Opinion

In Re: Nomination Petition of Joe Gale, Candidate for Lt. Gov.

  • 184 A.3d 185
Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 20, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Brobson
On the bench
Brobson
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.3%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Nomination Petition of :

Joe Gale, Candidate for :

Lieutenant Governor :

: No. 112 M.D. 2018

Zachary Brillhart, Michael A. Cibik, : Heard: March 16, 2018

Ellen Cox, Joel Sears, and :

Joshua J. Young, Objectors :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: March 20, 2018

Before this Court is a petition filed by Zachary Brillhart, Michael A.

Cibik, Ellen Cox, Joel Sears, and Joshua J. Young (Objectors) to set aside the

nomination petitions of Joe Gale (Candidate) as a Republican candidate for the office

of Lieutenant Governor. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the

petition to set aside.

Candidate seeks to appear on the ballot in the Republican Primary

Election scheduled for May 15, 2018 (2018 Republican Primary). Candidate’s

affidavit, filed with Candidate’s nomination petitions, contains a signed and sworn

statement by Candidate that he is eligible for the office of Lieutenant Governor.

Objectors challenge Candidate’s affidavit on the basis that Candidate is not eligible

under Article IV, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides:

No person shall be eligible to the office of Governor,

Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General except a citizen

of the United States, who shall have attained the age of 30

years, and have been seven years next preceding his

election an inhabitant of this Commonwealth, unless he

shall have been absent on the public business of the United

States or of this Commonwealth. No person shall be

eligible to the office of Attorney General except a member

of the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

(Emphasis added.) Specifically, Objectors aver that Candidate was born on

March 24, 1989, and is, therefore, currently 28 years old. Objectors correctly aver

that the 2018 Republican Primary is scheduled for May 15, 2018; the General

Election is scheduled for November 6, 2018 (General Election); and the Lieutenant

Governor’s term of office begins on January 15, 2019.1 Objectors further aver that

on each of the above relevant dates Candidate will be 29 years of age, and Candidate

will not attain the age of 30 years until March 24, 2019.2

On March 16, 2018, the Court conducted a hearing on both this matter

and the petition to set aside Candidate’s nomination petitions filed by Sklaroff.

During the hearing, the Court admitted into evidence, without objection, four

exhibits that Objectors offered. One of the exhibits is titled Joint Stipulations and is

executed by counsel for Objectors and Candidate. No additional evidence was

offered or admitted at the hearing. The Joint Stipulation confirms the material facts

alleged by Objectors regarding Candidate’s age and date of birth. There is, therefore,

no dispute that Candidate will not have attained 30 years of age prior to the 2018

Republican Primary Election, the 2018 General Election, or January 15, 2019, the

date on which the next term of the Lieutenant Governor begins under the

Pennsylvania Constitution. Candidate, nevertheless, maintains that he is “eligible”

1

Pursuant to Article IV, Sections 3 and 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Lieutenant

Governor’s term of office begins on the third Tuesday of January after the General Election. Thus,

the next term of office for the position of Lieutenant Governor begins on January 15, 2019.

2

Robert B. Sklaroff (Sklaroff) similarly filed a petition to set aside Candidate’s nomination

petitions, challenging Candidate’s eligibility on the basis of age, which is docketed before this

Court as In Re: Nomination Petition of Joseph C. Gale, No. 116 M.D. 2018.

2

to run for Lieutenant Governor, but if successful will be “disabled” due to age from

assuming the office until he attains the age of 30 years. He, therefore, urges the

Court to deny the petition to set aside.

Section 910(d) of the Pennsylvania Election Code3 requires that a

candidate for state office must file an affidavit with the candidate’s nomination

petitions, stating, in relevant part, that the candidate “is eligible for such office.”

Article IV, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o

person shall be eligible to the office of . . . Lieutenant Governor . . . except a citizen

of the United States, who shall have attained the age of 30 years.” (Emphasis added.)

With respect to interpreting provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court had directed:

In a case . . . which calls upon the court to construe

an Article of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the

fundamental rule of construction which guides us is that

the Constitution’s language controls and must be

interpreted in its popular sense, as understood by the

people when they voted on its adoption.

Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. 2004).

In this Court’s assessment, the language of the age requirement in the

Pennsylvania Constitution for Lieutenant Governor could not be clearer. To be

Lieutenant Governor, a person must “have attained the age of 30 years.” This is an

example of the use of the future perfect verb tense. Its use denotes an action that

will be completed before a certain time in the future. The Gregg Reference

Manual ¶ 1033(c), at p. 222 (7th ed. 1993). The Court believes that the “certain time

in the future” is the date on which the next ensuing term for Lieutenant Governor

begins following the General Election. The Court, however, need not definitively

3

Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2870(d).

3

rule on whether Candidate must have attained the age of 30 years at the time of the

2018 Republican Primary, the General Election, or January 15, 2019, the beginning

of the next term for Lieutenant Governor under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Here,

the Candidate is not now nor will he “have attained” the age of 30 years at any point

prior to January 15, 2019. Moreover, the Court refuses to accept a construction that

makes the certain time in the future flexible depending on the actual age and

birthdate of the candidate. Such could not have been the intent of the people who

voted in favor of the age threshold, a point Candidate’s counsel conceded at the

hearing. For purposes of this case, it is adequate to hold that in order to be eligible

to hold the office of Lieutenant Governor, the candidate must have attained the age

of 30 years by the third Tuesday of January after the General Election, at the latest.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth ex. rel. Kelley v.

Keiser, 16 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1940) (Keiser), supports this construction of the age

requirement. In the context of a quo warranto action,4 the Supreme Court in Keiser

considered whether a duly-elected magistrate must be removed from office because

he had not reached the prescribed age when his term of office began and did not

attain that age until five days later, when he took the oath and assumed the duties of

the office. With regard to the question of when a person elected or appointed to

office must satisfy a constitutional or statutory requirement relating to qualifications

for that office, the Supreme Court explained:5

The question as to when a person elected or

appointed to office must satisfy a constitutional or

statutory requirement relating to qualifications is quite

4

Quo warranto is an action to oust a person from public office. See Spykerman v. Levy,

421 A.2d 641 (Pa. 1980).

5

On appeal, the Supreme Court in Keiser adopted and republished as its own the opinion

of the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.

4

confused, both in this state and elsewhere. Upon this

subject there seem to be two principal lines of authority:

one holding that the qualification is determined as of the

date of election, and the other, as of the commencement of

the term. There are also a few authorities holding that the

officer need not be qualified prior to taking the oath of

office, while other cases hold that it is sufficient if the

qualification exists at the time the proceeding[s] are

brought to test his title. While these apparently conflicting

cases may not be completely reconcilable, we think that

they can in the main be harmonized by classifying them

according to the nature of the qualification and the

character of the office involved. In the early case of

Commonwealth v. Pyle, 18 Pa. 519 [(1852)], these cases

were classified in the following manner, at page 521:

“Where the constitution or a statute declares that certain

disqualifications shall render a person ineligible to an

office, he must get rid of his disqualification before he is

appointed or elected. . . . But if the law merely forbids him

to hold or enjoy the office, or exercise its duties, it is

sufficient if he qualifies himself before he is sworn.”

Subsequent cases have more precisely defined the

latter class and the test has been declared to be whether

the officer is qualified prior to the commencement of his

term, rather than before he is sworn. Thus it was stated in

Mosby v. Armstrong, . . . 139 A. 151[ (Pa. 1927)], at page

153: “where ‘the law merely forbids’ one ‘to hold or

enjoy’ an office . . . , it is sufficient if the candidate

becomes qualified before the time arrives for him to

assume the post in question.”

In 88 A.L.R. 812, it is noted that great conflict of

opinion exists on this problem, but that, even where

eligibility is not determined as of the date of election,

courts “are inclined to hold that removal of

disqualifications before the time fixed for commencement

of the term of office qualifies the incumbent.” A number

of Pennsylvania decisions are there cited in support of this

proposition.

A few cases in this state hold that the

disqualification may be removed after the commencement

of the term, but these all involve the holding of

incompatible offices under circumstances where the

5

constitution or statute failed to provide a penalty therefor.

In them, the court held that, if the office holder makes a

choice between the incompatible offices and cna [sic] so

answer at the time of quo warranto proceedings, he may

continue in the office he has chosen. De

Turk v. Commonwealth, . . . 18 A. 757[ (Pa. 1889)];

Commonwealth v. Kelly, . . . 100 A. 272[ (Pa. 1917)];

Commonwealth v. Snyder, . . . 144 A. 748[ (Pa. 1929)].

These cases dealing with incompatible offices are clearly

distinguishable from cases involving such fundamental a

priori qualifications as age, citizenship, domicile and the

like. The former involve conditions of holding the office,

the latter prerequisites for assuming it. Thus, in the case

of age and similar qualifications, it was held in Spitzer v.

Martin, 1917, 130 Md. 428, 100 A. 739, that this

qualification must be possessed at the date of election.

Keiser, 16 A.2d at 310-11 (emphasis added). In affirming the judgment of ouster

entered by the court of common pleas, our Supreme Court in Keiser further

explained:

From the standpoint of the public interest in the

continuity of office, it is equally important that an elected

officer shall be eligible to hold the office from the

beginning of its term. Circumstances such as illness,

unavoidable absence at the beginning of the term and the

like, may excuse his entering upon the duties of the office

immediately, so that he may not be removable for failing

to do so. But he cannot require that an office, the public

need for which is sufficiently evidenced by its creation and

existence, shall remain vacant for any length of time while

he is qualifying himself to assume it. This is not the case

of an office with an indefinite term which may begin at

any time, and in which, therefore, it is sufficient if the

disqualification has been removed when the writ issues to

test the incumbent’s right to hold it. The term of a

magistrate is fixed, with a definite beginning and ending;

and we therefore conclude that the respondent, having

lacked the required age of 35 years when his term began,

is ineligible to hold the office to which he was elected, and

into which he is now unlawfully intruding.

Id. at 312 (emphasis added).

6

The Court acknowledges that the Supreme Court in Keiser was not

considering the eligibility requirements for the office of Lieutenant Governor.

Regardless, the Supreme Court made clear that there are two different tests that may

be applied under different circumstances to determine whether a candidate or

candidate-elect is qualified for an office—one requires the candidate or

candidate-elect to be qualified at the time of election and the other at the beginning

of the term of office. Our Supreme Court in Keiser specifically rejected the argument

that a candidate or candidate-elect who has not attained the age of eligibility for an

office may simply wait to assume the office until the non-eligibility has passed.

Here, it is undisputed that Candidate will not have attained the required age as of

any of the relevant dates. Thus, it is clear to this Court, under both the Pennsylvania

Constitution and our Supreme Court’s rationale in Keiser, that Candidate does not

meet the eligibility requirements for Lieutenant Governor, regardless of whether age

is determined at the time of the election or at the time when the Lieutenant Governor

term begins, because Candidate will be 29 years of age on those dates. Nothing in

the Pennsylvania Constitution or Keiser allows a candidate to assume an office at a

date after the start of the term of the office as a result of ineligibility due to age.

Candidate attempts to bolster his eligibility to run for the office of

Lieutenant Governor by directing this Court to Article IV, Section 14 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. This section, titled “Vacancy in Office of Lieutenant

Governor,” provides, in relevant part:

In case of the death, conviction on impeachment,

failure to qualify or resignation of the Lieutenant

Governor, or in case he should become Governor under

the preceding section, the President pro tempore of the

Senate shall become Lieutenant Governor for the

remainder of the term. In case of the disability of the

Lieutenant Governor, the powers, duties and emoluments

7

of the office shall devolve upon the President pro tempore

of the Senate until the disability is removed. . . .

Pa. Const., art. IV, § 14 (emphasis added). Candidate contends that the second

sentence, relating to “disability of the Lieutenant Governor,” contemplates his

situation and provides for a temporary solution where a successful candidate for the

office is not yet of age to assume the office of Lieutenant Governor. In doing so,

Candidate likens his lack of attaining the constitutionally-required age at the

inception of the term of the Lieutenant Governor to a “disability,” such that the

President pro tempore of the Senate would assume the powers, duties and

emoluments of the office until the disability is removed—i.e., until Candidate attains

the age of 30 years. Candidate further contends that under the second sentence of

the section, once Candidate attains the age of 30 years, his “disability” would be

removed and he would be able to assume the office of Lieutenant Governor.

Candidate’s reliance on the second sentence of Article IV, Section 14 is

misplaced. The word “disability” is generally defined as “lack of physical,

intellectual or emotional capacity or fitness,” whereas the word “qualify” is

generally defined as “to measure up to or meet a set standard or requirement.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 642, 1858 (1993). Here, if Candidate

is allowed to remain on the ballot and wins the election, on January 15, 2019, he will

without question fail to “meet a set standard or requirement” that he “shall have

attained the age of 30 years.” Based on the ordinary definitions of the terms

“disability” and “qualify,”6 as between the two, Candidate will not be qualified to

6

In characterizing his ineligibility due to age as a “disability,” Candidate cherry picks a

single sentence from Keiser, which provides:

To permit an ineligible candidate-elect to delay entering upon the duties of his

office after his term begins, until the disability is removed by time or at his own

8

hold the office of Lieutenant Governor. A lack of qualification of a successful

candidate would trigger the first sentence of Article IV, Section 14 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, not the second. Under that provision, the President pro

tempore does not merely assume the duties of Lieutenant Governor, he becomes the

Lieutenant Governor for the duration of the term. Accordingly, if Candidate prevails

in the upcoming General Election, the President pro tempore of the Pennsylvania

Senate will be the Commonwealth’s next Lieutenant Governor, and Candidate will

not be able to displace him in that office upon reaching the age of 30 years.

Accordingly, the Court grants Objectors’ petition to set aside

Candidate’s nomination petitions.7

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

caprice, would work a species of fraud upon the electorate, and pro tanto create an

interregnum in office incompatible with that continuity in government which is

essential to its proper and efficient functioning.

Keiser, 16 A.2d at 312 (emphasis added). In addition to this single use of the term “disability,”

the Supreme Court frequently throughout its opinion references age as a “qualification” for

determining eligibility and uses the word “disqualification” as opposed to “disability.” Moreover,

as Candidate points out, Keiser involved a minimum age requirement imposed by statute, not

interpretation and application of a constitutional provision relating to eligibility and qualification

to hold the office of Lieutenant Governor. Thus, Candidate’s reliance on Keiser as establishing

his youth as a “disability” as opposed to a disqualification or issue of eligibility is misplaced.

7

The Court sees nothing in federal case law or the United States Constitution that requires

a different result, despite Candidate’s contention that federal case law supports his position.

9

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Nomination Petition of :

Joe Gale, Candidate for :

Lieutenant Governor :

: No. 112 M.D. 2018

Zachary Brillhart, Michael A. Cibik, :

Ellen Cox, Joel Sears, and :

Joshua J. Young, Objectors :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2018, upon consideration of the

petition filed by Zachary Brillhart, Michael A. Cibik, Ellen Cox, Joel Sears, and

Joshua J. Young (Objectors) to set aside the nomination petitions of Joe Gale

(Candidate) as a Republican candidate for the office of Lieutenant Governor, the

Court having concluded that Candidate does not meet the eligibility requirements

for the office of Lieutenant Governor, it is hereby ordered:

1. The petition to set aside the nomination petitions of Joe Gale as

Republican Candidate for the office of Lieutenant Governor is GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of the Commonwealth is directed to REMOVE the

name of Joe Gale as a Republican candidate for the office of Lieutenant Governor

from the ballot for the Republican Primary to be held on May 15, 2018.

3. The Chief Clerk shall notify the parties hereto and their counsel

of this order and also certify a copy hereof to the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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