Knowles v. U.S. Department of State

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

MAR292018

SAMUEL KNOWLES, )

. . ) C|erk. U.S. Dlstrict& Bankruptcy

Plalntlff, ) Courts for the Dlstrict of Co|umb|a

)

v. ) Civil Case No. 16-1450 (RJL)

)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(March 2;, 2018 [Dkt. ## 19, 24])

Samuel Knowles (“Knowles” or “plaintiff”), appearing pro se, sues the United

States Department of State (“State Department” or “defendant”) under the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The State Department has released responsive

records and has moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [Dkt. # 19]. Plaintiff has filed a motion for the Court

to take judicial notice of “a stipulated fact” that is not clearly defined. See Pet’r Requesting

Court to Take Judicial Notice [Dl<t. # 24]. Upon consideration of the partie-s’ submissions,

the record, and the relevant case law, the Court finds no genuine dispute surrounding

defendant’s compliance with the FOIA. Therefore, defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs Motion to Take J udicial Notice is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The documented facts are as follows. ln a FOIA request dated January 22, 2014,

plaintiff sought:

l) any and all information regarding communications between the

Bahamian authorities and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency

about [plaintiff"s] transport to the United States. 2) Any and all

information regarding the diplomatic process involved in [plaintiff`s]

extradition from the Bahamas to the United States. 3) The names of all

U.S. and Bahamian agents and personnel involved in the scheduling and

execution of the flight.

Decl. of Eric F. Stein (“Stein Decl.”), Ex. l, at l [Dkt. # 19-4].

The State Department released responsive records between May 2015 and March

2017. On May 9, 2015, it released seven documents, four with redactions. Stein Decl. il 6.

On December Zl, 2016, it released twenty-one documents, fourteen with redactions, and

withheld six documents completely. Id. 11 9. On January 31, 2017, it released five

documents, one with redactions, and withheld one document completely. Ia’. il ll. The

State Department withheld information under FOIA exemptions l, 5, 6, and 7(C), codified

in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). See id. W 33-59.

ln addition, the State Department referred a “one page extradition inemoranduin” to

the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), which, on March 13, 2017, released the

document with third-party names redacted under FOIA exemptions 7(C) and 7(F). Decl.

of Katherine L. l\/Iyrick W 8-9 (“Myrick Decl.”) [Dl<t. # 19-6]. Defendant also referred

eighteen documents, totaling forty-one pages, to the Department of Justice’s Criminal

Division, which withheld them in full under FOIA exemptions 5, 6 and 7(C).. Decl. of Gail

A. Brodfuehrer 11 8 (“Brodfuehrer Decl.”) [Dkt. # 19-5].

2

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). FOIA cases are routinely decided on motions for summaryjudgment.

See Brayton v. O/j’l`ce OfU.S. dee Rep/”esental‘ive, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

“FOIA requires executive branch agencies to make their records available ‘to any

person’ upon request, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), subject to nine exemptions, id. § 552(b)(l)-

(9).” Newport Aeronautl`cal Sales v. Dep’t ofAl`r Force, 684 F.3d 160, 162 (D.C. Cir.

2012). To prevail on summary judgment in a FOIA case, an agency must show that it

adequately searched for records responsive to the relevant request and that any records

withheld by the agency fall within one of FOIA’s statutory exemptions. See z`cz’.; Wez`sberg

v. U.S. Dep’tofJustice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

An agency seeking to satisfy that burden “[t]ypically . . . does so by affidavit.” Am.

Civl`l Lz'berties Union v. U.S. Dep’t OfDefense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “lf an

agency’s affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information with specific

detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed

exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the

agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit

alone.” Ia’. Provided that they are accordingly detailed, agency affidavits “cannot be

rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other

documents.”’ Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting SafeCard

Servs., [nc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). lndeed, “[t]o successfully

3

challenge an agency’s showing that it complied with the FOIA, the plaintiff must come

forward with ‘specific facts’ demonstrating that there is a genuine issue with respect to

whether the agency has improperly withheld extant agency records.” Span v. U.S. Dep ’t

OfJusl‘l`ce, 696 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2010).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has listed “issues of disputed material facts,” which essentially challenge

both the search for responsive records and the withholding of information. Pl.’s Br. Opp’n

to Def.’s Summ. J. Motion (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Attach. A, Stmt. of Disputed Factual lssues 1

[Dkt. # 21]. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff`s challenges all fail.

A. The Adequacy of the Search

To satisfy its obligations under the FOIA, an agency must perform an adequate

search for records responsive to the relevant request. Burwell v. Exec. O]j"ice for U.S.

Atly’s, 210 F. Supp. 3d 33, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted). “The adequacy of an

agency’s search is measured by a standard of reasonableness and is dependent upon the

circumstances of the case.” Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). An agency “fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate

beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant

documents.” Ancient Col`n Collectors Gul`la’ v. U.S. Dep ’t OfStale, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C.

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The adequacy of an agency’s search “is

generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the

methods used to carry out the search.” [turralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d

311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Therefore, “the failure of an agency to turn up one specific

document in its search does not alone render a search inadequate.” Id.

Typically, an agency is entitled to summary judgment on the search question when

it has provided a “reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type

of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if

such records exist) were searched.” Mobley, 806 F.3d at 581 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Such an affidavit or declaration is “accorded a presumption of good faith, which

cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of

other documents.” Ia’. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although an agency may not ignore obvious “indications in documents found in its

initial search that there were additional responsive documents elsewhere,” lturralde, 315

F.3d at 315, the “‘1ead’ must be ‘both clear and certain’ and ‘so apparent that the [agency]

cannot in good faith fail to pursue it,”’ Mobley, 806 F.3d at 582 (quoting K0walczyk v. U.S.

Dep’t ofJustz`ce, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The reasonableness ofthe search is

not undermined by a plaintiff` s “mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may

exist.” lturralde, 315 F.3d at 316 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Summary judgment is unwarranted only “if a review of the record raises substantial doubt”

about the search, “particularly in view of well defined requests and positive indications of

overlooked materials.” Valencz`a-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The State Department’s declarant is the Director of its Office of lnformation

Programs Services (“IPS”), which responds to FOIA and Privacy Act requests. Stein Decl.

5

11 1._He explains that upon reviewing plaintiffs request, it was determined that responsive

records were likely to be found in the Office of the Legal Adviser (“OLA”), the Bureau of

Western Hemisphere Affairs (“Bureau”), the U.S. Embassy in Nassau, Bahamas (“U.S.

Embassy”), and the Central Foreign Policy Records (“CFPR”), and that “no other offices

or records systems were reasonably likely to maintain documents on extraditions.” ]a’.

11 15. The declarant has provided adequately detailed descriptions of each office’s purpose,

search methods, and search terms, and the results of the searches. See id. 1111 17-20 (OLA

locating twenty-seven responsive documents); id. 1111 21-24 (Bureau locating no responsive

documents); id. 1111 25-31 (U.S. Embassy locating six responsive documents); z`d. 1132

(CFPR, maintained in the State Archiving System, locating seven responsive documents).

Plaintiff contends that defendant (1) “failed to search and explain whether [it]

possess[es] email archives for the Office of Law Enforcement and lntelligence (“L/LEI”),

U.S. Embassy Nassau, Bahamas, and State Archiving System employees other than the

former staff inember,” and (2) failed to search an email “backup system” that he only

surmises might exist. Pl.’s Opp’n Decl. 11 14 [Dkt. # 21-11 (brackets omitted). Neither

contention suffices to defeat summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s first assertion is contradicted by the record. The declarant in fact avers

that a search was conducted of “L/LEI’s electronic and paper files,” which “consist of

unclassified and classified email records ofthe Supervisory Extradition Specialist [and] the

archived email records of L/LEI employees who worked on issues in the relevant region,”

and further notes that the search yielded twenty-seven responsive documents Stein Decl.

1111 19-20. ln addition, a search ofplaintiff`s name and alias in the State Archiving System,

6

which houses records “commonly referred to as the ‘Central Foreign Policy Files’ or

‘Central File”’ and is capable of querying “over 40 million records through a single

interface,” yielded an additional seven responsive documents Ia’. 11 32.

Plaintiff"s second assertion is beyond the scope of FOIA. Plaintiff does not point to

anything suggesting the existence of an email backup system but instead asks “whether

there are backup tapes containing staff members’ emails and, if so, whether such backup

tapes might contain emails no longer preserved on staff member’s computers.” Pl.’s Opp’n

Decl. 11 14. Defendant’s disclosure obligations, however, do not extend to answering

questions. See Adams v. FBI, 572 F. Supp. 2d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Under the FOIA, an

individual may obtain access to records ‘written or transcribed to perpetuate knowledge or

events.’ . . . The FOIA neither requires an agency to answer questions disguised as a FOIA

request, nor to create documents or opinions in response to an individual’s request for

information.”) (alterations omitted) (quoting Hua’gins v. IRS, 620 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C.

_ 1985), ajj”'d, 808 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Naz"l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 960 F.

Supp. 2d 101, 160 n.28 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Although the FOIA is a powerful and necessary

statute, it was not intended to permit the public to commandeer agency employees as

research assistants, including with respect to performing queries in electronic databases.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendant conducted adequate

searches, and plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record that raises “substantial doubt”

about those searches. Valencz`a-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326. As a result, the Court will grant

summary judgment to defendant on this aspect of the FOIA claim.

B. Claimed Exemptions

Defendant withheld information under FOIA exemptions 1, 5, 6 and 7(C). The

Court considers the propriety of each exemption in light of the justifications set out in

defendant’s declarations and the Criminal Division’s Vaughn Index. See Brodfuehrer

Decl., Ex. 2 (“Vaughn Index”).l

1. Exemptionl

FOIA Exemption 1 exempts from mandatory disclosure records that are

“(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept

secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly

classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). “[C]ourts must

‘recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign

policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result

ofpublic disclosure ofa particular classified record.”’ Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d

966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974)). Thus, while this

Court’s review is de novo, Congress has indicated that courts should give “substantial

weight” to agency statements concerning decisions to withhold information on the basis of

Exemption 1. Larson v. Dep’t ofState, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Halperin

v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accordingly, “[i]f an agency’s statements

supporting exemption contain reasonable specificity of detail as to demonstrate that the

withheld information logically falls within the claimed exemption and evidence in the

l See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

8

record does not suggest otherwise,” the court “should not conduct a more detailed inquiry

to test the agency’s judgment and expertise or to evaluate whether the court agrees with

the agency’s opinions.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 865.

The State Department withheld in full a three-page cable dated September 1, 2006,

sent from the U.S. Embassy in Nassau, Bahamas, to the State Department “regarding

conversations between” officials ofthe two governments “on a number oftopics, including

the extradition of [plaintiff].” Stein Decl. 11 60. The State Department’s declarant

personally reviewed the document and “determined that the information . . . continues to

meet the classification criteria” of Executive Order 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29,

2009), which shields classified information “at the .CONFIDENTIAL level because its

unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national

security.” Stein Decl. 1111 34, 38 (capitaliZation in original). Although the document’s

original classification expired on June 6, 2014, it was reclassified “as CONFIDENTIAL”

on January 31, 2017, pursuant to “Sections 1.4(b) and (d) ofE.O. 13526,” which “pertain

to foreign government information and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United

States, including confidential sources.” Id. 11 60.

According to the declarant, the release of the document “could reasonably be

expected” generally to strain relations with foreign governments in matters of

confidentiality and, more specifically, “undermine” the U.S. Government’s “future

extradition efforts and damage bilateral relations with the Bahamas, whose cooperation is

vital to U.S. national security and anti-drug trafficking efforts in the region.” Ia’. ln

addition, “the Department conducted a line-by-line review of [the] document and

9

determined there is no meaningful information that can be reasonably segregated for

release.” Id.

For similar reasons, the State Department withheld confidential portions ofa three-

page cable and a two-page cable it received from the U.S. Embassy in Nassau regarding

plaintiffs extradition from the Bahamas to the United States, id. 11 61, and classified

portions ofa two-page cable it received from the U.S. Embassy that discussed the dismissal

of plaintiffs habeas corpus motion and plaintiffs extradition to the United States in

August 2006, ia’. 11 62. The withheld portions pertained to matters covered by E.O. 13526,

“including confidential sources.” Ia’.

The State Department has demonstrated that disclosure of the foregoing classified

information is reasonably expected to cause damage to national security and has adequately

described such damage. See Krikorl`an v. Dep’t OfState, 984 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (recognizing the State Department’s judgment that release would “jeopardize

‘reciprocal confidentiality’ and damage national security”). Plaintiff has offered no

meritorious argument to rebut the presumption of good faith accorded the declaration, and

he mistakenly argues that the Criminal Division has withheld records under Exemption 1.2

See Pl.’s Opp’n Decl. 11 17; Brodfuehrer Decl. 11 8 (citing exemptions 5, 6 and 7(C) as the

bases of the Criminal Division’s withholdings). Therefore, the State Department is entitled

to summaryjudgment on its Exemption 1 withholdings. See Larson, 565 F.3d at 864-65.

2 Even if the Criminal Division invoked Exemption 1 at the administrative level, it no

longer relies on that exemption.

10

2. Exemption 5

FOIA Exemption 5 exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency

memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency

in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “Exemption 5 incorporates the

traditional privileges that the Government could assert in civil litigation against a private

litigant,” including attorney work product, the deliberative process privilege, and the

government attorney-client privilege. Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep ’I of Commerce,

473 F.3d 312, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The State Department withheld information described

as attorney work product, deliberative process material, and attorney-client

communications See Stein Decl. 1111 47-49. The Criminal Division withheld the referred

documents in full under the attorney work product and deliberative process privileges See

Vaaghn lndex.

The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure “government documents

that are both ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative.”’ Jucll`cz`al Watch, lnc. v. U.S. Dep ’t of Def.,

847 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “Documents are ‘predecisional’ ifthey are generated

before the adoption of an agency policy, and ‘deliberative’ if they reflect the give-and-take

of the consultative process.” Ia’. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

Records that fall into that category include “advisory opinions, recommendations and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies

are formulated.” NLRB v. Sears, R0ebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (internal

quotation marks omitted). By allowing agencies to withhold such information, the

deliberative process privilege “reflects the commonsense notion that agencies craft better

11

rules when their employees can spell out in writing the pitfalls as well as strengths ofpolicy

opinions, coupled with the understanding that employees would be chilled from such

rigorous deliberation if they feared it might become public.” Judz`cial Watch, lnc., 847

F.3d at 739. The privilege similarly guards against “premature disclosure of proposed”

decisions “before they have been finally formulated or adopted.” Publl`c Citz'zen, Inc. v.

Ojj‘ice ofMgmt. & Bua’get, 598 F.3d 865, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The State Department withheld under the deliberate process privilege a “three-page

draft issue paper” discussing the U.S. Government’s “anti-money laundering efforts with

the cooperation of the Bahamian Government.” Stein Decl. 11 71.3 The draft was attached

to a one-page email sent by an agency attorney to other State Department officials with

regard to plaintiffs drug trafficking activities. Ia’. 1111 69, 71. The State Department’s

declarant explains that the withheld information in both the e-mail and draft issue paper “is

pre-decisional and deliberative” and if disclosed “would reveal the details of the

Department employees’ preliminary thoughts and ideas on a foreign country’s efforts to

stop money laundering and could reasonably be expected to chill the open and frank

expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occur [during the process of]

developing a preferred course of action.” Ia’. 11 71; see also ia’. 11 69. The State Department

has shown that the documents contained deliberative process material, which it properly

withheld under FOIA Exemption 5. See, e.g., Russell v. Dep ’z‘ ofAz`r Force, 682 F.2d 1045,

3 The State Department also redacted the names of U.S. Government employees under

FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Those exemptions are addressed separately.

12

1047-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (draft manuscript properly withheld under deliberative process

privilege).

The State Department, citing Exemption 5, also withheld certain attorney work

product and attorney-client privileged communications in the above-mentioned email. See

Stein Decl. 11 69. The State Department’s declarant notes that the withheld information

contains an agency attorney’s “mental impressions, thought processes, and legal strategies

regarding anti-money laundering efforts” that were created “in reasonable anticipation of

criminal litigation,” as well as “communications” between a State Department attorney and

other State Department officials for the “purpose of seeking and/or providing legal advice

regarding the extradition process.” Ia’. Along similar lines, the State Department withheld

“handwritten notes containing the mental impressions of an [agency] attorney” regarding

plaintiffs “drug trafficking activities and extradition,” both prepared “in reasonable

anticipation of criminal litigation. Ia’. 11 73. As the withheld records either involve

materials (1) “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by

or for that other party’s representative (including the other party’s attorney[)]” or

(2) containing “confidential communications between attorneys and their clients,” the State

Department properly invoked Exemption 5. Jua’icz`al Walch, [nc. v. Dep ’t of Justz`ce, 432

F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); New York Tl`mes Co. v.

U.S. Dep’t ofJustl`ce, 282 F. Supp. 3d 234, 237 (D.D.C. 2017).

The Criminal Division, for its part, Withheld all eighteen of the referred records

under Exemption 5. See Brodfuehrer Decl. 11 8. Although both the attorney work product

and deliberative process privileges are invoked, the declarant avers, among other things,

13

that all of the withheld documents “were prepared by or at the direction of an attorney in

anticipation ofthe prosecution ofplaintiff by U.S. authorities,” and contain “analysis” and

“evaluations” of information and legal standards relevant to plaintiffs arrest, extradition

and criminal charges. Ia’. 1111 18-19. The Criminal Division therefore withheld all of the

records under the “attorney-work product privilege because they contain information

constituting the legal analysis of DOJ attorneys, the DOJ prosecutors’ theory of the case

being investigated and evaluation of the evidence, and the OIA attorneys’ assessments of

facts and issues pertaining to the requests for arrest and extradition.” Ia’. 1111 19, 28.

Plaintiff counters particularly as to the Criminal l)ivision’s withholdings that “the

agency’s description of [certain] documents” in the Vaughn lndex “lacks . . . factual

context.” Pl.’s Opp’n Decl. 11 29. But our Circuit has made clear that “[t]he work-product

doctrine simply does not distinguish between factual and deliberative material.” Jua’icial

Wal‘ch, Inc., 432 F.3d at 371 (quoting Martz'n v. Ojj(ice ofSpecl`al Coansel, 819 F.2d 1181,

1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). As a result, “[i]f a document is fully protected as work product,

then segregability is not required.” Ia’. The State Department has properly justified

withholding attorney work product documents in full under Exemption 5, as has the

Criminal Division with regard to the referred documents. See ia’. at 369-70. Consequently,

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the Exemption 5 withholdings.

3. Exemptions 6 and 7(C)

“FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) seek to protect the privacy of individuals identified

in certain agency records.” Am. Civl`l Lz`bertz`es Um`on v. U.S. Dep’t ofJustice, 655 F.3d 1,

6 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files”

14

when disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) protects “records or information compiled for law

enforcement purposes” when disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” ]d. § 552(b)(7)(C). Both exemptions require

the Court to balance “the privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure

against the public interest in release of the requested information.” Lz`ght v. U.S. Dep ’t of

Juslz`ce, 968 F. Supp. 2d 11, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,

494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

The State Department and the Criminal Division invoked Exemptions 6 and 7(C)

together to justify the redaction of third-party identifying information, mostly the names of

U.S. Government employees or officials. See Stein Decl. 1111 66-68, 72-754; Brodfuehrer

Decl. 1111 22, 24. ln addition, DEA invoked Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F) together to justify

the redaction of the names of DEA special agents from the referred extradition

memorandum. l\/lyrick Decl. 1111 8-9. Plaintiff “concedes” that the requested records were

“compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Pl.’s Opp’n Decl. 11 37; see Brodfuehrer Decl.

1123 (discussing threshold law enforcement requirement). Therefore, the Court will

address only the application of Exemption 7 to the foregoing withholdings. See Roth v.

U.S. Dep’t of.]ustice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding “no need to consider

Exemption 6 separately [where1 all information that would fall within the scope of

Exemption 6 would also be immune from disclosure under Exemption 7(C)”).

4 Paragraph 74 is misnumbered in the declaration as paragraph 73.

15

“ln deciding whether the release of particular information constitutes an

664

‘unwarranted’ invasion of privacy under Exemption 7(C),” the Court must balance the

public interest in disclosure against the privacy interest Congress intended the Exemption

to protect.”’ Am. Civz`l Lz`bertz`es Union, 655 F.3d at 6 (alteration omitted) (quoting U.S.

Dep ’t ofJusl‘z`ce v. Reporters Comm.for Freedom ofthe Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989)).

The privacy interest at stake belongs to the individual, not the government agency, see

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763-65, and individuals have a “substantial interest in

ensuring that their relationship to [law enforcement] investigations remains secret,” Roz‘h,

642 F.3d at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a]s a result of Exemption

7(C), FOIA ordinarily does not require disclosure of law enforcement documents (or

portions thereof) that contain private information.” Blackwell v. FB[, 646 F.3d 37, 41 (D.C.

Cir. 201 1). “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear,” moreover, “that requests for such third

party information are strongly disfavored,” particularly “when the requester asserts a public

interest_however it might be styled_in obtaining information that relates to a criminal

prosecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

When balancing the private interest against invasions of privacy against the public

interest in disclosure, courts need only consider the public interest cognizable under FOIA,

533

that is, the “‘citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to. People

for the Ethz`cal Trealment ofAm'mals v. Nat’l Instz`taz‘es ofHealth, 745 F.3d 535, 542 (D.C.

Cir. 2014) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). The FOIA requester is required

to articulate a public interest sufficient to outweigh an individual’s privacy interest, and the

public interest must be “a significant one, more specific than having the information for its

16

own sake."’ Roth, 642 F.3d at 1175. When “the request implicates no public interest at

all,” the Court “need not linger over the balance; something outweighs nothing every time.”

Beck v. Dep ’t ofJustice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (alteration omitted) (quoting

Nat’l Ass ’n ofRetl`rea' Fea'. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

All of the agency declarants considered the interests at stake and concluded that the

individual privacy interests outweigh the public interest in disclosure. See Stein Decl. 11 59;

Brodfuehrer Decl. 111124-25; Myrick Decl. 11 14. The State Department’s declarant, for

example, explains that the release of third-party names and other identifying information

“could subject the individuals to harassment or unsolicited attention and would shed no

light on the operations and activities of the U.S. Government.” Ia’. 11 66. The declarant

further explains, convincingly, that the nature of the federal employees’ involvement in

international law enforcement efforts “may be of particular interest to non-U.S. actors who

may seek to use that information to the detriment of U.S. security.” Id.

Plaintiff counters that a public interest exists “in the disclosure of the facts

supporting the requests for his extradition and the evaluation of the steps taken by the

United States and the Bahamas authority to comply with the provisions of the treaty.” Pl.’s

Opp’n Decl. 11 38. He posits that “[t]here very well could be a public interest if the

government has erroneously applied Exemption 6 and 7(c) to hide government

misconduct.” Ia’. (brackets omitted). Of course, defendant did not withhold any such facts

under Exemption 7(C). ln any event, the burden rests with plaintiff to establish a

“sufficient reason for the disclosure” of information that implicates privacy concerns, Nat ’l

Archl`ves & Recora’s Admz`n. v. Favz`sh, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004), and plaintiffs self-

17

interest in the information adds no weight to the scales, cf. Prison Legal News v. Samuels,

787 F.3d1142, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

Finally, plaintiff suggests that some of the withheld third-party information is in the

public domain. Pl.’s Opp’n Decl. 1111 39-41. Plaintiff, however, has not carried his burden

of “pointing to the specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that

being Withheld.” Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the Exemption 7(C)

withholdings.

4. Record Seg'rcgability

lt is well established that an agency claiming that a document is exempt under FOIA

must, after excising the exempted information, release any reasonably segregable

information unless the non-exempt information is inextricably intertwined with the exempt

information. Trans-Pac. Polz`cl`ng Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1026-

27 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Defendant’s declarations establish that all responsive records were

reviewed with an eye toward releasing any non-exempt information and, where possible,

such information was released. See Stein Decl. 1111 59-75; l\/lyrick Decl. 1111 8-9. Moreover,

the Criminal Division had no obligation to “identify segregable material or disclose any

factual contents” because all of the records referred to it were appropriately determined to

be attorney work product and thus fully exempt under FOIA Exemption 5. Brodfuehrer

Decl. 11 28; see supra pp. 11-14. As a result, the Court concludes that defendant released

all reasonably segregable responsive records. See Trans-Pac. Poll`cl`ng Agreemem, 177

F.3d at 1028.

18

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the State Department has

satisfied its disclosure obligations under the FOIA and is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Accordingly, the State Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

United States lstrict Judge

19