Opinion

United States v. Lennon Brown

  • 884 F.3d 281
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Mar 1, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Dennis
On the bench
Jolly, Dennis, Elrod
Nature of suit
Direct Criminal
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 46.7%

The opinion

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

No. 16-11340

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 1, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

LENNON RAY BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

Lennon Ray Brown, a former Citibank employee, pleaded guilty to

intentionally damaging a protected computer in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030(a)(5)(A) after temporarily disabling a portion of Citibank’s network. He

was sentenced to twenty-one months of incarceration followed by two years of

supervised release. On appeal, Brown argues that his Guidelines range was

improperly increased under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii), which applies to

conduct causing a “substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.” Because

we conclude that Brown’s conduct could not have had a serious impact on

national economic security, we VACATE Brown’s sentence and remand for

resentencing.

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

I

Brown was a system specialist at Citibank’s Global Control Center in

Irving, Texas. On December 23, 2013, Brown was called into a meeting with

his supervisors and presented with a formal “Performance Improvement Plan”

based on accusations of poor work performance. Brown refused to participate

in the plan. At 6:03 p.m., about an hour after leaving the meeting, Brown

connected to Citibank’s secure network and intentionally executed commands

to disrupt network traffic through ten of Citibank’s data routers, ultimately

impacting nine. Brown’s sabotage resulted in a loss of connectivity to some but

not all of Citbank’s North American data centers, campuses, call centers, and

sixty-nine ATMs. He then left the building, informing a coworker that he

would not be returning. The Global Control Center almost immediately

received an automatic alert notifying it of the outage and promptly committed

company resources to resolve the problem. By 10:17 p.m., Citibank had

restored ninety percent of the lost connectivity, and by 4:21 a.m. the next

morning had fully restored the network.

Brown pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to a one-count

indictment charging him with intentional damage to a protected computer in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), and (c)(4)(B). Brown’s

Presentence Report (PSR) calculated a total offense level of twenty-three with

a criminal history category of I, resulting in a Guidelines range of forty-six to

fifty-seven months of incarceration. The PSR calculated Citibank’s actual loss

as $133,402, including $56,202 for increased phone calls to call centers from

customers affected by the outage. The PSR also applied a six-level sentencing

enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) for a violation of § 1030 that caused

a “substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure,” bringing the offense level

to twenty. Under § 2B1.1(b)(18)(B), because § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) applied, the

2

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

offense level was then increased to twenty-four, effectively an additional four-

level increase.

Brown subsequently filed a sentencing memorandum, requesting a

downward variance and disputing the loss calculations and other facts

included in the PSR. Brown alleged that his offense level was erroneously

calculated under the Guidelines and proposed an alternative calculation that,

relevant to this appeal, eliminated the six-level enhancement and

corresponding level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) and (18)(B) and

substituted a mutually exclusive four-level enhancement under

§ 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii). In its response, the Government stated that Brown

“appear[ed] to object to the loss figure [and] the 6 level increase pursuant to §

2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) for a substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.”

The Government contended that the § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) enhancement was

correctly applied because Brown “shut down nine (9) [of] CITI’s routers,

causing a substantial disruption to CITI’s call centers, and deleting essential

encryption in the ATM systems and Global Transaction systems.”

At sentencing, the district court concluded that the $56,202 figure

included in the PSR’s loss calculation as the amount attributable to increased

customer contacts with Citibank’s call center was too speculative and thus

determined that the total loss suffered was $77,200. This lowered Brown’s

Guidelines range to thirty-seven to forty-six months of incarceration. On the

Government’s request, the district court then addressed other objections

implicit in Brown’s sentencing memorandum, ruling that “[t]o the extent those

were objections, they are overruled.” Citing Brown’s otherwise upstanding

personal history, the district court found that Brown’s conviction constituted

aberrant conduct and downwardly departed under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20,

imposing a sentence of 21 months of incarceration followed by two years of

supervised release.

3

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

Brown appeals, challenging only the application of the enhancements

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) and (18)(B) for “substantial disruption of

a critical infrastructure.”

II

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the

Guidelines de novo. United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir.

2017). However, when a defendant fails to raise a claim below, we review for

plain error only. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009).

The Government argues that Brown failed to preserve his issue on

appeal by not raising it before the district court and, consequently, his claim is

subject to plain error review. In order to preserve an argument for appeal, it

“must be raised to such a degree that the district court has an opportunity to

rule on it.” United States v. Soza, 874 F.3d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Dallas Gas Partners, L.P. v. Prospect Energy Corp., 733 F.3d 148, 157 (5th Cir.

2013)). “The raising party must present the issue so that it places the opposing

party and the court on notice that a new issue is being raised.” Id. (quoting

Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 823 (5th Cir. 1996)). The appellant need not cite

directly to the provision at issue so long as his objection below offered the

opposing party and district court a fair opportunity to respond to its contention

that a sentencing enhancement should not apply. United States v. Ocana, 204

F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding issue preserved for appeal where

appellant “did not specifically cite to the USSG section which the PSR applied,

[but] she did make a general objection that notified the court of her

disagreement” with the challenged enhancement).

Brown’s sentencing memorandum did not explicitly argue that his

conduct did not amount to a substantial disruption of critical infrastructure.

However, he did directly dispute the calculation of his Guidelines range,

4

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

proposing an alternative calculation that eliminated the enhancement under

(18)(A)(iii) and substituted a different enhancement:

The base offense level, 2B 1.1 is -6

Loss between 5,000.-101[,]000 -2

1030(a)(5)A -4

There is no sophisticated means 0

Total 12

Brown’s proposed calculation does not include an enhancement under

(18)(A)(iii). Instead, it includes a four-level enhancement for “1030(a)(5)A.”

This amounts to an objection that his sentence should have been enhanced

under § 2B.1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii), which imposes a four-level increase for offenses

committed under this particular subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Notably, §§

2B.1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) and (18)(A)(iii) are mutually exclusive provisions, with the

Guidelines instructing the court to apply the greater that applies. Thus, by

stating that the court should apply § 2B.1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) and not (18)(A)(iii),

Brown effectively put the Government and the court on notice that he objected

to the greater increase under § 2B.1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii).

The Government’s response demonstrates that Brown’s sentencing

memorandum put it on notice of this particular argument. The Government

acknowledged that Brown, by proposing this alternative Guidelines

calculation, “appears to object to . . . the 6 level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) for a substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure,”

and then rebutted that implicit objection. See Ocana, 204 F.3d at 589 (finding

that written response from probation officer that specifically referenced the

indirectly challenged enhancement demonstrated that the opposing party and

district court were “clearly notified” of the objection). At sentencing, the

district court then overruled this and any other implicit objection Brown raised

“to the extent that they were made.”

5

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

Though Brown could have raised his objection more explicitly and

thoroughly below, we conclude that he presented both the Government and the

district court the opportunity to address Brown’s issue on appeal, and

consequently sufficiently preserved this issue for our review. Cf. United States

v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (“While Neal could certainly have

been more clear and more persistent in raising an objection . . . we conclude

that his actions were sufficient to preserve error.”).

III

Under U.S.S.G. § 2B.1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii), a six-level increase is warranted

if a defendant is convicted of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 “and the offense

caused a substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.” Further, under

§ 2B.1.1(b)(18)(B), “if subdivision (A)(iii) applies, and the offense level is less

than level 24,” a court is instructed to “increase [his] level to 24.”

The commentary to the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines defines “critical

infrastructure” as “systems and assets vital to national defense, national

security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of these

matters.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(18) cmt. n.14 (U.S.

Sentencing Comm'n 2015). The enumerated examples include public and

private “financing and banking systems.” Id. Neither the text of the

Guidelines nor the commentary, however, defines what constitutes a

“substantial disruption.” Nor has this circuit—or any other for that matter—

resolved this question. 1 Accordingly, we look to the text of the Guidelines

themselves, the relevant commentary, and statutory origins of the sentencing

provision to inform our analysis.

1 In United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 496–97 (7th Cir. 2005), apparently the only

circuit court decision to address this sentencing provision (under its former numbering at

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(13)(A)(iii)), the Seventh Circuit held that a city’s computer-based radio

system for emergency communications was “critical infrastructure,” but did not discuss what

constitutes a “substantial disruption.”

6

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

Other language in § 2B1.1 indicates what is not a substantial disruption.

Under § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(i), a defendant is eligible for only a two-level increase

for a § 1030 conviction that, inter alia, “involved a computer system used to

maintain or operate a critical infrastructure.” If, like Brown, a defendant is

convicted under § 1030(a)(5)(A) for conduct involving such a computer system,

then § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) would apply instead, resulting in a four-level

enhancement. This subsection of § 1030 criminalizes “knowingly caus[ing] the

transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of

such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a

protected computer.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). Necessarily, then, one who

knowingly causes the transmission of a command that intentionally causes

damage to a protected computer system used to maintain a critical

infrastructure is not, without more, eligible for the (b)(18)(A)(iii) increase, only

a four level increase under subsection (ii). Only if the damage caused a

“substantial disruption” of that critical infrastructure do we look to

§ 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii).

In contrast, the Commentary discusses conduct that is more egregious

than that which causes a “substantial disruption.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2B1.1(b)(18) cmt. n.20(B) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015). This

portion of the commentary recommends an upward departure “in a case in

which subsection (b)(18)(A)(iii) applies and the disruption to the critical

infrastructure(s) is so substantial as to have a debilitating impact on national

security, national economic security, [and/or] national public health or safety.”

Id. (emphasis added). “Substantial disruption,” then, must exist somewhere

between the conduct sufficient for enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) and

that which warrants this upward departure for disruptions that have a

debilitating impact.

7

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

The Commentary further directs readers to § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii)’s

statutory origins. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B.1.1(b)(18) cmt.

background (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015). It notes that “[s]ubsection (b)(18)

implements the directive in section 225(b) of Public Law 107-296,” also known

as the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002. Id.; see 6 U.S.C. § 145. This

act is a subsection of the Homeland Security Act, which was enacted in

response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 6 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.;

see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-609(I), at 63–67 (2002), as reprinted in 2002

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1352, 1353–57. The Cyber Security Enhancement Act instructed

the Sentencing Commission to ensure that the recommended sentences for

offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 take into account, among other factors,

whether the offending conduct “involved a computer used by the government

in furtherance of national defense, national security, or the administration of

justice,” “creat[ed] a threat to public health or safety,” or “significantly

interfer[ed] with or disrupt[ed] a critical infrastructure.” 6 U.S.C. § 145(2)(B).

According to the Commentary, § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii)’s enhancement for a

“substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure” implements this directive

from Congress by imposing harsher sentencing recommendations for those

offenses that could have a “serious impact” on “national security, national

economic security, national public health or safety, or a combination of any of

these matters.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B.1.1(b)(18) cmt.

background (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015). In specifying how this provision

satisfies the statutory directive, the Commentary here suggests a limiting

principle: to determine whether § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) can be applied to a

particular defendant, a court must ask whether his conduct was that which

could have a “serious impact” on “national security, national economic security,

[and/or] national public health or safety.” Id.

8

Case: 16-11340 Document: 00514369189 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/01/2018

No. 16-11340

Using the Commentary to guide our analysis, Brown’s conduct did not

constitute a “substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure.” There is no

indication that Brown’s conduct affecting a portion of Citibank’s operations for

a short period of time could have had a serious impact on national economic

security. As a result of Brown’s actions, Citibank suffered relatively minor

financial losses 2 and was temporarily unable to optimally serve its customers.

Neither of these harms threatened to disrupt the nation’s economy, and, in

light of Citibank’s demonstrated ability to quickly resolve the disruption and

mitigate in the interim, there is no other evidence that Brown’s conduct had

the potential to do so. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred by

applying an enhancement that we conclude is reserved for conduct that

disrupts a critical infrastructure in a way that could have a serious impact on

national economic security.

***

For these reasons, the sentence imposed by the district court is

VACATED. The case is REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this

ruling, with instructions to expedite proceedings in light of Brown’s scheduled

release from custody.

2 Citibank is one of the world’s largest banks with over $1.4 trillion in assets.

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Takes Action Against Citibank For Student Loan

Servicing Failures That Harmed Borrowers, (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.

gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-citibank-student-loan-servicing-failures-

harmed-borrowers/.

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.