Artis v. District of Columbia

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF

APPEALS

No. 16–460. Argued November 1, 2017—Decided January 22, 2018

Federal district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

state claims not otherwise within their adjudicatory authority if

those claims are “part of the same case or controversy” as the federal

claims the plaintiff asserts. 28 U. S. C. §1367(a). When a district

court dismisses all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of

federal jurisdiction, it ordinarily also dismisses all related state

claims. See §1367(c)(3). Section 1367(d) provides that the “period of

limitations for” refiling in state court a state claim so dismissed

“shall be tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and for a

period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a

longer tolling period.”

When petitioner Artis filed a federal-court suit against respondent

District of Columbia (District), alleging a federal employment-

discrimination claim and three allied claims under D. C. law, nearly

two years remained on the applicable statute of limitations for the

D. C.-law violations. Two and a half years later, the Federal District

Court ruled against Artis on her sole federal claim and dismissed the

D. C.-law claims under §1367(c). Fifty-nine days after the dismissal,

Artis refiled her state-law claims in the D. C. Superior Court, but

that court dismissed them as time barred. The D. C. Court of Ap-

peals affirmed, holding that §1367(d) accorded Artis only a 30-day

grace period to refile in state court and rejecting her argument that

the word “tolled” in §1367(d) means that the limitations period is

suspended during the pendency of the federal suit.

Held:

1. Section 1367(d)’s instruction to “toll” a state limitations period

means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock. Pp. 7–16.

(a) Statutes that shelter from time bars claims earlier com-

2 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Syllabus

menced in another forum generally employ one of two means. First,

the period of limitations may be “tolled,” i.e., suspended, while the

claim is pending elsewhere; the time clock starts running again when

the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off. A legislature may

instead elect simply to provide a grace period, permitting the statute

of limitations to run while the claim is pending in another forum and

averting the risk of a time bar by according the plaintiff a fixed peri-

od in which to refile. The District has identified no federal statute in

which a grace-period meaning has been ascribed to the word “tolled”

or any word similarly rooted. And the one case in which this Court

used tolling language to describe a grace period, see Hardin v.

Straub, 490 U. S. 536, is a feather on the scale against the weight of

decisions in which “tolling” a statute of limitations signals stopping

the clock. Pp. 7–11.

(b) Considering first the ordinary meaning of the statutory lan-

guage, §1367(d) is phrased as a tolling provision. It suspends the

statute of limitations both while the claim is pending in federal court

and for 30 days postdismissal. Artis’ interpretation is a natural fit

with this language. The District, in contrast, reads “tolled” to mean

to remove, temporarily, the bar that would ordinarily accompany the

expiration of the limitations period. But the District offers no reason

to home in only on the word “tolled” itself and ignore information

about the verb’s ordinary meaning gained from its grammatical ob-

ject, “period of limitations.” That object sheds light on what it means

to “be tolled.” The District’s reading also tenders a strained interpre-

tation of the phrase “period of limitations”; makes the first portion of

the tolling period, the duration of the claim’s pendency in federal

court, superfluous; and could yield an absurdity, permitting a plain-

tiff to refile in state court even if the limitations period on her claim

had expired before she filed in federal court. Pp. 11–13.

(c) The D. C. Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Congress

adopted an American Law Institute (ALI) recommendation to allow

refiling in state court only for 30 days after a dismissal. The ALI

provision, like §1367(d), established a 30-day federal floor on the time

allowed for refiling, but it did not provide for tolling “while the [state]

claim is pending” in federal court. Pp. 13–14.

(d) The 30-day provision casts no large shadow on Artis’ stop-the-

clock interpretation. The provision accounts for cases in which a

plaintiff commenced a federal action close to the expiration date of

the relevant state statute of limitations, by giving such a plaintiff

breathing space to refile in state court. Adding a brief span of days to

the tolling period is not unusual in stop-the-clock statutes. See, e.g.,

46 U. S. C. §53911. Section 1367(d)’s proviso “unless State law pro-

vides for a longer tolling period” could similarly aid a plaintiff who

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Syllabus

filed in federal court just short of the expiration of the state limita-

tions period. Pp. 14–16.

2. The stop-the-clock interpretation of §1367(d) does not present a

serious constitutional problem. In Jinks v. Richland County, 538

U. S. 456, the Court rejected an argument that §1367(d) impermissi-

bly exceeds Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper

Clause. Id., at 464–465. The District contends that a stop-the-clock

prescription serves “no federal purpose” that could not be served by a

grace-period prescription. But both devices are standard, off-the-

shelf means of accounting for the fact that a claim was timely pressed

in another forum. Requiring Congress to choose one over the other

would impose a tighter constraint on Congress’ discretion than this

Court has countenanced. A concern that a stop-the-clock prescription

entails a greater imposition on the States than a grace-period pre-

scription may also be more theoretical than real. Finally, a stop-the-

clock rule like §1367(d) is suited to the primary purposes of limita-

tions statutes: “ ‘preventing surprises’ ” to defendants and “ ‘barring a

plaintiff who has slept on his rights.’ ” American Pipe & Constr. Co.

v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 554. Pp. 16–19.

135 A. 3d 334, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J.,

filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ.,

joined.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–460

_________________

STEPHANIE C. ARTIS, PETITIONER v. DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS

[January 22, 2018]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Supplemental Jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C.

§1367, enables federal district courts to entertain claims

not otherwise within their adjudicatory authority when

those claims “are so related to claims . . . within [federal-

court competence] that they form part of the same case or

controversy.” §1367(a). Included within this supple-

mental jurisdiction are state claims brought along with

federal claims arising from the same episode. When dis-

trict courts dismiss all claims independently qualifying for

the exercise of federal jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss

as well all related state claims. See §1367(c)(3). A district

court may also dismiss the related state claims if there is a

good reason to decline jurisdiction. See §1367(c)(1), (2),

and (4). This case concerns the time within which state

claims so dismissed may be refiled in state court.

Section 1367(d), addressing that issue, provides:

“The period of limitations for any [state] claim [ joined

with a claim within federal-court competence] shall be

tolled while the claim is pending [in federal court] and

for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless

2 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

The question presented: Does the word “tolled,” as used in

§1367(d), mean the state limitations period is suspended

during the pendency of the federal suit; or does “tolled”

mean that, although the state limitations period continues

to run, a plaintiff is accorded a grace period of 30 days to

refile in state court post dismissal of the federal case?

Petitioner urges the first, or stop-the-clock, reading.

Respondent urges, and the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals adopted, the second, or grace-period, reading.

In the case before us, plaintiff-petitioner Stephanie C.

Artis refiled her state-law claims in state court 59 days

after dismissal of her federal suit.1 Reading §1367(d) as a

grace-period prescription, her complaint would be time

barred. Reading §1367(d) as stopping the limitations clock

during the pendency of the federal-court suit, her com-

plaint would be timely. We hold that §1367(d)’s instruc-

tion to “toll” a state limitations period means to hold it in

abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock. Because the D. C. Court of

Appeals held that §1367(d) did not stop the D. C. Code’s

limitations clock, but merely provided a 30-day grace

period for refiling in D. C. Superior Court, we reverse the

D. C. Court of Appeals’ judgment.

I

A

Section 1367, which Congress added to Title 28 as part

of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089,

codifies the court-developed pendent and ancillary juris-

——————

1 The nonfederal claims Artis asserted arose under the D. C. Code and

common law; on dismissal of her federal-court suit, she refiled those

claims in D. C. Superior Court. For the purpose at hand, District of

Columbia law and courts are treated as state law and courts. See 28

U. S. C. §1367(e) (“As used in this section, the term ‘State’ includes the

District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any

territory or possession of the United States.”).

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Opinion of the Court

diction doctrines under the label “supplemental jurisdic-

tion.” See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,

545 U. S. 546, 552–558 (2005) (describing the development

of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines and subse-

quent enactment of §1367); id., at 579–584 (GINSBURG, J.,

dissenting) (same). The House Report accompanying the

Act explains that Congress sought to clarify the scope of

federal courts’ authority to hear claims within their sup-

plemental jurisdiction, appreciating that “[s]upplemental

jurisdiction has enabled federal courts and litigants to . . .

deal economically—in single rather than multiple litiga-

tion—with related matters.” H. R. Rep. No. 101–734, p. 28

(1990) (H. R. Rep.). Section 1367(a) provides, in relevant

part, that a district court with original jurisdiction over a

claim “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other

claims . . . form[ing] part of the same case or controversy.”

“[N]ot every claim within the same ‘case or controversy’

as the claim within the federal courts’ original jurisdiction

will be decided by the federal court.” Jinks v. Richland

County, 538 U. S. 456, 459 (2003). Section 1367(c) states:

“The district courts may decline to exercise supple-

mental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)

if—

“(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of

State law,

“(2) the claim substantially predominates over the

claim or claims over which the district court has orig-

inal jurisdiction,

“(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction, or

“(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

If a district court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a

claim asserted under §1367(a) and the plaintiff wishes to

continue pursuing it, she must refile the claim in state

4 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

court. If the state court would hold the claim time barred,

however, then, absent a curative provision, the district

court’s dismissal of the state-law claim without prejudice

would be tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice. See,

e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 352

(1988) (under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, if the

statute of limitations on state-law claims expires before

the federal court “relinquish[es] jurisdiction[,] . . . a dis-

missal will foreclose the plaintiff from litigating his

claims”). To prevent that result, §1367(d) supplies “a

tolling rule that must be applied by state courts.” Jinks,

538 U. S., at 459. Section 1367(d) provides:

“The period of limitations for any claim asserted un-

der subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same

action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time

as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection

(a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a

period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law

provides for a longer tolling period.”

This case requires us to determine how §1367(d)’s tolling

rule operates.

B

Petitioner Artis worked as a health inspector for re-

spondent, the District of Columbia (the “District”). In

November 2010, Artis was told she would lose her job.

Thirteen months later, Artis sued the District in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

alleging that she had suffered employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78

Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. She also

asserted three allied claims under D. C. law: retaliation in

violation of the District of Columbia Whistleblower Act,

D. C. Code §1–615.54 (2001); termination in violation of

the District of Columbia False Claims Act, §2–381.04; and

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

Opinion of the Court

wrongful termination against public policy, a common-law

claim. Artis alleged that she had been subjected to gender

discrimination by her supervisor, and thereafter encoun-

tered retaliation for reporting the supervisor’s unlawful

activities. See Artis v. District of Columbia, 51 F. Supp.

3d 135, 137 (2014).

On June 27, 2014, the District Court granted the Dis-

trict’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII

claim. Having dismissed Artis’ sole federal claim, the

District Court, pursuant to §1367(c)(3), declined to exer-

cise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-

law claims. “Artis will not be prejudiced,” the court noted,

“because 28 U. S. C. §1367(d) provides for a tolling of the

statute of limitations during the period the case was here

and for at least 30 days thereafter.” Id., at 142.

Fifty-nine days after the dismissal of her federal action,

Artis refiled her state-law claims in the D. C. Superior

Court, the appropriate local court. The Superior Court

granted the District’s motion to dismiss, holding that

Artis’ claims were time barred, because they were filed 29

days too late. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. When Artis

first asserted her state-law claims in the District Court,

nearly two years remained on the applicable three-year

statute of limitations.2 But two and a half years passed

before the federal court relinquished jurisdiction. Unless

——————

2 The D. C. False Claims Act and the tort of wrongful termination

each have a three-year statute of limitations that started to run on the

day Artis lost her job in November 2010. See D. C. Code §2–381.04(c)

(2001) (D. C. False Claims Act); Stephenson v. American Dental Assn.,

789 A. 2d 1248, 1249, 1252 (D. C. 2002) (tort of wrongful termination

governed by D. C.’s catchall three-year limitations period and claim

accrues on the date when plaintiff has unequivocal notice of termina-

tion). Artis’ whistleblower claim had a one-year limitations period,

which began to accrue when Artis “first bec[a]m[e] aware” that she had

been terminated for reporting her supervisor’s misconduct. D. C. Code

§1–615.54(a)(2). The parties dispute the date the whistleblower claim

accrued. See Brief for Petitioner 10, n. 2; Brief for Respondent 8, n. 2.

6 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

§1367(d) paused the limitations clock during that time,

Artis would have had only 30 days to refile. The Superior

Court rejected Artis’ stop-the-clock reading of §1367(d),

reasoning that Artis could have protected her state-law

claims by “pursuing [them] in a state court while the

federal court proceeding [was] pending.” Ibid. In tension

with that explanation, the court noted that duplicative

filings in federal and state court are “generally disfavored

. . . as ‘wasteful’ and . . . ‘against [the interests of] judicial

efficiency.’ ” Id., at 14a, n. 1 (quoting Stevens v. Arco

Management of Wash. D.C., Inc., 751 A. 2d 995, 1002

(D. C. 2000); alteration in original).

The D. C. Court of Appeals affirmed. That court began

by observing that two “competing approaches [to §1367(d)]

have evolved nationally”: the stop-the-clock reading and

the grace-period reading. 135 A. 3d 334, 337 (2016).3

Without further comment on §1367(d)’s text, the D. C.

Court of Appeals turned to the legislative history. Section

1367(d)’s purpose, the court noted, was “to prevent the loss

of claims to statutes of limitations where state law might

fail to toll the running of the period of limitations while a

supplemental claim was pending in federal court.” Id., at

338 (quoting H. R. Rep., at 30; internal quotation marks

omitted). Following the lead of the California Supreme

Court, the D. C. Court of Appeals determined that Con-

——————

3 The high courts of Maryland and Minnesota, along with the Sixth

Circuit, have held that §1367(d)’s tolling rule pauses the clock on the

statute of limitations until 30 days after the state-law claim is dis-

missed. See In re Vertrue Inc. Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation,

719 F. 3d 474, 481 (CA6 2013); Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N. W. 2d

755, 759–760 (Minn. 2010); Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167, 180–182, 957

A. 2d 984, 992–993 (2008). In addition to the D. C. Court of Appeals,

the high courts of California and the Northern Mariana Islands have

held that §1367(d) provides only a 30-day grace period for the refiling of

otherwise time-barred claims. See Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 59

Cal. 4th 618, 622, 328 P. 3d 56, 58 (2014); Juan v. Commonwealth, 2001

MP 18, 6 N. Mar. I. 322, 327 (2001).

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

Opinion of the Court

gress had intended to implement a 1969 recommendation

by the American Law Institute (ALI) to allow refiling in

state court “within 30 days after dismissal.” 135 A. 3d, at

338 (quoting Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 59 Cal. 4th

618, 629, 328 P. 3d 56, 63 (2014)).

The D. C. Court of Appeals also concluded that the

grace-period approach “better accommodates federalism

concerns,” by trenching significantly less on state statutes

of limitations than the stop-the-clock approach. 135 A. 3d,

at 338–339. Construing §1367(d) as affording only a 30-

day grace period, the court commented, was “consistent

with [its] presumption favoring narrow interpretations of

federal preemption of state law.” Id., at 339.

To resolve the division of opinion among State Supreme

Courts on the proper construction of §1367(d), see supra,

at 6, n. 3, we granted certiorari. 580 U. S. ___ (2017).

II

A

As just indicated, statutes that shelter from time bars

claims earlier commenced in another forum generally

employ one of two means.

First, the period (or statute) of limitations may be

“tolled” while the claim is pending elsewhere.4 Ordinarily,

——————

4 Among illustrations: 21 U. S. C. §1604 (allowing suits to proceed

against certain biomaterial providers and providing that “[a]ny appli-

cable statute of limitations shall toll during the period from the time a

claimant files a petition with the Secretary under this paragraph until

such time as either (i) the Secretary issues a final decision on the

petition, or (ii) the petition is withdrawn,” §1604(b)(3)(C)); 28 U. S. C.

§1332 (permitting the removal of “mass actions” to federal court and

providing that “[t]he limitations periods on any claims asserted in a

mass action that is removed to Federal court pursuant to this subsec-

tion shall be deemed tolled during the period that the action is pending

in Federal court,” §1332(d)(11)(D)); 42 U. S. C. §233 (providing a

remedy against the United States for certain injuries caused by em-

ployees of the Public Health Service, and stating that “[t]he time limit

for filing a claim under this subsection . . . shall be tolled during the

8 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

“tolled,” in the context of a time prescription like §1367(d),

means that the limitations period is suspended (stops

running) while the claim is sub judice elsewhere, then

starts running again when the tolling period ends, picking

up where it left off. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1488 (6th

ed. 1990) (“toll,” when paired with the grammatical object

“statute of limitations,” means “to suspend or stop tempo-

rarily”). This dictionary definition captures the rule gen-

erally applied in federal courts. See, e.g., Chardon v.

Fumero Soto, 462 U. S. 650, 652, n. 1 (1983) (Court’s opin-

ion “use[d] the word ‘tolling’ to mean that, during the

relevant period, the statute of limitations ceases to run”).5

Our decisions employ the terms “toll” and “suspend” inter-

changeably. For example, in American Pipe & Constr. Co.

——————

pendency of a[n] [administrative] request for benefits,” §233(p)(3)

(A)(ii)). See also Wis. Stat. §893.15(3) (2011–2012) (“A Wisconsin law

limiting the time for commencement of an action on a Wisconsin cause

of action is tolled from the period of commencement of the action in a

non-Wisconsin forum until the time of its final disposition in that

forum.”). The dissent maintains that “stop clock examples [from the

U. S. Code] often involve situations where some disability prevents the

plaintiff from proceeding to court.” Post, at 12, n. 7. Plainly, however,

the several statutes just set out do not fit that description: They do not

involve “disabilities.” Instead, like §1367(d), they involve claims earlier

commenced in another forum.

5 As we recognized in Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U. S. 650 (1983),

there may be different ways of “calculating the amount of time avail-

able to file suit after tolling has ended.” Id., at 652, n. 1 (emphasis

added). In addition to the “common-law” stop-the-clock effect, id., at

655, under which the plaintiff must file within the amount of time left

in the limitations period, a statute might either provide for the limita-

tions period to be “renewed,” so that “the plaintiff has the benefit of a

new period as long as the original,” or “establish a fixed period such as

six months or one year during which the plaintiff may file suit, without

regard to the length of the original limitations period or the amount of

time left when tolling began.” Id., at 652, n. 1. Notably, under each of

the “tolling effect[s]” enumerated in Chardon, ibid., the word “tolled”

means that the progression of the limitations clock is stopped for the

duration of “tolling.”

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Opinion of the Court

v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974), we characterized as a “toll-

ing” prescription a rule “suspend[ing] the applicable stat-

ute of limitations,” id., at 554; accordingly, we applied the

rule to stop the limitations clock, id., at 560–561.6 We

have similarly comprehended what tolling means in deci-

sions on equitable tolling. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Wald-

burger, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 7) (describing

equitable tolling as “a doctrine that pauses the running of,

or ‘tolls’ a statute of limitations” (some internal quotation

marks omitted)); United States v. Ibarra, 502 U. S. 1, 4, n.

2 (1991) ( per curiam) (“Principles of equitable tolling

usually dictate that when a time bar has been suspended

and then begins to run again upon a later event, the time

remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from

the full limitations period whatever time ran before the

clock was stopped.”).

In lieu of “tolling” or “suspending” a limitations period

by pausing its progression, a legislature might elect sim-

ply to provide a grace period. When that mode is adopted,

the statute of limitations continues to run while the claim

is pending in another forum. But the risk of a time bar is

averted by according the plaintiff a fixed period in which

to refile. A federal statute of that genre is 28 U. S. C.

§2415. That provision prescribes a six-year limitations

period for suits seeking money damages from the United

States for breach of contract. §2415(a). The statute fur-

ther provides: “In the event that any action . . . is timely

brought and is thereafter dismissed without prejudice, the

action may be recommenced within one year after such

dismissal, regardless of whether the action would other-

wise then be barred by this section.” §2415(e).7 Many

——————

6 The dissent’s notion that federal tolling periods may be understood

as grace periods, not stop-the-clock periods, see post, at 7–8, is entirely

imaginative.

7 Also illustrative, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prescribes a five-

year limitations period for certain suits. 15 U. S. C. §1691e(f ). Where a

10 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

States have enacted similar grace-period provisions. See

App. to Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures

et al. as Amici Curiae 1a–25a. For example, Georgia law

provides:

“When any case has been commenced in either a state

or federal court within the applicable statute of limi-

tations and the plaintiff discontinues or dismisses the

same, it may be recommenced in a court of this state

or in a federal court either within the original appli-

cable period of limitations or within six months after

the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later

. . . .” Ga. Code Ann. §9–2–61(a) (2007).

Tellingly, the District has not identified any federal

statute in which a grace-period meaning has been ascribed

to the word “tolled” or any word similarly rooted. Nor has

the dissent, for all its mighty strivings, identified even one

federal statute that fits its bill, i.e., a federal statute that

says “tolled” but means something other than “suspended,”

or “paused,” or “stopped.” From what statutory text, then,

does the dissent start? See post, at 5.8

Turning from statutory texts to judicial decisions, only

once did an opinion of this Court employ tolling language

to describe a grace period: Hardin v. Straub, 490 U. S. 536

(1989). In Hardin, we held that, in 42 U. S. C. §1983

suits, federal courts should give effect to state statutes

——————

government agency has brought a timely suit, however, an individual

may bring an action “not later than one year after the commencement

of that proceeding or action.” Ibid.

8 Reasons of history, context, and policy, the dissent maintains, would

have made it sensible for Congress to have written a grace-period

statute. See post, at 4–5. But “[t]he controlling principle in this case is

the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must give effect to the

clear meaning of statutes as written[,] . . . giving each word its ordi-

nary, contemporary, common meaning.” Star Athletica, L. L. C. v.

Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 6) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 11

Opinion of the Court

sheltering claims from time bars during periods of a plain-

tiff ’s legal disability. We there characterized a state

statute providing a one-year grace period as “tolling” or

“suspend[ing]” the limitations period “until one year after

the disability has been removed.” 490 U. S., at 537. This

atypical use of “tolling” or “suspending” to mean some-

thing other than stopping the clock on a limitations period

is a feather on the scale against the weight of decisions in

which “tolling” a statute of limitations signals stopping the

clock.

B

In determining the meaning of a statutory provision,

“we look first to its language, giving the words used their

ordinary meaning.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S.

103, 108 (1990) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Section 1367(d) is phrased as a tolling provision.

It suspends the statute of limitations for two adjacent time

periods: while the claim is pending in federal court and for

30 days postdismissal. Artis urges that the phrase “shall

be tolled” in §1367(d) has the same meaning it does in the

statutes cited supra, at 7, n. 4. That is, the limitations

clock stops the day the claim is filed in federal court and,

30 days postdismissal, restarts from the point at which it

had stopped.

The District reads “tolled” for §1367(d)’s purposes differ-

ently. To “toll,” the District urges, means to “remove or

take away an effect.” Brief for Respondent 12–13. To

“toll” a limitations period, then, would mean to “remov[e]

the bar that ordinarily would accompany its expiration.”

Id., at 14.9 “[T]here is nothing special,” the District main-

——————

9 This is indeed a definition sometimes used in reference to a right.

See, e.g., Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 120 (1822) (“[A]n adverse

possession . . . toll[s] the right of entry of the heirs, and, consequently,

extinguish[es], by the lapse of time, their right of action for the land.”).

See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1488 (6th ed. 1990) (“toll” can mean

12 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

tains, “about tolling limitations periods versus tolling any

other fact, right, or consequence.” Id., at 13. But the

District offers no reason why, in interpreting “tolled” as

used in §1367(d), we should home in only on the word

itself, ignoring the information about the verb’s ordinary

meaning gained from its grammatical object. Just as

when the object of “tolled” is “bell” or “highway traveler,”

the object “period of limitations” sheds light on what it

means to “be tolled.”

The District’s reading, largely embraced by the dissent,

is problematic for other reasons as well. First, it tenders a

strained interpretation of the phrase “period of limita-

tions.” In the District’s view, “period of limitations” means

“the effect of the period of limitations as a time bar.” See

id., at 18 (“Section 1367(d) . . . provides that ‘the period of

limitations’—here its effect as a time bar—‘shall be [re-

moved or taken away] while the claim is pending [in fed-

eral court] and for a period of 30 days after it is dis-

missed.’ ” (alterations in original)). Second, the first

portion of the tolling period, the duration of the claim’s

pendency in federal court, becomes superfluous under the

District’s construction. The “effect” of the limitations

period as a time bar, on the District’s reading, becomes

operative only after the case has been dismissed. That

being so, what need would there be to remove anything

while the claim is pending in federal court?

Furthermore, the District’s reading could yield an ab-

——————

“bar, defeat, or take away; thus, to toll the entry means to deny or take

away the right of entry”). The dissent, also relying on this sense of the

word “toll,” cites Chardon as support for the proposition that §1367(d)’s

tolling instruction is ambiguous. See post, at 3; supra, at 8, n. 5. But,

importantly, the grace-period statutes noted in Chardon, 462 U. S., at

660, n. 13, were precise about their operation. Chardon provides no

support for the notion that a statute’s instruction that a “period of

limitations shall be tolled” plausibly could mean that the limitations

clock continues to run but its effect as a bar is removed during the

tolling. See post, at 2–3.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 13

Opinion of the Court

surdity: It could permit a plaintiff to refile in state court

even if the limitations period on her claim had expired

before she filed in federal court. To avoid that result, the

District’s proposed construction of “tolled” as “removed”

could not mean simply “removed.” Instead, “removed”

would require qualification to express “removed, unless

the period of limitations expired before the claim was filed

in federal court.” In sum, the District’s interpretation

maps poorly onto the language of §1367(d), while Artis’

interpretation is a natural fit.

C

The D. C. Court of Appeals adopted the District’s grace-

period construction primarily because it was convinced

that in drafting §1367(d), Congress embraced an ALI

recommendation. 135 A. 3d, at 338. Two decades before

the enactment of §1367(d), the ALI, in its 1969 Study of

the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal

Courts, did recommend a 30-day grace period for refiling

certain claims. The ALI proposed the following statutory

language:

“If any claim in an action timely commenced in a fed-

eral court is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter of the claim, a new action on the same

claim brought in another court shall not be barred by

a statute of limitations that would not have barred

the original action had it been commenced in that

court, if such new action is brought in a proper court,

federal or State, within thirty days after dismissal of

the original claim has become final or within such

longer period as may be available under applicable

State law.” ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction

Between State and Federal Courts §1386(b), p. 65

(1969) (ALI Study).

Congress, however, did not adopt the ALI’s grace-period

14 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

formulation. Instead, it ordered tolling of the state limita-

tions period “while the claim is pending” in federal court.

Although the provision the ALI proposed, like §1367(d),

established a 30-day federal floor on the time allowed for

refiling, it did not provide for tolling the period of limita-

tions while a claim is pending.10 True, the House Report

contained a citation to the ALI Study, but only in refer-

ence to a different provision, 28 U. S. C. §1391 (the general

venue statute). There, Congress noted that its approach

was “taken from the ALI Study.” H. R. Rep., at 23. Had

Congress similarly embraced the ALI’s grace-period for-

mulation in §1367(d), one might expect the House Report

to have said as much.11

D

The District asks us to zero in on §1367(d)’s “express

inclusion” of the “period of 30 days after the claim is dis-

missed” within the tolling period. Brief for Respondent 20

(internal quotation marks omitted). Under Artis’ stop-the-

——————

10 The District emphasizes that the Reporter’s note accompanying the

ALI’s proposed statute stated: “[A]ny governing statute of limitations is

tolled by the commencement of an action in a federal court, and for at

least thirty days following dismissal . . . in any case in which the

dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction.” ALI Study 66. The similarity

between this language and §1367(d), the District argues, rebuts any

argument that Congress did not adopt the ALI’s recommendation. We

are unpersuaded. The District offers no explanation why, if Congress

wanted to follow the substance of the ALI’s grace-period recommenda-

tion, it would neither cite the ALI Study in the legislative history of

§1367(d), see infra this page, nor adopt the precise language of either

the proposed statute or the Reporter’s note. The ALI Study, moreover,

cautions that the Reporter’s notes reflect “the Reporter’s work alone,”

not a position taken by the Institute. ALI Study, p. x.

11 The dissent offers a history lesson on the ancient common-law prin-

ciple of “journey’s account,” see post, at 5–6, and n. 4, but nothing

suggests that the 101st Congress had any such ancient law in mind

when it drafted §1367(d). Cf. post, at 9. More likely, Congress was

mindful that “suspension” during the pendency of other litigation is

“the common-law rule.” Chardon, 462 U. S., at 655.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 15

Opinion of the Court

clock interpretation, the District contends, “the inclusion

of 30 days within the tolling period would be relegated to

insignificance in the mine-run of cases.” Id., at 21 (cita-

tion and internal quotation marks omitted). In §1367(d),

Congress did provide for tolling not only while the claim is

pending in federal court, but also for 30 days thereafter.

Including the 30 days within §1367(d)’s tolling period

accounts for cases in which a federal action is commenced

close to the expiration date of the relevant state statute of

limitations. In such a case, the added days give the plain-

tiff breathing space to refile in state court.

Adding a brief span of days to the tolling period is not

unusual in stop-the-clock statutes. In this respect,

§1367(d) closely resembles 46 U. S. C. §53911, which

provides, in a subsection titled “Tolling of limitations

period,” that if a plaintiff submits a claim for war-related

vessel damage to the Secretary of Transportation, “the

running of the limitations period for bringing a civil action

is suspended until the Secretary denies the claim, and for

60 days thereafter.” §53911(d). Numerous other statutes

similarly append a fixed number of days to an initial

tolling period. See, e.g., 22 U. S. C. §1631k(c) (“Statutes of

limitations on assessments . . . shall be suspended with

respect to any vested property . . . while vested and for six

months thereafter. . . .”); 26 U. S. C. §6213(f )(1) (“In any

case under title 11 of the United States Code, the running

of the time prescribed by subsection (a) for filing a petition

in the Tax Court with respect to any deficiency shall be

suspended for the period during which the debtor is pro-

hibited by reason of such case from filing a petition in the

Tax Court with respect to such deficiency, and for 60 days

thereafter.”); §6503(a)(1) (“The running of the period of

limitations provided in section 6501 or 6502 . . . shall . . .

be suspended for the period during which the Secretary is

prohibited from making the assessment . . . and for 60

days thereafter.”); 50 U. S. C. §4000(c) (“The running of a

16 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

statute of limitations against the collection of tax deferred

under this section . . . shall be suspended for the period of

military service of the servicemember and for an addi-

tional period of 270 days thereafter.”). Thus, the “30 days”

provision casts no large shadow on Artis’ interpretation.

Section 1367(d)’s proviso, “unless State law provides for

a longer tolling period,” could similarly aid a plaintiff who

filed in federal court just short of the expiration of the

state limitations period. She would have the benefit of

§1367(d)’s 30-days-to-refile prescription, or such longer

time as state law prescribes.12 It may be that, in most

cases, the state-law tolling period will not be longer than

§1367(d)’s. But in some cases it undoubtedly will. For

example, Indiana permits a plaintiff to refile within three

years of dismissal. See Ind. Code §34–11–8–1 (2017). And

Louisiana provides that after dismissal the limitations

period “runs anew.” La. Civ. Code Ann., Arts. 3462, 3466

(West 2007).

III

Satisfied that Artis’ text-based arguments overwhelm

the District’s, we turn to the District’s contention that the

stop-the-clock interpretation of §1367(d) raises a signifi-

cant constitutional question: Does the statute exceed

Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper

——————

12 The dissent, post, at 8–9, conjures up absurdities not presented by

this case, for the District of Columbia has no law of the kind the dissent

describes. All agree that the phrase “unless State law provides for a

longer tolling period” leaves room for a more generous state-law regime.

The dissent posits a comparison between the duration of the federal

suit, plus 30 days, and a state-law grace period. But of course, as the

dissent recognizes, post, at 9, the more natural comparison is between

the amount of time a plaintiff has left to refile, given the benefit of

§1367(d)’s tolling rule, and the amount of time she would have to refile

under the applicable state law. Should the extraordinary circumstances

the dissent envisions in fact exist in a given case, the comparison the

dissent makes would be far from inevitable.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 17

Opinion of the Court

Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 18, because its connection to Con-

gress’ enumerated powers is too attenuated or because it

is too great an incursion on the States’ domain? Brief for

Respondent 46–49. To avoid constitutional doubt, the

District urges, we should adopt its reading. “[W]here an

alternative interpretation of [a] statute is fairly possible,”

the District reminds, we have construed legislation in a

manner that “avoid[s] [serious constitutional] problems”

raised by “an otherwise acceptable construction.” INS v.

St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (internal quotation

marks omitted). But even if we regarded the District’s

reading of §1367(d) as “fairly possible,” our precedent

would undermine the proposition that §1367(d) presents a

serious constitutional problem. See Jinks, 538 U. S., at

461–465.

In Jinks, we unanimously rejected an argument that

§1367(d) impermissibly exceeds Congress’ enumerated

powers.13 Section 1367(d), we held, “is necessary and

proper for carrying into execution Congress’s power ‘[t]o

constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,’ . . .

and to assure that those tribunals may fairly and effi-

ciently exercise ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States.’ ”

Id., at 462 (quoting U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 9, and

Art. III, §1).

In two principal ways, we explained, §1367(d) is “condu-

cive to the due administration of justice in federal court.”

538 U. S., at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).

——————

13 The dissent refers to an “understanding,” post, at 14, by the Court

in Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U. S. 456 (2003), that §1367(d) ac-

cords only a 30-day “window” for refiling in state court. Scattered

characterizations in the Jinks briefing might be seen as conveying that

understanding. See post, at 14, n. 9. The opinion itself, however,

contains nary a hint of any such understanding. And indeed, one year

earlier, we described §1367(d) as having the effect of stopping the clock,

i.e., “toll[ing] the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to

however long the claim had been pending in federal court.” Raygor v.

Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 542 (2002).

18 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

First, “it provides an alternative to the unsatisfactory

options that federal judges faced when they decided

whether to retain jurisdiction over supplemental state-law

claims that might be time barred in state court.” Ibid.

Section 1367(d) thus “unquestionably promotes fair and

efficient operation of the federal courts.” Id., at 463.

Second, §1367(d) “eliminates a serious impediment to

access to the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursu-

ing federal- and state-law claims” arising from the same

episode. Ibid. With tolling available, a plaintiff disin-

clined to litigate simultaneously in two forums is no longer

impelled to choose between forgoing either her federal

claims or her state claims.

Moreover, we were persuaded that §1367(d) was “plainly

adapted” to Congress’ exercise of its enumerated power:

there was no cause to suspect that Congress had enacted

§1367(d) as a “ ‘pretext’ for ‘the accomplishment of objects

not entrusted to [it],’ ”; nor was there reason to believe that

the connection between §1367(d) and Congress’ authority

over the federal courts was too attenuated. Id., at 464

(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423

(1819)).

Our decision in Jinks also rejected the argument that

§1367(d) was not “proper” because it violates principles of

state sovereignty by prescribing a procedural rule for state

courts’ adjudication of purely state-law claims. 538 U. S.,

at 464–465. “Assuming [without deciding] that a princi-

pled dichotomy can be drawn, for purposes of determining

whether an Act of Congress is ‘proper,’ between federal

laws that regulate state-court ‘procedure’ and laws that

change the ‘substance’ of state-law rights of action,” we

concluded that the tolling of state limitations periods “falls

on the [permissible] ‘substantive’ side of the line.” Ibid.

The District’s contention that a stop-the-clock prescrip-

tion serves “no federal purpose” that could not be served

by a grace-period prescription is unavailing. Brief for

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 19

Opinion of the Court

Respondent 49. Both devices are standard, off-the-shelf

means of accounting for the fact that a claim was timely

pressed in another forum. Requiring Congress to choose

one over the other would impose a tighter constraint on

Congress’ discretion than we have ever countenanced.

The concern that a stop-the-clock prescription entails a

greater imposition on the States than a grace-period pre-

scription, moreover, may be more theoretical than real.

Consider the alternative suggested by the D. C. Superior

Court. Plaintiffs situated as Artis was could simply file

two actions and ask the state court to hold the suit filed

there in abeyance pending disposition of the federal suit.

See supra, at 6. Were the dissent’s position to prevail,

cautious plaintiffs would surely take up the D. C. Superior

Court’s suggestion. How it genuinely advances federalism

concerns to drive plaintiffs to resort to wasteful, inefficient

duplication to preserve their state-law claims is far from

apparent. See, e.g., Stevens, 751 A. 2d, at 1002 (it “work[s]

against judicial efficiency . . . to compel prudent federal

litigants who present state claims to file duplicative and

wasteful protective suits in state court”).

We do not gainsay that statutes of limitations are “fun-

damental to a well-ordered judicial system.” Board of

Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U. S.

478, 487 (1980). We note in this regard, however, that a

stop-the-clock rule is suited to the primary purposes of

limitations statutes: “preventing surprises” to defendants

and “barring a plaintiff who has slept on his rights.”

American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 554

(1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whenever

§1367(d) applies, the defendant will have notice of the

plaintiff ’s claims within the state-prescribed limitations

period. Likewise, the plaintiff will not have slept on her

rights. She will have timely asserted those rights, en-

deavoring to pursue them in one litigation.

20 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Opinion of the Court

* * *

For the reasons stated, we resist unsettling the usual

understanding of the word “tolled” as it appears in legisla-

tive time prescriptions and court decisions thereon. The

judgment of the D. C. Court of Appeals is therefore re-

versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–460

_________________

STEPHANIE C. ARTIS, PETITIONER v. DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS

[January 22, 2018]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY,

JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.

Chesterton reminds us not to clear away a fence just

because we cannot see its point. Even if a fence doesn’t

seem to have a reason, sometimes all that means is we

need to look more carefully for the reason it was built in

the first place.

The same might be said about the law before us. Sec-

tion 1367(d) provides that “[t]he period of limitations . . .

shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period

of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides

for a longer tolling period.” 28 U. S. C. §1367(d). Grown

from a rich common law and state statutory tradition, this

provision serves a modest role. If a federal court dismisses

a party’s state law claim without ruling on its merits, the

law ensures the party will enjoy whatever time state law

allows, or at least 30 days, to refile the claim in state

court.

Today the Court clears away this traditional rule be-

cause it overlooks the original reasons for it. For the first

time in the statute’s history the Court now reads the law

to guarantee parties not 30 days or whatever state law

permits but months or years more to refile their dismissed

state law claims in state court. Rather than reading the

statute as generally deferring to state law judgments

2 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

about the appropriate lifespan of state law claims brought

in state courts, the Court now reads the statute as gener-

ally displacing them in favor of a new federal rule. In-

deed, the Court today tells state courts that they must

routinely disregard clearly expressed state law defining

the appropriate length of time parties should have to sue

on state law claims in state tribunals. Under the Court’s

rule, too, the disregard of state limitations law promises to

be not only routine but substantial. The Court’s approach

will require state courts to entertain state law claims that

state law deems untimely not only by weeks or months but

by many years, as 24 States, the National Conference of

State Legislatures, and the Council of State Governments

warn us. And the Court demands all this without offering

any rational account why it is necessary or proper to the

exercise of one of the federal government’s limited and

enumerated powers. It may only be a small statute we are

interpreting, but the result the Court reaches today repre-

sents no small intrusion on traditional state functions and

no small departure from our foundational principles of

federalism. Respectfully, I dissent.

Start with the statute’s key term. Where, as here, a law

instructs us to “toll” a limitations period, we know it may

be telling us to do one of (at least) two different things.

The dictionary informs that to “toll” means “[t]o take

away, bar, defeat, [or] annul.” See 18 Oxford English

Dictionary 204 (2d ed. 1989); Webster’s New International

Dictionary 2662 (2d ed. 1957) (“[t]o take away; to vacate;

to annul”); Oxford Latin Dictionary 1947 (1982) (“tollere,”

the Latin origin, means to “remove” or “lift”). So when a

statute speaks of tolling a limitations period it can, natu-

rally enough, mean either that the running of the limita-

tions period is suspended or that the effect of the limita-

tions period is defeated. The first understanding stops the

limitations clock running until a specified event begins it

running again: call it the stop clock approach. The second

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

understanding allows the limitations clock to continue to

run but defeats the effect of the clock’s expiration for an

additional specified period of time: call it the grace period

approach.

That both of these understandings of the word “toll” are

indeed possible and in fact historically common this Court

has already explained in Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462

U. S. 650 (1983):

“ ‘Tolling effect’ refers to the method of calculating the

amount of time available to file suit after tolling has

ended. The statute of limitations might merely be

suspended; if so, the plaintiff must file within the

amount of time left in the limitations period. . . . It is

also possible to establish a fixed period such as six

months or one year during which the plaintiff may file

suit, without regard to the length of the original limi-

tations period or the amount of time left when tolling

began.” Id., at 652, n. 1 (emphasis added).

When it comes to federal law today, Chardon has further

explained, both kinds of tolling can be found. “[S]ome

federal statutes provide for suspension” of the running of

the limitations period, or the stop clock approach, while

“other statutes establish a variety of different tolling

effects,” including grace periods for refiling after dismis-

sal. Id., at 660, n. 13.

Neither is it a surprise that Chardon acknowledged

tolling statutes might come in (at least) these two varie-

ties. At common law, both types of tolling were well and

long known, if often employed in different circumstances

to address different problems in equitably tailored ways.

Take the stop clock approach. While any generalization

is subject to its exceptions, the stop clock approach was

often used at common law to suspend a plaintiff ’s duty to

bring a timely lawsuit if, and for the period, the plaintiff

was prevented from coming to court due to some disability.

4 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

And this common law rule made common sense in those

circumstances. After all, if (say) a defendant’s fraud pre-

vented the plaintiff from discovering his injury, it’s easy

enough to see why the limitations clock should stop run-

ning until the fraud is revealed and the disability thus

dissipated.1

By contrast, the grace period approach was commonly

used in cases where, as here, the plaintiff made it to court

in time but arrived in the wrong court and had to refile in

the right one. In this situation, equity didn’t necessarily

call for suspending the running of the limitations period

for whatever arbitrary period of time—weeks or months or

years—the suit happened to sit in court before dismissal.

It’s not as if the defendant or uncontrollable circumstances

had conspired to prevent the plaintiff from proceeding

during that period. Instead, the law commonsensically

held that in these circumstances a grace period would

suffice to allow the plaintiff a brief time to find his way to

and refile in the correct court.2

——————

1 See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L.

Rev. 1177, 1220 (1950) (“[C]ircumstances which—despite the existence

of a right to sue—hinder or prevent suit have been recognized by courts

and legislatures as cause for postponing the start of the statutory

period until the occurrence of some additional fact, or for interrupting

the running of limitations while some condition exists”); 13 American

and English Encyclopaedia of Law 739–745 (1890) (discussing “disabili-

ties which postpone the running of the statute,” such as infancy,

absence of the defendant, insanity, and imprisonment).

2 See, e.g., Woods v. Houghton, 1 Gray 580, 583 (Mass. 1854) (grace

period allowed after plaintiff filed in the “wrong county”); Pittsburg, C.,

C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Bemis, 64 Ohio St. 26, 27–28 (1901) (grace period

allowed after suit was dismissed by federal court); Cox v. Strickland, 47

S. E. 912, 915 (Ga. 1904) (grace period allowed for refiling “in the

proper forum”). Indeed, courts have rejected the stop clock approach in

determining the time to refile. See Martin v. Archer, 3 Hill 211, 215

(SC 1837) (“A former suit is not a suspension of the statute during the

time it is pending”). Simply put, when it came to tolling effects, the

“pendency of legal proceedings” was “quite different from disabilities.”

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Indeed, grace periods appear to find their roots in a

common law rule known as the “journey’s account” that

expressly sought to account for and afford to a dismissed

party “the number of days which [he] must spend in jour-

neying to the court” to refile his claim. 37 C. J., Limita-

tions of Actions §526, p. 1082 (1925); see E. Coke, The

Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 567

(1642) (reprint 1797) (“[T]he common law set downe the

certaine time of 15 dayes,” because “a dayes journey is

accounted in law 20 miles,” as “a reasonable time . . .

within which time wheresoever the court of justice sate in

England, the party . . . wheresoever he dwelt in England

. . . might . . . by the said account of dayes journies ap-

peare in court”); Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 267,

267–268 (1603) (party has “the benefit of a new writ by

journeys accompts” after first writ “abated”); Elstob v.

Thorowgood, 91 Eng. Rep. 1086, 1087 (1697) (party has 30

days to bring an action “by journeys account” to avoid “the

Statute of Limitations”).

When it comes to the statute before us, the textual and

contextual clues point in the same and unsurprising direc-

tion. Much like the journey’s account from which it origi-

nated, section 1367(d)’s “tolling” provision seeks to provide

the plaintiff who finds her case dismissed because she

filed in the wrong court a reasonable grace period to jour-

ney to the right court to refile. No more and no less.

Take the textual clues. Section 1367(d) says that “the

period of limitations . . . shall be tolled while the claim is

pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed

unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

Note that the law uses the words “tolled” and “tolling” in

the same sentence. Normally, we assume that when

Congress repeats a term in a statute the term’s meaning

remains constant throughout. And that assumption is

——————

13 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, at 745–746.

6 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

surely “at its most vigorous” where, as here, Congress

repeats the same term in the same sentence. Brown v.

Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994).

This traditional rule of construction tells us a great deal.

It does because no one doubts that the state law “tolling

period[s]” referenced in the second half of the sentence

were at the time of section 1367(d)’s enactment—and still

are—grace periods allowing parties a specified number of

days or months after dismissal to refile in the proper

court. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §13–80–111 (1990)

(providing that the plaintiff “may commence a new action

upon the same cause of action within ninety days after the

termination of the original action”).3 In fact, these stat-

utes were often self-consciously patterned on the journey’s

account doctrine, seeking to address much the same prob-

lem the common law faced with much the same solution.4

——————

3 At the time of section 1367(d)’s enactment, it appears at least 31 of

36 States that provided tolling of some kind guaranteed a grace period.

See also Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as

Amici Curiae 1a–25a (discussing current state statutes).

4 The “[p]rinciple of journeys account became definitely fixed and

somewhat enlarged in England by an early statute. . . . This statute,

with varying changes, has been enacted in nearly all of the states of the

Union.” 19 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law 262 (2d ed.

1901); Cox, 47 S. E., at 915 (explaining that, “in lieu” of the journey’s

account, the colonial act of 1767 permitted “a new action within one

year” of dismissal, and then the act of 1847 allowed a new action within

six months of dismissal “notwithstanding the intervening bar of the

statute”); Denton v. Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute

adopted “the common-law rule of ‘journeys account’ ”); English v. T.H.

Rogers Lumber Co., 173 P. 1046, 1048 (Okla. 1918) (“Statutes such as

ours are said to have their origin in the common law rule of ‘journeys

account’ ”); Baker v. Cohn, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 765, 767 (1943) (“Historically,

the extension of one year’s time . . . is said to be an outgrowth of the

ancient common law rule of ‘journey’s account’ ”); Sorensen v. Overland

Corp., 142 F. Supp. 354, 362 (Del. 1956) (“The statute of ‘journeys’

account’ is one founded under English law, and enacted in most juris-

dictions today”); Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700, 702 (ED Pa. 1957)

(“Statutes of Journey’s Account originated in England and have long

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

And the fact that Congress used a variant of the word

“toll” in the second half of the sentence to refer to grace

periods strongly suggests it did so in the first half of the

sentence too. So that the first phrase “shall be tolled while

the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days” should be

understood to extend a grace period of 30 days after dis-

missal much as the second phrase “tolling period” is un-

derstood to refer the reader to parallel state law grace

periods affording short periods for refiling after dismissal.

The alternative reading endorsed by the Court today

extends too little respect to Congress’s competency as

drafter. It asks us to assume the legislature was so gar-

bled in its expression that it switched the meaning of the

term “toll” halfway through a single sentence without

telling anyone. It asks us to conclude that when Congress

spoke of the period “tolled” in the first part of the sentence

it meant to refer (unambiguously, no less) to a stop clock

approach even though it used the term “tolling period” to

refer to existing state law grace periods in the second part

of the sentence. The statute’s text drops no hint of such a

silent switch and it’s a lexicographical leap our traditional

rules of statutory interpretation warn against.

That, though, represents just the beginning of the tex-

tual troubles with the approach the Court adopts. Con-

sider next the fact that section 1367(d) tells us to apply its

federal tolling rule “unless” state law provides a “longer

tolling period.” In this way, the statute asks us to com-

pare the length of the state “tolling period” with the length

of the federal “tolling period” set by section 1367(d) and

apply the longer one. See ante, at 16 (courts apply the

federal rule if “the state-law tolling period will not be

longer than §1367(d)’s”). The equation we’re asked to

perform is straightforward and sensible if we understand

both the state and federal “tolling periods” discussed in

——————

existed, in varying forms, among the states”).

8 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

this statute as grace periods. We simply pick the longer

grace period: is it the federal 30 day period or one provided

by state law?

By contrast, the equation is anything but straightfor-

ward or sensible under the Court’s approach. The Court

tells us that, under its reading of the statute, the federal

“tolling period” is the “duration of the claim’s pendency in

federal court” plus 30 days. See ante, at 12, 15. So the

decision whether to apply the federal or the state tolling

period turns not on the sensible question which would

afford the plaintiff more time to refile but instead on the

happenstance of how long the plaintiff ’s claim sat in

federal court before dismissal. Under the Court’s inter-

pretation, we apply the federal stop clock rule if, but only

if, the time the case happened to linger in federal court

before dismissal (plus 30 days) is longer than the relevant

state grace period. But to state the test is to see it is a

nonsense—one we would not lightly attribute to any ra-

tional drafter, let alone Congress.

Consider some examples of the absurdities that follow

from the apples-to-oranges comparison the Court’s test

requires. Say state law provides a 5 year statute of limita-

tions and a 1 year grace period for refiling. The plaintiff

files in federal court one day before the statute of limita-

tions expires. The litigation in federal court lasts 1 year.

Under the Court’s view, the federal “tolling period” would

be 1 year plus 30 days—the time the claim was pending in

federal court plus 30 days after dismissal. That period is

longer than the state tolling period of 1 year and so the

federal tolling rule, not the state rule, controls—leaving

the plaintiff only 31 days to refile her claim after dismissal

even though state law would have allowed a full year.

That may be curious enough, but curiouser it gets. Now

suppose the litigation in federal court lasts only 10

months. That makes the federal tolling period only 11

months (10 months plus 30 days). Under the Court’s view,

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 9

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

state law now provides a longer tolling period (1 year) and

the litigant gets a full year to refile in state court instead

of 31 days. No one has offered a reason why the happen-

stance of how long the federal litigation lasted should

determine how much time a litigant has to refile in state

court. Yet that is what the Court’s reading of section

1367(d) demands.

Of course, it’s easy enough to imagine the rule the Court

really wants to adopt today: it would like to afford liti-

gants as a matter of federal law the benefit of a stop clock

approach whenever doing so would yield more time to

refile than the state’s grace period would permit. But to

accomplish so much we would need a very different stat-

ute than the one we have. We would need to be able to

compare the relevant state law grace “tolling period” not

with the federal “tolling period” as the statute says but

with the amount of time left under the relevant state limi-

tations period on the date the plaintiff filed her federal

suit. The problem is, no one has even hinted how we

might lawfully superimpose all those italicized words

(entirely of our own devise) onto the statutory text.5

There are still more textual clues that we have lost our

way today. Congress spoke of the federal tolling period as

embracing “30 days after . . . dismissal.” That language

sounds like and fits with a traditional grace period or

journey’s account approach. As we’ve seen, grace periods

often speak about affording parties some short period of

time after dismissal to refile their claims. Meanwhile, this

——————

5 In footnote 12 of its opinion, the Court suggests that a comparison

between state and federal tolling periods may not be “inevitable” and

that in “extraordinary circumstances” like those discussed above a

comparison between the state tolling period and the time left on the

clock before the federal filing might prove “more natural.” Ante, at 16,

n. 12. But even here the Court does not attempt to explain how the

latter comparison might be fairly extracted from the statutory text—let

alone only in “extraordinary circumstances.”

10 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

language proves no small challenge to square with a stop

clock approach. Generally we say a clock is stopped due to

the onset of a particular event like a disability: something

usually causes the stopping of the clock and when that

something goes away, the clock restarts. Here, the Court

says, the clock stops once a claim is pending in federal

court. Yet it doesn’t restart when that something—the

claim’s pendency—goes away but instead waits another 30

days before ticking again. All without any apparent rea-

son for the additional delay.

This case illustrates the oddity. The petitioner filed her

suit in federal court with 23 months remaining on the

three year statute of limitations. The case remained in

federal district court for nearly three years before dismis-

sal. Under the grace period approach the 30 day provision

does just as it appears, providing petitioner with 30 days

to journey to and refile in the correct court. Under the

stop clock approach, though, the statute affords the peti-

tioner 23 months plus a random 30 days more to refile.

Indeed, on the stop clock approach the only work the 30

day period is even imaginably left to do comes in cases

where the plaintiff filed her federal suit at the very end of

the limitations period. And if that’s the only problem

Congress sought to address, it chose a mighty murky way

to do it, for the parties point to not a single stop clock

provision in all of federal law that includes language

anything like this. All while (again) this language fits

hand in glove with every grace period statute known.6

——————

6 The Court offers a couple of competing textual arguments but nei-

ther can bear much weight.

First, the Court suggests that deriving a grace period from the statu-

tory term “period of limitations” requires “strain[ing].” Ante, at 12. But

the fact is both the grace period and stop clock interpretations require

some (and some very similar) inferences. The grace period approach

construes the term “period of limitations” as directing us to the “effect

of the period of limitations” that is tolled or taken away. For its part

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 11

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Beyond all these textual clues lie important contextual

ones too. When Congress replants the roots of preexisting

law in the federal code, this Court assumes it brings with

it the surrounding soil, retaining the substance of the

tradition it engages. Respect for Congress, this Court has

held, means assuming it knows and “legislate[s] against a

background of [the] common law . . . principles” found in

the field where it is working. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560

U. S. 305, 320, n. 13 (2010); see also Goodyear Atomic

Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 184–185 (1988). And, as

we’ve seen, the state law of tolling Congress expressly

referenced and replanted in section 1367(d) comes heavily

encrusted with meaning. In cases involving dismissal and

refiling, state statutory law and the common law from

which it grew have long afforded a grace period to allow

the litigant an appropriately tailored time to find his way

to the proper court. Meanwhile, a stop clock approach

isn’t usually part of this ecosystem for nothing has dis-

——————

meanwhile, the stop clock approach construes “period of limitations” to

refer to the “running of the period of limitations” that is tolled or taken

away. The question is which inference is more persuasive. And in light

of the dual kinds of tolling the law has long recognized, as well as the

textual and contextual clues before us (some still to be discussed), the

better answer is clear.

Second, the Court complains that the grace period interpretation

renders “superfluous” the phrase “while the claim is pending.” Ante, at

12. But the phrase does important work under the grace period ap-

proach, ensuring that the expiration of limitations period does not take

effect while the claim is pending in federal court. Indeed and some-

what paradoxically, the Court itself implicitly recognizes that the

language does real work when it suggests (in its next sentence no less)

that the grace period approach could “yield an absurdity” by working to

revive a claim that has already expired before it is brought in federal

court. Ante, at 12–13. There is of course no absurdity in it, for the term

“while the claim is pending” does the important work of addressing that

very concern, preventing the expiration of the statute of limitations

from taking effect while the claim is pending even as the language also

and sensibly permits the statute of limitations to take effect if it expires

before the plaintiff files his claim in federal court.

12 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

abled the litigant from reaching a court in the first place

and all he must do is journey from the old court to the new

one. We don’t assume Congress strips replanted statutes

of their soil, and we should not assume Congress displaced

so much tradition in favor of something comparatively

foreign.7

The Court’s reformation of the statute introduces another

problem still—one of significantly greater magnitude yet.

In our constitutional structure, the federal government’s

powers are supposed to be “few and defined,” while

the powers reserved to the States “remain . . . numerous

and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, p. 328 (B. Wright

ed. 1961) (Madison); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.

316, 405 (1819). No doubt, the Constitution affords Con-

gress the authority to make laws that are “necessary and

proper” to carry out its defined duties. Art. I, §8, cl. 18.

But it is difficult to see how, on the Court’s interpretation,

section 1367(d) might be said to survive that test—how it

——————

7 The Court dismisses this “history lesson” on the ground that it

doesn’t know if Congress had “the ancient common-law . . . in mind.”

Ante, at 14, n. 11. But respect for Congress’s competency means we

presume it knows the substance of the state laws it expressly incorpo-

rates into its statutes and the common law against which it operates.

See supra, at 11. When the Court turns to offer its own competing

contextual evidence, it observes that a stop clock approach can be found

in many other places in the U. S. Code. See ante, at 7, and n. 4, 15–16.

But it turns out the Court’s stop clock examples often involve situations

where some disability prevents the plaintiff from proceeding to court.

See, e.g., 26 U. S. C. §6213(f )(1) (limitations period for filing a petition

in the Tax Court “shall be suspended for the period during which the

debtor is prohibited . . . from filing a petition”); §6503(a)(1) (limitations

period on making an assessment shall “be suspended for the period

during which the Secretary is prohibited from making the assess-

ment”). Notably, not one of the Court’s examples purports to address a

situation like the one we face: where the plaintiff has proven able to

come to court but merely chosen the wrong one. The Court’s own

contextual evidence, then, serves to illustrate just how unusual and out

of place a stop clock approach would be here.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 13

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

might be said to be necessary and proper to effectuate any

recognized federal power or how it could be called any-

thing other than an unconstitutional intrusion on the core

state power to define the terms of state law claims litigat-

ed in state court proceedings.8

Under our precedent, the analysis here begins with

Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U. S. 456 (2003). Without

some tolling rule for dismissed state law supplemental

claims, the Court in Jinks noted, federal courts would be

left with “three basic choices:” (1) “condition dismissal of

the state-law claim on the defendant’s waiver of any

statute-of-limitations defense in state court”; (2) “retain

jurisdiction over the state-law claim even though it would

more appropriately be heard in state court”; or (3) “dismiss

the state-law claim but allow the plaintiff to reopen the fed-

eral case if the state court later held the claim to be time

barred.” Id., at 462–463. All three choices, the Court

held, would negatively affect the “ ‘administration of jus-

tice’ in federal court” and thus impair the exercise of the

enumerated “judicial power” of the federal government in

Article III. Id., at 462 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the

Court reasoned, some tolling rule “assur[ing] that state-

law claims asserted under [the supplemental jurisdiction

statute] will not become time barred while pending in

federal court” is necessary and proper to the execution of

the federal judicial power. Id., at 464.

The necessary and proper federal interest Jinks recog-

nized is fully discharged by a grace period. Even petitioner

appears to concede this. See Brief for Petitioner 27 (“Of

——————

8 Of course, the case before us arises from litigation in the District of

Columbia where the federal government enjoys plenary power. See

Art. I, §8, cl. 17. But the federalism concern here cannot be ignored, as

the Court today rightly acknowledges (ante, at 16–19), because the

statute at issue applies nationwide and the vast bulk of its applications

come in the States and implicate state causes of action, state limita-

tions laws, and state court proceedings.

14 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

course, the grace period approach also guarantees a plain-

tiff who is unsuccessful in federal court the opportunity to

bring a claim in state court”). Nor could anyone easily

argue otherwise. Jinks itself proceeded to uphold the

constitutionality of section 1367(d) as necessary and proper

on the basis of an understanding that the statute guar-

anteed just 30 days to a disappointed litigant to refile in

state court. No one in Jinks even hinted that a longer

period might be necessary or proper to serve any valid

federal interest.9

For good reason, it turns out. Trying to imagine how

the Court’s novel twist on section 1367(d) might serve a

necessary and proper federal interest is a hard business.

To discharge the federal interest in preventing state law

claims from “becom[ing] time barred while pending in

federal court” it may be necessary to impose a short grace

period. But how is it necessary to do anything more than

that, like consult the happenstance of how long the federal

court took to dismiss the case and then tack an equivalent

number of months or years onto state law limitations

periods? What federal interest could that even plausibly

serve? The Court does not and cannot attempt an answer

——————

9 See Brief for Petitioner in Jinks v. Richland County, O.T. 2002, No.

02–258, p. 9 (“The tolling window created lasts only 30 days after

dismissal without prejudice from district court[.]”); id., at 37 (section

1367(d) “provides a de minimis window in which a plaintiff may refile

in state court if the limitations period expires during the pendency of

the federal district court action”); Brief for Respondent in No. 02–258,

p. 31 (describing section 1367(d) as providing “a thirty-day tolling

window”); Brief for United States in No. 02–258, pp. 16, 22 (describing

section 1367(d) as “minimally intrusive on state prerogatives” since it

ensures that the “statute of limitations on the pendent claim will not

expire during the pendency of the federal-court action”); Pet. for Cert.

in No. 02–258, p. 22 (“Section 1367(d) merely saves—for a maximum

excess period of 30 days—a preexisting lawsuit that must be refiled to

allow the matter to be heard in a forum preferable to the State, namely,

in its own courts”); see also Brief for State of Wisconsin et al. as Amici

Curiae 8–9.

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 15

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

because its proffered solution is simply orthogonal to any

federal concern.

To be sure, the Court suggests that its approach will

help the States. See ante, at 19. But a great many States

have suggested the opposite, complaining to us that the

Court’s approach will regularly relegate to the dustbin

their own state limitations policy choices. See Brief for

State of Wisconsin et al. as Amici Curiae 22–27; Brief for

National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici

Curiae 6–29. And surely they would seem better posi-

tioned than we to know their own interests. To this, the

Court replies that “[w]ere the dissent’s position to prevail,

cautious plaintiffs would surely” file “two actions [one in

federal, the other in state court] and ask the state court to

hold the suit filed there in abeyance pending disposition of

the federal suit,” causing “plaintiffs to resort to wasteful,

inefficient duplication.” Ante, at 19. But, of course, this

observation does nothing to tell us whether stop clock

tolling is necessary to serve a federal interest. Nor does it

even tell us whether stop clock tolling is necessary to help

the States. A very long historical record before us suggests

that grace periods have worked well to obviate the need

for simultaneous filings in state and federal court; the

Court offers no account why its innovation might be

needed only now to rescue States from their own legisla-

tive choices about the appropriate lifespan of their state

law claims.

The Court’s approach isn’t just unnecessary; it isn’t

proper either. A law is not “proper for carrying into

[e]xecution” an enumerated power if it “violates the prin-

ciple of state sovereignty” reflected in our constitutional

tradition. Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 923–924

(1997). The word “proper” was “used during the founding

era to describe the powers of a governmental entity as

peculiarly within the province or jurisdiction of that en-

tity.” Lawson & Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal

16 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping

Clause, 43 Duke L. J. 267, 297 (1993). Limitations periods

for state law claims fall well within the peculiar province

of state sovereign authority. As Chancellor Kent ex-

plained, “ ‘[t]he period sufficient to constitute a bar to the

litigation of sta[l]e demands, is a question of municipal

policy and regulation, and one which belongs to the discre-

tion of every government, consulting its own interest and

convenience.’ ” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717, 726

(1988) (quoting 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American

Law 462–463 (2d ed. 1832)). Described as “laws for ad-

ministering justice,” time bars are “one of the most sacred

and important of sovereign rights and duties.” Hawkins v.

Barney’s Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 466 (1831). And “from a re-

mote antiquity,” they have been the province of the sover-

eign “by which it exercises its legislation for all persons

and property within its jurisdiction.” McElmoyle ex rel.

Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327 (1839). Our States have

long “exercise[d] this right in virtue of their sovereignty.”

Ibid.

The decision today gives short shrift to these traditional

interests. Just consider how differently the two approaches

treat States when it comes to one of their most “im-

portant of sovereign rights.” Under a grace period ap-

proach, Congress simply fills a void, for the great bulk of

States provide for grace periods of 30 days or longer; only

a few States don’t allow that much or don’t speak to the

question. See n. 3, supra. So on the grace period account,

Congress provides a modest backstop consistent with

existing state law. By contrast, under the stop clock in-

terpretation, state law grace periods are displaced when-

ever the federal litigation (plus those odd 30 days) hap-

pens to be longer than the state law grace period. And

that, of course, is sure to happen often, for federal litiga-

tion is no quick business and state law grace periods often

are. Any time federal litigation (plus, again, 30 days) lasts

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 17

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

longer than the 30 or 60 or 90 or 365 day grace period

found in state law, state law will be forced to give way,

and a federally mandated stop clock approach will usurp

its place.

The stop clock approach, then, ensures that traditional

state law judgments about the appropriate lifespan of

state law claims will be routinely displaced—and dis-

placed in favor of nothing more than a fortuity (the time a

claim sits in federal court) that bears no rational relation-

ship to any federal interest. The Court’s approach forces

state courts to entertain routinely state law claims that

the state legislatures treat as no claims at all. And it

forces state courts to entertain claims that aren’t just stale

by days or weeks under state law, but stale by months or

even many years too. So, for example, take a plaintiff who

files suit in federal court shortly after a six year state law

limitations period begins running and the litigation lasts

six years before it’s finally dismissed. Under the Court’s

approach, federal law will now promise the plaintiff nearly

six years more (plus those stray 30 days again) to refile his

claim in state court. Neither is this illustration fiction; it

is drawn from the facts of Berke v. Buckley Broadcasting

Corp., 821 A. 2d 118, 121 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).

See also Krause v. Textron Fin. Corp., 2007 WL 8054628,

*1–2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007); Brief for State of Wisconsin et al.

as Amici Curiae 20–21 (offering many more examples).

Given all this, it’s no wonder that 24 States, the National

Conference of State Legislatures, and the Council of State

Governments complain that the result the Court reaches

today flies in the face of federalism.10

——————

10 The Court’s reply—that stop clock tolling is “standard” and “off-the-

shelf ”—is no answer. Ante, at 19. The propriety of a legal tool in one

area does not establish its propriety in all; while stop clock tolling may

be standard and off-the-shelf in other contexts (such as for equitable

tolling) that doesn’t mean it is necessary and proper here. Indeed, and

as we’ve seen, the “standard” and “off-the-shelf” solution to the problem

18 ARTIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

The Court today clears away a fence that once marked a

basic boundary between federal and state power. Maybe it

wasn’t the most vital fence and maybe we’ve just simply

forgotten why this particular fence was built in the first

place. But maybe, too, we’ve forgotten because we’ve

wandered so far from the idea of a federal government of

limited and enumerated powers that we’ve begun to lose

sight of what it looked like in the first place. If the federal

government can now, without any rational reason, force

States to allow state law causes of action in state courts

even though the state law limitations period expired many

years ago, what exactly can’t it do to override the applica-

tion of state law to state claims in state court? What

boundaries remain then?

I respectfully dissent.

——————

of dismissal and the need to refile is the one adopted at common law

and by state law: a grace period. If we’re interested in looking for the

right shelf, that’s the one.