Opinion

Berkheimer v. Hp Inc.

  • 881 F.3d 1360
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Feb 8, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Moore
On the bench
Moore, Taranto, Stoll
Cited by
531 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.4%

stating that, “[a]t this stage of the case, . . . there is at least 5 a genuine issue of material fact in light of the specification regarding whether claims 4-7 archive 6 documents in an inventive manner that improves these aspects of the disclosed archival system[;] 7 [w]hether claims 4-7 perform well-understood, routine, and conventional activities to a skilled 8 artisan is a genuine issue of material fact making summary judgment inappropriate”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that, “[a]t this stage of the case, . . . there is at least 5 a genuine issue of material fact in light of the specification regarding whether claims 4-7 archive 6 documents in an inventive manner that improves these aspects of the disclosed archival system[;] 7 [w]hether claims 4-7 perform well-understood, routine, and conventional activities to a skilled 8 artisan is a genuine issue of material fact making summary judgment inappropriate”
  • holding that claims may be treated Case: 22-2109 Document: 61 Page: 4 Filed: 04/04/2024 4 AI VISUALIZE, INC. v. NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. as “representative” in a § 101 inquiry if a patentee makes no “meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations not found in the representative claim”
  • holding that claims that fail to capture a purportedly unconventional form of data stor- age ineligible, while finding that other claims that do cap- ture purportedly unconventional forms of data storage gave rise to a factual dispute underlying patent eligibility
  • finding that the district court erred in concluding that there were no underlying factual questions about the claimed inventive process of storing parsed data in an unconventional manner that improved efficiency, reduced storage costs, and eliminated redundancies

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Whitserve LLC v. Donuts Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 571 (2019)

    Here, Berkheimer and Aatrix are inapplicable because neither the patent nor the complaint alleges any improvement in technology.
    District Court, D. DelawareJul 8, 2019Read it
  • Distinguished by Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1138 (2018)

    In any event, Berkheimer is distinguishable on that ground that the patent at issue there "describe[d] an inventive feature that store[d] parsed data in a purportedly unconventional manner" whereas here Cellspin fails to identify any portion of the specification which describes the purportedly inventive power usage, battery savings, resource conservation, or cost benefits.
    District Court, N.D. CaliforniaApr 3, 2018Read it

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

STEVEN E. BERKHEIMER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

HP INC., FKA HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2017-1437

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:12-cv-09023, Judge

John Z. Lee.

______________________

Decided: February 8, 2018

______________________

JAMES P. HANRATH, Much Shelist, PC, Chicago, IL,

argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by

MICHAEL JOHN FEMAL; PAUL SKIERMONT, Skiermont

Derby LLP, Dallas, TX.

WILLIAM R. PETERSON, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,

Houston, TX, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-

sented by THOMAS R. DAVIS, DAVID JACK LEVY; JASON C.

WHITE, NICHOLAS A. RESTAURI, Chicago, IL.

______________________

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

2 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Steven E. Berkheimer appeals the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ summary

judgment holding claims 1–7 and 9 of U.S. Patent

No. 7,447,713 (’713 patent) invalid as ineligible under

35 U.S.C. § 101. Mr. Berkheimer also appeals the district

court’s decision holding claims 10–19 of the ’713 patent

invalid for indefiniteness. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand for

further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The ’713 patent relates to digitally processing and ar-

chiving files in a digital asset management system. ’713

patent at 1:11–12. The system parses files into multiple

objects and tags the objects to create relationships be-

tween them. Id. at 1:13–18, 16:26–36. These objects are

analyzed and compared, either manually or automatical-

ly, to archived objects to determine whether variations

exist based on predetermined standards and rules. Id. at

13:14–20, 16:37–51. This system eliminates redundant

storage of common text and graphical elements, which

improves system operating efficiency and reduces storage

costs. Id. at 2:53–55, 16:52–54. The relationships be-

tween the objects within the archive allow a user to “carry

out a one-to-many editing process of object-oriented data,”

in which a change to one object carries over to all archived

documents containing the same object. Id. at 15:65–16:2,

16:52–60.

Mr. Berkheimer sued HP Inc. in the Northern District

of Illinois, alleging infringement of claims 1–7 and 9–19 of

the ’713 patent. Following a Markman hearing, the

district court concluded that the term “archive exhibits

minimal redundancy” in claim 10 is indefinite and ren-

ders claim 10 and its dependents invalid. HP moved for

summary judgment that claims 1–7 and 9 are patent

ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and the district court

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 3

granted the motion. Mr. Berkheimer appeals. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Indefiniteness

We review indefiniteness determinations de novo ex-

cept for necessary subsidiary fact findings, which we

review for clear error. Cox Commc’ns v. Sprint Commc’n

Co., 838 F.3d 1224, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Under

35 U.S.C. § 112, patent claims must “particularly point[]

out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter” regarded as

the invention. A lack of definiteness renders the claims

invalid. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,

134 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2014). Claims, viewed in light of

the specification and prosecution history, must “inform

those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention

with reasonable certainty.” Id. at 2129; see Interval

Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed.

Cir. 2014) (“The claims, when read in light of the specifi-

cation and the prosecution history, must provide objective

boundaries for those of skill in the art.”). This standard

“mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute preci-

sion is unattainable.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.

“Claim language employing terms of degree has long been

found definite where it provided enough certainty to one

of skill in the art when read in the context of the inven-

tion.” Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1370.

The district court analyzed the term “archive exhibits

minimal redundancy” in claim 10 and determined that

the intrinsic evidence “leaves a person skilled in the art

with a highly subjective meaning of ‘minimal redundan-

cy.’” Berkheimer v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2015 WL

4999954, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2015). It relied on

the declaration of HP’s expert, Dr. Schonfeld, to find that

an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have known what

the term “minimal redundancy” meant in claim 10. Id. at

*10. We hold that the district court’s subsidiary factual

4 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

finding based on Dr. Schonfeld’s declaration was not

clearly erroneous and affirm its indefiniteness determina-

tion for claims 10–19.

We look first to the language of the claim to determine

whether the meaning of “minimal redundancy” is reason-

ably clear. Claim 10 recites “a storage medium, and a set

of executable instructions for establishing an archive of

documents represented by linked object oriented elements

stored in the medium, wherein the archive exhibits mini-

mal redundancy with at least some elements linked to

pluralities of the elements.” Claims 11–19 depend from

claim 10 and therefore include the same limitation. This

claim language is not reasonably clear as to what level of

redundancy in the archive is acceptable.

The specification uses inconsistent terminology to de-

scribe the level of redundancy that the system achieves.

For example, it describes “minimiz[ing] redundant ob-

jects,” ’713 patent at 16:50–51, “eliminating redundancy,”

id. at 16:52, and “reducing redundancies,” id. at 15:18–19.

The only example included in the specification is an

archive that exhibits no redundancy. ’713 patent at 13:5–

13. The claim language, however, does not require elimi-

nation of all redundancies from the archive. For example,

the specification discloses providing users with “user

interfaces and tools for examining and choosing the

elimination of document and document element redun-

dancies.” Id. at 6:60–65 (emphasis added). Indeed,

Mr. Berkheimer acknowledges that “the invention at-

tempts to minimize redundancy but may not in all cases

achieve absolute [elimination of] redundancy.” Appellant

Br. at 64. The specification contains no point of compari-

son for skilled artisans to determine an objective bounda-

ry of “minimal” when the archive includes some

redundancies. Sonix Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,

844 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that specific

examples in the specification provided “points of compari-

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 5

son” that helped form an objective standard of the claim’s

scope).

The prosecution history does not add clarity. In re-

sponse to an indefiniteness rejection during prosecution,

Mr. Berkheimer explained that the claim “desires to

eliminate redundancy” but includes the word “minimal”

because “to eliminate all redundancy in the field of the

claimed invention is not likely.” J.A. 656. This does not

explain how much redundancy is permitted.

In light of the lack of objective boundary or specific

examples of what constitutes “minimal” in the claims,

specification, and prosecution history, the district court

properly considered and relied on extrinsic evidence.

Relying on the specification’s lack of explanation and

specific examples of this term, HP’s expert Dr. Schonfeld

opined that the patent does not inform a skilled artisan of

the meaning of “archive exhibits minimal redundancy”

with reasonable certainty. Mr. Berkheimer did not pro-

vide the court with expert testimony of his own. While

Dr. Schonfeld’s explanation for his opinion was brief, it

was not clear error for the district court to find that a

skilled artisan would not have known the meaning of

“minimal redundancy” with reasonable certainty.

Mr. Berkheimer’s argument that “the archive” pro-

vides an objective baseline to measure what exhibits

“minimal redundancy” misses the point. He is correct

that it is “the archive” that must exhibit “minimal redun-

dancy,” but the issue is not what must exhibit minimal

redundancy, but rather how much is minimal.

Mr. Berkheimer’s only arguments on this point are that

terms of degree are not required to have an objective

boundary and a contrary holding would invalidate a large

swath of patents relying on terms of degree such as “min-

imal” or “substantial.” Our case law is clear that the

objective boundaries requirement applies to terms of

degree. In Sonix, we held that the term “visually negligi-

6 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

ble” had an objective baseline to interpret the claims.

844 F.3d at 1378. In Interval Licensing, we held that the

phrase “unobtrusive manner” lacked objective boundaries.

766 F.3d at 1371. We do not hold that all terms of degree

are indefinite. We only hold that the term “minimal

redundancy” is indefinite in light of the evidence in this

case.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determina-

tion that claims 10–19 are invalid as indefinite.

II. Patent Eligibility

In patent appeals, we apply the law of the regional

circuit, here the Seventh Circuit, to issues not unique to

patent law. AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v.

Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir.

2014). The Seventh Circuit reviews a grant of summary

judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in

the light most favorable to the non-movant. Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th Cir. 2011). Summary

judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dis-

pute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is ultimately an

issue of law we review de novo. Intellectual Ventures I

LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed.

Cir. 2017). The patent eligibility inquiry may contain

underlying issues of fact. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First

Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir.

2016).

First, we address whether Mr. Berkheimer waived his

ability to argue that the dependent claims are separately

patent eligible. Courts may treat a claim as representa-

tive in certain situations, such as if the patentee does not

present any meaningful argument for the distinctive

significance of any claim limitations not found in the

representative claim or if the parties agree to treat a

claim as representative. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 7

S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Intellectual

Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316 &

n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Because Mr. Berkheimer maintained

that limitations included in dependent claims 4–7 bear on

patent eligibility and never agreed to make claim 1 repre-

sentative, we hold that arguments going specifically to

claims 4–7 are properly preserved on appeal.

Mr. Berkheimer never agreed to make claim 1 repre-

sentative. In his opposition brief to HP’s motion for

summary judgment, he argued that claim 1 is not repre-

sentative of the limitations found in the dependent

claims. J.A. 1280. In particular, he argued that limita-

tions in claim 5 drawn to effecting a one-to-many change

add inventive concepts. Id. Other portions of his brief

below argued that reducing redundancy and enabling one-

to-many editing are patent eligible concepts. See, e.g.,

J.A. 1278 (“The innovative aspects of the claims improve

computerized digital asset and content management

systems by enabling control of object and object relation-

ship integrity, reducing redundancy, [and] linking objects

to enable one to many editing . . . . Such improvements to

computer functionality are precisely the kind of improve-

ments that have been found patent eligible under Alice.”

(internal citations omitted)). Because claim 1 does not

recite reducing redundancy or enabling one-to-many

editing, we interpret these arguments as applying to

dependent claims 4–7, which include these limitations.

Mr. Berkheimer makes these same arguments to us on

appeal.

The district court stated that it was treating claim 1

as representative because claim 1 is the only asserted

independent claim and Mr. Berkheimer focused “all of his

8 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

primary arguments” on claim 1. 1 Berkheimer v. Hewlett-

Packard Co., 224 F. Supp. 3d 635, 643 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Dec.

12, 2016). Neither rationale justifies treating claim 1 as

representative. A claim is not representative simply

because it is an independent claim. Indeed,

Mr. Berkheimer advanced meaningful arguments regard-

ing limitations found only in the dependent claims. In

acknowledging that Mr. Berkheimer focused his “primary

arguments” on claim 1, the district court necessarily

recognized that he raised arguments regarding the de-

pendent claims. Thus, Mr. Berkheimer’s separate argu-

ments regarding claims 4–7 are not waived.

Turning to the merits of the § 101 inquiry, anyone

who “invents or discovers any new and useful process,

machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any

new and useful improvement thereof” may obtain a pa-

tent. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Because patent protection does not

extend to claims that monopolize the “building blocks of

human ingenuity,” claims directed to laws of nature,

natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patent

eligible. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct.

2347, 2354 (2014). The Supreme Court instructs courts to

distinguish between claims that claim patent ineligible

subject matter and those that “integrate the building

blocks into something more.” Id. “First, we determine

whether the claims at issue are directed to” a patent-

ineligible concept. Id. at 2355. If so, “we consider the

elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an or-

dered combination’ to determine whether the additional

elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-

eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative

1 Though the district court stated it was treating

claim 1 as representative, it separately analyzed the

dependent claims.

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 9

Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78–79

(2012)).

Independent claim 1 recites:

1. A method of archiving an item in a computer

processing system comprising:

presenting the item to a parser;

parsing the item into a plurality of multi-

part object structures wherein portions of

the structures have searchable infor-

mation tags associated therewith;

evaluating the object structures in accord-

ance with object structures previously

stored in an archive;

presenting an evaluated object structure

for manual reconciliation at least where

there is a predetermined variance between

the object and at least one of a predeter-

mined standard and a user defined rule.

The district court construed “parser” as “a program

that dissects and converts source code into object code”

and “parsing” as using such a program. J.A. 47. It con-

strued “evaluating the object structures in accordance

with object structures previously stored in an archive” as

“analyzing the plurality of multi-part object structures

obtained by parsing and comparing it with object struc-

tures previously stored in the archive to determine if

there is variance between the object and at least one of a

predetermined standard and a user defined rule.” Id.

These constructions are not challenged on appeal.

At Alice step one, we must “determine whether the

claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.”

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The district court held claim 1 is

directed to the abstract idea of “using a generic computer

to collect, organize, compare, and present data for recon-

10 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

ciliation prior to archiving.” Berkheimer, 224 F. Supp. 3d

at 644. Mr. Berkheimer argues the district court charac-

terized the invention too broadly and simplistically,

ignoring the core features of the claims. We hold that

claims 1–3 and 9 are directed to the abstract idea of

parsing and comparing data; claim 4 is directed to the

abstract idea of parsing, comparing, and storing data; and

claims 5–7 are directed to the abstract idea of parsing,

comparing, storing, and editing data.

These claims are similar to claims we held directed to

an abstract idea in prior cases. See, e.g., In re TLI

Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir.

2016); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells

Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.

2014). In Content Extraction, the claims at issue general-

ly recited “a method of 1) extracting data from hard copy

documents using an automated digitizing unit such as a

scanner, 2) recognizing specific information from the

extracted data, and 3) storing that information in a

memory.” 776 F.3d at 1345. We held those claims were

directed to the abstract idea of “1) collecting data, 2)

recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and

3) storing that recognized data in a memory.” Id. at 1347.

Similarly, in TLI, the claims recited a “method for record-

ing and administering digital images,” which involved

“recording images using a digital pick up unit in a tele-

phone unit,” digitally storing them, transmitting the

digital images and classification information to a server,

and storing the digital images in the server based on the

classification information. 823 F.3d at 610. We held the

claim at issue used only conventional computer compo-

nents to implement the abstract idea of “classifying and

storing digital images in an organized manner.” Id. at

613. Here, the specification explains that the parser

“determines and extracts components of the standardized

document or item representation” and reassembles the

components “into composite output files.” ’713 patent at

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 11

3:61–4:17. Even though the parser separates the docu-

ments or items into smaller components than the claims

determined to be abstract in Content Extraction and TLI,

the concept is the same. The parsing and comparing of

claims 1–3 and 9 are similar to the collecting and recog-

nizing of Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347, and the

classifying in an organized manner of TLI, 823 F.3d at

613. Claim 4 adds the abstract concept of storing, and

claims 5–7 add the abstract concept of editing.

Mr. Berkheimer argues that the claims are not ab-

stract because the “parsing” limitation roots the claims in

technology and transforms the data structure from source

code to object code. Limiting the invention to a technolog-

ical environment does “not make an abstract concept any

less abstract under step one.” Intellectual Ventures I,

850 F.3d at 1340. That the parser transforms data from

source to object code does not demonstrate non-

abstractness without evidence that this transformation

improves computer functionality in some way. See Visual

Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed.

Cir. 2017) (“[W]e must . . . ask whether the claims are

directed to an improvement to computer functionality

versus being directed to an abstract idea.” (internal

quotations omitted)); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,

822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he first step

in the Alice inquiry in this case asks whether the focus of

the claims [was] on the specific asserted improvement in

computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that

qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are

invoked merely as a tool.”). No such evidence exists on

this record. Indeed, Mr. Berkheimer admitted that

parsers had existed for years prior to his patent.

J.A. 1106. Because the claims are directed to an abstract

idea, we proceed to the second step of the Alice inquiry.

At step two, we “consider the elements of each claim

both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to

determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the

12 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

nature of the claim’ into a patent eligible application.”

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–

79). The second step of the Alice test is satisfied when the

claim limitations “involve more than performance of ‘well-

understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previ-

ously known to the industry.’” Content Extraction,

776 F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359).

The question of whether a claim element or combina-

tion of elements is well-understood, routine and conven-

tional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a

question of fact. Any fact, such as this one, that is perti-

nent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear

and convincing evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.

P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). Like indefiniteness, ena-

blement, or obviousness, whether a claim recites patent

eligible subject matter is a question of law which may

contain underlying facts. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v.

Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

(“Indefiniteness is a question of law that we review de

novo, [] subject to a determination of underlying facts.”);

Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180,

1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Whether a claim satisfies the

enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a question

of law that we review without deference, although the

determination may be based on underlying factual find-

ings, which we review for clear error.”); Apple Inc. v.

Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034, 1047 (Fed. Cir.

2016) (en banc) (“Obviousness is a question of law based

on underlying facts.”). We have previously stated that

“[t]he § 101 inquiry ‘may contain underlying factual

issues.’” Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1325 (emphasis in

original) (quoting Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v.

Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir.

2013)). And the Supreme Court recognized that in mak-

ing the § 101 determination, the inquiry “might some-

times overlap” with other fact-intensive inquiries like

novelty under § 102. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 13

As our cases demonstrate, not every § 101 determina-

tion contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts

material to the § 101 inquiry. See, e.g., Content Extrac-

tion, 776 F.3d at 1349 (patent owner conceded the argued

inventive concept “was a routine function of scanning

technology at the time the claims were filed”); Intellectual

Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d

1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (patent owner argued an

“interactive interface” is “a specific application of the

abstract idea that provides an inventive concept” and did

not dispute that the computer interface was generic).

Whether a claim recites patent eligible subject matter is a

question of law which may contain disputes over underly-

ing facts. Patent eligibility has in many cases been re-

solved on motions to dismiss or summary judgment.

Nothing in this decision should be viewed as casting

doubt on the propriety of those cases. When there is no

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the

claim element or claimed combination is well-understood,

routine, conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant

field, this issue can be decided on summary judgment as a

matter of law.

Here, the district court concluded that the claims do

not contain an inventive concept under Alice step two

because they describe “steps that employ only ‘well-

understood, routine, and conventional’ computer func-

tions” and are claimed “at a relatively high level of gener-

ality.” Berkheimer, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48 (quoting

Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348). Mr. Berkheimer

argues portions of the specification referring to reducing

redundancy and enabling one-to-many editing contradict

the district court’s finding that the claims describe well-

understood, routine, and conventional activities. He

argues, both below and on appeal, that summary judg-

ment is improper because whether the claimed invention

is well-understood, routine, and conventional is an under-

lying fact question for which HP offered no evidence.

14 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

While patent eligibility is ultimately a question of

law, the district court erred in concluding there are no

underlying factual questions to the § 101 inquiry. Id. at

642. Whether something is well-understood, routine, and

conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent

is a factual determination. Whether a particular technol-

ogy is well-understood, routine, and conventional goes

beyond what was simply known in the prior art. The

mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior

art, for example, does not mean it was well-understood,

routine, and conventional.

Mr. Berkheimer argues that the claimed combination

improves computer functionality through the elimination

of redundancy and the one-to-many editing feature, which

provides inventive concepts. The specification of the ’713

patent discusses the state of the art at the time the patent

was filed and the purported improvements of the inven-

tion. Conventional digital asset management systems at

the time included “numerous documents containing

multiple instances of redundant document elements.”

’713 patent at 1:24–27. This redundancy in conventional

systems led to “inefficiencies and increased costs.” Id. at

2:22–26. The specification explains that the claimed

improvement increases efficiency and computer function-

ality over the prior art systems:

By eliminating redundancy in the archive 14, sys-

tem operating efficiency will be improved, storage

costs will be reduced and a one-to-many editing

process can be implemented wherein a singular

linked object, common to many documents or files,

can be edited once and have the consequence of

the editing process propagate through all of the

linked documents and files. The one-to-many ed-

iting capability substantially reduces effort need-

ed to up-date files which represent packages or

packaging manuals or the like as would be under-

stood by those of skill in the art.

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 15

Id. at 16:52–60.

The specification describes an inventive feature that

stores parsed data in a purportedly unconventional man-

ner. This eliminates redundancies, improves system

efficiency, reduces storage requirements, and enables a

single edit to a stored object to propagate throughout all

documents linked to that object. Id. The improvements

in the specification, to the extent they are captured in the

claims, create a factual dispute regarding whether the

invention describes well-understood, routine, and conven-

tional activities, see Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–

48, so we must analyze the asserted claims and determine

whether they capture these improvements, Alice,

134 S. Ct. at 2357.

The parties dispute whether these improvements to

computer functionality are captured in the claims. See

Appellant Br. at 42; Appellee Br. at 39–40, 43–44. We

conclude that claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept

sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent

eligible application. Claim 1 recites a method of archiving

including parsing data, analyzing and comparing the data

to previously stored data, and presenting the data for

reconciliation when there is a variance. It does not in-

clude limitations which incorporate eliminating redun-

dancy of stored object structures or effecting a one-to-

many change of linked documents within an archive. It

does not even require the storage of data after it is pre-

sented for manual reconciliation. Thus, it does not recite

any of the purportedly unconventional activities disclosed

in the specification. Mr. Berkheimer does not advance

any separate arguments regarding claims 2–3 and 9.

Even considering these claims separately, they recite

patent ineligible subject matter for the same reason.

Mr. Berkheimer argues that claim 1 recites an im-

provement to computer functionality and digital asset

management systems. Mr. Berkheimer, however, admit-

16 BERKHEIMER v. HP INC.

ted that parsers and the functions they perform existed

for years before his patent. J.A. 1106. These convention-

al limitations of claim 1, combined with limitations of

analyzing and comparing data and reconciling differences

between the data, “fail to transform th[e] abstract idea

into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 1357.

The limitations amount to no more than performing the

abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conven-

tional computer components. Because claims 1–3 and 9

do not capture the purportedly inventive concepts, we

hold that claims 1–3 and 9 are ineligible.

Claims 4–7, in contrast, contain limitations directed

to the arguably unconventional inventive concept de-

scribed in the specification. Claim 4 recites “storing a

reconciled object structure in the archive without sub-

stantial redundancy.” The specification states that stor-

ing object structures in the archive without substantial

redundancy improves system operating efficiency and

reduces storage costs. ’713 patent at 16:52–58. It also

states that known asset management systems did not

archive documents in this manner. Id. at 2:22–26. Claim

5 depends on claim 4 and further recites “selectively

editing an object structure, linked to other structures to

thereby effect a one-to-many change in a plurality of

archived items.” The specification states one-to-many

editing substantially reduces effort needed to update files

because a single edit can update every document in the

archive linked to that object structure. Id at 16:58–60.

This one-to-many functionality is more than “editing data

in a straightforward copy-and-paste fashion,” as charac-

terized by the district court. Berkheimer, 224 F. Supp. 3d

at 645. According to the specification, conventional

digital asset management systems cannot perform one-to-

many editing because they store documents with numer-

ous instances of redundant elements, rather than elimi-

nate redundancies through the storage of linked object

structures. ’713 patent at 1:22–55, 4:4–9, 16:52–60.

BERKHEIMER v. HP INC. 17

Claims 6–7 depend from claim 5 and accordingly contain

the same limitations. These claims recite a specific

method of archiving that, according to the specification,

provides benefits that improve computer functionality.

HP argues that redundancy and efficiency are consid-

erations in any archival system, including paper-based

systems. The district court agreed. Berkheimer,

224 F. Supp. 3d at 647. At this stage of the case, however,

there is at least a genuine issue of material fact in light of

the specification regarding whether claims 4–7 archive

documents in an inventive manner that improves these

aspects of the disclosed archival system. Whether claims

4–7 perform well-understood, routine, and conventional

activities to a skilled artisan is a genuine issue of materi-

al fact making summary judgment inappropriate with

respect to these claims.

We do not decide today that claims 4–7 are patent eli-

gible under § 101. We only decide that on this record

summary judgment was improper, given the fact ques-

tions created by the specification’s disclosure.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district

court’s decision that claims 10–19 of the ’713 patent are

invalid as indefinite and its grant of summary judgment

that claims 1–3 and 9 of the ’713 patent are ineligible

under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We vacate the district court’s

grant of summary judgment that claims 4–7 are ineligible

under § 101 and remand for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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