because it is not a pure

legal question related to qualified immunity.

12 No. 17-1898

Lacking jurisdiction, we DISMISS the appeal.