Zilkha v. Zilkha

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KAREN ZILKHA v. DAVID ZILKHA

(AC 39714)

Alvord, Prescott and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis-

solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

denying his motion for modification of custody and visitation and his

motion for order. The parties’ separation agreement, which had been

incorporated into the dissolution judgment, provided, inter alia, that the

parties would share joint physical custody of their two minor children,

even though access by the defendant to the children was by therapeutic

parenting time only, and that the children would reside with the plaintiff.

Following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, the trial court ren-

dered judgment on a stipulated agreement between the parties concern-

ing efforts to reunify the defendant with his children, including the

retention of certain therapists for the children. Thereafter, the defendant

filed a motion seeking to open the dissolution judgment to modify the

custody and visitation orders in effect and a motion for order, which

both sought, inter alia, to enforce the stipulated agreement regarding

reunification and to continue the reconciliation in order to reunite the

defendant with the children. The trial court denied both of the defen-

dant’s motions and ordered that, inter alia, he would not have any legal

right to direct access to the children, and that the extent of such contact,

if any, would be determined solely by the children. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abandoned

its obligation to decide the matter before it and improperly delegated

its statutory authority regarding custody and visitation by granting the

children a considerable level of control over the extent of the defendant’s

access to them: that court, rather than delegating its responsibility,

properly exercised its decision-making authority and met its obligation

to decide issues of custody and visitation by denying the defendant’s

motions, as the court did not ask any other person to decide whether

the defendant should have any right to custody or visitation, fully

weighed the facts presented and the competing interests of all the par-

ties, set forth the proper legal framework, and rendered a decision on

the merits, which articulated in detail the basis for its decision denying

the defendant’s motions; moreover, the defendant failed to show that

the court abused its discretion by failing to consider the best interests

of the children or any established public policy, and the fact that the

court’s order left open the possibility of voluntary visits at the discretion

of the children did not transform the court’s decision-making into imper-

missible delegation.

2. This court found unavailing the defendant’s claim that the trial court

improperly relied on events that occurred between 2004 and 2007 in

reaching its decision to deny his motions, and disregarded what he

described as an indication to the parties during the evidentiary hearing

that such evidence was too remote and insufficiently weighty for proper

consideration by the court; the trial court properly exercised its discre-

tion by weighing all the facts and circumstances of the family situation,

and it did not indicate during the proceedings that it would not consider

or rely on evidence occurring before 2007, or that it otherwise precluded

or limited the scope of the parties’ presentation of evidence, as the

court encouraged the parties to focus on the most relevant facts relating

to the then current feelings and their conduct, and it was not improper

or surprising that such guidance from the court was necessary and

appropriate to maintain an orderly and timely presentation of the

evidence.

3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

considered and adopted the recommendations made by the children’s

guardian ad litem because she chose to function as an attorney for the

minor children instead of fulfilling her obligations as a guardian ad litem:

the record did not support the defendant’s claim that the guardian ad

litem blindly advocated for the children rather than exercised her own

discretion in making her recommendations to the court, and although

the court indicated that the guardian ad litem’s recommendation assisted

it in its own independent calculus of what relief would be in the best

interests of the children, the court never indicated that it was simply

adopting the recommendations of the guardian ad litem, and it also

carefully considered and discussed in its decision other contrasting

viewpoints; furthermore, the guardian ad litem’s testimony and opinion

were subject to cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel, who was

free to explore the defendant’s allegations of bias and failure to adhere

to her obligations as guardian ad litem.

4. The defendant’s claim that the trial court, in reaching its decision, improp-

erly relied on an erroneous factual finding that the parties’ reconciliation

therapist had ended reconciliation therapy with the parties was unavail-

ing: whether the therapy was in fact ended by the professionals or

whether the parties simply stopped attending on their own, there was

nothing in the court’s analysis that suggested that that was an important

or material factor in its decision to deny the defendant’s motions, as it

was the failure of the therapy to alter the destructive behaviors of the

parties that led the court to its conclusion that continuing therapy was

unlikely to be in the best interests of the children, and, thus, even if

the court’s finding that the reconciliation therapist ended reunification

therapy was a factual error, when the court’s remaining unchallenged

findings were considered as a whole rather than focusing on that one

alleged inaccuracy, there was ample support in the record for the relief

ordered by the court.

Argued November 30, 2017—officially released March 13, 2018

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-

trict of Stamford and tried to the court, Abery-Wetstone,

J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting cer-

tain other relief; thereafter, the court, Emons, J., ren-

dered judgment on a stipulated agreement between the

parties concerning efforts to reunify the defendant with

his minor children; subsequently, the matter was trans-

ferred to the judicial district of Waterbury; thereafter,

the court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee,

denied the defendant’s motion for modification of cus-

tody and motion for order; subsequently, the court,

Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee, denied

the defendant’s motion to reargue, and the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Nicholas J. Adamucci, with whom, on the brief, was

George Kent Guarino, for the appellant (defendant).

D. Suzanne Snearly, guardian ad litem for the

minor children.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. In this highly protracted and bitterly

contested family matter, the defendant, David Zilkha,

whose marriage to the plaintiff, Karen Kaiser,1 was dis-

solved in 2005, appeals following the denial of postdis-

solution motions that sought to modify existing orders

governing custody and visitation rights of the defendant

with respect to the parties’ children, who are now teen-

agers. The defendant claims on appeal that the court

improperly (1) delegated its judicial function and failed

to consider both the best interests of the children and

public policy by granting the children considerable con-

trol over the defendant’s level of access to them; (2)

relied on events that occurred between 2004 and 2007,

despite having informed the parties that such evidence

was too remote and insufficiently weighty for consider-

ation; (3) adopted the recommendation of the children’s

guardian ad litem, despite the guardian ad litem’s

alleged abandonment of that role; and (4) relied on an

erroneous factual finding that reconciliation therapy

had concluded, purportedly in direct contradiction to

testimony provided by the parties’ reconciliation thera-

pist. Additionally, the defendant requests by way of

relief that, if this court agrees with all or parts of his

claims, we should exercise our inherent equitable

authority and order, without a remand, that the children

participate in one of the reunification programs identi-

fied in his proposed orders to the trial court. For the

reasons that follow, we reject the defendant’s claims

and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history and facts, as set

forth by the trial court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge

trial referee, in its detailed, thoughtful and well rea-

soned memorandum of decision are relevant to our

discussion of the defendant’s claims. The parties mar-

ried in 1998, and their twin children, Chloe and Jake,

were born a few years later in February, 2001. The

parties ‘‘never were able to form the mutually support-

ive and understanding relationship that a successful

marriage would require. . . . By 2004, their relation-

ship became untenable . . . .

‘‘[Despite the plaintiff having commenced divorce

proceedings in late 2003, the parties] remained in the

[marital] home in Connecticut together, and the escalat-

ing tensions were difficult for both of them to endure.

[The defendant] worked in New York for a hedge fund,

which ultimately collapsed. The time constraints of his

position did not permit him to be home with his young

children during the evenings before they were put to

bed. [The plaintiff] assumed the traditional mothering

role to the considerable exclusion of [the defendant],

whom she viewed as unfit to parent. . . . [The defen-

dant] found the proposed loss of the daily society of

his children extremely painful, and so resisted moving

out of the home.’’

On three separate occasions during the summer and

fall of 2004, the police were called concerning conflicts

between the defendant and the plaintiff. The second

and most significant of the three incidents ‘‘came during

a verbal argument between these [parties] on June 30,

2004, which the children witnessed. [The defendant]

lost control and struck [the plaintiff] that evening. He

struck her in the face several times, and the police

observed [the plaintiff] to have a black eye, ultimately

medically determined to be a fractured eye orbit and

bridge of her nose. [The defendant] denied hitting [the

plaintiff], and blamed it on the children. . . .

‘‘[The defendant] was ultimately criminally charged

. . . and vacated the family residence. His children

were then three and one-half years old. He has not

resided with them or had them in his care without

supervision during the day or overnight since that time

. . . .’’2 (Footnotes omitted.)

‘‘[The defendant’s] employment situation was also

fraught with difficulties, and the hedge fund where he

was employed collapsed during this time. A Securities

and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation into the

collapse of the fund and the conduct of its principals,

including [the defendant], resulted in negative publicity.

Among other factors, this negative publicity resulted

in [the defendant’s] continued unemployment in the

ensuing years and to the present time. All these matters

added . . . stress and tension [to] the end of his marital

relationship [and contributed to] his inability to enjoy

free and uninhibited access to his two children.’’

The plaintiff and the defendant were psychologically

evaluated by Harry Adamakos, a psychologist, from

October, 2004, through March, 2005. The evaluation was

ordered, at least in part, because the plaintiff, at that

time, was seeking sole custody of the children. Ada-

makos prepared a report summarizing his findings as

to each party.3 At the time of the evaluation, the parties

agreed that, prior to the escalation of conflict in 2004,

the children enjoyed a very positive relationship with

the defendant. Adamakos noted that, although the

defendant lacked experience, he probably could learn

to care for the children responsibly, at first for short

periods of time but eventually for a day or two at a time.

Adamakos also believed that the defendant’s ability to

parent the children ‘‘would likely improve as they

become older and move out of the tender years, sup-

porting a plan that would further increase father-child

time as they get older.’’ Despite this evaluation, ‘‘a nor-

mal divorced parent relationship with their father was

not permitted to evolve. The psychological features of

each parent noted in [Adamakos’] evaluation combined

into the ‘perfect storm’ of mutually negatively reinforc-

ing interactions and destructive synergy to prevent a

normal visiting relationship from developing in the

many years that have passed since that time.

‘‘[The plaintiff’s] anxiety and need for control over

all aspects of visitation have called into play the worst

of [the defendant’s] needs for denial and excessive

repressive defense mechanisms, all to the detriment of

their two children. The plaintiff does not accept or

believe that it is best and healthy for her children to

have access to [the defendant]. Her rejection of this

central and important tenet of child-rearing and her

beliefs about [the defendant] have led her to completely

frustrate the normalization of [the defendant’s] access

to his children. [The defendant’s] own angry conduct

and at times inappropriate, childishly self-focused deal-

ings with his children have played into her fears and

anxieties, and only strengthened her beliefs in this

regard.’’

The court also found that the following contributed

to the parties’ inability to implement a normal visiting

relationship between the defendant and his children.

First, the parties never developed any effective means

to communicate about their children, a defect that con-

tinues to the present day. Second, the plaintiff never

could overcome her distrust of the defendant or her lack

of respect for his input regarding parenting decisions,

ignoring the consequences this had on the children.

Finally, the defendant lacked the attentive and focused

parenting skills needed to achieve a successful visiting

relationship with the children, failing to understand or

accept that such a relationship, even under the best of

circumstances, would likely fail to achieve the type of

closeness experienced in intact families.

The parties eventually entered into a separation

agreement that was approved by the court and incorpo-

rated into the judgment of dissolution rendered on May

31, 2005. ‘‘That agreement provided, inter alia, that they

would share joint physical custody of their children,

who would reside with their mother. Despite this pur-

ported joint custody label, access by the father to the

children was by therapeutic parenting time only . . .

[consisting of] five hours each Saturday, three hours

each Wednesday, with detailed provision for makeup

visits, cancellation and so on.

‘‘The agreement also provided for a complicated and

ultimately prohibitively expensive method of supervi-

sion and gatekeeping by the children’s therapist and a

clinical psychologist. There were no detailed provisions

for how [the defendant] might establish his ability in the

future to have unsupervised visitation with his children.

The agreement is silent as to the reasons for such super-

vision, although it can be inferred by the events which

took place in 2004 . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Although the dissolution

judgment was modified several times, those provisions

governing the legal and physical custody of the children,

including that the defendant have only supervised visita-

tion with the children, remained unchanged.

Between 2005 and 2007, some of the defendant’s

supervised visits with the children were successful and

even enjoyable. The defendant, however, was unhappy

about the cost of supervised visits and what he viewed

as excessive scrutiny as a result of the presence of

supervisors. ‘‘The reports from this time describe [the

defendant] as often unable to respect the children’s

physical boundaries. He would tickle his son far too

long, after being requested to stop. He would tease him

in ways that were uncomfortable for the child. His anger

at [their periodic] negative reactions to him also frus-

trated progress in visitation.’’ Although the defendant

made attempts to end supervision, those efforts failed.

Nevertheless, toward the beginning of 2007, the defen-

dant’s counsel at that time recommended the appoint-

ment of ‘‘a new set of supervisors without the negative

connections that the then existing supervisors and gate-

keeper had with the family. That recommendation,

whether by acceptance or by happenstance, was in fact

followed, and a revised order entered by agreement in

family court. A new team of supervisors was appointed

and the process continued.

‘‘The outcome was, unfortunately, no different . . .

[because] the system required by [the plaintiff] in the

initial decree was inherently flawed. Because of such

continued close observation, [the plaintiff’s] obsessive

fears about [the defendant], as well as [the defendant’s]

parenting failures, the very outcome the court orders

were designed to prevent came about. That outcome

was the slow, but complete erosion of the relationship

between [the defendant] and his children. . . .

‘‘There was a gap in contact between [the defendant]

and his children during 2007 before a new supervision

plan was put into place. When supervised visits were

resumed, they were conducted by new therapeutic

supervisors . . . . When the supervised visitation con-

cluded in September of 2009, [the primary supervisor]

wrote a summary of the supervision. As to [the defen-

dant] and his then [eight year old] twins, she wrote:

Jake and Chloe are black and white thinkers, with little

room in their ability at this point to think about the

duality of situations. . . . Their belief now is [that the

defendant] is a liar. It is all about one side or the other,

and in this instance it is the negative side. When [the

defendant] tries to challenge the children to recall a

memory and see it from his perspective, the children

feel invalidated and disrespected. . . . Children of this

age have a huge sense of what is right and wrong and

what is fair and unfair. The only way to handle this

situation is to acknowledge the children’s point of view.

. . . [The defendant], himself being a black and white

thinker, has trouble with this concept, and tries to drive

the point home, that it didn’t happen that way. This

only creates power struggles between [the defendant]

and the children and does not enhance their relation-

ship.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

‘‘Of [the plaintiff’s] conduct, [the primary supervisor]

noted that . . . [the plaintiff] is empathic with the chil-

dren, and often is in the mode of I know which further

reinforces their belief that their father is wrong. The

empathy reinforces the polarized differences. That is

not [the plaintiff’s] intention, I believe, but because she

is concerned and aroused emotionally by wanting to

attune to her children’s needs, this activates the chil-

dren’s fears and therefore their fight/flight mechanisms

come into play, which makes them want to avoid these

feelings, which they associate with their father.’’

(Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) The supervisor did not believe,

however, that the plaintiff was consciously undermin-

ing visitation. The supervisor further maintained that

the defendant exhibited great parental ability as long

as he was being supervised and the children felt calm.

Nevertheless, ‘‘during this period of supervised visita-

tion when her children were between the ages of six

and eight years old, [the plaintiff] indirectly sabotaged

the visitation. She did this by being overly involved in

exchanges and by soothing Jake and Chloe both before

and after the visitation. As documented in the visitation

notes, she [frequently] scheduled activities and meals

shortly after visitation . . . which caused the chil-

dren’s engagement in the sessions to become minimal

and resisting. Further . . . it was her custom and habit

to keep notes of everything the children said about such

sessions. While she claimed she did not let the children

know she was keeping these notes, it strains the court’s

credulity that her heightened and emotional obsessive

need ‘to protect’ her children would not have been

apparent to them, through her body language, her ten-

sion and her focused interest in what they were saying

about their father.

‘‘[The defendant] did not always cover himself in the

cloak of good parenting in these visitations, either. . . .

As he came under scrutiny, his less helpful traits were

called forth and negatively impacted visitation. . . .

[V]isitation ended by September, 2009, after two partic-

ularly unpleasant events.4 A different focus and concern

on his part could have made a significant difference in

his children’s perception of them.’’ (Footnote added.)

‘‘[The] visits ended in September, 2009, with no reso-

lution of [the] negative tensions between [the defen-

dant] and his children. . . . [A]t that time, when Chloe

and Jake were eight years old, they had emotionally

aligned themselves with their mother. [The sometimes]

emotionally obtuse conduct [of their father] during visi-

tation supported their negative view of him. The combi-

nation of unhelpful conduct [of] both parents meant

that their children accepted their mother’s anxiety and

concerns about visits. They accepted her belief system

about their father and his family as their own, and their

stance continues to the present time.

‘‘Wherever the blame for the cessation of visits in

2009 lies, the fact remains that there were no more

visits until early spring [of] 2014 . . . when Jake and

Chloe were almost thirteen. This is a very significant

length of time for children of this age. The memories

of their father and their sense of any relationship with

him would have eroded just due to that gap in time

alone, never mind the other issues between them . . . .

Both [the defendant’s] parenting deficits, which the chil-

dren still recall, and the lost window of time during

these children’s latency years had important and signifi-

cant consequences for the next and last failed attempt

at reunification.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

On January 25, 2013, the court rendered judgment on

a stipulated agreement between the parties concerning

efforts to reunify the defendant with the children,

including the retention of therapists Linda Smith and

David Israel for the children. According to the stipula-

tion, ‘‘[t]he therapists [were to] direct who meets with

them, at what time and with what frequency.’’ The trial

court noted that ‘‘[t]he agreement was the result of all

counsel understanding that it was in the children’s best

interest[s] to have contact with their father and his

extended family.5 But even this agreement and order

was frustrated for over a year by [the plaintiff’s] unwill-

ingness to sign the retainer agreement and her detailed

concerns. She has admitted that she did not believe

the reunification would ever go forward. In a very real

sense, although there were subsequently four visits,

reunification did not go forward. It ended prematurely

and did not accomplish the outcome sought . . . .

‘‘As had happened before, [the plaintiff] encouraged

her children to believe that each of them could deter-

mine whether or not the visits should continue. Chloe

and Jake were demonstrably extremely resistant to visi-

tation with their father. [The plaintiff] continued her

resistant and undermining behavior, ongoing at that

point for more than ten years . . . . By this time, [the

plaintiff] had perfected the art.’’6 (Footnote added.)

The four visitation sessions the children had with the

defendant were very stressful for them, and they ‘‘began

to demonstrate and disclose symptoms of their distress

to their mother and their therapist. . . . The children’s

symptoms of distress, in addition to the conduct of their

mother, caused the professionals to end the attempt

at reunification.

‘‘There was no rapprochement between the children

and their father possible at this late date when they

were thirteen. [The defendant] and his children have

not had any contact since the last of the four visits

scheduled with [Smith].’’ The trial court agreed with

and credited the following assessment by the guardian

ad litem with respect to the extent of the parental con-

flict at issue in the present case: ‘‘The parents have

demonstrated a complete lack of insight as to the effects

of their inability to communicate after the unfortunate

and dramatic history and, if ordered to participate in

reunification therapy, the children will have the added

emotional distress of the tension involved in bringing

these two parents again within the orbit of the other.

Neither parent accepts responsibility for the familial

circumstances in which the children cope, but instead

blame the other in every aspect. . . . Both believe the

other had ruined his or her respective life and that of

the children.’’

On April 23, 2014, the defendant filed a motion seek-

ing to open the initial 2005 dissolution judgment to

modify the custody and visitation orders in effect. The

defendant claimed that the plaintiff was in violation of

the January 25, 2013 stipulated judgment and, by way of

relief, sought orders (1) requiring the children’s removal

from the plaintiff’s home, (2) continuing the reconcilia-

tion therapist’s efforts to reunite him with the children,

(3) mandating the plaintiff to pay for all ongoing costs

related to the children’s individual therapy, reconcilia-

tion therapy, and the attorney’s fees of the defendant.

On May 20, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for order

that asked the court (1) to order that the January 25,

2013 stipulated agreement regarding reunification

remain in effect and be complied with, (2) to issue

appropriate orders properly structuring the reconcilia-

tion process, and (3) to award the defendant reasonable

attorney’s fees for bringing and arguing the motion.

The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the

defendant’s two postjudgment motions over the course

of ten days beginning on January 13, 2016, and ending

on February 19, 2016. At the close of the hearings, on

February 19, 2016, the defendant filed a statement of

proposed orders amending his original claims for relief.

As described by the court, the statement set forth three

alternative orders in descending order of desirability.

The first two options each sought ‘‘to require the chil-

dren to attend the Building Bridges reunification pro-

gram, either the intensive four day program or the

shorter two day Overcoming Barriers program. The

third option [was to continue] reunification services

with [Smith] and order that the mother undergo therapy

to deal with the issues of the minor children and their

contact with their father. Other claims for relief [were]

for an award of attorney’s fees, to compensate [the

defendant] for [the plaintiff’s] ‘alienation’ of the children

from him, as well as an acknowledgment by the court

with an apology that this matter has taken so long to

reach a contested hearing.’’ The plaintiff, who repre-

sented herself throughout, filed a closing statement that

summarized the testimony in her favor and implied that

nothing should change regarding custody or visitation

because the defendant failed to demonstrate any change

in circumstances.

During the trial court proceedings, the court heard

recommendations about potential future efforts at fam-

ily reunification, including from Benjamin D. Garber,

an expert witness in psychology and parent/child reuni-

fication therapy offered by the defendant. ‘‘Garber rec-

ommended a program called Building Bridges, for

troubled and alienated parent-child relationships. . . .

He acknowledged that children involved in this program

experience intense pain initially in the process and are

under stress. . . . The Building Bridges program

would require Jake and Chloe to leave the care of their

mother, and attend what is essentially a ‘boot camp’ for

reunification with their father. The intensive program

is a four day residential program with [twenty-four]

hour therapeutic support, then followed by time alone

with their father for a week with continued therapeutic

support. Additionally, there is a period of temporary

custody of the children to their father for ninety days.

The children could also not have any contact with their

mother for a specified period of time. The second option

is a less intensive [two and one-half] day program, titled

Overcoming Barriers, with the same structure and

enforced access thereafter. Both programs prohibit

contact with the parent who has been determined to

be ‘alienating’ the children from their father.’’

The court also heard testimony from the children’s

past and present guardians ad litem regarding the well-

being of the children and the effects on them of ongoing

reunification efforts. The court summarized as follows:

‘‘With the exception of contact with their father, the

children have been and are doing extraordinarily well

in all other spheres of their lives in the care of their

mother. It speaks well of [the plaintiff] and [her current

husband] and the home they have been able to create for

these children. They are gifted children and excelling

academically. They have full social lives and are well

respected by their teachers and other students. They

are seen as the ‘rock stars’ of their school class by the

school administrators.

‘‘On the negative side, the radioactive fallout from

the access disputes between their parents has had an

impact. All reports are that they remain anxious about

whether they will be forced to spend time with their

father by the court or whether, worse yet, custody will

be awarded to him. They do not understand why the

court does not hear them and accept the validity of

their position and emotions about their father.’’

The present guardian ad litem, Attorney Suzanne

Snearly, indicated to the court that the children ‘‘believe

that their father has not respected them, their physical

boundaries and their positions in the past. . . . [They]

firmly believe right now that they are a prize to be

captured by their [father] at their expense and that of

others. They do not want to be treated that way.’’ (Inter-

nal quotation marks omitted.) She further indicated that

‘‘[t]o be viewed as a prize is offensive to [the children]

. . . and they would be devastated if [the defendant]

were to be awarded custody of them. They feel that

they have been hostages to this protracted litigation.

[Snearly] stated she was sad that they had lost their

childhood in that way and lost the ability to have a full

relationship with their father. In her opinion, litigation

or the Building Bridges program could not create that

which had been lost. The children had shared with her

that they would be more inclined to reach out to their

father if the litigation and forceful efforts to have access

would stop. And allowing them to move forward at their

own pace is what she recommended, after all these

many years of anxiety and protracted litigation. She

believed neither the law nor court orders could provide

a more reasonable remedy than the parties could fash-

ion on their own in ordering their lives privately.’’

Finally, Snearly testified ‘‘that the children did not wish

to be forced to have visitation and that, at this point in

time, they were prepared to explore the issue volunta-

rily and send a report of their doings and lives to their

father every ninety days. She also felt strongly that their

therapy with [Israel] had been enormously beneficial

to them and should continue.’’

On May 16, 2016, the court issued its memorandum

of decision denying the defendant’s motions. Citing to

the guiding criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-

56, the court reached the following conclusions:7 ‘‘[The

defendant’s] capacity and disposition to understand and

meet the needs of [the children] has been limited. [The

plaintiff’s] capacity has been limited only on the issues

of understanding the importance of knowing their

father in the children’s optimal development and

exposing them to detailed information about the ongo-

ing conflict. In all other areas, she has met their needs

very well. The children’s past interactions with their

father have been largely negative, in their view. Some

positive interactions have occurred but not for some

considerable time. They have a close relationship with

their mother. . . . [Both parties have] been guilty of

involving their children in their disputes and litigation.

Overall, in considering these factors as to what is in

these children’s best interests, neither parent fares well

on all measures. As found earlier in this decision, nei-

ther parent fully appreciates the harm each has done

to each other or to their minor children.

‘‘As to [the defendant’s] claims, the court begins with

the observation that in a civilized society, it should not

be the custom or practice to punish youthful victims

for the transgression of their elders. [The defendant’s]

preferred solution would force Chloe and Jake to have

contact with him, in a program with therapeutic sup-

ports. It appears to be a method for forced reprogram-

ming of the children and their emotional understanding

of their family constellation. The emotional coercion

of necessity involved in this program would do violence

to these children’s emerging sense of self and ability

to determine their lives. Ordering their attendance at

the program would punish these innocent teenagers for

the inability of their parents to become fully functioning

and emotionally forgiving adults who could leave their

personal war and hatred behind. The court finds that

ordering attendance at the Building Bridges program,

or the less intensive Overcoming Barriers program, to

be a draconian solution in these unusual circumstances.

Forced attendance at either program would mete out

the blame and punishment [the defendant] wishes to

impose on [the plaintiff] on his children. The court

declines to take this shortsighted step.

‘‘These children believe that they and their views are

not respected by their father or heard by the court.

The court does find [that] they have internalized their

mother’s emotional landscape and negative views of

their father and made them their own. Whatever one’s

view of how their position about their father came

about, the court finds that for Jake and Chloe, it has

emotional validity and reality, and must be seen in that

light. . . .

‘‘The [g]uardian ad litem has suggested and advocated

a solution, which would let these . . . teenagers deter-

mine the progress of access by themselves. Ordinarily,

courts do not empower young people of this age to

make adult determinations. But each case is unique, as

are these two teenagers. Each of them has been given

tacit permission at a younger age to determine the

course of their access to their father. Additionally, there

have been years of court imposed solutions to the Zil-

kha/Kaiser family dysfunction supported by well-mean-

ing attorneys and therapists. None of the proposed

solutions and earlier court orders has resulted in any

meaningful change or increased access.

‘‘There are circumstances where it is the public policy

of the state of Connecticut to permit more adult modes

of self-determination by young people under the age of

eighteen. General Statutes § 45a-724 (a) (1), for exam-

ple, provides that a child in foster care who can be

adopted must consent to that adoption [if the child

has attained the age of twelve]. If that consent is not

forthcoming, the planned adoption will not proceed.

The young person is permitted to have a significant

say in [his or] her future, under those circumstances.

Additionally, a young person who is sixteen may seek

to be recognized as an emancipated minor. General

Statutes § 46b-150d permits such a minor, if so emanci-

pated, to live independently and function as a legal

adult. Chloe and Jake, fortunately, do not find them-

selves in either of these statutorily enumerated situa-

tions. But their request to be permitted a similar level

of mature choice is entitled to be recognized. The court

concludes that to do so is in their best interests.

‘‘The court finds that it is past time to seek change

and healing for this group of individuals tied by familial

connections. As [Garber] noted in his testimony and

the court also finds, there is a limit to what court orders

can accomplish to achieve personal change in resistant

individuals. The usual court remedies of sanctions,

financial orders and the like are not well suited for

this herculean task. They would serve only to fuel the

ongoing Zilkha family war, as they have for twelve years

in the past.

‘‘In this war, this court will seek to impose a cease

fire, a cessation of hostilities and some recommenda-

tions for how lasting peace and recovery might be

achieved. Lasting peace and reconciliation are not out-

comes that can be imposed, either on nations or individ-

uals. But if they are sincerely sought and mechanisms

[are] put in place for their achievement, they may be

secured. It is . . . time to try something new and dif-

ferent.

‘‘First, the court finds that it is in Jake’s and Chloe’s

best interests to permit them to move forward at their

own pace to secure a relationship with their father and

his extended family. Their position about access to their

father has been heard and understood. They should not

worry about ‘something’ until they create that ‘some-

thing’ and give it reality.

‘‘To continue with these thoughts, the ‘something’ the

court now orders is only whatever ‘something’ they

allow it to become. Both Jake and Chloe shall report

to their father in detail about their lives every ninety

days. They have indicated that they are willing to start

with such contact. As that process becomes more com-

fortable for them, more contact could occur, although

it is not ordered. Telephone, e-mail and other contact

has never been prohibited in this case, although the

parents have considered it to be so. Both children are

encouraged to communicate more often in the future

than their current stated preference when they are

ready to do so. The court encourages them to make it

‘something’ that begins to approach normal parental

access, when they are ready and prepared to do so.

‘‘After they have become comfortable sharing some

of their life with their father, they might begin with

phone calls, e-mails or text exchanges and then con-

sider meeting face-to-face at a comfortable place of

their choosing, such as [a] food court in a mall for a

brief snack. Such progression of contact is for them to

determine. All these statements are only suggestions

by the court, to be shaped by Chloe and Jake and their

stated wishes. Both [Israel] and the guardian [ad litem]

should assist them in their efforts.’’

The court then issued the following orders. With

respect to future access by the defendant to the chil-

dren, the court stated that ‘‘[s]uch access as may evolve

between [the defendant], his extended family and Jake

and Chloe during the less than three years remaining

before Jake and Chloe are eighteen shall be voluntary

and at Jake and Chloe’s choosing and direction. Mini-

mally, it shall be by quarterly written reports provided

by the children about their lives to their father. Hope-

fully, it will progress to more access and, ultimately,

personal contact on a regular basis. Should the children

wish to progress at some point in the future to normal

access, [the plaintiff] must permit alternate weekend

overnight access from Friday through Sunday, some

hours during the week after school, as well as uninter-

rupted vacation time in the summer for up to three

weeks. All such access is to be unsupervised.

‘‘[The plaintiff] must also permit access by the Zilkha

extended family, if Jake and Chloe wish it. That access

should begin by sharing information about their lives

with their paternal grandmother, much the same way

they share information with their father, and perhaps

more frequently than every ninety days. The court

encourages both of them to communicate with their

grandmother, as in the past they had a good relationship

with her. Should they wish to do so, they may visit with

her and [the plaintiff] is ordered to facilitate such visits.

‘‘The court cautions [the defendant] not to read any

legal entitlement to direct access in any fashion to his

children through these orders. Visitation is always for

the children’s benefit. In this unusual high conflict

family and, given Jake and Chloe’s age, the court has

made it exclusively the minor children’s legal entitle-

ment.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The court ordered both parties to attend individual

therapy with a therapist. With respect to the defendant,

the court’s order provided that ‘‘[h]is therapist should

assist him in understanding his children and adoles-

cents in general so that when Jake and Chloe are able

to reach out to him, he will be able to respond in

thoughtful and emotionally appropriate, as well as con-

siderate, ways. He is to be guided by the affirmative

steps his children take and not to prematurely initiate

contact on his own. Any such contact as he does have

shall be at their request only.’’ As to the plaintiff, the

court indicated that ‘‘[w]ithin the context of the therapy,

it is suggested that the therapist explore the importance

of access to both parents for the well-being of children

and the consequences of the estrangement and align-

ment with her own views that [the plaintiff] has imposed

upon her children.’’

The court ordered the children to continue in counsel-

ing with Israel ‘‘as long as he is willing to provide such

assistance and it is therapeutically indicated. If he per-

sonally can no longer continue at some point in the

future, he shall recommend a replacement therapist for

the children. Their mother is ordered to ensure the

two children attend such therapy. Additionally, [Israel],

consistent with the therapeutic goals for the children,

should endeavor to assist in their voluntary reestablish-

ment of a relationship with their father. To that extent

and only if he so requests, the parents and their thera-

pists shall cooperate with any steps he may recommend.

Each of the parties shall sign all necessary releases to

ensure that all therapists are able to communicate with

each other about these steps.’’

In addition, the court ordered the children’s guardian

ad litem to disseminate copies of the court’s written

decision to the parents’ individual therapists and to

Israel and to ensure that any ordered releases were

signed so that the professionals could communicate

with each other. The court denied the defendant’s

request for attorney’s fees, indicating that ‘‘an order for

payment of such fees can only be designed as punish-

ment. The request to use the court system to bludgeon

the [plaintiff] is denied with prejudice.’’ The court

directed the plaintiff to dismantle her ‘‘war room . . .

in which her litigation materials are kept and where

she works on preparation for the litigation in which she

has been involved.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

According to the court, dedicating the space to a ‘‘more

peaceful use . . . will signal to the children a signifi-

cant change in their mother’s stance toward their father

and help them all move forward to secure some peace

and healing.’’ The court retained jurisdiction over the

matter for a period of one year with respect to issues

involving access and visitation ‘‘to both streamline fur-

ther litigation and to ensure enforcement of its orders.’’

Finally, although acknowledging the parties’ right to

appeal its decision, the court cautioned that ‘‘[g]iven

their many years of toxic litigation in this family dispute,

their collateral civil litigation, as well as appeals already

taken, the court directs each of them to carefully con-

sider the negative impact of such conduct on their chil-

dren. Neither should act in ways to increase their

children’s anxiety over their future. Such conduct

would not be in their children’s best interests.’’

The defendant filed a motion for reargument on June

3, 2016, followed by a supplemental memorandum in

support of the motion on June 8, 2016. The court denied

the defendant’s motion on September 28, 2016. This

appeal followed.8

I

The defendant first claims that by granting the chil-

dren a considerable level of control over the extent of

the defendant’s access to them, the court improperly

delegated its judicial function and failed to consider

both public policy and the best interests of the children.

In support of this claim, the defendant primarily relies

upon cases in which our appellate courts have, in differ-

ent circumstances, found that the trial court completely

delegated its decision-making authority to a third party.

See Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 532–33, 429 A.2d

964 (1980); Nashid v. Andrawis, 83 Conn. App. 115,

120, 847 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 912, 853

A.2d 528 (2004); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn. App.

622, 628–29, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). We conclude that

those cases are readily distinguishable from the court’s

action in the present case. Furthermore, the defendant

has failed to persuade us that, in rendering its decision,

the court ignored its obligation to consider the best

interests of the children or ran afoul of public policy.

Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim.

We begin with the applicable law governing custody

and visitation orders as well as our standard of review.

Subsection (a) of § 46b-56 authorizes the Superior Court

in any action involving the custody or care of minor

children, including a divorce action brought under Gen-

eral Statutes § 46b-45, to ‘‘make or modify any proper

order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation

and support of the children . . . according to its best

judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to

such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable.’’

Subsection (b) of § 46b-56 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In

making or modifying any order as provided in subsec-

tion (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities

of both parents shall be considered and the court shall

enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests

of the child and provide the child with the active and

consistent involvement of both parents commensurate

with their abilities and interests. . . .’’ Subsection (b)

contains a nonexhaustive list of possible orders, ending

with a catchall provision permitting ‘‘any other custody

arrangements as the court may determine to be in the

best interests of the child.’’ Subsection (c) of § 46b-56

provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]n making or modifying

any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this

section, the court shall consider the best interests of

the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not

be limited to, one or more of [sixteen enumerated]

factors9 . . . . The court is not required to assign any

weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall

articulate the basis for its decision.’’ (Footnote added.)

‘‘It is well settled authority that [n]o court in this state

can delegate its judicial authority to any person serving

the court in a nonjudicial function. The court may seek

the advice and heed the recommendation contained in

the reports of persons engaged by the court to assist

it, but in no event may such a nonjudicial entity bind

the judicial authority to enter any order or judgment

so advised or recommended.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Nashid v. Andrawis, supra, 83 Conn. App.

120.

We utilize an abuse of discretion standard in

reviewing orders regarding custody and visitation

rights; see Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 43, 440 A.2d

782 (1981); Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 541,

429 A.2d 801 (1980); although recognizing that whether

the court improperly delegated its judicial authority

presents a legal question over which we exercise ple-

nary review. See Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 458,

998 A.2d 766 (2010). In exercising its discretion, the

court should consider ‘‘the rights and wishes of the

parents and may hear the recommendations of profes-

sionals in the family relations field, but the court must

ultimately be controlled by the welfare of the particular

child. . . . This involves weighing all the facts and cir-

cumstances of the family situation. Each case is unique.

The task is sensitive and delicate, and involves the most

difficult and agonizing decision that a trial judge must

make. . . . The trial court has the great advantage of

hearing the witnesses and in observing their demeanor

and attitude to aid in judging the credibility of testi-

mony. . . . Great weight is given to the conclusions of

the trial court which had the opportunity to observe

directly the parties and the witnesses. . . . A conclu-

sion of the trial court must be allowed to stand if it is

reasonably supported by the relevant subordinate facts

found and does not violate law, logic or reason. . . .

[T]he authority to exercise the judicial discretion under

the circumstances revealed by the finding is not con-

ferred upon this court, but upon the trial court, and

. . . we are not privileged to usurp that authority or

to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere

difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our

intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the

action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear

abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’’ (Cita-

tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gallo

v. Gallo, supra, 43–45.

The defendant’s claim that the court in the present

case abandoned its obligation to decide the matter

before it and improperly delegated its statutory author-

ity regarding custody and visitation simply is not borne

out by the careful and exhaustive decision issued by

the trial court. The court did not ask any other person

to decide whether the defendant should have any right

to custody or visitation. The court fully weighed the

facts presented and the competing interests of all the

parties, set forth the proper legal framework, including

citing § 46b-56, and rendered a decision on the merits,

articulating in detail the basis for its decision denying

the defendant’s motions.

Because the court properly exercised its decision-

making authority, we summarily reject the defendant’s

reliance upon cases in which this court or our Supreme

Court have reversed a family court’s order on the

ground that the court had improperly delegated a core

decision-making function to a party not ‘‘clothed with

judicial authority.’’ Valante v. Valante, supra, 180 Conn.

532–33; see also Nashid v. Andrawis, supra, 83 Conn.

App. 120–21; Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 18 Conn.

App. 628–29. The present case is wholly inapposite to

those cited by the defendant. In each of the cases cited

by the defendant, the court removed itself entirely from

the decision-making process by permitting legal issues

to be resolved through binding arbitration that was

subject to limited judicial review; see Nashid v.

Andrawis, supra, 120–21; or by delegating the court’s

authority and obligation to render a binding decision

to a family relations officer; see Valante v. Valante,

supra, 532–33; or to a guardian ad litem. See Weinstein

v. Weinstein, supra, 628–29. Unlike in those cases, the

court in the present case properly considered and fully

resolved the custody and visitation issues before it by

rendering a decision on the defendant’s motions and

the relief requested therein.

Simply put, rather than delegating its responsibility,

the court exercised its authority and met its obligation

to decide issues of custody and visitation by denying

the defendant’s motions. This adjudication by the court

was the antithesis of a delegation because it plainly

decided that the defendant should not have any right

to custody or visitation. The fact that the court’s order

left open the possibility of voluntary visits at the discre-

tion of the teenagers does not transform the court’s

decision-making into impermissible delegation.

The court went to great lengths to consider the poten-

tial benefits the children might gain from independently

reestablishing some relationship with the defendant

while recognizing that ordering visitation, at this late

stage, in light of the children’s deeply ingrained atti-

tudes, was unlikely to magically heal their fractured

relationship with the defendant. The court gave apt

consideration to the children’s desires to have some

control over their lives and the people with whom they

interact. It was entirely appropriate, for the reasons

stated by the court, for it to have considered that the

children were teenagers and to give considerable weight

to their opinions and desires to control their own des-

tinies.

Ultimately, it was the court’s judicial determination

that the best interests of the children required that the

defendant’s physical access to them be voluntary in

nature, at the choosing and direction of the children.

Such a decision avoided the setting of an arbitrary and

inflexible visitation schedule or reunification regime,

which the family’s history suggests would very likely

lead to further conflicts, and, instead, encouraged and

facilitated a voluntary path to reunification while at all

times making clear that the defendant had no legal

rights in this regard.

Finally, the court correctly, and on numerous occa-

sions throughout its decision, acknowledged and gave

due consideration to its duty to craft orders that took

into consideration both the best interests of these par-

ticular children and the well established public policy

that children of divorce are usually best served by main-

taining a meaningful relationship with their noncusto-

dial parent. In the present case, in which those

considerations often suggested divergent paths, the

court did an admirable job in taking a balanced

approach. The court recognized that the children would

benefit from a relationship with the defendant and

squarely placed much of the blame for a lack of such

a relationship at the feet of the plaintiff. Nevertheless,

the court could not ignore the defendant’s own poor

behavior or the detrimental effect that would result

from removing the children from the plaintiff and forc-

ing them into one of the requested programs.

In sum, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that

the court improperly delegated its judicial function. He

also has failed to show that the court abused its discre-

tion by failing to consider the best interests of the chil-

dren or any established public policy. The defendant’s

claim, accordingly, fails.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

relied upon events that occurred between 2004 and 2007

in reaching its decision to deny his motions, disre-

garding what he characterizes as an indication to the

parties during the evidentiary hearing that such evi-

dence was too remote and insufficiently weighty for

proper consideration by the court. We are not per-

suaded.

In support of this claim, the defendant focuses our

attention to an instance during the presentation of evi-

dence in which the court attempted to encourage the

parties not to focus upon minute details of long past

events but upon the presentation of the evidence most

likely to be germane to the important decision facing

the court. Specifically, at one point in the proceeding,

the self-represented plaintiff, who is not an attorney,

was cross-examining the defendant about details of his

2004 assault of her, attempting to demonstrate that he

had made false statements about the cause of her injur-

ies, something he had admitted during direct examina-

tion. When the cross-examination began to falter

following an objection regarding the admission of

details of a Department of Children and Families report,

the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘The Court: Let me say this. I recognize and do not

mean to make any statements about how important this

event has been in your dissolution proceedings and in

the various claims about visitation and access. But it

is now eleven years ago.

‘‘So for purposes of this hearing about what’s to hap-

pen next, it has become remote in time. Yes, it informs

your consequential actions from it. But the details of

what was said to whom in 2004 and the accuracy of

those statements today is perhaps not as weighty as

you might feel them to be.

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: My—thank you, Your Honor. My rea-

soning is to bring up the veracity of [the defendant]

in situations.

‘‘The Court: I hear you, but he has admitted that he

made false statements already.

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: That this was not true.

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Thank you, Your Honor. I will

move on.’’

The defendant also directs our attention to an

exchange that occurred during a discussion regarding

scheduling, in particular, the plaintiff’s list of witnesses

she potentially might call for the purpose of authenticat-

ing documents. After agreeing to withdraw a number

of the witnesses, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. I don’t object to

Mr. Magnano as a witness, even though I think—

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I will withdraw him at this point. I

think Your Honor [has] made it abundantly clear that

you would like the further—

‘‘The Court: I’m more interested in the more recent

than—I don’t mind having a summary of the past

events—

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: A mosaic?

‘‘The Court: —but I don’t know that it’s necessary to

prove each and every one of them now.’’

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude

that the defendant misconstrues the nature and import

of the preceding colloquies. As previously observed,

in matters involving custody and visitation, the court

properly exercises its discretion by ‘‘weighing all the

facts and circumstances of the family situation.’’ Gallo

v. Gallo, supra, 184 Conn. 44. The court did so in the

present case. We are not aware of any point during the

proceedings in which the court indicated that it would

not consider or rely upon evidence occurring in or

before 2007, as the defendant suggests, or that the court

otherwise precluded or limited the scope of the parties’

presentation of evidence.

Instead, the court was simply trying to encourage the

parties to focus on the most relevant facts relating to

the current feelings and conduct of the parties. In doing

so, the court never indicated that the historical facts

were irrelevant or that the parties were precluded

entirely from offering evidence regarding them.

The trial court is responsible for the orderly and

efficient management of its docket. See Sowell v.

DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 132, 127 A.3d 356 (‘‘[m]at-

ters involving judicial economy, docket management

[and control of] courtroom proceedings . . . are par-

ticularly within the province of a trial court’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 909,

128 A.3d 953 (2015). Accordingly, it is not improper

or surprising that some guidance from the court was

necessary and appropriate to maintain an orderly and

timely presentation of the evidence in the present case.

We conclude that the court properly admitted and

considered all relevant evidence presented in reaching

its decision. The defendant has failed to demonstrate

that the court abused its discretion in this regard and,

accordingly, we reject his claim.

III

The defendant also claims that the court improperly

considered and adopted the recommendations made

by Snearly, the children’s guardian ad litem, because,

according to the defendant, she ‘‘chose to function as

an attorney for the minor children instead of fulfilling

her obligations as [a] guardian ad litem.’’ The record

does not support this claim.

We agree with the defendant that the role and func-

tion of a guardian ad litem for a minor child is distinct

from that of an attorney for a minor child. ‘‘Typically,

the child’s attorney is an advocate for the child, while

the guardian ad litem is the representative of the child’s

best interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ire-

land v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 439, 717 A.2d 676 (1998).

It is axiomatic, however, that, in making a final decision

regarding custody and visitation, ‘‘[a] court is permitted

to seek advice, and accept recommendations, from the

guardian ad litem.’’ Keenan v. Casillo, 149 Conn. App.

642, 661, 89 A.3d 912, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 910, 93

A.3d 594 (2014).

The defendant has not directed our attention to any

factual findings of the court or other evidence in the

record before us that would support his assertion that

Snearly blindly advocated for the children rather than

exercised her own discretion in making the recommen-

dations that she did. The mere fact that her recommen-

dations that the defendant’s motions be denied aligned

with the wishes of the children does not support a

conclusion that Snearly abandoned her role as a guard-

ian ad litem for the children to don the mantle of their

legal advocate or that her recommendations could not

properly be considered by the court.

Furthermore, there is nothing to support the asser-

tion that the court simply adopted Snearly’s recommen-

dations in the present case. Snearly testified during

the hearing, detailing her investigation and interactions

with the children. She also made recommendations,

both orally and in writing, about what, in her opinion,

would be in the children’s best interests with respect to

visitations with the defendant and further reunification

efforts. Specifically, Snearly testified that the children

did not want to be forced by the court to have visitations

with the defendant and that they would be emotionally

devastated if that happened. She indicated that any

attempt at forced reunification would be intensely

upsetting for the children. She indicated that forced

participation in the Family Bridges reunification pro-

gram would ‘‘turn their entire lives completely upside

down at a very detrimental point in their life and devel-

opment.’’

Unquestionably, the court considered Snearly’s opin-

ion as a guardian ad litem as part of its consideration

of the record as a whole. The court never indicated at

any point, however, that it was simply adopting Snear-

ly’s recommendations wholesale. In fact, the court

stated: ‘‘The [guardian ad litem’s] recommendation

demonstrates her compassion for her wards and the

pain they have suffered. It also assists the court in

considering the parties’ claims for relief and what rem-

edy, if any, is available for this group of adults and two

children who stand in the middle of their protracted

conflict.’’ (Emphasis added.) We construe this as an

indication by the court that Snearly’s recommendation

assisted the court in its own independent calculus of

what relief would be in the best interests of the children.

We thus reject as factually unsupported the notion that

the court adopted Snearly’s recommendations.

Finally, Snearly’s testimony and opinion were subject

to cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel, who

was free to explore the defendant’s allegations of bias

and failure to adhere to her obligations as a guardian

ad litem. Moreover, in addition to Snearly’s recommen-

dations, the court also carefully considered and dis-

cussed in its decision other contrasting viewpoints,

including those from Garber, who recommended and

advocated for the Building Bridges program favored

by the defendant. Ultimately, our review of the record

demonstrates that the court reached its own indepen-

dent decision regarding what would be in the best inter-

ests of the teenaged children moving forward, and did

not simply adopt the recommendation of Snearly as

suggested by the defendant. Accordingly, we reject the

claim and its underlying premise. To the extent that

the defendant truly believes that Snearly failed to exer-

cise her obligations as a guardian ad litem properly,

other avenues were available for addressing those con-

cerns, such as seeking her removal and replacement.

Such allegations simply do not form a basis for reversing

the decision of the trial court in the present case.

IV

Finally, the defendant claims that, in reaching its

decision, the court improperly relied on an erroneous

factual finding, namely, that the parties’ reconciliation

therapist, Smith, had ended reconciliation therapy with

the parties. The defendant argues that the finding is not

supported by the record and is in direct contradiction to

Smith’s own testimony. He also argues that the alleged

error was ‘‘so material to the heart of the matter at

issue as to have changed the outcome of the trial.’’ We

again find the defendant’s claim wholly unpersuasive.

As previously stated, in reviewing a court’s decision

in family matters, this court defers to the facts as found

by the trial court unless those findings are clearly erro-

neous. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there

is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Adams,

93 Conn. App. 423, 427, 890 A.2d 575 (2006). ‘‘Where,

however, some of the facts found [by the court] are

clearly erroneous and others are supported by the evi-

dence, we must examine the clearly erroneous findings

to see whether they were harmless, not only in isolation,

but also taken as a whole. . . . If, when taken as a

whole, they undermine appellate confidence in the

court’s fact finding process, a new hearing is required.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lambert v.

Donahue, 78 Conn. App. 493, 507, 827 A.2d 729 (2003).

The defendant directs our attention to certain pas-

sages in the trial court’s decision in which the court

discusses the agreement the parties reached in 2013 to

enter into reunification therapy with Smith. The court

indicated that the parties had only four sessions, they

were very stressful for the children, and ‘‘[t]he chil-

dren’s symptoms of distress, in addition to the conduct

of the mother, caused the professionals to end the

attempt at reunification. There was no rapprochement

between the children and their father possible at this

late date when they were thirteen.’’ The gravamen of

these findings, when read in context, is that the parties

had been unable to benefit in any meaningful way from

their reunification therapy sessions.

The defendant argues that it was a misrepresentation

for the court to have stated that the professionals ended

the therapy, pointing to testimony by Smith in which

she stated that, in her opinion, she did not believe the

parties had ‘‘reached an end’’ therapeutically and that

the parties may have benefitted from different treat-

ment approaches. In the same testimony, however,

Smith also acknowledged that she did not ‘‘know what

happened because at that point [it] ended, but it just

didn’t go forward after that.’’ Whether therapy was in

fact ended by the professionals or whether the parties

simply stopped attending on their own, there is nothing

in the court’s analysis that suggests that this was an

important or material factor in its decision to deny

the motions of the defendant. It was the failure of the

therapy to alter the destructive behaviors of the parties

that led the court to its conclusion that more of the

same was unlikely to be in the best interests of the

children. Accordingly, even if we were to agree that the

court’s finding that Smith ended reunification therapy

was a factual error, when the court’s remaining unchal-

lenged findings are considered as a whole rather than

focusing on that one alleged inaccuracy, there is ample

support in the record for the relief ordered by the court.

This includes its decision regarding the defendant’s

future access to his teenaged children, with whom he

has never developed any meaningful relationship.

Because the claimed error does not undermine our con-

fidence in the court’s overall fact-finding process, we

conclude that any error was harmless.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

Karen Zilkha is now known as Karen Kaiser. Although the trial court

altered the case caption of its memorandum of decision to reflect that name

change, we caption our opinion to reflect the names of the parties as they

appeared in the original pleadings.

2

The first incident involving the police happened on June 17, 2004, when,

during a heated dispute, the plaintiff decided she was going to a motel and

taking the children. The defendant grabbed his daughter Chloe and would

not release her despite her screams for the plaintiff. The responding officer

advised the defendant that he would be arrested unless he released the

child, which he eventually did. As described by the court in its memorandum

of decision, ‘‘[t]he third incident occurred during supervised visitation on

October 30, 2004. The police were called by the visitation supervisor, who

witnessed [the defendant] being verbally very aggressive toward [the plain-

tiff] in front of the children. The supervisor terminated the visit because he

was afraid [the plaintiff] would be assaulted by [the defendant].’’ (Foot-

note omitted.)

3

With respect to the defendant, Adamakos’ report provided as follows:

‘‘Undoubtedly, [the defendant’s] demeanor and behavioral presentation

improves when he is feeling less defensive, and may indicate the presence

of some psychological strengths which are now under assault by the very

high level of stress he is experiencing (regardless of whether it is caused by

himself or by the situation). There was some indication that [the defendant’s]

response can be somewhat histrionic, and that in this regard, he can be

impulsive and evidence impaired judgment. There was also some sense that

he maintains an attitude of narcissism and a sense of entitlement [that] may

contribute to his occasionally violating the expectations of others. However,

there was lacking indication that he was malicious in his intent. There is

no dispute that he was engaged in severe verbal disputes (tirade at Borders

10/30/2004), some level of physicality (pushing [the plaintiff] 6/30/2004) and

desperate dramatic acts (holding Chloe so that [the plaintiff] could not leave

with her 6/17/2004). He seems to be a person who tends to manage his

stress by finding outlets of escape or recreation. He engages in denial and

repressive defense mechanisms excessively.’’ With respect to the plaintiff,

Adamakos made the following observations: ‘‘[The plaintiff] is a woman

who appears to have a fairly traditional sense of mores and expectations.

Her aspirations have been modest and continued to be centered around

parenting the children. She appears to have needed some assistance in the

transitions in her life, and she sometimes had some difficulties adjusting to

trying circumstances. It would seem as though she may struggle with some

anxiety and dependency related issues, but largely she has compensated

for them over the years. Extreme stress threatens to escalate these needs,

but there is no indication of significant psychopathology for her either,

and in a very straightforward manner, psychological testing supported the

impression that she is functioning normally.’’

As indicated by the court in its memorandum of decision, Adamakos’

observations were consistent with the court’s own contemporaneous obser-

vations of the parties during the underlying courtroom proceedings.

4

The first event occurred in July, 2009, when the children were performing

in a play and asked the defendant not to attend. Because the plaintiff also

did not want him to attend, the supervisor’s company would not supervise

that contact. Nevertheless, the defendant attended the performance, and

his attendance was videotaped by the plaintiff’s spouse, Glen Kaiser. When

asked, the plaintiff told the children that the defendant had attended. As

the trial court found, ‘‘[n]either parent earn[ed] any glory for their conduct.

. . . [The defendant] should have respected his children’s wishes and used

the next visitation session to ask his children to tell him about the play,

which undoubtedly they would have enjoyed. His conduct, if [the plaintiff’s]

resistance to his access to the children is at least a partially conscious

strategy, played right into her hands by his failure to honor the children’s

wishes.

‘‘The [plaintiff’s and Glen Kaiser’s] reaction was also not appropriate

and calls into question just how innocent [the plaintiff’s] intentions in her

‘empathy’ with her children have been. The visitation supervisor was focused

only on [the defendant’s] less than exemplary conduct. She constructed,

together with [the defendant], a script for a sincere apology which he did

not follow. The self-indulgent excuses he made upset the children and the

visits deteriorated from then on. Likely, as [Adamakos] noted in 2005, more

than four years earlier, [the defendant’s] ‘denial and excessive defense mech-

anisms’ did not help him in this task.

‘‘Some three or four weeks later, there was a visit scheduled between

[the defendant], his mother and the children’s step-grandfather. By way of

background, [the defendant] comes from a prominent extended family, with

members that reside in England and Europe. When they were young, Jake

and Chloe enjoyed a good relationship with their paternal grandmother,

[Jillian] Ritblat, and other members of the family. Over time, [the plaintiff]

put the brakes on these connections and did not support them. [Jillian]

Ritblat testified as to how attenuated their connections had become during

the 2007–2009 supervised visitation period. The children, in 2009, were

extremely resistant to visitation and acted in a manner that can only be

described as contemptuous and extremely rude toward their grandmother

and grandfather. In an ordinary family situation or even visitation situation,

they would have been sanctioned for such conduct. In this instance, however,

therapeutic supervision meant that they were rewarded by the intervention

of the supervisor when the grandparents reacted with some hostility to the

lack of respect shown to them.

‘‘There is no doubt the entire situation could have been handled by the

adults with more compassion. But these children were then just eight years

old. That the children’s standoffish, resistant, and at times rude conduct

would not have been acceptable pursuant to the cultural norms of the

grandparents was not considered by anyone. The visit ended prematurely

with many recriminations. Jake and Chloe have not seen their grandmother

since that time, a period of seven years.’’

5

The stipulation provided in relevant part: ‘‘The mother will support the

father/child relationship by saying to the children that she and the father

have agreed to stop arguing in court; that she wants them to have a loving

and caring relationship with their father, and that she will support them in

their efforts to rebuild that relationship, because he is their father and

because he cares about them, loves them, and has much to offer them. [The

children’s attorney and their guardian ad litem] will be present when the

mother has this conversation with the children. Both parents will respect

the desires of the children, except they jointly expect the children to engage

and cooperate with their goal to reunite them with their father.’’

6

‘‘On March 9, 2014, Smith wrote an e-mail to the guardian ad litem and

the children’s therapist outlining [the plaintiff’s] resistant actions. [Smith]

stated that: I have offered to try to make this as easy and least disruptive

[as possible] for the children. For example, not taking them out of school.

[The plaintiff] then chooses to take them out of school, and the children

then blame [the defendant] for missed school. They blame [the defendant]

for having to hide in their rooms when the process services came. But who

didn’t open the door? They blame [the defendant] for the court dates over

the last year and all the money that has been spent. But who didn’t sign

the contract and resisted starting the reunification? They vilify every profes-

sional who has not aligned with their viewpoint of no contact ([the] children

and [the] mother). They are looking to make [the defendant] appear bad

that he may be bipolar or [manic]. Yesterday they locked themselves in

their room. A typical parent response would have been to open the door.

Locked doors can be opened, both with tools and/or taking doors off the

hinges. . . . [T]hey didn’t do that. Why not? A clear message was sent to

the children. Yesterday, Chloe had a concert that was supposed to be taken

away. It wasn’t. . . . [The defendant] predicted that the children would go

to the concert last night. . . . He also predicted that the children would

blame him for missing school (after [the plaintiff] chose missing school

instead of a late afternoon [appointment]). . . . I really hope that a fuller

picture of the family dynamics are becoming clear to everyone. There are

many issues to address here. It is not just the children and [the defendant].

This is systemic and needs a unified systemic approach. Otherwise the same

pattern will happen as from the past.’’

7

The court earlier in its decision had reached the following conclusion

based upon its review of the exhibits and testimony presented by the parties:

‘‘[T]he truth of each of these parents’ assertions against the other lies some-

where between the extremes they present. The plaintiff cannot acknowledge

or recognize the manner in which her excessive anxiety and compulsive

fears about [the defendant] have impacted her children and their reaction

to their father. Conversely, the defendant only now appears to recognize

how [the plaintiff’s] conduct and the children’s mirroring actions triggered

his overblown and faulty parenting reactions. The parties’ testimony and

demeanor in court amply demonstrated their ability and willingness to con-

tinue their negative and toxic interactions.

‘‘[Although] greater fault in bringing about the complete failure of access

between the children and their father can perhaps be assigned to the [plain-

tiff], neither of these parents is blameless. For [the children], the amount

of blame to be assigned [to] each of their parents has little meaning. Both

have lost sight of the children’s need to have the unhampered love and

affection of both parents. Their war over their children brings the biblical

example of King Solomon’s ruling vividly to mind. Unfortunately, the biblical

sword has already fallen on Jake and Chloe.’’

8

The plaintiff never filed an appellee’s brief in this matter. On April 13,

2017, this court issued an order indicating that the appeal would be heard

solely on the basis of the appellant’s brief, appendices and record as defined

by Practice Book § 60-4. Thereafter, the guardian ad litem filed a brief in

opposition to the defendant’s appeal. See Practice Book § 67-13.

9

The statutory factors are as follows: ‘‘(1) The temperament and develop-

mental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents

to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material

information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of

the child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (5) the past

and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the

child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best

interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to

facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between

the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with

any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents

in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of

each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child’s

adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10)

the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory

environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environ-

ment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily

leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the

household; (11) the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences,

or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved,

except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in

and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed

custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child’s

cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser,

if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a

parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling

of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section

46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation

in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b.’’

General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).