a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
How later courts described this case
- a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BILLY DEAN SMITH; JACOB LEE No. 17-35225
ANAGICK,
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00010-TMB
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT CORCORAN; G. SCOTT
WELLARD, sued in their individual
capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Alaska state prisoners Billy Dean Smith and Jacob Lee Anagick appeal pro
se from the district court’s summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging a due process claim arising from their placement in administrative
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
both summary judgment and a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity.
Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether their placement in administrative segregation implicated a
protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-85 (1995) (a
constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a restraint imposes an
“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (the
threshold question for a qualified immunity analysis is whether a defendant’s
conduct violated a constitutional right), overruled in part on other grounds by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because they did not establish any grounds for relief.
See SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010)
(setting forth standard of review and listing grounds warranting reconsideration
under Rule 59(e)).
AFFIRMED.
2 17-35225