Opinion

Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.

  • 882 F.3d 1121
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Feb 14, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Reyna
On the bench
Moore, Reyna, Taranto
Cited by
354 cases
Authority
More cited than 97.2%

finding resolution of patent eligibility issue improper at motion to dismiss “in the face of factual allegations, spelled out in the proposed second amended complaint, that, if accepted as true, establish that the claimed combination contains inventive components and improves the workings of the computer”

How later courts described this case

  • finding resolution of patent eligibility issue improper at motion to dismiss “in the face of factual allegations, spelled out in the proposed second amended complaint, that, if accepted as true, establish that the claimed combination contains inventive components and improves the workings of the computer”
  • holding that “concrete allegations . . . that individual elements and the claimed combination are not well- understood, routine, or conventional activity” and allegations “regarding the claimed combination’s improvement to the functioning of the computer” should be accepted at true at the pleading stage
  • holding that the plaintiff could avoid dismissal because the complaint presented detailed factual allegations that the claimed invention "uses less memory, results in fast processing speed, and reduces the risk of thrashing which makes the computer process forms more efficiently"
  • holding 7 patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage “when there are no factual 8 allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2017-1452

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida in No. 3:15-cv-00164-HES-

MCR, Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger.

______________________

Decided: February 14, 2018

______________________

JOHN BENTLEY LUNSETH, II, Briggs & Morgan, PA,

Minneapolis, MN, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

JOSEPH W. BAIN, Shutts & Bowen LLP, West Palm

Beach, FL, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represent-

ed by HAROLD TIMOTHY GILLIS, Jacksonville, FL.

______________________

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

2 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE.

Opinion concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part filed by

Circuit Judge REYNA.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Aatrix Software, Inc. (“Aatrix”) appeals the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida’s

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), in which the district court

held claims 1, 2, and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 7,171,615

(“’615 patent”) and claims 1, 13, and 17 of U.S. Patent No.

8,984,393 (“’393 patent”) invalid as directed to ineligible

subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Aatrix also appeals

the district court’s denial of its motion for leave to file a

second amended complaint. We vacate the district court’s

grant of the motion to dismiss, reverse its denial of

Aatrix’s motion for leave to file a second amended com-

plaint, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The ’615 and the ’393 patents have essentially the

same specification and are directed to systems and meth-

ods for designing, creating, and importing data into a

viewable form on a computer so that a user can manipu-

late the form data and create viewable forms and reports.

’615 patent at Abstract. The preferred embodiment in the

specification describes a data processing system, which

has three main components: a form file, a data file, and a

viewer. Id. at 3:4–31, Fig. 1. The form file is created

using in-house form development tools and is designed to

model the physical characteristics of an existing form,

including the calculations and rule conditions required to

fill in the form. Id. at 3:5–14. The data file, referred to as

the Aatrix Universal File (“AUF”), allows data from third-

party applications to be “seamlessly imported” into the

form file program to populate the form fields. Id. at 3:14–

22. The viewer generates a report by merging the data in

the AUF file with the fields in the form file, performing

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 3

calculations on the data, and allowing the user to review

and change the field values. Id. at 3:24–31. Claim 1 of

the ’615 patent is representative (emphases added):

1. A data processing system for designing, creat-

ing, and importing data into, a viewable form

viewable by the user of the data processing sys-

tem, comprising:

(a) a form file that models the physical

representation of an original paper form

and establishes the calculations and rule

conditions required to fill in the viewable

form;

(b) a form file creation program that im-

ports a background image from an original

form, allows a user to adjust and test-

print the background image and compare

the alignment of the original form to the

background test-print, and creates the

form file;

(c) a data file containing data from a user

application for populating the viewable

form; and

(d) a form viewer program operating on

the form file and the data file, to perform

calculations, allow the user of the data

processing system to review and change

the data, and create viewable forms and

reports.

Aatrix sued Green Shades Software, Inc. (“Green

Shades”) for infringement of the ’615 and ’393 patents.

Green Shades moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule

12(b)(6). It argued all claims in the asserted patents were

ineligible under § 101. Aatrix argued the motion should

be denied “to permit claim construction to go forward and

for the [district court] to acquaint itself with the actual

4 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

inventions.” J.A. 198; see also J.A. 5, 204. Aatrix also

filed declarations discussing the claimed invention, which

the district court did not consider in its analysis.

The district court granted Green Shades’ motion and

held every claim ineligible under § 101. J.A. 33 (holding

“the ’615 and ’393 Patents to be drawn to ineligible sub-

ject matter”). Though not argued by the parties, the

district court concluded claim 1 is not directed to any

tangible embodiment and therefore not directed to eligible

subject matter under § 101. The district court applied the

Alice/Mayo two-step analysis to the remaining claims at

issue. The court held that ’615 patent claim 2 is directed

to the abstract idea of “collecting, organizing, and per-

forming calculations on data to fill out forms: a funda-

mental human activity that can be performed using a pen

and paper.” J.A. 23. It found that the claim elements do

not supply an inventive concept. It concluded ’615 patent

claim 22 and ’393 patent claims 1, 13, and 17 are substan-

tively the same as ’615 patent claim 2 and similarly

directed to abstract ideas without inventive concepts.

Aatrix moved to modify and vacate the judgment, for

reconsideration, and for leave to amend the complaint. It

sought reconsideration of the district court’s tangible

embodiment analysis and leave to file a second amended

complaint that it argued supplied additional allegations

and evidence that would have precluded a dismissal

under § 101 at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The district court

denied these motions, stating that “[u]pon consideration

of the filings and the relevant case law, the [district court]

sees no reason to reconsider its prior determination.

Accordingly, [Aatrix’s] motions will be denied.” J.A. 34.

Aatrix timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 5

DISCUSSION

I.

“We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to

state a claim under the law of the regional circuit.”

Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo

Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

The Eleventh Circuit reviews the grant of Rule 12(b)(6)

motions de novo, accepting as true the complaint’s factual

allegations and construing them in the light most favora-

ble to the plaintiff. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &

Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623

F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).

We have held that patent eligibility can be deter-

mined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See, e.g., Genetic Techs.

Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.

2016); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1346, 1351. This is

true only when there are no factual allegations that,

taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as

a matter of law. Indeed, we have explained that “plausi-

ble factual allegations may preclude dismissing a case

under § 101 where, for example, ‘nothing on th[e] rec-

ord . . . refutes those allegations as a matter of law or

justifies dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).’” FairWarning IP,

LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1097 (Fed. Cir.

2016) (quoting BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v.

AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir.

2016)). If there are claim construction disputes at the

Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we have held that either the court

must proceed by adopting the non-moving party’s con-

structions, BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1352; Content Extrac-

tion, 776 F.3d at 1349, or the court must resolve the

disputes to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101

analysis, which may well be less than a full, formal claim

construction. Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1373.

This is not a case where patent ineligibility was

properly adjudicated with finality at the Rule 12(b)(6)

6 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

stage. The district court erred to the extent it determined

that claim 1 of the ’615 patent is ineligible because it is

not directed to a tangible embodiment. The district court

granted this Rule 12(b)(6) motion without claim construc-

tion. We have some doubt about the propriety of doing so

in this case, but need not reach that issue because it did

err when it denied leave to amend without claim construc-

tion and in the face of factual allegations, spelled out in

the proposed second amended complaint, that, if accepted

as true, establish that the claimed combination contains

inventive components and improves the workings of the

computer.

As a preliminary matter, the district court erred to

the extent it held that claim 1 of the ’615 patent is ineligi-

ble solely because it is directed to an intangible embodi-

ment. We have held that claims to pure data and claims

to transitory signals embedded with data are directed to

ineligible subject matter under § 101. Digitech Image

Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,

1348–50 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346,

1353–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But the rationale of those

decisions—failure of the claimed matter to come within

any of the four statutory categories: process, machine,

manufacture, composition of matter—does not apply here.

It remains true after Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Inter-

national, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), that “[a] § 101 analysis

begins by identifying whether an invention fits within one

of the four statutorily provided categories of patent-

eligible subject matter.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,

772 F.3d 709, 713–14 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (post-Alice); Dig-

itech, 758 F.3d at 1348–50 (post-Alice). Claim 1 of the

’615 patent meets that requirement. Like many claims

that focus on software innovations, it is a system claim. It

claims a data processing system which clearly requires a

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 7

computer operating software, a means for viewing and

changing data, and a means for viewing forms and re-

ports. This is very much a tangible system. 1 The district

court erred in holding claim 1 ineligible because it was

directed to intangible matter and should have instead

performed an Alice/Mayo analysis of claim 1.

The district court did perform an Alice/Mayo analysis

on the remaining claims and dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), concluding that the claims are ineligible. The

subsequent refusal to permit an amended complaint was

erroneous because at that stage there certainly were

allegations of fact that, if Aatrix’s position were accepted,

would preclude the dismissal.

The district court denied, without explanation,

Aatrix’s motion to amend its complaint. The Eleventh

Circuit reviews a district court’s denial of leave to amend

for abuse of discretion. Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306,

1316 (11th Cir. 2013). A district court should freely give

leave to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774

F.3d 1329, 1340 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court may

1 The district court recognized that claims drawn to

a computer system are not intangible elsewhere in its

analysis. In assessing dependent claim 2 of the ’615

patent, the district court noted that it is directed to a

tangible embodiment because it adds a client computer

and server computer limitation to the data processing

system of claim 1. It then explained that claim 2 “de-

scribes the structural components and functional limita-

tions of said components of a data processing system (i.e.,

software program) on generic computers.” J.A. 22 (em-

phasis added); see also J.A. 24. It failed, however, to

appreciate that claim 1 is similarly directed to a data

processing system.

8 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

deny a motion to amend on numerous grounds such as

“undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and

futility of the amendment.” Mann, 713 F.3d at 1316; see

also Perez, 774 F.3d at 1340–41 (listing other factors).

The Eleventh Circuit reviews de novo a district court’s

denial of leave to amend for futility. Mann, 713 F.3d at

1316. A justification for denying leave to amend may be

declared or apparent from the record. See Garfield v.

NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006)

(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

In this case, the district court denied Aatrix’s motions

stating in full that “[u]pon consideration of the filings and

the relevant case law, the Court sees no reason to recon-

sider its prior determination.” J.A. 34. The district court

gave no reason for its denial of Aatrix’s motion to amend,

and this is not a case where the record contains “ample

and obvious grounds for denying leave to amend.” Rhodes

v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir.

1981). 2 Indeed, the only argument Green Shades makes

on appeal is that the amendment would be futile because

the claims “at issue are invalid on their face and a more

carefully drafted complaint would do nothing to alter”

their validity. Appellee’s Br. 4, 12. We do not agree.

The proposed second amended complaint contains al-

legations that, taken as true, would directly affect the

district court’s patent eligibility analysis. These allega-

tions at a minimum raise factual disputes underlying the

§ 101 analysis, such as whether the claim term “data file”

constitutes an inventive concept, alone or in combination

with other elements, sufficient to survive an Alice/Mayo

2 The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding prece-

dent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala.,

661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 9

analysis at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Alice/Mayo step two

requires that we consider whether the claims contain “an

‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed

abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,

134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.

Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 79 (2012)). We

have held that patentees who adequately allege their

claims contain inventive concepts survive a § 101 eligibil-

ity analysis under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., BASCOM, 827

F.3d at 1352 (so holding after analysis of allegations).

Here, allowing Aatrix to file the proposed amended com-

plaint, which alleges facts directed to the inventive con-

cepts in its claimed invention, would not be futile. See

FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1097.

Aatrix’s proposed second amended complaint supplies

numerous allegations related to the inventive concepts

present in the claimed form file technology. It describes

the development of the patented invention, including the

problems present in prior art computerized form file

creation. J.A. 418–33. It then presents specific allega-

tions directed to “improvements and problems solved by

the Aatrix patented inventions.” J.A. 454–57 (emphasis

removed). As directed to the claimed data file, for exam-

ple, the proposed second amended complaint alleges:

The inventions claimed in the Aatrix Patents al-

low data to be imported into the viewable elec-

tronic form from outside applications. Prior art

forms solutions allowed data to be extracted only

from widely available databases with published

database schemas, not the proprietary data struc-

tures of application software. The inventions of

the Aatrix Patents allowed data to be imported

from an end user application without needing to

know proprietary database schemas and without

having to custom program the form files to work

with each outside application. The inventions of

the Aatrix Patents permit data to be retrieved

10 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

from a user application and inserted into a form,

eliminating the need for hand typing in the values

and eliminating the risk of transcription error.

J.A. 455 ¶ 109; see also J.A. 431–32 ¶¶ 43–46 (describing

the development and success of the claimed data file

despite the difficulty in obtaining data from other soft-

ware vendors given proprietary data structures). These

allegations about the claimed data file claim that the data

file is directed to an improvement in importing data from

third-party software applications.

The complaint also alleges that “[t]his invention in-

creased the efficiencies of computers processing tax

forms.” J.A. 429 ¶ 39. The complaint alleges that the

claimed invention “saved storage space both in the users’

computers’ RAM (Random Access Memory, which is fast,

short-term storage used by running programs) and hard

disk (permanent slower storage used for files and pro-

grams when not running).” J.A. 429 ¶ 38. The claimed

invention, according to the complaint, reduces the risk of

“thrashing,” a condition which slowed down prior art

systems. J.A. 429–30 ¶ 39. The complaint alleges that

the claimed software uses less memory, results in faster

processing speed, and reduces the risk of thrashing which

makes the computer process forms more efficiently. J.A.

429 ¶ 39. These allegations suggest that the claimed

invention is directed to an improvement in the computer

technology itself and not directed to generic components

performing conventional activities. We have repeatedly

held that inventions which are directed to improvements

in the functioning and operation of the computer are

patent eligible. See, e.g., Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA

Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Amdocs

(Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300–

02 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822

F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also DDR Holdings,

LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.

2014). Viewed in favor of Aatrix, as the district court

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 11

must at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the complaint alleges that

the claimed combination improves the functioning and

operation of the computer itself. These allegations, if

accepted as true, contradict the district court’s conclusion

that the claimed combination was conventional or routine.

J.A. 26. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the

district court to deny leave to amend.

While the ultimate determination of eligibility under

§ 101 is a question of law, like many legal questions, there

can be subsidiary fact questions which must be resolved

en route to the ultimate legal determination. Relevant to

this case, the second step of the Alice/Mayo test requires

examining “the elements of the claim to determine

whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to

‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible

application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566

U.S. at 72, 79). If the elements involve “well-understood,

routine, [and] conventional activity previously engaged in

by researchers in the field,” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73, they do

not constitute an “inventive concept.” We have explained

that the second step of the Alice/Mayo test is satisfied

when the claim limitations “involve more than perfor-

mance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional

activities previously known to the industry.’” Content

Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct.

at 2359); see also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV,

LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that

the features constituting the inventive concept in step two

of Alice/Mayo “must be more than ‘well-understood,

routine, conventional activity’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at

79–80)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co.,

850 F.3d 1315, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (same); BASCOM,

827 F.3d at 1350 (“[I]t is of course now standard for a

§ 101 inquiry to consider whether various claim elements

simply recite ‘well-understood, routine, conventional

activit[ies].’” (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359)). Whether

the claim elements or the claimed combination are well-

12 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

understood, routine, conventional is a question of fact.

And in this case, that question cannot be answered ad-

versely to the patentee based on the sources properly

considered on a motion to dismiss, such as the complaint,

the patent, and materials subject to judicial notice.

There are concrete allegations in the second amended

complaint that individual elements and the claimed

combination are not well-understood, routine, or conven-

tional activity. There are also concrete allegations re-

garding the claimed combination’s improvement to the

functioning of the computer. We have been shown no

proper basis for rejecting those allegations as a factual

matter.

Below, even on the motion to dismiss, Aatrix argued

the district court should have held claim construction

proceedings to obtain a full understanding of the claims

prior to granting Green Shades’ motion to dismiss. It

argued the claims are directed to specific structures

defined in the claim language. On the other hand, Aatrix

did not clearly explain which claim terms required con-

struction or propose a construction of any particular term.

We need not decide whether it was proper on that record

for the court to grant the motion to dismiss without claim

construction: the need for claim construction might be

apparent just from the claim terms themselves, to arrive

at “a full understanding of the basic character of the

claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun

Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273–74

(Fed. Cir. 2012). We conclude that Aatrix is entitled to

file its proposed second amended complaint, and that

ruling makes it unnecessary to decide whether the district

court erred by ruling on the § 101 motion prior to claim

construction. The briefing and argument on appeal

demonstrate a need for claim construction, to be conduct-

ed on remand after the amended complaint is filed.

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 13

On appeal, Aatrix argues, for example, that the

claimed “data file” imports data from third-party applica-

tions into a viewable electronic form without program-

ming each form file to work with each third-party

application, which improves interoperability with third-

party software. Aatrix cites the specification as support

for its argument that the claimed data file contains an

inventive concept directed to improved importation of

data and interoperability with third-party software. It

explains that through the data file, “data from the vendor

application is seamlessly imported into the program” and

the data file imports “only the data for a selected report-

ing period based on the guidelines programmed into the

forms.” ’615 patent at 3:14–19; 10:59–67; see also id. at

12:21–24 (“By examining the data requirements for a

form, the vendor application can determine what data it

should supply in the AUF to correctly fill in as much of

the form as possible.”). The specification describes the

structure of the data file, including the “forms index file”

that “provides the vendor application with information on

the forms available to the program.” Id. at 9:46–60; see

id. at 9:45–12:24. It explains that “allow[ing] data to be

imported into the viewable electronic form from outside

applications” is a “principal object and advantage of the

present invention.” Id. at 2:46–48; see also id. at 5:1–6

(“In its preferred embodiment, the main program 800

pulls information from the user’s payroll or accounting

application’s export file, thus filling in 900 certain infor-

mation on the form without the user having to type it in.

With the export file, a lot of information that would

normally have to be manually filled in is tagged for popu-

lating fields.”). Green Shades argues that this purported

improvement in importation of data is in fact a routine

and conventional use of a computer, however, at oral

argument, Green Shades conceded that nothing in the

specification describes this importation of data as conven-

tional. Oral Arg. at 34:34–35:53.

14 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC.

In assessing the claims under Alice/Mayo step two,

the district court found that the claimed “data file con-

taining data from a user application for populating the

viewable form” describes “a ‘well understood’ and ‘routine’

component and function of a computer.” J.A. 26. The

district court supplied no reasoning or evidence for its

finding that the claimed data file “describes a ‘well under-

stood’ and ‘routine’ component and function of a comput-

er,” J.A. 26, nor is there any in the record at this stage of

the proceedings.

At least since the proposal of the second amended

complaint, and perhaps even before, allegations as to facts

and the proper construction of the claims have precluded

the court’s conclusion that the claimed “data file” is “a

‘well understood’ and ‘routine’ component and function of

a computer.” J.A. 26. The “data file” limitation may

reflect, as Aatrix argues, an improvement in the importa-

tion of data from third-party software applications. Cf.

Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337 (“Here, the claims are not simply

directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead

are specifically directed to a self-referential table for a

computer database.”). In light of the allegations made by

Aatrix, the district court could not conclude at the Rule

12(b)(6) stage that the claimed elements were well-

understood, routine, or conventional. Cf. Affinity Labs of

Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed.

Cir. 2016) (rejecting criticism of conclusion that the claims

recited “routine and generic processing and storing capa-

bilities of computers generally” where it was not suggest-

ed those elements were new or inventive); Content

Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (noting the concept of “data

collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-

known” (emphasis added)). Thus, allowing Aatrix to file

the proposed amended complaint would not have been

futile.

We vacate the district court’s dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). There are factual allegations in the second

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC. v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC. 15

amended complaint, which when accepted as true, pre-

vent dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Nothing in this

opinion should be viewed as going beyond the Rule

12(b)(6) stage. Summary judgment, for example, involves

different standards than Rule 12(b)(6). On remand, the

district court should resolve, as necessary, claim construc-

tion issues.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we vacate the district

court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and reverse its

denial of Aatrix’s motion for leave to file a second amend-

ed complaint.

REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND

REMANDED

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2017-1452

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida in No. 3:15-cv-00164-HES-

MCR, Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger.

______________________

REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-

part.

I concur with the majority’s decision to vacate and

remand to the district court on the motion to dismiss.

Like the majority, I find that the district court erred in its

conclusion that Claim 1 of the ’615 patent was directed to

an abstract idea because the patent lacked a “tangible

embodiment.” I believe that the “tangible embodiment”

requirement imposed by the district court also underlined

its decision to deny Aatrix’s motion for leave to file a

2 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC

Second Amended Complaint. 1 Therefore, I would vacate

and remand on the motion for leave to file a Second

Amended Complaint as well. As a court, we should have

decided on this issue alone.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s broad

statements on the role of factual evidence in a § 101

inquiry. Our precedent is clear that the § 101 inquiry is a

legal question. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital

One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In a

manner contrary to that standard, the majority opinion

attempts to shoehorn a significant factual component into

the Alice § 101 analysis. The problem here is twofold.

First, the majority opinion attempts to shift the char-

acter of the § 101 inquiry from a legal question to a pre-

dominately factual inquiry. The risk of this approach is

that it opens the door in both steps of the Alice inquiry for

the introduction of an inexhaustible array of extrinsic

evidence, such as prior art, publications, other patents,

and expert opinion. 2 Similarly, the majority opinion

strongly suggests that the district court must require

claim construction where the meaning of a claim term is

placed in controversy, even where, as here, proposed

claim constructions are not presented to the court. Maj.

Op. at 12–13. One effect of this approach is that a plain-

tiff facing a 12(b)(6) motion may simply amend its com-

plaint to allege extrinsic facts that, once alleged, must be

taken as true, regardless of its consistency with the

intrinsic record. The majority asserts that its opinion is

not intended to extend beyond the 12(b)(6) stage, but that

is not the problem. The problem is that the 12(b)(6)

procedure is converted into a full blown factual inquiry on

1 For purposes of this dissent, “Second Amended

Complaint” refers to the proposed Second Amended

Complaint that was filed on April 26, 2016.

2 See infra note 3.

AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC 3

the level of § 102, § 103, and § 112 inquiries. Clearly, this

approach would turn the utility of the 12(b)(6) procedure

on its head, in particular in the context of § 101, which is

primarily focused on the “allegations” in the patent—the

claims and written description. That said, despite the

majority’s attempt to cabin its opinion to 12(b)(6), I see

little to prevent argument that these notions extend also

to summary judgment proceedings.

Second, the posture of the case on appeal does not

support the majority opinion. The motion to dismiss on

appeal only challenges the First Amended Complaint.

There was no motion to dismiss filed challenging the

Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, the “new” allega-

tions and evidence 3 discussed by the majority were not

3 Aatrix’s new allegations in the Second Amended

Complaint included: the background and development of

the inventions of the Aatrix Patents; specific allegations

and diagrams spelling out the technology of the Aatrix

Patents; the prosecution history of the patents with the

relevant USPTO file wrappers attached as exhibits; a

large number of prior art and patentably distinct means

and methods of creating, displaying and filling out forms

on computers, such as Aatrix’s own “monolithic software;”

hundreds of search results by the USPTO disclosing prior

art in the field; eleven patents or publications disclosing

prior art and/or patentably distinct means and methods

cited by the USPTO in the prosecution of the applications

for the Aatrix’s patents; several products for creating,

designing and filling out forms, allegedly distinct from

Aatrix’s patents, on sale before the date of invention;

alternate methods for creating, displaying and filling out

forms such as Superforms and the use of SDK’s to launch

monolithic software; and the allegedly many improve-

ments, objectives and advantages over the prior art that

the inventions of Aatrix’s patents provide, including

4 AATRIX SOFTWARE, INC v. GREEN SHADES SOFTWARE, INC

raised before the district court. Thus, the part of the

majority opinion devoted to the Second Amended Com-

plaint is dicta. As an appellate court, we should not pass

judgment on matters not addressed by the district court.

Here, we must first give the district court the opportunity

to perform a § 101 analysis in light of this new complaint,

which we can later review, if at all. See Singleton v.

Wulff, 428 US 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of

course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an

issue not passed upon below.”). Nor should we prejudge

whether the Second Amended Complaint survives a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in the first instance, particular-

ly when the defendant, Greenshades, has had no oppor-

tunity to present arguments with respect to the new

pleading.

The majority attempts to expand this court’s law re-

garding patent eligibility under § 101 at the Rule 12(b)(6)

stage. This contradicts our case law that patent ineligibil-

ity under § 101 is a question of law, and that it can be

appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,

Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d

905, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]his court has determined

claims to be patent-ineligible at the motion to dismiss

stage based on intrinsic evidence from the specification

without need for ‘extraneous fact finding outside the

record.’”).

For these reasons, I respectfully concur-in-part and

dissent-in-part from the majority opinion.

improvements in the functioning of the computer compo-

nents of the inventions. J.A. 407–09.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.