Ronald Henry Aho v. State of Tennessee

02/23/2018

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

January 17, 2018 Session

RONALD HENRY AHO v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Warren County

Nos. F-13913, F-13974 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

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Nos. M2017-00163-CCA-R3-PC

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In 2012, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Ronald Henry Aho, in case

number F-13913 for aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000 but less than

$10,000. Petitioner was also indicted in case number F-13974 for two counts each of

aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000. In January

2014, Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas in case numbers F-13913 and F-13974

to a total of two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft over $1,000 but

less than $10,000 in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and the

dismissal of charges contained in three additional indictments. Pursuant to the plea

agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a total effective sentence of twenty-three

years, with the first fifteen years to be served at sixty percent release eligibility and the

last eight years to be served at forty-five percent release eligibility. Petitioner filed a

petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an

evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the

judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

G. Jeff Cherry and Christopher Beauchamp (on appeal), Lebanon, Tennessee, and

Samuel F. Hudson (at hearing), Dunlap, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ronald Henry Aho.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel;

Lisa Zavogiannis, District Attorney General; and Randal Gilliam, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Plea Submission Hearing

On January 29, 2014, Petitioner entered a best interest guilty plea, as a Career

Offender, to aggravated burglary and theft over $1,000 in case number F-13913 and

received concurrent sentences of fifteen years and twelve years, respectively, to serve in

the Department of Correction. In case number F-13974, Petitioner entered a best interest

guilty plea, as a Range III Persistent Offender, to one count each of aggravated burglary

and theft over $1,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner received concurrent

sentences of eight years with forty-five percent release eligibility on each count to be

served consecutively to his effective fifteen-year sentence with a sixty percent release

eligibility in case number F-13913, for a total effective sentence of twenty-three years in

the Department of Correction. Based on Petitioner’s plea, the State dismissed the two

remaining counts in case number F-13974, as well as the charges against Petitioner in

case numbers F-13975, F-13976, and F-13977.

At the plea submission hearing, the State recited the following factual basis for

case number F-13913:

[O]n October 18 of 2012, the State’s proof would have been that

[Petitioner] broke into a home on Spring Street here in Warren County

owned by Ms. Sheila Bates. Once inside, [he] obtained several items of

property including several items of jewelry with a combined value in

excess of a thousand dollars. [He] [l]eft the house with those items and was

able to elude the police in that incident.

The State recited the facts of case number F-13974, as follows:

[A] burglary [also] occurred [] on October 18 of 2012 of a house on 70

Underwood Road. Taken during that burglary were a Nintendo Wii, a

PlayStation 2, approximately 100 DVD and BluRay videos, an HP Compaq

notebook computer, a quantity of oxycodone and several other items and

that burglary and theft occurred here in Warren County. The State’s proof

would be that a short time later [Petitioner] was found in possession of that

stolen property.

....

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The State’s proof . . . would be . . . that they were found at a residence that

[Petitioner] was associated with and there would have been proof linking

him to that property.

When questioned by the trial court, Petitioner agreed that he went over the plea

documents in both cases “thoroughly” with trial counsel. Petitioner testified that he

understood the nature of the charges to which the pleas were offered, the minimum and

maximum sentence on each charge if convicted, his right to counsel at every stage of the

proceedings, his right to plead not guilty, his right to a jury trial, his right to confront

adverse witnesses and bring his own witnesses, his right to remain silent, and his right to

appeal any resulting conviction or sentence. In accepting the terms of the plea

agreement, Petitioner affirmed that he was waiving each of those rights. He also agreed

that he was entering his pleas freely and voluntarily. Petitioner denied that he was

entering the pleas because he had been threatened to do so. The trial court found that

Petitioner understood his rights and made a knowing, voluntary, and understanding

waiver of his rights by pleading guilty. The trial court additionally found that there was a

factual basis for Petitioner’s pleas.

Post-Conviction Proceedings

On January 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction

relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his best

interest plea was unknowing and involuntary due to Petitioner’s mental incompetence.

On February 8, 2015, the post-conviction court entered a preliminary order appointing

counsel for Petitioner. Petitioner later retained counsel to represent him. On May 27,

2015, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief.

At an evidentiary hearing on the petition, Bud Sharp testified that he had been

practicing law for seven years when he was retained by Petitioner’s parents to represent

Petitioner in case number F-13913. Mr. Sharp stated that he met with Petitioner twice in

a three-week period regarding the case. He stated that he may have filed a discovery

motion but did not investigate any witnesses because he was on the case for only four

weeks. He stated that the case had not yet been set for trial when he withdrew from

representing Petitioner. Mr. Sharp recalled that he talked to Petitioner about entering a

best interest plea based on Petitioner’s extensive prior record, which consisted of “[forty]

something felony convictions[,]” the unpredictability of a jury trial, and the strength of

the State’s proof. Specifically, Mr. Sharp recalled from the police report that the victim

in case number F-13913 “pulled up to her house and [Petitioner] was in the house, came

out of the house, the car was sitting in the driveway, and she got his tag number and he

left.”

-3-

Although Mr. Sharp remembered Petitioner discussing matters unrelated to his

case, Mr. Sharp stated that this was not unusual because many of his clients tended to go

off subject. Mr. Sharp stated that Petitioner was “very intelligent[.]” Mr. Sharp stated

that he represented Petitioner in 2007 on a burglary and theft case and that Petitioner was

mentally competent when he entered his guilty plea on the case. He acknowledged that

he was aware Petitioner was drawing SSI disability, but he stated that he was not aware

of Petitioner’s being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder or anti-social

personality disorder. Mr. Sharp stated that, if the case had proceeded to trial, he may

have had Petitioner undergo a forensic evaluation based on the Petitioner’s drawing

disability. Mr. Sharp denied telling Petitioner he should talk with the prosecutor. He

stated, “[Petitioner] may have written a letter to [the prosecutor]. My clients do not talk

to the State period. I do not want my clients talking to the State even though they may

have good intentions.” Mr. Sharp recalled that Petitioner’s parents retained co-counsel,

Steve Roller. Mr. Sharp talked to Mr. Roller over the phone about who would ultimately

handle the case and whether a plea agreement should be negotiated. They did not discuss

trial strategy. Mr. Sharp withdrew from the case on April 29, 2013.

Steve Roller testified that he had been a practicing attorney since 1978. Mr. Roller

was retained by Petitioner’s parents to represent Petitioner after dismissing Mr. Sharp for

some unspecified reason. Mr. Roller recalled that a trial date had been set for one of

Petitioner’s cases. Mr. Roller did not recall Petitioner’s parents’ expressing concerns

about Petitioner’s mental health.

Mr. Roller testified that he met with Petitioner in the Warren County Jail more

than once. During this time, Petitioner told Mr. Roller that he wanted to meet with the

prosecutor; however, the State was not interested in meeting with him. Mr. Roller

acknowledged that he scheduled a meeting with Petitioner and investigators Jason

Rowland and Barry Powers to discuss facts about “certain different cases[,]” despite

Petitioner not having an immunity agreement. Mr. Roller stated that he advised

Petitioner not to meet with the investigators, but Petitioner “insisted” on meeting with

them.

Mr. Roller denied having any knowledge of Petitioner’s mental health issues.

However, he recalled an incident in which Petitioner lost his temper and acted in such a

way that guards interrupted their meeting and took Petitioner to his cell. Mr. Roller

testified that Petitioner demonstrated his understanding of the nature of the charges

against him by asking and answering relevant questions about the case. Petitioner was

“very educated with legal procedure and trial” due to his extensive criminal record.

Based on Petitioner’s participation in his defense, Mr. Roller did not see the need to have

Petitioner undergo a forensic evaluation.

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Mr. Roller recalled that he was the subject of a complaint Petitioner filed with the

Board of Professional Responsibility (BPR). In his response to the complaint, Mr. Roller

stated that Petitioner had serious mental problems and that Petitioner had “a mental

breakdown at the jail[.]” Mr. Roller testified, however, that he was attempting to

describe the incident at the jail in which Petitioner lost his temper. Despite his letter to

the BPR, Mr. Roller did not believe that Petitioner lacked competency to participate in

his own defense. Mr. Roller acknowledged that he was required by the BPR to refund a

substantial amount of the money paid by Petitioner’s parents for his representation.

Christopher Stanford testified that, at the time of the post-conviction hearing, he

had been practicing law for approximately nine years. He stated that about fifty percent

of his practice involved defending individuals charged with criminal offenses. Mr.

Stanford recalled that he was retained by Petitioner’s parents in 2013 to represent

Petitioner on his charges in multiple indictments. Petitioner’s parents also retained Lee

Nettles as a defense investigator. After being retained, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles met

with Petitioner at a prison in West Tennessee for approximately three hours. Mr.

Stanford also obtained copies of the State’s discovery. Mr. Stanford recalled how

knowledgeable Petitioner was about his cases, and he testified that he observed nothing in

Petitioner’s behavior during their discussions to make him concerned about Petitioner’s

mental health and to warrant a forensic evaluation. He explained:

. . . I never once had an inkling that [Petitioner] was unable to assist me

with his defense. In fact, he was probably – he seemed fairly well-versed in

the law. He seemed fairly able to point us in particular directions, able to

give us theories of defense and so while he did have some scattered thought

processes, . . . I mean, he would go down a rabbit trail and we would have

to redirect him back to the main issue but other than that I didn’t notice

anything about him that gave me cause for concern.

Mr. Stanford testified that he learned of Petitioner’s extensive prior record when

the State filed its “Notice of Intent to Use Conviction for Impeachment.” He recalled that

the State elected to proceed to trial first on case number F-13913. He explained that,

once the State made its election, he and the defense investigator primarily focused their

investigative efforts on that case. Mr. Stanford recalled that he met with Petitioner at the

Warren County Jail after Petitioner was transferred to the jail about a week before trial.

He met with Petitioner “several times in a three[-]day period” to prepare Petitioner for

trial.

Initially, the State refused to make a settlement offer, but Mr. Stanford eventually

convinced the prosecutor to make Petitioner an offer. He explained:

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[I]t was my decision at that point that Petitioner needed to explore all

reasonable offers before he made a decision about trying these cases[.] [I]t

was my understanding that the DA wasn’t going to stop [trying Petitioner’s

cases] until [the State] had the number that they wanted as far as sentencing

goes. The initial offer was not acceptable to Petitioner.

During Petitioner’s time in the Warren County Jail, Mr. Stanford approached the prosecutor

and requested an agreement to continue the trial so that the parties could explore reaching a

negotiated settlement as Mr. Stanford could not adequately prepare for trial if he focused on

plea negotiations. He spent the next two to three days, in January 2014, going back and

forth between the prosecutor and Petitioner to settle the case.

Mr. Stanford remembered an individual named Joe Holland.1 He recalled that

Petitioner wanted Mr. Holland charged with theft based on information Petitioner

provided to Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles. Petitioner was adamant that Mr. Holland was

criminally responsible for the offenses pending against Petitioner. Petitioner expressed

this belief to Mr. Stanford in person and through a thirteen-page letter written by

Petitioner, in which Petitioner stated that he expected Mr. Holland to be charged before

Petitioner’s trial. When pressed about whether anyone in Mr. Sanford’s office had

investigated Mr. Holland, Mr. Stanford said that he did not personally conduct the first

interview with witnesses but stated that Mr. Nettles would have done that. Based on

Petitioner’s thirteen-page letter, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles investigated people

“surrounding Joe Holland.” Mr. Stanford believed that it would be helpful to talk to Mr.

Holland’s associates because they might be more willing to share information that Mr.

Holland was the person who had committed the crimes. Mr. Stanford recalled that he

received a letter from Barry McCormick, which indicated that certain stolen items had

been purchased from Mr. Holland.

Mr. Stanford testified that he made a “strategic decision” that he needed to get

ready for one trial—the first case set for trial—and that he and Mr. Nettles needed to

focus the investigation on the individuals involved in that case. Regarding Petitioner’s

plea in case number F-13974, Mr. Stanford explained:

The DA wanted a plea to the first case. That [case] was not an option. That

was going to be part of the plea deal. [The prosecutor] . . . didn’t care

which case [Petitioner] pled to after that. So we put the ball in

[Petitioner’s] court and said, you pick. Which case do you want to plead

to? And [Petitioner] wanted to plead to . . . [case number F-13974].

1

The record reflects that Mr. Holland was listed on the indictment in case number F-13974 as a

witness for the State.

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Mr. Stanford testified that Petitioner was “looking at a hundred plus years” based

on all the pending charges. He told Petitioner he would “be happy to try [the] case” but

that he wanted to also explore plea negotiations with the State. He explained that,

originally, the State’s plea offer included a much higher sentence but that Mr. Stanford

“eventually worked it down[.]” He talked to Petitioner about the facts of the case, the

perception of the jurors given those facts, and “what we thought the jury was likely to do

with that case[.]” Mr. Stanford believed that, as Petitioner realized his considerable

liability, Petitioner’s mood began to “shift[.]” Petitioner was “tearful,” “angry,” and

“very upset.” Mr. Stanford stated that Petitioner’s

main concern was that he get out of prison or that . . . all these charges be

dropped so he could spend the rest of his life with his lovely parents and I

think he became very sad and very tearful when he realized that [there]

might be a possibility that he might be in prison longer than they might

live.

Mr. Stanford explained that he had not subpoenaed witnesses the week before the

scheduled trial because the defense could not come up with any witnesses other than

character witnesses like Petitioner’s parents and Shelia Thompson. He explained that

Ms. Thompson was the only witness that the defense could find that corroborated

Petitioner’s version of events, but she would have “basically regurgitated . . . what

[Petitioner] had told her[.]” Mr. Stanford recalled that the victim in case number F-13913

was “clear as [] could be that it was [Petitioner]” who had been in her driveway.

Mr. Stanford explained that most of his communication with Petitioner was

conducted through Petitioner’s parents and through letters that Petitioner sent to Mr.

Stanford. Mr. Stanford denied that Petitioner’s parents tried to set up a phone account

with him to use to communicate with Petitioner. Mr. Stanford stated that Mr. Nettles

never advised Petitioner that “if you don’t accept this plea then I’m going to have to go

out now and start subpoenaing witnesses[.]” He recalled that, on the day of the plea, the

court clerk or the trial court indicated that they needed to know if Petitioner intended to

enter the plea by a certain time that day so that the court would know whether or not to

call in the jury. However, there was not a deadline on the plea negotiations. Mr.

Stanford explained that the trial court would have granted a continuance because they had

spent so much time in plea negotiations rather than trial preparation. Mr. Stanford had

advised Petitioner not to testify based on Petitioner’s prior record. He stated that, once he

explained to Petitioner the details of his investigative findings and what the State’s proof

would be at trial, Petitioner told Mr. Stanford, “[G]et me the best number you can get

me[.]”

-7-

Mr. Stanford acknowledged that he did not file a motion challenging the State’s

use of Petitioner’s prior convictions to impeach Petitioner at trial. He agreed that many

of Petitioner’s prior convictions were very similar to the charges Petitioner was facing.

Mr. Stanford recalled that he and Mr. Nettles met several times to review and organize

discovery before the three-hour meeting with Petitioner. Mr. Stanford recalled that their

investigation showed that the State had a witness that would testify that Petitioner

possessed a weapon. The witness indicated Petitioner tried to give her two firearms.

Because of his substantial practice in federal court, Mr. Stanford was “very concerned”

that the federal prosecutors might seek to charge Petitioner under the Armed Career

Criminal Act, in which case Petitioner “would have been looking at . . . probably [thirty]

to life.” When Mr. Stanford approached the State about plea negotiations, Mr. Stanford

had a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the prosecutor that the prosecutor would not report

the firearms offense to the federal prosecutors. Mr. Stanford indicated that this was a

“big part” of why Petitioner chose to plead guilty to the two indictments.

Mr. Stanford testified that Mr. Nettles spent over sixty hours investigating

Petitioner’s cases prior to the plea and then spent an additional twenty hours after the plea

trying to secure an indictment against Mr. Holland in Coffee County. Mr. Stanford stated

that Petitioner wanted to go to trial until the prosecutor agreed to enter into plea

negotiations. Petitioner then wanted to explore the possibility of a plea. Mr. Stanford

stated, “Once he realized that the State was willing to make an offer to him he was very

interested in how low we could get the number.” Mr. Stanford testified that he knew the

prosecutor would not object to a continuance of the trial and testified that he told

Petitioner about a possible continuance.

Mr. Stanford said that he did not believe he would have been able to cross-

examine Mr. Holland about any pending charges he was facing.2 He did not think that

information would have been relevant and admissible. Petitioner provided Mr. Stanford

with a letter signed by Barry McCormick dated February 4, 2013, indicating Mr.

Holland’s potential “guilt and involvement in some of the matters.”3

2

At the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner made an offer of proof regarding Mr. Holland’s

conviction, submitting a Coffee County Grand Jury indictment charging Mr. Holland with theft over

$10,000 and a judgment of conviction showing that Mr. Holland pled guilty to the charge on January 20,

2016. It is not clear from the offer of proof the nature of Mr. Holland’s role in that offense. Moreover,

although it appears that some of the victims listed in the indictment correspond to the victims listed in the

indictments for case numbers F-13913 and F-13974, it is not clear from the record how Mr. Holland was

involved in the offenses to which Petitioner pled guilty or why Mr. Holland was charged in Coffee

County rather than Warren County.

3

It is unclear from the record whether Mr. Stanford’s reference to “some of the matters” meant

Petitioner’s cases.

-8-

Lee Nettles testified that he owned a private investigation company, ICT

Investigations, in Manchester. Mr. Nettles explained that he had seventeen years’ prior

experience in law enforcement before beginning his work as a private investigator. Mr.

Nettles recalled that Petitioner’s parents hired him in July 2013, along with Mr. Stanford,

to assist with Petitioner’s defense. The following month, Mr. Nettles accompanied Mr.

Stanford to the prison in West Tennessee where Petitioner was being housed before trial

and met with Petitioner for three hours to discuss the cases against Petitioner. Mr.

Nettles recalled that, during the meeting, Petitioner asked him to investigate Mr.

Holland’s culpability in the burglaries and thefts. They “talked about each one of the[]

[Petitioner’s] individual cases and different pieces of stolen property that was at Mr.

Holland’s that . . . went to other people that [were] in the community.” In August 2013,

Mr. Nettles began conducting “computer intel work” on individuals who were supposed

to be in possession of stolen property they received from Mr. Holland. Mr. Nettles

attempted to find them, interview them, and tie the stolen items “back to Mr. Holland and

see what it had to do with [Petitioner].” Mr. Nettles noted that Mr. Holland made

statements to the Warren County Sheriff’s Department and the McMinnville City Police

Department indicating that he was involved “in this stolen property.” Following

Petitioner’s plea, Mr. Nettles took the information about Mr. Holland that he found

through his investigation to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department.

Mr. Nettles recalled that he received letters from Petitioner, and he met with

Petitioner’s parents multiple times. Additionally, Petitioner’s parents indicated to Mr.

Nettles that they were communicating with Petitioner regarding his cases during their

prison visitations. Mr. Nettles testified that he learned on September 3, 2013, that the

State intended to take case number F-13913 to trial first, and Mr. Stanford instructed him

to focus on that case. Mr. Nettles agreed that Mr. Holland had given two statements to

law enforcement regarding stolen property, but he stated that Mr. Holland “[d]idn’t have

anything to do with the burglary from [F-]13913.” Mr. Nettles explained, “I had

[Petitioner’s] theory about what happened [in case number F-13913]. So I began to

investigate it.” He interviewed Sandy Bratcher and obtained a statement from her in

October 2013. Petitioner told Mr. Nettles that Ms. Bratcher was present on the night

Petitioner allegedly burglarized the victim’s home. However, when Mr. Nettles spoke to

her, Ms. Bratcher denied knowing Petitioner. Mr. Nettles stated that he had known that

Ms. Bratcher had been in jail in Warren County, but he was unaware of the nature of the

charges. Mr. Nettles explained that he also interviewed another potential witness, Sheila

Thompson.

Mr. Nettles recalled that Petitioner was “very specific” in the information that he

provided Mr. Nettles and Mr. Stanford. Mr. Nettles said that eventually some stolen

property was recovered, but he could not recall “which burglaries they came from[.]”

Mr. Nettles investigated Petitioner’s cases for about sixty hours prior to Petitioner’s

-9-

entering a plea. Mr. Nettles explained that Petitioner’s parents paid him additional

money after Petitioner’s plea to locate more of the stolen property, hoping that it would

“help [Petitioner] get parole.” Accordingly, Mr. Nettles pursued the information received

from Petitioner with the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department. Mr. Nettles explained that

the property eventually recovered was not the stolen property at issue in case number F-

13913. Mr. Nettles stated that Mr. Holland was later indicted based on the information

provided by Petitioner.

Barry McCormick testified that he first met Petitioner in December 2012, at the

Warren County Jail. Mr. McCormick explained that he was Petitioner’s cellmate for

several months. He recalled that Petitioner was “just emotionally wrecked” one day,

after Petitioner spoke to Investigator Rowland and Mr. Roller. Mr. McCormick claimed

that Petitioner began hallucinating, hearing voices, and Petitioner was paranoid that

others were going to hurt him. Mr. McCormick recalled that Petitioner was sent to

segregation for a few days after this event.

Dr. David Solovey, an expert in clinical psychology, testified that he had been

hired to conduct a mental evaluation of Petitioner prior to the post-conviction hearing.

Dr. Solovey stated that he conducted the seven-and-a-half-hour evaluation on November

21, 2015. He interviewed Petitioner at the Bledsoe Correctional Complex, and he also

reviewed “some extensive mental health records” that were obtained from the Social

Security Administration and prior treatment facilities. Dr. Solovey testified that his

review of the records showed that Petitioner had a “significant history dating back to

elementary school.” From 1999 to 2012, Petitioner had twenty-one psychiatric

hospitalizations. The records indicated that Petitioner had “a variety of diagnoses

ranging from psychosis, suicidal depression, paranoia, post-traumatic stress disorder,

[and] chemical dependency.” Dr. Solovey testified that Petitioner had been prescribed

mood stabilizers, anti-depressants, and anti-psychotic medications at various times

throughout his life.

Dr. Solovey stated that he diagnosed Petitioner as having a “schizoaffective

disorder which can be called a number of different things like bipolar disorder or mood

disorder and their underlying psychotic processes.” According to Dr. Solovey, Petitioner

provided a history of the days leading up to his entering the plea—“a Thursday, Friday,

and then a weekend and then a Monday.” Petitioner reported that it was a “very

stressful” time and that he felt increasing stress and pressure to enter the plea. Petitioner

explained to Dr. Solovey:

Well, it was at first before it started he was fairly uplifted thinking that

things were going to be okay and then the police started coming in and

there was some reference to ATF and then the potential threat of having

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something even worse occur, wasn’t allowed to talk to his parents. He

wanted to talk to them to at least get some neutral person to discuss what it

was all about and he felt there was just an absolute I have to do this or else.

According to Dr. Solovey, Petitioner reported that he was taking an anti-

depressant while in prison, but he was not receiving an anti-psychotic medication. Dr.

Solovey stated that the lack of medication would have “really ma[d]e things much more

difficult for [Petitioner].” Dr. Solovey opined that Petitioner’s repeated hospitalizations

should have been “red flags” for counsel indicating that Petitioner needed to be evaluated

for competency to stand trial and to determine Petitioner’s mental health status at the time

of his plea “to see whether it would be knowingly and fully reasonably entered.” The

following exchange occurred during Dr. Solovey’s direct examination:

Q. And sir, also pursuant to your evaluation you formed an opinion

as to whether [Petitioner’s] guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily

entered, did you not?

A. I feel the pressure was there. He was poorly medicated and given

that history that was just ever present that I think a full psychiatric

evaluation or psychological forensic evaluation would have been relevant at

least to determine that.

When asked again if Petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary, Dr. Solvey responded

that Petitioner “needed quite a bit more to really fully consider that before standing

before court.”

On cross-examination, Dr. Solovey acknowledged that the medical records

indicated various treatment plans for Petitioner, which were appropriate for Petitioner’s

diagnosis. Dr. Solovey also stated that the results of his evaluation reflected Petitioner’s

condition on November 21, 2015, but that the results were consistent with Petitioner’s

history. Dr. Solovey tested Petitioner for competency to stand trial and found that

Petitioner was competent. He agreed that factors contributing to Petitioner’s competency

were the structured prison environment and being properly medicated. Dr. Solovey

agreed that Petitioner’s medical records indicated that Petitioner was being properly

medicated prior to his plea, but Petitioner told Dr. Solovey that he was un-medicated on

the day of the plea. Dr. Solovey opined that Petitioner had the capacity to understand

what would be in his “best interest” but that,

when that agreement was made that was not a good time for [Petitioner],

that was not what you would call a reasonable . . . appropriate time where

he could fully consider everything that was going on and everything that

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was involved with his plea, that he was probably . . . quite disturbed at that

time.

Petitioner’s father, Rodney Aho, testified that Petitioner had mental health

problems beginning at an early age. Mr. Aho agreed that Petitioner also struggled with

drug addictions and had a lengthy criminal record. Mr. Aho testified that he told Mr.

Sharp, Mr. Roller, and Mr. Stanford about Petitioner’s mental health issues. He stated

that Mr. Roller’s representation of Petitioner ended on bad terms, and Mr. Aho filed an

ethical complaint against Mr. Roller with the BPR; Mr. Roller had to provide Mr. Aho a

refund of $3,700 as a result of the complaint. Mr. Aho recalled that he offered to set up a

phone account for Mr. Nettles to talk to Petitioner, but Mr. Nettles said that “it wasn’t

necessary now.” Mr. Aho stated that the only direct communication Petitioner had with

Mr. Nettles and Mr. Stanford before January 2014 was the three-hour meeting at the

prison in West Tennessee. Mr. Aho recalled that, after Petitioner was transported to the

Warren County Jail in January 2014, he was able to speak to Petitioner over the telephone

at least two times before Petitioner entered his guilty plea. However, Mr. Aho explained,

“We really didn’t talk about a plea agreement. We . . . knew he was really upset and he

said, [‘T]hey’re not working with us, they’re not going to give us what we want.[’]”

During his phone calls with Petitioner before the plea, Mr. Aho “could tell [Petitioner]

was stressed out and ready to cry[.]” Mr. Aho testified, “I think [Petitioner] felt at that

time that [Mr.] Stanford wasn’t going to do anything for him, wasn’t going to go to trial.”

He claimed that he had very little communication with Mr. Nettles and Mr. Stanford,

although he recalled at least one meeting with Mr. Nettles at the Aho’s residence. Mr.

Aho also met with Mr. Nettles at least three times at Mr. Nettles’ office, and he met with

Mr. Stanford two or three times at Mr. Stanford’s office. Mr. Aho stated that he paid Mr.

Nettles additional money after Petitioner’s plea to further investigate items of stolen

property, which led to Mr. Holland’s arrest and conviction.

Petitioner testified that he “had no choice” when he entered best interest pleas in

case number F-13913 and F-13974. Mr. Sharp initially represented Petitioner, and

Petitioner informed Mr. Sharp of his mental health history. Petitioner also told Mr. Sharp

that he had information that would help the State prosecute other cases. At Petitioner’s

arraignment hearing, Mr. Sharp told Petitioner to share the information with the State.

Later, Mr. Sharp visited Petitioner while Petitioner was incarcerated in the Warren

County Jail. Petitioner testified that, during this visit, Mr. Sharp told Petitioner that he

“ran his mouth too much” while they were standing at the booking area. Petitioner

testified that, after this interaction, he ended Mr. Sharp’s representation. Petitioner spoke

with Mr. Roller about representing him, and he informed Mr. Roller of his mental health

history. Petitioner informed Mr. Roller that he was receiving treatment for depression,

bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Mr. Roller did not advise that

Petitioner should receive a forensic evaluation. Petitioner asked Mr. Roller to schedule a

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meeting with the State and gave Mr. Roller a letter from Barry McCormick that discussed

the location of stolen property. Petitioner gave Mr. Roller the letter hoping that the State

would recover the stolen property and charge Mr. Holland. Petitioner testified that Mr.

Roller did not use the letter in his case. Petitioner stated that Mr. Roller’s inaction made

him feel helpless, and he did not have confidence in Mr. Roller’s representation.

Petitioner testified that he never received discovery until he ended Mr. Roller’s

representation.

On February 15, 2013, Mr. Roller brought two investigators to meet with

Petitioner at the jail. Petitioner hoped to arrange for immunity in exchange for the

information he had about the stolen property; however, no agreement was reached.

Petitioner told the investigators about seeing Mr. Holland with the stolen property, and

Mr. Roller never advised him to end the interview. At Petitioner’s arraignment hearing

on February 27, 2013, Mr. Roller said he would visit Petitioner, but he did not. Mr.

Roller met with Petitioner on March 15, 2013, and after this meeting, Petitioner

“snapped” and became depressed and paranoid. Petitioner believed that other inmates

were going to attack him, and he was placed in solitary confinement for seven days. On

April 5, 2013, Petitioner met with Mr. Roller for the last time. At this meeting, Mr.

Roller gave Petitioner his discovery. Petitioner testified that Mr. Roller only investigated

one witness, Monica Burgess, for his cases.

Petitioner’s parents later hired Mr. Stanford to represent him. Mr. Stanford and

the defense investigator, Mr. Nettles, met with Petitioner while he was incarcerated in

West Tennessee in August 2013. Petitioner informed Mr. Stanford that he was taking

Paxil for his mental health issues. Mr. Stanford discussed with Petitioner whether

Petitioner should testify at trial, but Mr. Stanford did not file a motion to limit the State’s

ability to impeach Petitioner with his prior convictions. Petitioner believed that his cases

were proceeding to trial, and he asked Mr. Stanford to follow leads regarding the stolen

property. The only contact that Petitioner received from Mr. Stanford between the initial

meeting and his plea submission was a letter that Mr. Stanford wrote to the State

requesting to extend the trial date and to conduct fingerprint testing. On November 20,

2013, Petitioner wrote a letter to Mr. Stanford asking Mr. Stanford to investigate the

stolen property tied to Mr. Holland and requesting a mental health evaluation. Mr.

Stanford never responded to this letter. In January 2015, Petitioner was transferred to the

Warren County Jail for his trial. Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles met with Petitioner on

January 22, 2015. During this meeting, Petitioner believed that he was going to trial, and

he felt that a positive outcome was likely. Mr. Stanford conveyed a plea agreement to the

Petitioner with a twenty-five year sentence. Petitioner also discussed his other cases with

Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles.

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The next day, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles met with Petitioner again, and Mr.

Nettles told Petitioner that he could receive federal charges for gun offenses. Mr.

Stanford conveyed a new plea agreement to the Petitioner for a sentence of thirty years.

Regarding his mental state at this time, the Petitioner stated, “[T]he way they pushed it

and switched up on me there was no way in the world I could have went to court with

them to represent me and come out good. I would have been done [sic] worse than what

they were trying to do.” Mr. Nettles informed Petitioner that he had not subpoenaed any

witnesses. Petitioner stated that he felt that he had no choice but to enter a plea.

Petitioner began to sign the plea but asked to speak with his parents. Mr. Stanford

contacted the State, and around 3:27 p.m., Mr. Stanford informed Petitioner that the trial

court stated that the plea needed to be submitted by 4:00 p.m. Petitioner agreed that, at

the plea submission hearing, he testified that he “thoroughly” discussed the plea

agreement with Mr. Stanford. Petitioner noted that he had never proceeded to trial on

any of his previous criminal charges.

On cross-examination, Petitioner agreed that he had a lengthy criminal history.

Petitioner also agreed that he understood the State’s allegations in case numbers F-13913

and F-13974. Petitioner agreed that he discussed these charges with his three attorneys.

Petitioner agreed that a witness in case number F-13913 had observed him at the offense

scene and identified him at the preliminary hearing. He also agreed that this witness

could have testified at his trial. Petitioner stated that, when he signed the plea agreement

documents, he understood what the terms of the agreement were. Petitioner agreed that

he testified during the plea submission hearing that no one had promised or threatened

anything to coerce him into entering a plea. On redirect examination, Petitioner testified

that he did not voluntarily enter his plea.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner’s

first two attorneys did not affect Petitioner’s case. The post-conviction court also found

that there was no evidence that “that Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles could have provided

some witnesses or statements or something to [Petitioner] or to the court that would have

significantly changed the outcome of the case as far as what they discovered.” The post-

conviction court found that Mr. Stanford was prepared for trial and that Mr. Nettles was

prepared to subpoena a defense witness to testify at trial. The post-conviction court

further noted that Mr. Stanford and the State agreed to continue Petitioner’s trial if

Petitioner rejected the plea agreement and that the trial court would not have opposed this

agreement to continue. The post-conviction court found that there was no evidence that

witnesses existed that could have testified at trial to impeach the State’s witnesses. The

post-conviction court found that Mr. Stanford’s representation was deficient for failing to

file a motion to exclude Petitioner’s prior record for impeachment purposes. However,

the post-conviction court concluded that the motion would not have affected Petitioner’s

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case because some of Petitioner’s prior convictions were admissible. The post-conviction

court concluded that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

Regarding the voluntariness of Petitioner’s plea, the post-conviction court found

that Petitioner appeared to be competent when he entered his best interest plea. The post-

conviction court also found that, during the plea submission hearing, Petitioner “was very

alert and understanding and there was no question that he appeared to know what he was

doing.” The post-conviction court noted that Dr. Solovey testified that Petitioner had

depression, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the post-

conviction court concluded that Mr. Stanford’s representation was not ineffective for

failing to request a mental health evaluation for Petitioner “because he didn’t see

anything that caused him to believe that [Petitioner] was not competent.”

Following the hearing, the post-conviction court entered a written order of its

findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied post-conviction relief. This timely

appeal follows.

Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner contends that Mr. Stanford rendered ineffective assistance

based on counsel’s failure to issue subpoenas, file motions, and respond to the State’s

motion to use Petitioner’s prior convictions as impeachment evidence. Additionally,

Petitioner alleges that he gave Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles “the tools they needed to

secure a sound defense” by providing them with information about Mr. Holland but that

Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles failed to investigate that lead until after Petitioner’s plea.

Petitioner further asserts that Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles used unreasonable persuasion

to get Petitioner to sign the agreement. Petitioner asserts that they threatened him with a

federal firearms charge if he did not accept the State’s offer when “[l]ittle to no proof was

available to the government to support such a charge[,]” and Mr. Stanford failed to relay

to Petitioner the possibility of a continuance. The State responds that the post-conviction

court properly denied Petitioner relief on his claim that his plea was involuntarily and

unknowingly entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. In

order to prevail on a petition for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove all factual

allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tenn.

2003). Post-conviction relief cases often present mixed questions of law and fact. See

Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). Appellate courts are bound by the

post-conviction court’s factual findings unless the evidence preponderates against such

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findings. Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2015). When reviewing the

post-conviction court’s factual findings, this court does not reweigh the evidence or

substitute its own inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court. Id.; Fields, 40

S.W.3d at 456 (citing Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997)). Additionally,

“questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given

their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the

[post-conviction court].” Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 456 (citing Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579);

see also Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457. The trial court’s conclusions of law and

application of the law to factual findings are reviewed de novo with no presumption of

correctness. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457.

The right to effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded by the Constitutions of

both the United States and the State of Tennessee. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const.

art. I, § 9. In order to receive post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must prove: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that the same

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee

cases). Both factors must be proven in order for the court to grant post-conviction relief.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363,

370 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, if we determine that either factor is not satisfied, there is

no need to consider the other factor. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tenn. 2007)

(citing Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004)). Additionally, review of

counsel’s performance “requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689; see also Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579. We will not second-guess a reasonable trial

strategy, and we will not grant relief based on a sound, yet ultimately unsuccessful,

tactical decision. Granderson v. State, 197 S.W.3d 782, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).

As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective

if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523

S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369. In order to prove that

counsel was deficient, the petitioner must demonstrate “that counsel’s acts or omissions

were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); see

also Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

Even if counsel’s performance is deficient, the deficiency must have resulted in

prejudice to the defense. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370. Therefore, under the second prong

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of the Strickland analysis, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A substantially similar two-prong standard applies when the petitioner challenges

counsel’s performance in the context of a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58

(1985); Don Allen Rodgers v. State, No. W2011-00632-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 1478764,

at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 26, 2012), no perm app. filed. First, the petitioner must

show that his counsel’s performance fell below the objective standards of reasonableness

and professional norms. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Second, “in order to satisfy the

‘prejudice’ requirement, the [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.

Whether a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary is a mixed question of law and

fact. Jaco, 120 S.W.3d at 830-31. Therefore, in such cases we review the post-

conviction court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness. Id. The

post-conviction court’s findings of law are reviewed purely de novo. Id.

When reviewing a guilty plea, this court looks to both the federal standard as

announced in the landmark case Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the state

standard as announced in State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), superseded on

other grounds by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b) and Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Don Allen Rodgers,

2012 WL 1478764, at *5. Under the federal standard, there must be an affirmative

showing that the plea was “intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.

Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “the record of acceptance of a

defendant’s plea of guilty must affirmatively demonstrate that his decision was both

voluntary and knowledgeable, i.e. that he has been made aware of the significant

consequences of such a plea . . . .” Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 340. “[A] plea is not

‘voluntary’ if it is the product of ‘[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror,

inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats . . . .” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897,

904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43).

In order to determine whether a plea is intelligent and voluntary, the trial court

must “canvass[] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of

what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. The trial court

looks to several factors before accepting a plea, including:

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[T]he relative intelligence of the defendant; degree of his familiarity with

criminal proceedings; whether he was represented by competent counsel

and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about the options available

to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the

charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead guilty,

including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might result from a jury

trial.

Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904; Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-31 (Tenn. 2006).

Once the trial court has conducted a proper plea colloquy, it discharges its duty to assess

the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea and creates an adequate record for any

subsequent review. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244.

Statements made by a petitioner, his attorney, and the prosecutor during the plea

colloquy, as well as any findings made by the trial court in accepting the plea, “constitute

a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison,

431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Statements made in open court carry a strong presumption of

truth, and to overcome such presumption, a petitioner must present more than

“conculsory allegations unsupported by specifics.” Id. at 74.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that Mr. Stanford rendered ineffective assistance based on

counsel’s failure to adequately prepare for trial. He asserts that Mr. Stanford failed to

issue subpoenas, investigate Mr. Holland, and respond to the State’s motion to use

Petitioner’s prior convictions as impeachment evidence.

The record reflects that, after they were retained, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles

obtained a copy of the State’s discovery and met with Petitioner for three hours.

Petitioner was adamant that Mr. Holland was criminally responsible for the offenses

pending against Petitioner. Based on Petitioner’s assertions regarding Mr. Holland’s

involvement, Mr. Stanford and Mr. Nettles investigated people “surrounding Joe

Holland.” Mr. Stanford believed that it would be helpful to talk to Mr. Holland’s

associates because they might be more willing to share information that Mr. Holland was

the person who had committed the crimes. Mr. Nettles spent over sixty hours

investigating Petitioner’s cases prior to the plea. Mr. Nettles interviewed multiple

witnesses, including Sandy Bratcher, Monica Burgess, and Sheila Thompson. He

conducted “computer intel work” on the individuals who were supposed to be in

possession of stolen items received from Mr. Holland. Mr. Nettles attempted to find

them, interview them, and tie the stolen items “back to Mr. Holland and see what it had to

do with [Petitioner].” Mr. Nettles agreed that Mr. Holland was later indicted based on the

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information provided by Petitioner, but he stated that Mr. Holland “[d]idn’t have

anything to do with the burglary from [F-]13913.” He explained that the property

eventually recovered was not the stolen property at issue in case number F-13913.

When the State elected to proceed to trial first on case number F-13913, Mr.

Stanford testified that he made a “strategic decision” that he and Mr. Nettles needed to

focus the investigation on the individuals involved in that case. Mr. Stanford recalled

that the victim in case number F-13913 was “clear as [] could be that it was [Petitioner]”

who had been in her driveway. Mr. Stanford met with Petitioner at the Warren County

Jail after Petitioner was transferred to the jail about a week before trial. He met with

Petitioner “several times in a three[-]day period” to prepare Petitioner for trial. Mr.

Stanford explained that he had not subpoenaed witnesses because the defense

investigation did not discover any witnesses other than Shelia Thompson and character

witnesses like Petitioner’s parents. He explained that Ms. Thompson was the only

witness that the defense could find that corroborated Petitioner’s version of events, but

she would have “basically regurgitated . . . what [Petitioner] had told her[.]” Mr.

Stanford testified that he approached the State about a potential plea agreement and

worked for several days with the prosecutor to reach an agreement that was in

Petitioner’s best interest. Mr. Stanford testified that he knew the prosecutor would not

object to a continuance of the trial if plea negotiations broke down, and Mr. Stanford told

Petitioner about a possible continuance.

We agree with the post-conviction court that Mr. Stanford was prepared for trial

and was prepared to subpoena at least one witness to testify on Petitioner’s behalf if the

case went to trial. Mr. Stanford communicated to Petitioner that the State agreed to

continue Petitioner’s trial if Petitioner rejected the plea agreement and that the trial court

would not have opposed this agreement to continue. Moreover, the record shows that

Petitioner’s defense team adequately investigated the background of Mr. Holland, and

Mr. Stanford was prepared to effectively cross-examine him. Petitioner failed to

establish or explain how evidence of Mr. Holland’s apparent involvement in some of the

thefts would have affected his decision to go to trial in case number F-13913. Mr. Nettles

testified that Mr. Holland had no involvement in case number F-13913, and Mr. Stanford

stated that the victim in that case was “clear as [she] could be that it was [Petitioner]”

who had been in her driveway at the time of the burglary. Although in his brief Petitioner

characterizes Mr. Holland as a key witness for the State in case number F-13974, the

evidence presented at the hearing fails to establish this claim. Moreover, it is not clear

from the record what additional charges Petitioner was facing in case numbers F-13975,

F-13976, and F-13977, which were dismissed by the State as part of Petitioner’s plea

agreement, or the strength of the evidence against Petitioner in those cases. It is,

therefore, impossible for this court to conclude that but for trial counsel’s alleged errors,

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Petitioner “would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” in

these cases. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

Regarding Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Stanford was ineffective for failing to

respond to the State’s motion to use Petitioner’s prior convictions as impeachment

evidence, the post-conviction court concluded that Mr. Stanford’s performance was

deficient but that Petitioner was not prejudiced “because some, if not several, of

Petitioner’s prior convictions would have been allowed by the [trial court] for

impeachment.” We agree with the post-conviction court’s assessment that Petitioner

failed to establish prejudice. The State’s “Notice of Intent to Use Conviction for

Impeachment” reflects that Petitioner had a total of thirty-two prior convictions, the

majority of which were felony convictions. The Petitioner failed to establish that, had

Mr. Stanford filed a motion challenging the State’s notice, the trial court would have

precluded the State’s use of Petitioner’s prior convictions as impeachment. Accordingly,

Petitioner has not shown that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and he is

not entitled to relief.

Unknowing and Involuntary Guilty Plea

Petitioner further asserts that trial counsel and the defense investigator used

unreasonable persuasion to get Petitioner to sign the agreement. Petitioner asserts that

they threatened him with a federal firearms charge if he did not accept the State’s offer

when “[l]ittle to no proof was available to the government to support such a charge.”

Here, the record reflects that, during the defense investigation, Mr. Stanford and

Mr. Nettles learned that the State had a witness that would testify that Petitioner had

possession of a weapon. Mr. Stanford explained that the witness indicated Petitioner

tried to give her two firearms, which were a part of one of the cases pending against

Petitioner. Because of his substantial practice in federal court, Mr. Stanford was “very

concerned” that the federal prosecutors might seek to charge Petitioner under the Armed

Career Criminal Act, in which case Petitioner “would have been looking at . . . probably

[thirty] to life.” When Mr. Stanford approached the State about plea negotiations, Mr.

Stanford had a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the prosecutor that the prosecutor would

not report the firearms offense to the federal prosecutors. Mr. Stanford indicated that this

was a “big part” of why Petitioner chose to plead guilty to the two indictments.

The guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that, when questioned by the trial court,

Petitioner agreed that he went over the plea documents in both cases “thoroughly” with

trial counsel. Petitioner testified that he understood the nature of the charges to which the

pleas were offered, the minimum and maximum sentence on each charge if convicted, his

right to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, his right to plead not guilty, his right to

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a jury trial, his right to confront adverse witnesses and bring his own witnesses, his right

to remain silent, and his right to appeal any resulting conviction or sentence. In accepting

the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner affirmed that he was waiving each of those

rights. He also agreed that he was entering his pleas freely and voluntarily. Petitioner

denied that he was entering the pleas because he had been threatened to do so. The trial

court found that Petitioner understood his rights and made a knowing, voluntary, and

understanding waiver of his rights by pleading guilty.

Upon review, we agree with the post-conviction court’s assessment that

Petitioner’s best interest pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily. Mr. Stanford

testified that Petitioner was able to write very coherently, was able to pass along volumes

of information to him about the cases (such as specific times and the people involved),

understood the potential sentences he was facing, and understood that additional charges

could possibly result from his alleged possession of a firearm based on his previous

felony convictions. Petitioner declared in open court that his plea was knowing and

voluntary, and the post-conviction court recalled that the Petitioner was very alert during

said plea process such that there was no question that he appeared to know and

understand what he was doing. The record also shows that Petitioner had a very

extensive criminal record and great familiarity with the criminal justice system.

Petitioner entered his guilty plea to avoid a greater penalty that might have resulted had

Petitioner’s cases proceeded to trial, as well as to avoid the possibility of a federal

firearms charge. That Petitioner was facing the possibility of a lengthier sentence if

convicted at trial did not render his plea involuntary. See Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at

904. Under the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner’s plea was knowingly and

voluntarily entered. He is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the post-conviction

court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief.

____________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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