Opinion

Kisela v. Hughes

  • 584 U.S. 100
  • 138 S. Ct. 1148
  • 200 L. Ed. 2d 449
  • 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2066
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Apr 2, 2018
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Cited by
1,795 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.5%

finding that officers were not on “fair notice” that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because the factual differences between the purportedly 2Indeed, just four months ago, another panel of this court found exactly that. See Studdard, 934 F.3d at 481–83 (relying on Sova as “clearly established law”). No. 18-6296 Reich, et al. v. City of Elizabethtown, Ky., et al. Page 29 governing Ninth Circuit precedent and the facts before the Court “leap[t] from the page”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that officers were not on “fair notice” that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because the factual differences between the purportedly 2Indeed, just four months ago, another panel of this court found exactly that. See Studdard, 934 F.3d at 481–83 (relying on Sova as “clearly established law”). No. 18-6296 Reich, et al. v. City of Elizabethtown, Ky., et al. Page 29 governing Ninth Circuit precedent and the facts before the Court “leap[t] from the page”
  • holding that qualified immunity attaches when “official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” and “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • explaining that the court of appeals erred in holding that a circuit decision defeated qualified immunity where the Supreme Court "ha[d] already instructed the Court of Appeals not to read [that] decision ... too broadly in deciding whether a new set of facts is governed by clearly established law"
  • finding that it was far from obvious that shooting an erratic woman swinging a the determination of qualified immunity. We find it unnecessary to re- solve that question. 14 No. 19-2723 large kitchen knife near others would violate the Fourth Amendment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANDREW KISELA v. AMY HUGHES

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–467. Decided April 2, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Andrew Kisela, a police officer in Tucson,

Arizona, shot respondent Amy Hughes. Kisela and two

other officers had arrived on the scene after hearing a

police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic

behavior with a knife. They had been there but a few

minutes, perhaps just a minute. When Kisela fired,

Hughes was holding a large kitchen knife, had taken steps

toward another woman standing nearby, and had refused

to drop the knife after at least two commands to do so.

The question is whether at the time of the shooting

Kisela’s actions violated clearly established law.

The record, viewed in the light most favorable to

Hughes, shows the following. In May 2010, somebody in

Hughes’ neighborhood called 911 to report that a woman

was hacking a tree with a kitchen knife. Kisela and an-

other police officer, Alex Garcia, heard about the report

over the radio in their patrol car and responded. A few

minutes later the person who had called 911 flagged down

the officers; gave them a description of the woman with

the knife; and told them the woman had been acting errat-

ically. About the same time, a third police officer, Lindsay

Kunz, arrived on her bicycle.

Garcia spotted a woman, later identified as Sharon

Chadwick, standing next to a car in the driveway of a

nearby house. A chain-link fence with a locked gate sepa-

rated Chadwick from the officers. The officers then saw

another woman, Hughes, emerge from the house carrying

a large knife at her side. Hughes matched the description

2 KISELA v. HUGHES

Per Curiam

of the woman who had been seen hacking a tree. Hughes

walked toward Chadwick and stopped no more than six

feet from her.

All three officers drew their guns. At least twice they

told Hughes to drop the knife. Viewing the record in the

light most favorable to Hughes, Chadwick said “take it

easy” to both Hughes and the officers. Hughes appeared

calm, but she did not acknowledge the officers’ presence or

drop the knife. The top bar of the chain-link fence blocked

Kisela’s line of fire, so he dropped to the ground and shot

Hughes four times through the fence. Then the officers

jumped the fence, handcuffed Hughes, and called para-

medics, who transported her to a hospital. There she was

treated for non-life-threatening injuries. Less than a

minute had transpired from the moment the officers saw

Chadwick to the moment Kisela fired shots.

All three of the officers later said that at the time of the

shooting they subjectively believed Hughes to be a threat

to Chadwick. After the shooting, the officers discovered

that Chadwick and Hughes were roommates, that Hughes

had a history of mental illness, and that Hughes had been

upset with Chadwick over a $20 debt. In an affidavit

produced during discovery, Chadwick said that a few

minutes before the shooting her boyfriend had told her

Hughes was threatening to kill Chadwick’s dog, named

Bunny. Chadwick “came home to find” Hughes “somewhat

distressed,” and Hughes was in the house holding Bunny

“in one hand and a kitchen knife in the other.” Hughes

asked Chadwick if she “wanted [her] to use the knife on

the dog.” The officers knew none of this, though. Chad-

wick went outside to get $20 from her car, which is when

the officers first saw her. In her affidavit Chadwick said

that she did not feel endangered at any time. Ibid. Based

on her experience as Hughes’ roommate, Chadwick stated

that Hughes “occasionally has episodes in which she acts

inappropriately,” but “she is only seeking attention.” 2

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Per Curiam

Record 108.

Hughes sued Kisela under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C.

§1983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court

granted summary judgment to Kisela, but the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 862 F. 3d 775

(2016).

The Court of Appeals first held that the record, viewed

in the light most favorable to Hughes, was sufficient to

demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment.

See id., at 782. The court next held that the violation was

clearly established because, in its view, the constitutional

violation was obvious and because of Circuit precedent

that the court perceived to be analogous. Id., at 785.

Kisela filed a petition for rehearing en banc. Over the

dissent of seven judges, the Court of Appeals denied it.

Kisela then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court.

That petition is now granted.

In one of the first cases on this general subject, Tennes-

see v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), the Court addressed the

constitutionality of the police using force that can be deadly.

There, the Court held that “[w]here the officer has proba-

ble cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of

serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it

is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by

using deadly force.” Id., at 11.

In Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989), the

Court held that the question whether an officer has used

excessive force “requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the sever-

ity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to evade arrest by flight.” “The ‘reasonableness’ of a par-

ticular use of force must be judged from the perspective of

a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

4 KISELA v. HUGHES

Per Curiam

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Ibid. And “[t]he calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second judg-

ments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is neces-

sary in a particular situation.” Id., at 396–397.

Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether

Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment when he used

deadly force against Hughes. For even assuming a Fourth

Amendment violation occurred—a proposition that is not

at all evident—on these facts Kisela was at least entitled

to qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (per

curiam) (slip op., at 6) (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted). “Because the focus is on whether the

officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful,

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law

at the time of the conduct.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S.

194, 198 (2004) (per curiam).

Although “this Court’s caselaw does not require a case

directly on point for a right to be clearly established,

existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U. S.,

at ___ (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has

“ ‘repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particu-

lar—not to define clearly established law at a high level of

generality.’ ” City and County of San Francisco v.

Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 13) (quoting

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also

Brosseau, supra, at 198–199.

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

Per Curiam

“[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that

it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the

relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to

the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix v.

Luna, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Use of excessive force

is an area of the law “in which the result depends very

much on the facts of each case,” and thus police officers

are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing prece-

dent “squarely governs” the specific facts at issue. Id., at

___ (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted and

emphasis deleted). Precedent involving similar facts can

help move a case beyond the otherwise “hazy border be-

tween excessive and acceptable force” and thereby provide

an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlaw-

ful. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

“Of course, general statements of the law are not inher-

ently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to offic-

ers.” White, 580 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (internal

quotation marks omitted). But the general rules set forth

in “Garner and Graham do not by themselves create clearly

established law outside an ‘obvious case.’ ” Ibid. Where

constitutional guidelines seem inapplicable or too remote,

it does not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer

may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny quali-

fied immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on the

question of reasonableness. An officer “cannot be said to

have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s

contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable

official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood

that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S.

___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12). That is a necessary part of

the qualified-immunity standard, and it is a part of the

standard that the Court of Appeals here failed to imple-

6 KISELA v. HUGHES

Per Curiam

ment in a correct way.

Kisela says he shot Hughes because, although the offic-

ers themselves were in no apparent danger, he believed

she was a threat to Chadwick. Kisela had mere seconds to

assess the potential danger to Chadwick. He was con-

fronted with a woman who had just been seen hacking a

tree with a large kitchen knife and whose behavior was

erratic enough to cause a concerned bystander to call 911

and then flag down Kisela and Garcia. Kisela was sepa-

rated from Hughes and Chadwick by a chain-link fence;

Hughes had moved to within a few feet of Chadwick; and

she failed to acknowledge at least two commands to drop

the knife. Those commands were loud enough that Chad-

wick, who was standing next to Hughes, heard them. This

is far from an obvious case in which any competent officer

would have known that shooting Hughes to protect Chad-

wick would violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals made additional errors in conclud-

ing that its own precedent clearly established that Kisela

used excessive force. To begin with, “even if a controlling

circuit precedent could constitute clearly established law

in these circumstances, it does not do so here.” Sheehan,

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 13). In fact, the most analogous

Circuit precedent favors Kisela. See Blanford v. Sacra-

mento County, 406 F. 3d 1110 (CA9 2005). In Blanford,

the police responded to a report that a man was walking

through a residential neighborhood carrying a sword and

acting in an erratic manner. Id., at 1112. There, as here,

the police shot the man after he refused their commands

to drop his weapon (there, as here, the man might not

have heard the commands). Id., at 1113. There, as here,

the police believed (perhaps mistakenly), that the man

posed an immediate threat to others. Ibid. There, the

Court of Appeals determined that the use of deadly force

did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1119.

Based on that decision, a reasonable officer could have

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

Per Curiam

believed the same thing was true in the instant case.

In contrast, not one of the decisions relied on by the

Court of Appeals—Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F. 3d 1272

(CA9 2001), Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F. 3d 864

(CA9 2011), and Harris v. Roderick, 126 F. 3d 1189 (CA9

1997)—supports denying Kisela qualified immunity. As

for Deorle, this Court has already instructed the Court of

Appeals not to read its decision in that case too broadly in

deciding whether a new set of facts is governed by clearly

established law. Sheehan, 572 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,

at 13–14). Deorle involved a police officer who shot an

unarmed man in the face, without warning, even though

the officer had a clear line of retreat; there were no by-

standers nearby; the man had been “physically compliant

and generally followed all the officers’ instructions”; and

he had been under police observation for roughly 40

minutes. 272 F. 3d, at 1276, 1281–1282. In this case,

by contrast, Hughes was armed with a large knife; was

within striking distance of Chadwick; ignored the officers’

orders to drop the weapon; and the situation unfolded in

less than a minute. “Whatever the merits of the decision

in Deorle, the differences between that case and the case

before us leap from the page.” Sheehan, supra, at ___ (slip

op., at 14).

Glenn, which the panel described as “[t]he most analo-

gous Ninth Circuit case,” 862 F. 3d, at 783, was decided

after the shooting at issue here. Thus, Glenn “could not

have given fair notice to [Kisela]” because a reasonable

officer is not required to foresee judicial decisions that do

not yet exist in instances where the requirements of the

Fourth Amendment are far from obvious. Brosseau, 543

U. S., at 200, n. 4. Glenn was therefore “of no use in the

clearly established inquiry.” Brosseau, supra, at 200, n. 4.

Other judges brought this mistaken or misleading citation

to the panel’s attention while Kisela’s petition for rehear-

ing en banc was pending before the Court of Appeals. 862

8 KISELA v. HUGHES

Per Curiam

F.3d, at 795, n. 2 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc). The panel then amended its opinion,

but nevertheless still attempted to “rely on Glenn as illus-

trative, not as indicative of the clearly established law in

2010.” Id., at 784, n. 2 (majority opinion). The panel

failed to explain the difference between “illustrative” and

“indicative” precedent, and none is apparent.

The amended opinion also asserted, for the first time

and without explanation, that the Court of Appeals’ deci-

sion in Harris clearly established that the shooting here

was unconstitutional. Id., at 785. The new mention of

Harris replaced a reference in the panel’s first opinion to

Glenn—the case that postdated the shooting at issue here.

Compare 841 F. 3d 1081, 1090 (CA9 2016) (“As indicated

by Glenn and Deorle, . . . that right was clearly estab-

lished”), with 862 F. 3d, at 785 (“As indicated by Deorle

and Harris, . . . that right was clearly established”).

The panel’s reliance on Harris “does not pass the

straight-face test.” 862 F. 3d, at 797 (opinion of Ikuta, J.).

In Harris, the Court of Appeals determined that an FBI

sniper, who was positioned safely on a hilltop, used exces-

sive force when he shot a man in the back while the man

was retreating to a cabin during what has been referred to

as the Ruby Ridge standoff. 126 F. 3d, at 1202–1203.

Suffice it to say, a reasonable police officer could miss the

connection between the situation confronting the sniper at

Ruby Ridge and the situation confronting Kisela in

Hughes’ front yard.

For these reasons, the petition for certiorari is granted;

the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANDREW KISELA v. AMY HUGHES

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–467. Decided April 2, 2018

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG

joins, dissenting.

Officer Andrew Kisela shot Amy Hughes while she was

speaking with her roommate, Sharon Chadwick, outside of

their home. The record, properly construed at this stage,

shows that at the time of the shooting: Hughes stood

stationary about six feet away from Chadwick, appeared

“composed and content,” Appellant’s Excerpts of Record

109 (Record), and held a kitchen knife down at her side

with the blade facing away from Chadwick. Hughes was

nowhere near the officers, had committed no illegal act,

was suspected of no crime, and did not raise the knife in

the direction of Chadwick or anyone else. Faced with

these facts, the two other responding officers held their

fire, and one testified that he “wanted to continue trying

verbal command[s] and see if that would work.” Id., at

120. But not Kisela. He thought it necessary to use deadly

force, and so, without giving a warning that he would

open fire, he shot Hughes four times, leaving her seriously

injured.

If this account of Kisela’s conduct sounds unreasonable,

that is because it was. And yet, the Court today insulates

that conduct from liability under the doctrine of qualified

immunity, holding that Kisela violated no “clearly estab­

lished” law. See ante, at 5–6. I disagree. Viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Hughes, as the Court

must at summary judgment, a jury could find that Kisela

violated Hughes’ clearly established Fourth Amendment

rights by needlessly resorting to lethal force. In holding

2 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

otherwise, the Court misapprehends the facts and misap­

plies the law, effectively treating qualified immunity as an

absolute shield. I therefore respectfully dissent.

I

This case arrives at our doorstep on summary judgment,

so we must “view the evidence . . . in the light most favor­

able to” Hughes, the nonmovant, “with respect to the

central facts of this case.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U. S. ___,

___ (2014) (per curiam) (slip op., at 8). The majority pur­

ports to honor this well-settled principle, but its efforts fall

short. Although the majority sets forth most of the rele­

vant events that transpired, it conspicuously omits several

critical facts and draws premature inferences that bear on

the qualified-immunity inquiry. Those errors are fatal to

its analysis, because properly construing all of the facts in

the light most favorable to Hughes, and drawing all infer­

ences in her favor, a jury could find that the following

events occurred on the day of Hughes’ encounter with the

Tucson police.

On May 21, 2010, Kisela and Officer-in-Training Alex

Garcia received a “ ‘check welfare’ ” call about a woman

chopping away at a tree with a knife. 862 F. 3d 775, 778

(CA9 2016). They responded to the scene, where they

were informed by the person who had placed the call (not

Chadwick) that the woman with the knife had been acting

“erratically.” Ibid. A third officer, Lindsay Kunz, later

joined the scene. The officers observed Hughes, who

matched the description given to the officers of the woman

alleged to have been cutting the tree, emerge from a house

with a kitchen knife in her hand. Hughes exited the front

door and approached Chadwick, who was standing outside

in the driveway.

Hughes then stopped about six feet from Chadwick,

holding the kitchen knife down at her side with the blade

pointed away from Chadwick. Hughes and Chadwick

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

conversed with one another; Hughes appeared “composed

and content,” Record 109, and did not look angry. See 862

F. 3d, at 778. At no point during this exchange did

Hughes raise the kitchen knife or verbally threaten to

harm Chadwick or the officers. Chadwick later averred

that, during the incident, she was never in fear of Hughes

and “was not the least bit threatened by the fact that

[Hughes] had a knife in her hand” and that Hughes “never

acted in a threatening manner.” Record 110–111. The

officers did not observe Hughes commit any crime, nor was

Hughes suspected of committing one. See 862 F. 3d, at

780.

Nevertheless, the officers hastily drew their guns and

ordered Hughes to drop the knife. The officers gave that

order twice, but the commands came “in quick succession.”

Id., at 778. The evidence in the record suggests that

Hughes may not have heard or understood the officers’

commands and may not have been aware of the officers’

presence at all. Record 109–110, 195, 323–324 (Officer

Kunz’s testimony that “it seemed as though [Hughes]

didn’t even know we were there,” and “[i]t was like she

didn’t hear us almost”); id., at 304 (Officer Garcia’s testi­

mony that Hughes acted “almost as if we weren’t there”).

Although the officers were in uniform, they never verbally

identified themselves as law enforcement officers.

Kisela did not wait for Hughes to register, much less

respond to, the officers’ rushed commands. Instead, Kisela

immediately and unilaterally escalated the situation.

Without giving any advance warning that he would shoot,

and without attempting less dangerous methods to deesca­

late the situation, he dropped to the ground and shot four

times at Hughes (who was stationary) through a chain-

link fence. After being shot, Hughes fell to the ground,

screaming and bleeding from her wounds. She looked at

the officers and asked, “ ‘Why’d you shoot me?’ ” Id., at

308. Hughes was immediately transported to the hospital,

4 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

where she required treatment for her injuries. Kisela

alone resorted to deadly force in this case. Confronted

with the same circumstances as Kisela, neither of his

fellow officers took that drastic measure.

II

Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if

“(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly

established at the time.’ ” District of Columbia v. Wesby,

583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 13) (quoting Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U. S. 658, 664 (2012)). Faithfully applying

that well-settled standard, the Ninth Circuit held that a

jury could find that Kisela violated Hughes’ clearly estab­

lished Fourth Amendment rights. That conclusion was

correct.

A

I begin with the first step of the qualified-immunity

inquiry: whether there was a violation of a constitutional

right. Hughes alleges that Kisela violated her Fourth

Amendment rights by deploying excessive force against

her. In assessing such a claim, courts must ask “whether

the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of

the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 397 (1989). That inquiry “re­

quires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of

each particular case, including the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Id., at 396; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S.

1, 11 (1985). All of those factors (and others) support the

Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that a jury could find that

Kisela’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable.

862 F. 3d, at 779–782. Indeed, the panel’s resolution of

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

this question was so convincing that not a single judge on

the Ninth Circuit, including the seven who dissented from

denial of rehearing en banc, expressly disputed that con­

clusion. See id., at 791–799 (opinion of Ikuta, J.). Neither

does the majority here, which simply assumes without

deciding that “a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.”

Ante, at 4.

First, Hughes committed no crime and was not suspected

of committing a crime. The officers were responding to a

“check welfare” call, which reported no criminal activity,

and the officers did not observe any illegal activity while

at the scene. The mere fact that Hughes held a kitchen

knife down at her side with the blade pointed away from

Chadwick hardly elevates the situation to one that justi­

fies deadly force.

Second, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hughes

presented no immediate or objective threat to Chadwick or

the other officers. It is true that Kisela had received a

report that a woman matching Hughes’ description had

been acting erratically. But the police officers themselves

never witnessed any erratic conduct. Instead, when

viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, the record

evidence of what the police encountered paints a calmer

picture. It shows that Hughes was several feet from

Chadwick and even farther from the officers, she never

made any aggressive or threatening movements, and she

appeared “composed and content” during the brief

encounter.

Third, Hughes did not resist or evade arrest. Based on

this record, there is significant doubt as to whether she

was aware of the officers’ presence at all, and evidence

suggests that Hughes did not hear the officers’ swift com­

mands to drop the knife.

Finally, the record suggests that Kisela could have, but

failed to, use less intrusive means before deploying deadly

force. 862 F. 3d, at 781. For instance, Hughes submitted

6 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

expert testimony concluding that Kisela should have used

his Taser and that shooting his gun through the fence was

dangerous because a bullet could have fragmented against

the fence and hit Chadwick or his fellow officers. Ibid.; see

also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F. 3d 805, 831 (CA9 2010)

(noting that “police are required to consider what other

tactics if any were available to effect the arrest” and

whether there are “clear, reasonable, and less intrusive

alternatives” (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted)). Consistent with that assessment, the other two

officers on the scene declined to fire at Hughes, and one of

them explained that he was inclined to use “some of the

lesser means” than shooting, including verbal commands,

because he believed there was time “[t]o try to talk

[Hughes] down.” Record 120–121. That two officers on

the scene, presented with the same circumstances as

Kisela, did not use deadly force reveals just how unneces­

sary and unreasonable it was for Kisela to fire four shots

at Hughes. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. ___, ___

(2014) (slip op., at 8) (“We analyze [the objective reason-

ableness] question from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Taken together, the foregoing facts would permit a jury

to conclude that Kisela acted outside the bounds of the

Fourth Amendment by shooting Hughes four times.

B

Rather than defend the reasonableness of Kisela’s con­

duct, the majority sidesteps the inquiry altogether and

focuses instead on the “clearly established” prong of the

qualified-immunity analysis. Ante, at 4. To be “ ‘clearly

established’ . . . [t]he contours of the right must be suffi­

ciently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987). That standard is not

nearly as onerous as the majority makes it out to be. As

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

even the majority must acknowledge, ante, at 4, this Court

has long rejected the notion that “an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful,” Anderson,

483 U. S., at 640. “[O]fficials can still be on notice that

their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S. 730, 741 (2002).

At its core, then, the “clearly established” inquiry boils

down to whether Kisela had “fair notice” that he acted

unconstitutionally. See ibid.; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he focus” of quali­

fied immunity “is on whether the officer had fair notice

that her conduct was unlawful”).

The answer to that question is yes. This Court’s prece­

dents make clear that a police officer may only deploy

deadly force against an individual if the officer “has prob­

able cause to believe that the [person] poses a threat of

serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”

Garner, 471 U. S., at 11; see also Graham, 490 U. S., at

397. It is equally well established that any use of lethal

force must be justified by some legitimate governmental

interest. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 383 (2007);

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015)

(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2–3). Consistent

with those clearly established principles, and contrary to

the majority’s conclusion, Ninth Circuit precedent predat­

ing these events further confirms that Kisela’s conduct

was clearly unreasonable. See Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 199

(“[A] body of relevant case law” may “ ‘clearly establish’ ”

the violation of a constitutional right); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U. S. 731, 746 (2011) (KENNEDY, J., concurring)

(“[Q]ualified immunity is lost when plaintiffs point either

to ‘cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the

time of the incident’ or to ‘a consensus of cases of persua­

sive authority such that a reasonable officer could not

have believed that his actions were lawful’ ” (quoting

8 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 617 (1999))). Because

Kisela plainly lacked any legitimate interest justifying the

use of deadly force against a woman who posed no objec­

tive threat of harm to officers or others, had committed no

crime, and appeared calm and collected during the police

encounter, he was not entitled to qualified immunity.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Deorle v. Rutherford, 272

F. 3d 1272 (2001) proves the point. In that case, the police

encountered a man who had reportedly been acting “errat­

ically.” Id., at 1276. The man was “verbally abusive,”

shouted “ ‘kill me’ ” at the officers, screamed that he would

“ ‘kick [the] ass’ ” of one of the officers, and “brandish[ed] a

hatchet at a police officer,” ultimately throwing it “into a

clump of trees when told to put it down.” Id., at 1276–

1277. The officers also observed the man carrying an

unloaded crossbow in one hand and what appeared to be

“a can or a bottle of lighter fluid in the other.” Id., at

1277. The man discarded the crossbow when instructed to

do so by the police and then steadily walked toward one of

the officers. Ibid. In response, that officer, without giving

a warning, shot the man in the face with beanbag rounds.

Id., at 1278. The man suffered serious injuries, including

multiple fractures to his cranium and the loss of his left

eye. Ibid.

The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to the

officer, concluding that his use of force was objectively

unreasonable under clearly established law. Id., at 1285–

1286. The court held, “Every police officer should know

that it is objectively unreasonable to shoot . . . an unarmed

man who: has committed no serious offense, is mentally or

emotionally disturbed, has been given no warning of the

imminent use of such a significant degree of force, poses

no risk of flight, and presents no objectively reasonable

threat to the safety of the officer or other individuals.” Id.,

at 1285.

The same holds true here. Like the man in Deorle,

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Hughes committed no serious crime, had been given no

warning of the imminent use of force, posed no risk of

flight, and presented no objectively reasonable threat to

the safety of officers or others. In fact, Hughes presented

even less of a danger than the man in Deorle, for, unlike

him, she did not threaten to “kick [their] ass,” did not

appear agitated, and did not raise her kitchen knife or

make any aggressive gestures toward the police or Chad­

wick. If the police officers acted unreasonably in shooting

the agitated, screaming man in Deorle with beanbag bul­

lets, a fortiori Kisela acted unreasonably in shooting the

calm-looking, stationary Hughes with real bullets. In my

view, Deorle and the precedent it cites place the unlawful­

ness of Kisela’s conduct “ ‘beyond debate.’ ” Wesby, 583

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).

The majority strains mightily to distinguish Deorle, to

no avail. It asserts, for instance, that, unlike the man in

Deorle, Hughes was “armed with a large knife.” Ante, at 7.

But that is not a fair characterization of the record, par­

ticularly at this procedural juncture. Hughes was not

“armed” with a knife. She was holding “a kitchen knife—

an everyday household item which can be used as a

weapon but ordinarily is a tool for safe, benign purposes”—

down at her side with the blade pointed away from Chad­

wick. 862 F. 3d, at 788 (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of

rehearing en banc). Hughes also spoke calmly with

Chadwick during the events at issue, did not raise the

knife, and made no other aggressive movements, under­

mining any suggestion that she was a threat to Chadwick

or anyone else. Similarly, the majority asserts that

Hughes was “within striking distance” of Chadwick, ante,

at 7, but that stretches the facts and contravenes this

Court’s repeated admonition that inferences must be

drawn in the exact opposite direction, i.e., in favor of

Hughes. See Tolan, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). The

facts, properly viewed, show that, when she was shot,

10 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Hughes had stopped and stood still about six feet away

from Chadwick. Whether Hughes could “strik[e]” Chad­

wick from that particular distance, even though the kitchen

knife was held down at her side, is an inference that

should be drawn by the jury, not this Court.

The majority next posits that Hughes, unlike the man in

Deorle, “ignored the officers’ orders to drop the” kitchen

knife. Ante, at 7. Yet again, the majority here draws

inferences in favor of Kisela, instead of Hughes. The

available evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find

that Hughes did not hear or register the officers’ swift

commands and that Kisela, like his fellow officers on the

scene, should have realized that as well. See supra, at 3–

4. Accordingly, at least at the summary-judgment stage,

the Court is mistaken in distinguishing Deorle based on

Hughes’ ostensible disobedience to the officers’ directives.

The majority also implies that Deorle is distinguishable

because the police in that case observed the man over a

40-minute period, whereas the situation here unfolded in

less than a minute. Ante, at 7. But that fact favors

Hughes, not Kisela. The only reason this case unfolded in

such an abrupt timeframe is because Kisela, unlike his

fellow officer, showed no interest in trying to talk further

to Hughes or use a “lesser means” of force. See Record

120–121, 304.

Finally, the majority passingly notes that “this Court

has already instructed the Court of Appeals not to read

[Deorle] too broadly.” Ante, at 7 (citing City and County of

San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015)

(slip op., at 13–14)). But the Court in Sheehan concluded

that Deorle was plainly distinguishable because, unlike in

Deorle, the officers there confronted a woman who “was

dangerous, recalcitrant, law-breaking, and out of sight.”

575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). As explained above,

however, Hughes was none of those things: She did not

threaten or endanger the officers or Chadwick, she did not

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

break any laws, and she was visible to the officers on the

scene. See supra, at 2–4. Thus, there simply is no basis

for the Court’s assertion that “ ‘the differences between

[Deorle] and the case before us leap from the page.’ ” Ante,

at 7 (quoting Sheehan, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14)).

Deorle, moreover, is not the only case that provided fair

notice to Kisela that shooting Hughes under these circum­

stances was unreasonable. For instance, the Ninth Circuit

has held that the use of deadly force against an individual

holding a semiautomatic rifle was unconstitutional where

the individual “did not point the gun at the officers and

apparently was not facing them when they shot him the

first time.” Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F. 2d 321,

325 (1991). Similarly, in Harris v. Roderick, 126 F. 3d

1189 (1997), the Ninth Circuit held that the officer unrea­

sonably used deadly force against a man who, although

armed, made “no threatening movement” or “aggressive

move of any kind.” Id., at 1203.* Both Curnow and Har-

ris establish that, where, as here, an individual with a

weapon poses no objective and immediate threat to officers

or third parties, law enforcement cannot resort to exces­

sive force. See Harris, 126 F. 3d, at 1201 (“Law enforce­

ment officers may not shoot to kill unless, at a minimum,

the suspect presents an immediate threat to the officers,

or is fleeing and his escape will result in a serious threat

of injury to persons”).

If all that were not enough, decisions from several other

Circuits illustrate that the Fourth Amendment clearly

——————

* The majority insists that reliance on Harris fails the “ ‘straight-face

test’ ” because Harris involved an FBI sniper on a hilltop who shot a

man while he was retreating to a cabin during a standoff. Ante, at 8

(quoting 862 F. 3d, at 797 (opinion of Ikuta, J.)). If anything, though,

the context of Harris could be viewed as more dangerous than the

context here because, unlike Hughes, the suspect in Harris had en­

gaged in a firefight with other officers the previous day, during which

an officer was shot. See 126 F. 3d, at 1193–1194.

12 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

forbids the use of deadly force against a person who is

merely holding a knife but not threatening anyone with it.

See, e.g., McKinney v. DeKalb County, 997 F. 2d 1440,

1442 (CA11 1993) (affirming denial of summary judgment

based on qualified immunity to officer who shot a person

holding a butcher knife in one hand and a foot-long stick

in the other, where the person threw the stick and began

to rise from his seated position); Reyes v. Bridgwater, 362

Fed. Appx. 403, 404–405 (CA5 2010) (reversing grant of

summary judgment based on qualified immunity to officer

who shot a person holding a kitchen knife in his apart­

ment entryway, even though he refused to follow the

officer’s multiple commands to drop the knife); Duong v.

Telford Borough, 186 Fed. Appx. 214, 215, 217 (CA3 2006)

(affirming denial of summary judgment based on qualified

immunity to officer who shot a person holding a knife

because a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff

was sitting down and pointing the knife away from the

officer at the time he was shot and had not received any

warnings to drop the knife).

Against this wall of case law, the majority points to a

single Ninth Circuit decision, Blanford v. Sacramento

County, 406 F. 3d 1110 (2005), as proof that Kisela rea­

sonably could have believed that Hughes posed an imme­

diate danger. But Blanford involved far different circum­

stances. In that case, officers observed a man walking

through a neighborhood brandishing a 2½-foot cavalry

sword; officers commanded the man to drop the sword,

identified themselves as police, and warned “ ‘We’ll shoot.’ ”

Id., at 1112–1113. The man responded with “a loud growl­

ing or roaring sound,” which increased the officers’ concern

that he posed a risk of harm. Id., at 1113. In an effort to

“evade [police] authority,” the man, while still wielding the

sword, tried to enter a home, thus prompting officers to

open fire to protect anyone who might be inside. Id., at

1113, 1118. The Ninth Circuit concluded that use of deadly

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

force was reasonable in those circumstances. See id., at

1119.

This case differs significantly from Blanford in several

key respects. Unlike the man in Blanford, Hughes held a

kitchen knife down by her side, as compared to a 2½-foot

sword; she appeared calm and collected, and did not make

threatening noises or gestures toward the officers on the

scene; she stood still in front of her own home, and was not

wandering about the neighborhood, evading law enforce­

ment, or attempting to enter another house. Moreover,

unlike the officers in Blanford, Kisela never verbally

identified himself as an officer and never warned Hughes

that he was going to shoot before he did so. Given these

significant differences, no reasonable officer would believe

that Blanford justified Kisela’s conduct. The majority’s

conclusion to the contrary is fanciful.

* * *

In sum, precedent existing at the time of the shooting

clearly established the unconstitutionality of Kisela’s

conduct. The majority’s decision, no matter how much it

says otherwise, ultimately rests on a faulty premise: that

those cases are not identical to this one. But that is not

the law, for our cases have never required a factually

identical case to satisfy the “clearly established” standard.

Hope, 536 U. S., at 739. It is enough that governing law

places “the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct beyond

debate.” Wesby, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because, taking the facts in the

light most favorable to Hughes, it is “beyond debate” that

Kisela’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable,

he was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity.

III

For the foregoing reasons, it is clear to me that the

14 KISELA v. HUGHES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Court of Appeals got it right. But even if that result were

not so clear, I cannot agree with the majority’s apparent

view that the decision below was so manifestly incorrect as

to warrant “the extraordinary remedy of a summary re­

versal.” Major League Baseball Players Assn. v. Garvey,

532 U. S. 504, 512–513 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). “A

summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved

by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and

stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below

is clearly in error.” Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785,

791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Office of Personnel

Management v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 422 (1990)

(“Summary reversals of courts of appeals are unusual

under any circumstances”). This is not such a case. The

relevant facts are hotly disputed, and the qualified-

immunity question here is, at the very best, a close call.

Rather than letting this case go to a jury, the Court de­

cides to intervene prematurely, purporting to correct an

error that is not at all clear.

This unwarranted summary reversal is symptomatic of

“a disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court’s re­

sources” in qualified-immunity cases. Salazar-Limon v.

Houston, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dis­

senting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 8). As I have

previously noted, this Court routinely displays an un­

flinching willingness “to summarily reverse courts for

wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified im­

munity” but “rarely intervene[s] where courts wrongly

afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these

same cases.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also

Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 Cal. L. Rev.

45, 82 (2018) (“[N]early all of the Supreme Court’s quali­

fied immunity cases come out the same way—by finding

immunity for the officials”); Reinhardt, The Demise of

Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The

Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Par­

ticularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 Mich. L. Rev.

1219, 1244–1250 (2015). Such a one-sided approach to

qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an abso­

lute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deter­

rent effect of the Fourth Amendment.

The majority today exacerbates that troubling asym­

metry. Its decision is not just wrong on the law; it also

sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and

the public. It tells officers that they can shoot first and

think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreason­

able conduct will go unpunished. Because there is noth-

ing right or just under the law about this, I respectfully

dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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