The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-880
Filed: 17 April 2018
Mecklenburg County, No. 17 CVD 3949
DANIEL RYAN DEBRUHL, Petitioner,
v.
MECKLENBURG COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, Respondent.
Appeal by petitioner from order entered 28 April 2017 by Judge Regan A.
Miller in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24
January 2018.
Redding Jones, PLLC, by Ty Kimmell McTier and David G. Redding, for
petitioner-appellant.
Ruff Bond Cobb Wade & Bethune, LLP, by Ronald L. Gibson, for respondent-
appellee.
ZACHARY, Judge.
The issue presented is whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the applicant be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing to contest the denial of his application for renewal of a Concealed Handgun
Permit pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3). We conclude that it does.
I. Factual Background
On 9 September 2016, Petitioner Daniel Ryan DeBruhl submitted an
application for the renewal of his Concealed Handgun Permit to the Mecklenburg
County Sheriff’s Office. A veteran of the United States military, Petitioner had
DEBRUHL V. MECKLENBURG COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE
Opinion of the Court
maintained a Concealed Handgun Permit for ten years prior to submitting his
renewal application. The Sheriff’s Office issued a perfunctory denial of Petitioner’s
application for renewal on 14 December 2016, without notice of the nature of or basis
for the denial or any opportunity for Petitioner to be heard on the allegations against
him.
The communication that advised Petitioner of the denial contained the
following information:
It is found that your actions for the following constitute a
violation of the provisions set forth in the North Carolina
General Statute 14-415.12 for the possession of a concealed
handgun permit.
Your application for a concealed handgun permit has been
denied for the following reasons:
[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 14-415.12(a) – Does not meet the
requirements for application
[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 14-415.12(b)(1) – Ineligible to own,
possess, or receive firearm under State or Federal Law
YOU ARE DENIED DUE TO INFORMATION RECEIVED
FROM VETERANS AFFAIRS.
Petitioner appealed the Sheriff’s decision to the district court on 6 March 2017,
but complained that “there is no way for Petitioner to know what facts to challenge
on appeal” because of the lack of facts “provided in the Denial”. After “having
reviewed [Petitioner’s] criminal background and other relevant information,” the
Honorable Regan A. Miller entered an order “Denying Appeal For A Concealed
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Handgun Permit” on 24 April 2017. In Finding of Fact No. 5, the trial court concluded
that the Sheriff’s Office “denied [Petitioner] a Concealed Handgun Permit because
[Petitioner] sought or received mental health and/or substance abuse treatment in
2016,” although Petitioner had not previously been adjudicated to be mentally ill. In
Finding of Fact No. 6, the district court found that Petitioner “suffers from a mental
health disorder that affects his ability to safely handle a firearm.” 1 Based on these
findings, the district court concluded that “[t]he Sheriff’s decision was a reasoned and
reasonable decision[,]” and affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s Concealed Handgun
Permit renewal application. Petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to be heard
on the matter before the court entered its order.
Petitioner filed notice of appeal to this Court on 30 May 2017. On appeal,
Petitioner argues that “the district court’s finding of fact that petitioner suffers from
a mental health disorder was improper absent a formal adjudicatory hearing
regarding petitioner’s mental competency and violates petitioner’s due process
rights.” In the alternative, Petitioner argues that the district court’s “application of
section N.C.G.S. § 14-415.12(a)(3) is overbroad, contrary to statutory construction
and encompasses a myriad of protected activities under the Second Amendment of
the United States Constitution.”
1 While neither the Sheriff’s Office nor the district court cited a specific statutory provision,
the district court’s language tracks that of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3), which provides for the
denial of a Concealed Handgun Permit if the applicant “suffer[s] from a physical or mental infirmity
that prevents the safe handling of a handgun.”
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We find Petitioner’s due process claim dispositive.
II. North Carolina Statutory Framework
In North Carolina, “[a]ny person who has a concealed handgun permit may
carry a concealed handgun unless otherwise specifically prohibited by law.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-415.11(a) (2017). The criteria for obtaining a Concealed Handgun
Permit are set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12. A permit is obtained from the
local sheriff and once issued is valid for five years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.11(b)
(2017). If an individual applies to renew his Concealed Handgun Permit, the sheriff
must determine whether that individual “remains qualified to hold a permit in
accordance with the provisions of G.S. 14-415.12.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.16(c)
(2017).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12 provides that a sheriff “shall issue” a Concealed
Handgun Permit to an applicant so long as “the applicant qualifies under the
following criteria:”
(a) . . .
(1) The applicant is a citizen of the United States or
has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence
. . . and has been a resident of the State 30 days or
longer immediatly preceding the filing of the
application.
(2) The applicant is 21 years of age or older.
(3) The applicant does not suffer from a physical or
mental infirmity that prevents the safe handling of
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a handgun.
(4) The applicant has successfully completed an
approved firearms safety and training course which
involves the actual firing of handguns and
instruction in the laws of this State governing the
carrying of a concealed handgun and the use of
deadly force. The North Carolina Criminal Justice
Education and Training Standards Commission
shall prepare and publish general guidelines for
courses and qualifications of instructors which
would satisfy the requirements of this subdivision.
An approved course shall be any course which
satisfies the requirements of this subdivision and is
certified or sponsored by:
a. The North Carolina Criminal Justice
Education and Training Standards
Commission,
b. The National Rifle Association, or
c. A law enforcement agency, college, private
or public institution or organization, or
firearms training school, taught by
instructors certified by the North Carolina
Criminal Justice Education and Training
Standards Commission or the National Rifle
Association.
Every instructor of an approved course shall
file a copy of the firearms course description,
outline, and proof of certification annually, or
upon modification of the course if more
frequently, with the North Carolina Criminal
Justice Education and Training Standards
Commission.
(5) The applicant is not disqualified under
subsection (b) of this section.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a) (2017). Even where the applicant satisfies subsections
(a)(1)-(4) above, however,
(b) The sheriff shall deny a permit to an applicant who:
(1) Is ineligible to own, possess, or receive a firearm
under the provisions of State or Federal law.
(2) Is under indictment or against whom a finding of
probable cause exists for a felony.
(3) Has been adjudicated guilty in any court of a
felony . . . .
...
(6) Is currently, or has been previously adjudicated
by a court or administratively determined by a
governmental agency whose decisions are subject to
judicial review to be, lacking mental capacity or
mentally ill. Receipt of previous consultative
services or outpatient treatment alone shall not
disqualify an applicant under this subdivision.
...
(8) Except as provided in subdivision (8a), (8b), or
(8c) of this section, is or has been adjudicated guilty
of . . . one or more crimes of violence constituting a
misdemeanor . . . within three years prior to the date
on which the application is submitted.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(b) (2017).
The statute thus includes two provisions related to mental health: N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(b)(6). The critical distinction
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between the two subsections is the requirement of a prior adjudicatory hearing.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(b)(6), if an applicant has been adjudicated to be
“lacking mental capacity or mentally ill[,]” the sheriff must deny the application.
However, even without a prior adjudication of mental illness, if a sheriff determines
that an applicant “suffer[s] from a physical or mental infirmity that prevents the safe
handling of a handgun” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3), the sheriff may deny
the application.
III. The Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1. An important check on the power of the
government, the principle of procedural due process requires that the states afford
the individual a certain level of procedural protection before a governmental decision
may be validly enforced against the individual. Procedural due process safeguards
may be invoked when a state seeks to apply its laws in a manner in which individuals
are “exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds[.]” Bi-Metallic
Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446, 60 L. Ed. 372, 375 (1915)
(discussing Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385, 52 L. Ed. 1103, 1112 (1908)).
“The touchstone of [procedural] due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 41
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L. Ed. 2d 935, 952 (1974) (citation omitted). In order to guard against the threat of
any such arbitrary government action, “the right to some kind of prior hearing is
paramount.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556
(1972). The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that “[t]he right to be
heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a principle
basic to our society.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 32
(1976) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, whether a state will owe
procedural due process protections to an individual depends upon the nature of the
individual right that is at stake. “The requirements of procedural due process apply
only to the deprivation of . . . liberty and property” interests. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569,
33 L. Ed. 2d at 556.
Accordingly, in order for Petitioner to prevail in his argument that he was
entitled to a hearing on appeal from the denial of his renewal application, it must
first be determined that he had a property or liberty interest in retaining his
Concealed Handgun Permit that was deserving of due process protection.
IV. Whether Process was Owed
Petitioner maintains in the instant case that he was entitled to due process
protection in the form of a hearing because he “had both a liberty and property
interest at issue at the time of the Denial.” The Sheriff’s Office maintains that “[t]he
District Court’s Order affirming the Sheriff’s denial of the [Petitioner’s] Application
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for a Concealed [Handgun] Permit does not violate any constitutional right to bear
arms . . . .” We first address Petitioner’s contention that he had a vested property
interest in his Concealed Handgun Permit at the time of the denial of his application.
“[T]he property interests protected by procedural due process extend well
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-
72, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 557. In this sense, a property interest “may take many forms.” Id.
at 576, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 560. Nevertheless, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural
protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has
already acquired in specific benefits.” Id. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a
person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. . . . He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. at 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561.
A legitimate claim of entitlement is often created by statute. E.g., id.
(“Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law[.]”); Wolff,
418 U.S. at 557, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951; Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 349 N.C.
315, 321, 507 S.E.2d 272, 277 (1998) (citation omitted) (“State law determines
whether an individual . . . does or does not possess a constitutionally protected
‘property’ interest in continued employment.”). For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970), the United States Supreme Court “held that a
person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and administrative standards
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defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that
is safeguarded by procedural due process.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 576, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 560
(discussing Goldberg). A valid property interest existed in Goldberg because the
welfare payments were “grounded in the statute defining eligibility[.]” Id. at 577, 33
L. Ed. 2d at 561. While “[t]he recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact,
within the statutory terms of eligibility[,]” the Supreme Court “held that they had a
right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so.” Id.
In contrast, in Bd. of Regents v. Roth, the respondent had a “ ‘property’ interest
in employment at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh [that] was created and
defined by the terms of his appointment.” Id. at 578, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561. However,
those terms “specifically provided that the respondent’s employment was to
terminate” after the one-year contract term, and “they made no provision for renewal
whatsoever.” Id. Under those circumstances, “the respondent surely had an abstract
concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require
the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his
contract of employment.” Id. The decision to rehire the respondent was left solely to
the discretion of the University.
The statutory regime in the present case is analogous to that in Goldberg.
Petitioner’s initial permit was valid only for a period of five years, and there is no
question but that, pursuant to the provisions of the statute, he maintained a property
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interest in that permit during those years. Moreover, Petitioner maintained a
property interest in the renewal of his Concealed Handgun Permit upon expiration of
his prior permits. The relevant statute provides that “[t]he sheriff shall issue a permit
to carry a concealed handgun to a person who qualifies for a permit under G.S. 14-
415.12.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.11(b) (2017) (emphasis added). Because the statute
does not give the local sheriff unfettered, unassailable discretion in the issuance of
permit renewals, an applicant enjoys a legitimate claim of entitlement to renewal so
long as the enumerated criteria have been satisfied. E.g., Mallette v. Arlington
County Emples. Supplemental Retirement Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 1996).
Thus, Petitioner had a clear property interest in the renewal of his Concealed
Handgun Permit, and was entitled to procedural due process protections.
In that Petitioner had a recognized property interest in the renewal of his
Concealed Handgun Permit, we need not determine whether he also had a liberty
interest in its renewal.
V. What Process was Due
Having established that Petitioner had a property interest in the issuance of
his Concealed Handgun Permit sufficient to trigger procedural due process
protection, we must determine whether Petitioner was deprived of such protection by
the manner in which his renewal application was denied.
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The statute at issue provides that a sheriff may deny an application for a
Concealed Handgun Permit pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3) without first
holding a hearing on the matter. See Kelly v. Riley, 223 N.C. App. 261, 265, 733
S.E.2d 194, 197 (2012) (“N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.16 . . . specifically governs renewal
of a concealed handgun permit[,] [and] does not require a hearing prior to the
nonrenewal of an applicant’s concealed handgun permit.”) (quotation marks and
alterations omitted). The statute instead affords the following scope of procedural
protections:
A person’s application for a permit shall be denied only if
the applicant fails to qualify under the criteria listed in this
Article. If the sheriff denies the application for a permit,
the sheriff shall, within 45 days, notify the applicant in
writing, stating the grounds for the denial. An applicant
may appeal the denial, revocation, or nonrenewal of a
permit by petitioning a district court judge of the district in
which the application was filed. The determination by the
court, on appeal, shall be upon the facts, the law, and the
reasonableness of the sheriff’s refusal. The determination
by the court shall be final.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.15(c) (2017). Accordingly, following a sheriff’s denial of a
Concealed Handgun Permit application, the process afforded is the applicant’s
opportunity to appeal that decision.
The question remains, however, whether the opportunity to obtain appellate
review is sufficient when that review is unaccompanied by an opportunity to be heard.
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We conclude that appellate review without an opportunity to be heard does not satisfy
the demands of due process.
It is manifest that “some kind of hearing is required at some time before a
person is finally deprived of his property interests.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58, 41 L.
Ed. 2d at 952 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168, 95 L. Ed. 817, 852 (1951)).
Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with
complete immunity from outward responsibility in
depriving others of their rights. . . . That a conclusion
satisfies one’s private conscience does not attest its
reliability. The validity . . . of a conclusion largely depend[s]
on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not
congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too
slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument
has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person
in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been
found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular
government, that justice has been done.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 171-72, 95 L. Ed. at 854.
Nevertheless, “[t]hat a hearing has been thought indispensable in so many other
situations, leaving the cases of denial exceptional, does not itself prove that it must
be found essential [everywhere].” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at
172, 95 L. Ed. at 854. It does, however, create a “burden of showing weighty reason
for departing in [an] instance from a rule so deeply imbedded in history and in the
demands of justice.” Id.
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In the case at bar, nothing has been presented to this Court that would justify
the departure from such a significant safeguard of the rights of the individual. There
has been no indication “that it will be impractical or prejudicial to a concrete public
interest to disclose” to an applicant the nature and basis of the denial of the
applicant’s renewal application and, when on the grounds that the applicant “suffer[s]
from a . . . mental infirmity,” “to permit [the applicant] to meet [the allegations] if
[the applicant] can.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 172-73, 95 L.
Ed. at 854. Instead, our attention has been directed to Kelly v. Riley, 223 N.C. App.
261, 733 S.E.2d 194 (2012), in support of the argument of the Sheriff’s Office that the
“denial of [Petitioner’s] Application for a Concealed [Handgun] Permit does not
violate any constitutional right to bear arms[.]” However, Kelly is inapplicable to the
case at bar.
In Kelly, the sheriff’s office denied the petitioner’s application for a Concealed
Handgun Permit under the mandatory disqualification provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-415.12(b)(8) because the petitioner had a “previous conviction for assault on a
female[.]” Kelly, 223 N.C. App. at 262, 733 S.E.2d at 195. It is important to note that
Kelly involved issues of substantive due process rather than procedural due process.
Moreover, in Kelly the petitioner was afforded a hearing on appeal from the denial of
his Concealed Handgun Permit. The petitioner had also been protected by the various
adjudication procedures that led to his initial conviction.
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In the instant case, Petitioner was not afforded the benefit of an adjudicatory
proceeding prior to the district court’s affirmance of the Sheriff’s Office’s denial of his
Concealed Handgun Permit renewal on the grounds that Petitioner “suffers from a
mental health disorder that affects his ability to safely handle a firearm.” Rather, the
procedures employed consisted of (1) a vague, bare bones written notice advising
Petitioner that his application had been denied, and (2) an opportunity to appeal that
denial. The written notice stated that Petitioner had been denied pursuant to “NCGS
14-415.12(a)—Does not meet the requirements for application.” The notice did not
specify which subsection of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a) Petitioner did not satisfy,
nor did it provide him with an explanation of the factual basis for the denial. Finally,
the notice informed Petitioner that “You may appeal the decision by submitting a
written or typed petition (statement); or complete the appeal form and submit to the
Senior Resident Superior Court Judge setting forth the reasons for appeal.” In
Petitioner’s appeal to the district court, he noted that “[t]he information provided in
the Denial is so minimal that there is no way for Petitioner to know what facts to
challenge on appeal.” Petitioner was not subsequently provided with any such
information, and on appeal the district court merely “reviewed [Petitioner’s] . . .
relevant information” before finding that Petitioner “suffers from a mental health
disorder that affects his ability to safely handle a firearm.” It is undisputed that
Petitioner was first informed of the precise grounds for the denial of his renewal
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application in the district court’s order. Petitioner was not afforded a hearing on
appeal, nor was he given an opportunity to submit even minimal contradictory
information, before the district court made its final determination.
These procedures were wholly inadequate. The State’s prohibition against the
grant of a Concealed Handgun Permit to a person who “suffer[s] from a . . . mental
infirmity that prevents the safe handling of a handgun” necessarily requires an
individualized inquiry as to whether the specific applicant does indeed suffer from a
mental infirmity. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3) (2017). The absence of any prior
process requires that, if sought, process is due at that moment. This is particularly
so in the instant case, as a determination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.12(a)(3) that
an individual suffers “from a . . . mental infirmity that prevents the safe handling of
a handgun” is especially susceptible to the type of arbitrary governmental action that
the due process clause was designed to prevent.
We do not discount the safety concerns expressed by the Sheriff’s Office.
Nonetheless, “[t]he heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the
elementary rights of men. . . .” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 170,
95 L. Ed. at 853. “[A] democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and
fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of
rights.” Id. The State is not “immune from the historic requirements of fairness
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merely because [it] acts, however conscientiously, in the name of security” and safety.
Id. at 173, 95 L. Ed. at 855.
At the very least, it is evident that “some kind of hearing is required at some
time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at
557-58, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 952 (citation omitted). We need not determine the full panoply
of rights that Petitioner should have been afforded had there been a hearing in the
present case. By definition, “a hearing, in its very essence, demands that he who is
entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument, however
brief; and, if need be, by proof, however informal.” Londoner, 210 U.S. at 386, 52 L.
Ed. at 1112. Here, Petitioner was deprived of his procedural due process safeguards
by the absence of any hearing whatsoever.
VI. Conclusion
Where a local sheriff determines that an application for renewal of a Concealed
Handgun Permit ought to be denied on the grounds that the applicant “suffer[s] from
a . . . mental infirmity that prevents the safe handling of a handgun[,]” that applicant
must be afforded an opportunity to dispute the allegations underlying the denial
before it becomes final. The opportunity to appeal the denial to the district court as
set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.15(c) is procedurally sufficient only to the extent
that it provides an opportunity for the applicant to be heard at that stage. At a
minimum, an applicant denied the renewal of a permit pursuant to the provisions of
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this subsection must be provided notice of the precise grounds for the sheriff’s denial,
together with the information alleged in support thereof. This process must be
followed by an opportunity to contest the matter in a hearing in district court.
Because neither was afforded in the instant case, the district court’s Order Denying
Appeal For A Concealed Handgun Permit is reversed. The matter is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges CALABRIA and ARROWOOD concur.
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