Opinion

Bay Harbor Marina Limited Partnership v. Erie County Board of Assessment Appeals and the School District of the City of Erie

  • 177 A.3d 406
Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jan 10, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Covey
On the bench
Jubelirer, McCullough, Covey
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 53.1%

holding that lessee had standing to challenge denial of tax immunity

How later courts described this case

  • holding that lessee had standing to challenge denial of tax immunity

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bay Harbor Marina Limited :

Partnership, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, and The School District : No. 1377 C.D. 2016

of the City of Erie, and City of Erie :

Marina Holdings Limited, and Bay :

Harbor Marina Limited Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, and The School District :

of the City of Erie, and City of Erie :

: No. 1387 C.D. 2016

Appeal of: Marina Holdings Limited :

Marina Holdings Limited and Bay :

Harbor Marina Limited Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, The School District of the :

City of Erie and the City of Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1388 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

Marina Holdings Limited and :

Bay Harbor Marina Limited :

Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, The School District of the :

City of Erie and the City of Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1389 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

Bay Harbor Marina Limited Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, The School District of the :

City of Erie and the City of Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1390 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

Bay Harbor Marina Limited :

Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals and The School District of :

The City of Erie and the City of :

Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1391 C.D. 2016

City of Erie : Argued: April 6, 2017

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: January 10, 2018

Bay Harbor Marina Limited Partnership (Bay Harbor) and Marina

Holdings Limited (Marina Holdings) (collectively, Lessees) appeal from the Erie

County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) July 13, 2016 order that denied Lessees’

summary judgment motions and granted the Erie County Board of Assessment

Appeals (Board), the City of Erie (City) School District (District), and the City’s

summary judgment motions. The District cross-appeals from the trial court’s July 13,

2016 order and appeals from the trial court’s July 18, 2016 order that denied the

District’s motion to assign burdens of proof to Bay Harbor and Marina Holdings.

There are six issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether Lessees of the Erie-Western

Pennsylvania Port Authority (Authority), a Commonwealth agency, have standing to

seek tax immunity and exemption; (2) whether the Authority is or should be a party

to the tax appeal; (3) whether the Authority’s marina properties are immune and/or

exempt from taxation; (4) whether the trial court should have examined each parcel

and individual part thereof to determine if their public access areas were exempt from

taxation; (5) whether the District’s cross-appeals are properly before this Court; and,

(6) whether the trial court’s July 18, 2016 order is an appealable order.

The Authority is a third class port authority organized under the Third

Class City Port Authority Act (Act).1 It leased two parcels of its property – Bay

Harbor West and Bay Harbor East (collectively, Parcels) – to Marina Holdings and

Bay Harbor, respectively. The trial court described the Parcels as follows:

Both Bay Harbor West and Bay Harbor East operate as

private gated marinas for pleasure and recreational craft.

Bay Harbor West consists of approximately 8.8 acres,

including water lots. There are approximately 229 slips

available for lease. Two buildings are located on the Bay

Harbor West property, one of which houses bath/restroom

facilities and a commercial restaurant. Bay Harbor leases a

1

Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1392, 55 P.S. §§ 571-585.

2

portion of the Bay Harbor West property and first building

to Litz Enterprises, LLC, t/d/b/a Jr’s on the Bay (‘Sloppy

Duck’). Rent ranges from $44,820.00 to $48,708[.00] for

2016. Bay Harbor also leases a portion of the second

building to a commercial mechanic business, which pays

$2,200[.00] per quarter. The remainder of the second

building is utilized as an office for both Bay Harbor entities.

Bay Harbor East consists of approximately 12 acres. There

are three docks and 236 slips located on the property. There

is also a parking lot and bathhouse and vending area for

tenants.

Boat slips in Bay Harbor West and Bay Harbor East are

leased to private tenants on an annual basis. Once a slip is

assigned to a tenant, that tenant may renew his/her

membership year-to-year. Tenants are selected on a first-

come, first-serve basis and members of the public may

become members if dockage is available.

Both marina areas are fenced and locked. Access requires a

key device. The leases with the [] Authority provide for []

Authority approval of the fence at Bay Harbor East and

installation of a fence at Bay Harbor West. Parking is

located within the fenced areas of both marinas. Public

parking is located outside of the fence on the southern

portion of Bay Harbor West. Marina member amenities,

including bathhouse facilities, picnic shelters, fish cleaning

station and port-a-potties are not available to the general

public. Furthermore, various postings on both properties

exclude entry by the general public.

Use of both marinas is limited to members and their

family/friends, except for limited public access areas.

Public access at Bay Harbor West includes a walkway

along the eastern edge of the property allowing the public to

walk to the water. Another form of public access at Bay

Harbor West is a boat launch that provides public access to

the bay. Public transient boaters who use the boat launch

may not moor their boats in the marina area, although they

may use slips for a fee. Bay Harbor has a courtesy dock

allowing members and the general public to briefly dock

their boats and move their trucks/trailers to the launch to

remove their boats.

3

Public access to Bay Harbor East consists of a public access

walkway [] maintained by Bay Harbor along the eastern and

northern perimeter of Bay Harbor East. There is no public

boat launch. For a fee, transient boats may use one of six

open slips.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).

The Authority does not use or occupy the Parcels, is not involved in the

daily operations, decision-making, policy administration, rule enforcement or

membership criteria/approval of the entities using the Parcels. Each of Lessees’

leases provides, in relevant part:

4. Taxes, Utilities and Assessments.

(a) The [l]eased [p]remises are not subject to any taxes or

assessments as they have been acquired and have been used

and will continue to be used to further and effectuate the

Lessor’s authorized purposes. Nonetheless, in the event of

a change in law, an agreement between [the Authority] and

Lessee pursuant to which a payment in lieu of taxes is to be

made with respect to the [l]eased [P]remises (which

payment agreement shall be approved in writing by the

Lessee in advance), or a determination by a court or

governmental body with jurisdiction that any tax or

assessment may be chargeable against the [l]eased

[p]remises, the following subparagraphs shall control the

determination of liability for any taxes or assessments.

(b) The Lessee shall pay all taxes (including but not

limited to real estate taxes) and assessments, if any,

upon or against the [l]eased [p]remises by any

governmental entity by reason of the occupancy of the

[l]eased [p]remises by the Lessee regardless of whether or

not Lessee occupies the [l]eased [p]remises during the

entire period of such assessment. Lessee shall also pay all

water and sewer rental charges commencing with the

commencement date of the Lease term (such items for the

current Year to be prorated as of such commencement date),

all utility and telephone charges, and all expenses necessary

for the maintenance of the [l]eased [p]remises during the

term of the lease and any and all renewals thereof.

4

(c) The Lessee shall have the right in good faith to

contest or review by legal proceedings or in such other

manner as it deems suitable, which proceedings, if

instituted, shall be conducted promptly at Lessee’s

expense and free of expense to the Lessor, any taxes or

assessments imposed upon or growing due and payable

by reason of said [l]eased [p]remises or any part thereof.

The Lessee shall pay the amount that shall be finally

assessed or imposed against such premises or be

adjudicated to be due and payable as any such disputed or

contested tax or assessment. The Lessor will join in any

contest or protest provided for in this paragraph at the

request of the Lessee but at the Lessee’s sole cost and

expense and as a condition of such joinder the Lessor

may require reasonable indemnity against costs or other

damage by reason of such joinder.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 131a-132a, 220a-221a (emphasis added).

On December 17, 2012, Lessees applied to the Board seeking tax

immunity and/or exempt status for the Parcels. In a February 21, 2013 letter, the

Authority’s Chairman Jeffrey Johnson (Johnson) notified the Erie County Bureau of

Assessment’s Director of Assessment Scott Maas (Maas):

The [Authority] does not support the immunity or

exemption from real estate taxes for Authority property

unless it fulfills the core mission of the Authority. The

Authority has leased properties to . . . Bay Harbor Marina,

which are purely private, for-profit and commercial entities.

These types of entities operate yacht clubs, marinas and

recreational boat sales, and in no way further the core

mission of the Authority. As the record owner of the

[Parcels], the Authority opposes the grant of immunity or

exemption from ad valorem property taxes for these

[Parcels] and believes they are a proper subject of taxation.

We are, therefore, revoking the Authority’s joinder in the

Petitions seeking immunity or exemption from taxes that

are now before the [Board].

We would kindly request that you make the Board aware of

our position on this matter in that there is a hearing

scheduled before the Board . . . .

5

R.R. at 222a. The Board held a hearing on Lessees’ application and, on March 28,

2013, declared that the Parcels remained taxable. See R.R. at 19a-20a. Lessees

timely appealed to the trial court.2 The City and the District intervened. On April 22,

2014, the Authority passed a resolution stating:

BE IT RESOLVED THAT THE [AUTHORITY] DOES NOT

SUPPORT THE EXEMPTION FROM REAL ESTATE TAXES FOR

AUTHORITY PROPERTY UNLESS IT FULFILLS THE CORE

MISSION OF THE AUTHORITY, THE AUTHORITY HAS

LEASED THE PROPERTY TO BAY HARBOR MARINA, WHICH

IS PURELY PRIVATE, FOR PROFIT AND COMMERCIAL

ENTITY. THIS ENTITY OPERATES A MARINA AND HAS

PAID TAXES ON THE LEASED PROPERTY SINCE THE

INITIATION OF THE LEASE. AS THE RECORD OWNER OF

THE SUBJECT PARCELS, THE AUTHORITY SUPPORTS THE

CONTINUED PAYMENT OF PROPERTY TAXES FOR THESE

PARCELS AND BELIEVES THEY ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF

TAXATION.

R.R. at 223a.

On October 31, 2014, the District filed a summary judgment motion

(District’s Motion), in which the City and the Board joined. On March 2, 2015, the

trial court heard argument on the District’s Motion. During argument, the trial court

informed the parties that because there were no material facts at issue, it would

decide the case on summary judgment motions, and offered Lessees an opportunity to

file their own summary judgment motions. The trial court also notified the parties

that it would remove the Authority from the caption since the Authority was not a

party.

On March 27, 2015, the District and the City moved to amend the

caption to add the District and the City as intervenors. On March 31, 2015, the trial

2

The matter was severed into two separate actions, but the cases were handled on a

consolidated basis. See Alma vs. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 83 A.3d 1121 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2014) (the taking of one appeal from multiple judgments is discouraged).

6

court issued an order granting the motion to amend the caption, declared that the

Authority was not a party to the action, and removed the Authority from the caption.

On April 27, 2015, Lessees filed their summary judgment motion and a motion to

join the Authority as a party. On June 10, 2015, the District filed a motion to assign

all burdens of proof to Lessees (Burdens Motion).

On October 12, 2015, the trial court heard argument on the summary

judgment motions and the joinder motion. On July 13, 2016, the trial court granted

the District’s Motion and denied Lessees’ summary judgment motion. Although the

trial court declared that Lessees had standing to pursue an exemption,3 relative to

immunity, the trial court explained:

Under the [Act], an authority has the power to lease real

estate. 55 P.S. § 573. The [Authority] is also entitled to

immunity from taxation based upon Section [12 of the Act],

which states, inter alia, that ‘the authority shall not be

required to pay any taxes or assessments upon property

acquired or used by it for such purposes[.]’ 55 P.S. § 582.

There is no provision under the [Act] regarding standing

and immunity claims for purposes of appeal. Additionally,

[Section] 8844 of the Consolidated County Assessment

Law [(CCAL)4], which permits [Lessees] to file an

exemption appeal, does not specifically authorize an

immunity challenge.

Th[e trial c]ourt agrees with [Lessees] that there is a paucity

of legal authority on the issue of standing in an immunity

claim. The absence of relevant case law, however, does not

lead to the conclusion that cases involving standing in

exemption claims are applicable by analogy or default.

Rather, th[e trial c]ourt concludes that the lack of legal

authority on the specific issue of standing in the context of

an immunity claim is due to the fact that immunity is

normally not raised by a lessee of a property owner or

3

The District acknowledges in its brief to this Court: “Admittedly, the [t]rial [c]ourt granted

standing to seek an exemption under what the [trial c]ourt determined to be applicable case law and

this is not challenged on appeal.” District’s Br. at 15.

4

53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8801-8868.

7

others claiming derivative standing. Accordingly, for

purposes of this appeal, th[e trial c]ourt finds that [Lessees]

have no standing to raise immunity from taxation.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10 (footnote omitted). The trial court further considered whether the

Parcels are used for a public purpose and concluded that Lessees were not so entitled

to immunity.

The trial court’s opinion also included the following footnote:

In tax exemption cases, the burden of proof is normally on

the taxpayer. City of Phila[.] v. Cumberland C[ty.] Bd. [o]f

Assessment Appeals, 81 A.3d 24, 25 n.1 (Pa. 2013). (‘[I]f

an entity is immune, the taxing authority bears the burden

of establishing why taxation is permissible; if the entity is

exempt[,] the entity bears the burden of establishing why it

should not be subject to taxation.’) However, Norwegian

T[ownship v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment

Appeals, 74 A.3d 1124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013),] held that

property owned by a municipality is presumed to be exempt

from taxation; accordingly, the burden of proof is on a

taxing authority to claim otherwise. Norwegian Twp[.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 11 n.6. On July 18, 2016, the trial court entered a post-judgment

order denying the Burdens Motion.

On August 11, 2016, Bay Harbor timely appealed from the trial court’s

July 13, 2016 order to this Court.5 On August 11, 2016, Marina Holdings also

appealed from the trial court’s July 13, 2016 order to this Court.6 On August 16,

2016, the District filed a cross-appeal to Marina Holdings’ appeal,7 and filed a cross-

appeal to Bay Harbor’s appeal,8 contending that the trial court erred in its July 13,

2016 opinion and order by ruling that the taxing authorities had the burden of proving

exemption and immunity. On August 16, 2016, the District appealed from the trial

5

Bay Harbor’s appeal is docketed at 1377 C.D. 2016.

6

Marina Holdings’ appeal is docketed at 1387 C.D. 2016.

7

The District’s cross-appeal of Marina Holdings’ appeal is docketed at 1389 C.D. 2016.

8

The District’s cross-appeal of Bay Harbor’s appeal is docketed at 1391 C.D. 2016.

8

court’s July 18, 2016 order denying the District’s Burdens Motion.9 On September 6,

2016, this Court ordered the parties to address in their briefs, the appealability of the

trial court’s July 18, 2016 order. On November 2, 2016, this Court consolidated

Lessees’ appeals, the District’s cross-appeals, and the District’s appeals from the trial

court’s July 18, 2016 order. 10

Lessees first argue that the trial court erred when it held that Lessees did

not have standing to pursue their tax immunity claim.

Standing is a requirement that parties have sufficient

interest in a matter to ensure that there is a legitimate

controversy before the court. In determining whether a

party has standing, a court is concerned only with the

question of who is entitled to make a legal challenge and

not the merits of that challenge.

In re T.J., 739 A.2d 478, 481 (Pa. 1999). Consequently, we consider Lessees’

interests.

Initially, we note that Section 3(a) of the Act states, in relevant part, that

“[t]he [port] authority shall exercise the public powers of the Commonwealth as an

agency thereof.” 55 P.S. § 573(a). “As a general matter, property owned by the

Commonwealth and its agencies is immune from taxation by a local subdivision in

9

The District appealed from the trial court’s July 18, 2016 order relative to Bay Harbor

docketed at 1390 C.D. 2016, and relative to Marina Holdings docketed at 1388 C.D. 2016.

10

This Court has explained:

Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or denying

summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear:

the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that

the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.

Kincel v. Dept of Transp., 867 A.2d 758, 761 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (citation omitted).

9

the absence of express statutory authority.” Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA) v. Bd. of

Revision of Taxes, 833 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. 2003) (emphasis added).

Section 12 of the Act, entitled: “Exemption from taxes and assessments”

provides, in pertinent part:

The effectuation of the authorized purposes of any

authority created under this [A]ct, shall and will be in all

respects for the benefit of the people of the Commonwealth,

for the increase of their commerce and prosperity, and for

the improvement of their health and living conditions; and

since the authority will be performing essential government

functions in effectuating such purposes, the authority shall

not be required to pay any taxes or assessments upon

any property acquired or used by it for such purposes[.]

55 P.S. § 582 (emphasis added). Although the title of Section 12 of the Act

specifically references “[e]xemption,” in Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority v.

Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals, 889 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 2005), our

Supreme Court interpreted almost identical language in Section 5620 of the

Municipality Authorities Act (MAA)11 as affording tax immunity. See also Del. Cty.

Solid Waste Auth. v. Berks Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 626 A.2d 528 (Pa. 1993).

In contrast, with respect to exemption, Section 8812(a) of the CCAL

provides, in relevant part:

The following property shall be exempt from all county,

city, borough, town, township, road, poor, county institution

district and school real estate taxes:

....

(8) All other public property used for public purposes with

the ground annexed and necessary for the occupancy and

use of the property, but this shall not be construed to

include property otherwise taxable which is owned or held

by an agency of the [f]ederal [g]overnment. This chapter or

11

53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5601-5623.

10

any other law shall not be construed to exempt from

taxation any privilege, act or transaction conducted upon

public property by persons or entities which would be

taxable if conducted upon nonpublic property regardless of

the purpose for which the activity occurs, even if conducted

as agent for or lessee of any public authority.

53 Pa.C.S. § 8812(a).

Section 8844(c)(1) of the CCAL permits “[a]ny person aggrieved by any

assessment, whether or not the value thereof shall have been changed since the

preceding annual assessment, or any taxing district having an interest in the

assessment, [to] appeal to the [B]oard for relief.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 8844(c)(1). Appeals

from the Board to the trial court are governed by Section 8854(a)(1) of the CCAL

which provides:

Following an appeal to the [B]oard, any appellant, property

owner or affected taxing district may appeal the [B]oard’s

decision to the court of common pleas in the county in

which the property is located in accordance with [Section

5571(b) of the Judicial Code,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b)

(relating to appeals generally) and local rules of court.

53 Pa.C.S. § 8854(a)(1). The aforementioned language does not specify whether a

Commonwealth agency lessee is a “person aggrieved by an[] assessment[.]” 53

Pa.C.S. § 8844(c)(1). However, our Supreme Court

has held that ‘where a person is not adversely affected in

any way by the matter challenged, he is not aggrieved and

thus has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of that

challenge.’ Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of P[a.] v. Dep[’t]

of Pub[.] Welfare, . . . 888 A.2d 601, 607 ([Pa.] 2005)

(citing William Penn Parking Garage, Inc., v. City of

Pittsburgh, . . . 346 A.2d 269, 280 ([Pa.] 1975)). Moreover,

in order to be aggrieved, a party must show that it has a

substantial, direct and immediate interest in the claim

sought to be litigated. Id.; William Penn, 346 A.2d at 280–

83. We have defined these requirements as follows: a

‘substantial’ interest is an interest in the outcome of the

litigation which surpasses the common interest of all

11

citizens in procuring obedience to the law; a ‘direct’ interest

requires a showing that the matter complained of caused

harm to the party’s interest; an ‘immediate’ interest

involves the nature of the causal connection between the

action complained of and the injury to the party

challenging it, and is shown where the interest the party

seeks to protect is within the zone of interests sought to

be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee

in question. Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n, 888 A.2d at 607;

S[.] Whitehall T[wp.] Police Serv[.] v. S[.] Whitehall T[wp.],

. . . 555 A.2d 793, 795 ([Pa.] 1989).

Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 39 A.3d 267, 278 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis

added).

In In re Board of Property Assessment, 797 A.2d 414 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2002), this Court considered whether Pittsburgh International Airport private, for-

profit food vendor sublessees had standing under the General County Assessment

Law (GCAL)12 to appeal from an assessment finding that their parcels were not tax

exempt. The Court examined the language of Section 518.1(a) of the GCAL which

states “[a]ny owner of real estate or taxable property in this Commonwealth, who

may feel aggrieved by the last or any future assessment or valuation of his real estate

or taxable property, may appeal . . .” therefrom. 72 P.S. § 5020-518.1(a).13 The

Court explained that in earlier cases it had “determined that the term ‘owner’ includes

not only the registered owner of the real estate, but also an equitable owner or owner

of a taxable interest in the property.” In re Bd., 797 A.2d at 417. It further stated:

Each of the sublessees in this matter has entered into a

seven-year sublease that obligates it to pay all taxes

assessed or levied against the premises. Under the terms of

each sublease, upon expiration or termination of the lease

term, improvements made by the sublessee become the

property of the County as record owner of the terminal and

12

Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5020-1 – 5020-602.

13

Added by Section 2 of the Act of December 28, 1955, P.L. 917.

12

remain in place unless the County requests their removal, in

which case the sublessee is obligated to remove them. . . .

[T]he facts . . . support a conclusion that the parties to the

lease agreements intended that the sublessee is the owner of

the parcel for tax purposes because the seven-year

commercial sublease indicates that the title to the

improvements, as well as the leasehold itself, remain in the

lessee during the term. [E]ach of the sublessees of public

property in this case, is the ‘owner’ of a non-freehold,

possessory interest in the taxable property for a term of

years, something less than legal or equitable ownership, but

ownership nonetheless for the purposes of Section 518.1 [of

the GCAL].

In re Bd., 797 A.2d at 418 (footnotes omitted).14

In addition, this Court must examine the factors established in

Pennsylvania Medical Society to determine whether Lessees are aggrieved. First,

Lessees do have a substantial interest in the litigation’s outcome because of their

interests in tax relief from taxes imposed on the Parcels, where their leases require

payment thereof, exceed the common interest of all citizens. Further, Lessees have

direct interests because the Board’s decision triggers their lease obligations.

Whether Lessees have an immediate interest is less clear. Here, if the

Parcels are not immune under Section 12 of the Act, Lessees are subject to tax

liability. Therefore, we must consider the “zone of interests sought to be protected

by” Section 12 of the Act. Pa. Med. Soc’y, 39 A.3d at 278. The District argues that

since Section 12 of the Act applies only to the Authority, the “zone of interests sought

14

The In re Board Court, stated: “Of equal importance to our conclusion on this point is that

the interests of the County, as record owner of the airport terminal, are not adverse to those of the

tax-paying sublessees.” In re Bd., 797 A.2d at 418 n.11. In the instant action, because the

Authority has taken the position that the Parcels are taxable, “the interests of the [Authority], as

record owner of the [Parcels], are . . . adverse to those of the tax-paying [Lessees].” Id. (emphasis

added). We note that “[i]t is well settled that tax immunity is distinct from tax exemption.” SEPTA,

833 A.2d at 713. Although this Court has considered lessees’ standing in the context of tax

exemption, it has not done so with respect to tax immunity. Notwithstanding, the nature of Lessees’

interests are similar to those in In re Board.

13

to be protected” pertains only to the Authority. Id. However, Section 12 of the Act is

not so narrow, but rather focuses on the “[t]he effectuation of the authorized

purposes[15] of any authority created . . . ” thereunder. 55 P.S. § 582 (emphasis

added).16 Therefore, as lessees of Authority property which is purportedly used to

further the Authority’s authorized purposes, Lessees would be included within

Section 12 of the Act’s “zone of interests.” Pa. Med. Soc., 39 A.3d at 278.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that Lessees had standing to challenge the denial

of tax immunity, and the trial court erred when it held otherwise.

15

The Authority’s purpose is described in Section 3(a) of the Act: “Each authority shall be

for the purpose of planning, acquiring, holding, constructing, improving, maintaining and operating,

owning, leasing, either as lessor or lessee, port facilities and equipment.” 55 P.S. § 573(a)

(emphasis added). Section 2 of the Act defines “port facility” to include

all real and personal property used in the operation of a port

terminal, including, but without being limited to, wharves, piers,

slips, ferries, docks, graving docks, drydocks, ship building and/or

repair yards, bulkheads, dock walls, basins, carfloats, float-bridges,

dredging equipment, radio receiving and sending stations, grain or

other storage elevators, warehouses, cold storage, tracks, yards, sheds,

switches, connections, overhead appliances, bunker coal, oil and fresh

water stations, railroads, motor trucks, floating elevators, airports,

barges, scows or harbor craft of any kind, markets and every kind of

terminal storage or supply depot, now in use or hereafter designed for

use, to facilitate transportation and for the handling, storage, loading

or unloading of freight at terminals, and equipment, materials and

supplies therefor.

55 P.S. § 572 (emphasis added). Section 2 of the Act also defines “port terminal” as “any marine .

. . terminal . . . used or to be used, in connection with the transportation or transfer of freight,

personnel and equipment.” 55 P.S. § 572 (emphasis added).

16

Consideration of this broader “zone of interests” is consistent with the concept that

immunity attaches to the Commonwealth property itself, rather than simply to the Commonwealth.

As our Supreme Court stated, “property owned by the Commonwealth and its agencies is immune

from taxation by a local subdivision in the absence of express statutory authority,” so long as the

agency action is within the agency’s authorized purposes and powers, and so long as the property is

used for a purpose that is within the agency’s operations. SEPTA, 833 A.2d at 713 (emphasis

added).

14

Our conclusion that Lessees have standing to assert their immunity

claims is not a declaration that the claims are meritorious. See In re T.J. “Whether

property is tax-exempt or immune from taxation is a question of law[.]” Norwegian

Twp., 74 A.3d at 1128 n.3. Thus, we consider Lessees’ immunity claim consistent

with our Supreme Court’s holding in SEPTA, that

a court must first look at the broader question of whether

the agency’s action is within its ‘authorized purposes and

powers.’ Delaware C[ty.]. However, the inquiry does not

end at that point. The court must also consider the scope of

the immunity, i.e., whether the property was acquired or

used for a purpose that is within the operation of the

agency. In making this determination, the court must keep

in mind that immunity is not limited to the absolute

minimum of property necessary for operations.

SEPTA, 833 A.2d at 716. This includes considering whether the Parcels are being

used as “port facilities” as defined by the Act. Lessees’ argument that Section 3(b)(5)

of the Act permits the Authority to “lease as lessor” Authority property is not alone

sufficient to conclude that the use of the Parcels is within the Authority’s purposes

and powers. See SEPTA.

Lessees rely on the subject lease language and deposition testimony to

establish that the Act authorizes operation of the recreational marinas. Specifically,

Lessees point to the testimony of the Authority’s Executive Director Raymond

Schreckengost (Schreckengost), who testified that the Authority’s mission is “[t]o

promote industrial, commercial and recreational opportunities on Presque Isle Bay

and adjacent waters.” R.R. at 261a. Lessees further rely on Schreckengost’s

descriptions of other Authority-operated recreational marina facilities, asserting that

the Authority “regularly elects to utilize public-private partnerships to further its

statutory purposes.” Lessees’ Br. at 44. According to Lessees, “[i]n every case, the

[Authority] is utilizing its statutory power to enter into leases as a lessor and is doing

15

so to implement its statutory purpose of developing and maintaining marine

facilities.” Lessees’ Br. at 45.

Notwithstanding Lessees’ claims, the Authority’s actions do not

“implement [its] statutory purpose of developing and maintaining marine facilities.”

Id. (emphasis added). This Court acknowledges the Authority’s statutory power to

enter into leases and to lease Authority property. However, Section 3(a) of the Act

provides that “[e]ach authority shall be for the purpose of planning, acquiring,

holding, constructing, improving, maintaining and operating, owning, leasing, either

as lessor or lessee, port facilities and equipment.” 55 P.S. § 573(a) (emphasis

added). Section 2 of the Act defines “port facilities” as “including all real and

personal property used in the operation of a port terminal[.]” 55 P.S. § 572 (bold

and italicized emphasis added). “‘Port terminal’ includes any marine . . . terminal .

. . used or to be used, in connection with the transportation or transfer of

freight, personnel and equipment.” Id. (emphasis added). Because the Authority’s

statutorily-mandated purpose does not expressly authorize the Authority’s operation

of a recreational marina, we conclude that the Parcels are not immune from taxation.

We next address whether the trial court erred by sua sponte removing

the Authority from the case caption because the Authority is an indispensable or

necessary party. The District,17 City18 and Lessees19 do not dispute that the Authority

is a party to the action. Lessees named the Authority as a party in its appeal to the

17

The District states in its brief to this Court that “[t]he [Authority] was a named party at

least until April 1, 2015, and remained a designated party even after September 5, 2014[,] when the

[trial court] granted severance by a September 5, 2014 order providing that [Lessees] will be [the

a]ppellants along with the [Authority].” District’s Br. at 20 (citation omitted).

18

The City argues in its brief to this Court that it “is not disputing that the Authority did

become a party commencing with the appeal to the [B]oard and throughout.” City’s Br. at 22.

19

Lessees assert in their brief to this Court that “[u]pon the filing of the appeals, the owner

of the properties, the [Authority], was identified as an appellant by [Lessees].” Lessees’ Br. at 32.

“[T]he [Lessees] believe that the [Authority] has already been joined as a party.” Id.

16

trial court based on Section 4 of the leases, which stated in relevant part, “[t]he

Lessor will join in any contest or protest provided for in this paragraph at the request

of the Lessee . . . .” R.R. at 132a, 221a. Lessees further reason that they properly

named the Authority as a party consistent with the rationale behind Pennsylvania

Rule of Civil Procedure No. 2227 which states:

(a) Persons having only a joint interest in the subject matter

of an action must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or

defendants.

(b) If a person who must be joined as a plaintiff refuses to

join, he or she shall, in a proper case, be made a defendant

or an involuntary plaintiff when the substantive law permits

such involuntary joinder.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 2227. Lessees also note that the Authority’s party status is consistent

with Section 8844(e)(1) of the CCAL, that provides:

When an appeal has been filed, the [B]oard shall notify

the appellant, property owner and each affected taxing

district of the time and place of the hearing. Each party

attending the hearing shall have the right to examine any

witness. The notice shall be mailed to the appellant at the

address designated in the appeal. Notices required by this

section shall be mailed no later than 20 days preceding the

appeal. Any appellant who fails to appear for the hearing at

the time fixed shall be conclusively presumed to have

abandoned the appeal unless the hearing date is rescheduled

by the mutual consent of the appellant and the [B]oard.

53 Pa.C.S. § 8844(e)(1) (emphasis added). This Court agrees that the Authority was

properly named as a party in this action, and retained that status throughout the trial

court’s proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court erred by sua sponte removing the

Authority’s name from the case caption.

Lessees next contend that the trial court erred by concluding that

Lessees, as Commonwealth agency lessees, were not entitled to tax exemption.

17

Lessees argue that the Authority-owned marina properties are entitled to tax

immunity and/or exemption even when leased to private operators.

Initially,

[t]he elementary premise underlying taxation is that the

power to tax is exclusively vested within the legislature.

‘Property is immune from taxation if the taxing body has

not been granted the authority to levy a tax.’ Delaware

C[ty. Solid Waste Auth. v. Berks Cty. Bd. of Assessment

Appeals,] 626 A.2d [528,] 530 [(Pa. 1993)]. As a general

matter, property owned by the Commonwealth and its

agencies is immune from taxation by a local subdivision in

the absence of express statutory authority. It cannot be

presumed that general statutory provisions giving local

subdivisions the power to tax local real estate, were meant

to include property owned by the Commonwealth, since to

allow such taxation would upset the orderly processes of

government. Thus, in order to tax property owned by the

Commonwealth, a local subdivision must establish that it

has the authority to tax such property.

On the other hand, tax ‘exemption’ carves out specified

property from taxation that the taxing body otherwise

has the authority to tax. Delaware C[ty.], 626 A.2d at

530. The exemptions are the result of Article VIII,

Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which

provides that the General Assembly may by law exempt

from taxation certain classes of property, including ‘that

portion of public property which is actually and

regularly used for public purposes.’ Pa. Const. Art. VIII,

§ 2(a)(iii). Thus, unlike immunity situations, the property is

presumed to be subject to tax unless specifically excluded

and the taxpayer must establish that the property is exempt

from taxation.

Thus, the primary distinction between ‘immunity’ and

‘exemption’ is simply that ‘the ordinary presumption

against exemption does not apply where the property

involved is owned by the Commonwealth, since such

property has for reasons of public policy been

consistently recognized as free from taxation.’

[Commonwealth v.] Dauphin C[ty.], 6 A.2d [870,] 872-73

[(Pa. 1939)].

18

SEPTA, 833 A.2d at 713 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also In re Appeal of

Riegelsville, 979 A.2d 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). In Lehigh-Northampton, the

Supreme Court further clarified its SEPTA analysis:

[A] precept evident from Delaware County and SEPTA is

that the standard for judging the scope of immunity may be

different from that applicable to questions of tax exemption.

Because exemptions are statutory in nature, the relevant

statute supplies the governing standard. Presently, . . . the

trial court focused upon the ‘public purpose’ test embodied

in the [GCAL] . . . . On the other hand, under Delaware

County and SEPTA, immunity is assumed unless the agency

acts outside of its authorized governmental purposes. This

aligns with Section 5620 [of the MAA], which affirms that

authorities need not pay taxes on property acquired or used

for ‘authorized purposes’ relating to the ‘perform[ance of]

essential governmental functions.’ 53 Pa.C.S. § 5620[.]

Lehigh-Northampton, 889 A.2d at 1179. Importantly, in Norwegian Township this

Court explained:

In SEPTA, our Supreme Court described two distinct

analyses; one used to determine whether a property is tax-

immune and the other used to determine whether a property

is tax-exempt. However, . . . the Supreme Court observed

that courts within the Commonwealth have used the terms

‘immunity’ and ‘exemption’ interchangeably. As we noted

in Granville [Township v. Board of Assessment Appeals of

Mifflin County, 900 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)],

the distinction between tax immunity and tax exemption is

unnecessary in the context of government-owned property.

Whether either term is used, government-owned

property is not taxable if it is being used for a public

purpose, and the taxing authority bears the burden to

prove its taxability. Stated otherwise, the taxing

authority must prove that the government-owned

property is not being used for a governmental purpose

in order for the property to be taxable.[20]

20

The District and the City strenuously argue that the trial court erred by placing the burden

of proof on the taxing authority rather than on Lessees. They contend that because the Authority

19

does not support Lessees’ immunity and exemption claims, the burden should be with Lessees. The

District asserts:

The [Authority] does not seek the exemption. It opposes it. Either

way, the effort to derive the benefits of Section [12 of the Act] suffer

from the fatal flaw [-] [Lessees are] not the part[ies] Section [12 of

the Act] intends to benefit. The burden of proof in exemption cases

rests with the proponent of the exemption. The burden of proof in

exemption cases normally rests on the taxpayer. Statutory provisions

that exempt property from taxation must be strictly construed.

District’s Br. at 70-71 (citations omitted). After our Supreme Court explained in SEPTA that the

presumption against exemption does not apply where Commonwealth property is involved, it again

addressed the issue in Lehigh-Northampton, stating:

In contrast to tax immunity, tax exemption does not implicate the

authority to tax, but excludes from taxation specified property that

would otherwise be taxable. This difference is significant because

exemptions are evaluated according to a principle of strict

construction in favor of taxation, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(5), whereas

doubts are resolved in favor of the taxpayer in assessing the reach of

the taxing statute in the first instance. See . . . Delaware C[ty.], . . .

626 A.2d at 531 (‘[W]e strictly construe statutes purporting to

permit taxation of Commonwealth property, and such a grant

may not be found by implication.’ (citing Appeal of Harrisburg Sch.

Dist., . . . 417 A.2d 848 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1980), and Mastrangelo v.

Buckley, . . . 250 A.2d 447 ([Pa.] 1969))). ‘Thus, the primary

distinction between ‘immunity’ and ‘exemption’ is simply that

‘the ordinary presumption against exception does not apply

where the property involved is owned by the Commonwealth,

since such property has for reasons of public policy been

consistently recognized as free from taxation.’ SEPTA, . . . 833

A.2d at 713 (quoting Commonwealth v. Dauphin C[ty.], . . . 6 A.2d at

872-73). In short, Commonwealth property is presumed immune,

and the local taxing body bears the burden to demonstrate

taxability.

Lehigh-Northampton, 889 A.2d at 1175-76 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In Granville, this

Court held that “the burden of proof of liability for taxes is on the taxing authority where the real

estate in question is owned by a governmental body.” Granville, 900 A.2d at 1016 (emphasis

added). There is no ambiguity here. Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Court have

spoken clearly that Commonwealth-owned property is presumed immune and exempt from

taxation and the burden is on the taxing authority to demonstrate otherwise. Certainly, the

presumption may be overcome. Although the Authority, as owner, may disagree that Lessees are

20

Norwegian Township, 74 A.3d at 1131 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

What, then, is the established law as to the taxability of

property or part of property which would admittedly be

exempt from taxation if used by the owner for a public

purpose but which is leased to other tenants? The

controlling test is, not merely whether the property or part

of it has been rented out, but whether the use of the part

so leased is for a public or a private purpose. It is the

use of the property, and not the use of the proceeds from

the property, which determines whether tax exemption

may constitutionally be granted.

Appeal of Mun. Auth. of Borough of W. View, 113 A.2d 307, 309 (Pa. 1955)

(emphasis added); see also Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 248 A.2d 212

(Pa. 1968). More recently, this Court explained: “[T]he key to exemption is evidence

establishing that the lessee’s use of the public property is furthering the purpose of

the governmental agency from which the lessee rents the property. In the absence of

such evidence . . . the property is not serving a public purpose and is not tax exempt.”

Pier 30 Assocs. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 493 A.2d 126, 129-30 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).

Citing to Borough of West View and to Pittsburgh Public Parking

Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, 105 A.2d 165 (Pa. 1954), this Court in

Wesleyville Borough v. Erie County Board of Assessment Appeals, 676 A.2d 298 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1996), further explained:

Our Supreme Court has . . . stated that the fact that property

of a public body is leased to another entity, even a private

party deriving profit therefrom, will not defeat the tax

exemption if the property is being used for the

specifically[-]authorized public purpose for which it was

acquired. The controlling test for tax exemption is not

whether the property or part of it has been leased out,

but whether the use of the property so leased is for a

entitled to tax exemption, the Authority’s position does not change the burden as long as the

Authority owns the Parcels.

21

public purpose. This [C]ourt has also stated that the

crucial point is not whether the public body is benefitted

by the use of the leased property but whether the use is, in

fact, public.

Where the primary and principal use to which property is

put is public, the mere fact that income is incidentally

derived from the use of the property does not affect its

character as property devoted to a public use. On the other

hand, property that is owned by a tax-exempt entity is

taxable if the property is used for commercial purposes

or is rented to a lessee for a purely business enterprise

and not a public use.

Id. at 302 (citations omitted; bold and italicized emphasis added); see also Upper

Dauphin Nat’l Bank v. Dauphin Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 561 A.2d 378 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1989); see also Indiana Univ. of Pa. v. Indiana Cty. Bd. of Assessment

Appeals (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1923 C.D. 2014, filed September 17, 2015), slip op. at 16

(“The general rule is when a governmental entity leases property for a private or

commercial purpose, that lease does not count as a ‘public purpose’, and that

property will not be exempt from taxation.”21 (Emphasis added)).22

In light of the foregoing, the Court examines Lessees’ use of the Parcels

to determine whether the trial court properly concluded their “use is [not], in fact,

public.” Wesleyville, 676 A.2d at 302. The trial court explained the factors upon

which it based its conclusion that Lessees’ use was not for a public purpose:

21

This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for [their] persuasive value,

but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating

Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

22

This Court acknowledges that in 2002, in In re Board, this Court stated that “when public

property is used by a private entity, the key to maintaining the tax exemption is evidence

establishing that the lessee’s use of the public property is furthering the purpose of the

governmental agency from which the lessee rents the property.” Id. at 419 (emphasis added). The

analysis used therein seems more akin to an immunity analysis. Thus, the Court concludes that the

In re Board Court’s analysis does not reflect the current state of the law given the distinction

between tax immunity and exemption recognized by our Supreme Court in 2003 in SEPTA, and in

its 2005 Lehigh-Northampton decision.

22

Here, the [Authority], in exchange for rental income, leases

the subject properties to commercial entities not affiliated

with the [Authority]. As reflected by the evidence, these

properties are utilized as private, for-profit marinas and

inure to the sole benefit of [Lessees] and its subtenants.

The public has either limited or restricted access to the

marinas. The record is devoid of any evidence that the

marinas are used for a public purpose. Furthermore, the

[Authority] has no control over the marinas, particularly in

the operations, decision making, or administration of the

marinas. The [Authority] is also not involved in

membership approval and rental fees with the subtenants.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13.

In support of their contention, the trial court erred and the Parcels are

indeed being used for a public purpose, Lessees posit:

The [Parcels] are by definition owned by a public agency

and therefore constitute public property. As for their use, it

is equally apparent that the [Parcels] are used for public

purposes. The leases mandate the use of the property for

marinas. Hundreds of members of the public are able to

utilize the docks for dockage every year. Uncountable

others have access to the public access areas enabling both

foot traffic and boats to be launched from the ramp at Bay

Harbor West.

Although the exemption section of the [Act] is the source of

the immunity of the [Authority], its statements of the

benefits of the [Authority’s] purposes is of relevance in

demonstrating the public purposes to which the properties

are being applied. [Section 12 of the Act] states that the

purposes of the Authority are ‘for [ . . .] the benefit of the

people of this Commonwealth, for the increase of their

commerce and prosperity, and for the improvement of their

health and living conditions: [ . . . ,] 55 P.S. [§] 582. The

marinas serve these purposes. They facilitate commerce

and generate economic benefit to the Bayfront and

surrounding areas. In terms of health and living conditions,

the marinas provide recreation opportunities to the public

which would not otherwise exist.

Lessees’ Br. at 53-54 (citation omitted).

23

Importantly, Lessees omit critical terms from their quotation of Section

12 of the Act which omission serves to obfuscate the provision’s true meaning.

Specifically, Section 12 of the Act states:

The effectuation of the authorized purposes of any

authority created under this [A]ct, shall and will be in all

respects for the benefit of the people of the Commonwealth,

for the increase of their commerce and prosperity, and for

the improvement of their health and living conditions; and

since the authority will be performing essential government

functions in effectuating such purposes, the authority shall

not be required to pay any taxes . . . .

55 P.S. § 582 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Lessees’ assertions, the

recreational marinas would only serve the Act’s purposes and thereby “benefit . . . the

people of the Commonwealth” if those recreational marinas fall within the

authorized purposes of the Act. Id. Further, despite Lessees’ contentions that the

recreational marinas “facilitate commerce and generate economic benefit to the

Bayfront and surrounding areas[, and] . . . provide recreation opportunities to the

public which would not otherwise exist[,]” Lessees’ Br. at 54, “the crucial point [in

tax exemption] is not whether the public body is benefitted by the use of the leased

property but whether the use is, in fact, public.” Wesleyville, 676 A.2d at 302.

The case of Reading Municipal Airport Authority v. Schuylkill Valley

School District, 286 A.2d 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972), is instructive here. Therein, the

Reading Municipal Airport Authority (Reading Authority), an authority created to

manage Reading’s airport, purchased two buildings containing a total of 16 T-

hangars. The Reading Authority leased the buildings to a private corporation that

leased the 16 T-hangars to aircraft owners. The Reading Authority claimed tax

exemption for the buildings. Both the board of assessment and the county common

pleas court concluded that the Reading Authority was not entitled to an exemption.

On appeal, this Court affirmed, concluding:

24

Where, . . . as here, buildings arranged for T-hangars are

provided to a private business entity with no restriction as to

use or charges for use and available for rental by that

private business organization to persons of its unfettered

choosing, we believe that there is not a public use. . . .

[T]he property primarily serves [the lessee] and not the

general public using the airport.

Reading Mun. Airport Auth., 286 A.2d at 9-10.

Similarly, we find no public purpose in a gated, for-profit, membership-

restricted recreational marina that leases boat slips. Nor do we find the existence of

the Parcels’ public access walking area and public boat launch persuasive in

determining whether the recreational marinas are used for a public purpose,

especially where Section 306.10 of the City’s Zoning Ordinance mandates such

public access for all proposed Bayfront development.23 Although we acknowledge

23

Section 306.10 of the Zoning Ordinance for the city of Erie (No. 80-2005) states:

A free public access way* must be regarded as an essential

component of all developments in all Waterfront Districts. Every

proposed site development that has access to the Bayfront water's

edge shall show on the plans a proposed free public access way,

abutting and parallel to the water’s edge. The free public access way

shall be of sufficient width to comfortably handle the expected

amount of pedestrians, but shall not be less than twelve (12) feet in

width. The construction of the free public access way shall be of such

material as to be aesthetically pleasing and in harmony with the site

development, and shall not consist of gravel, stone, grass or other

unapproved material. When the free public access way is abutting the

water’s edge, and an apparent danger exists, a safety barrier shall be

installed. It shall be the responsibility of the developer and/or

property owner to construct and maintain the public access way. In

addition, said developer or property owner shall assume all liability.

The public access way shall be made accessible to the handicapped.

The free public access way shall have north/south access to a [City]

Public Right-of-Way at maximum intervals of seven hundred sixty

(760) feet. The issuance of a building permit shall be contingent upon

the developer providing a performance bond in an amount equal to

one hundred ten (110%) percent of the cost of the proposed free

public access way.

25

that the Authority “is benefitted by the use of the leased property . . . the use is [not],

in fact, public.”24 Wesleyville, 676 A.2d at 302.

Lessees also argue that the trial court applied an erroneous standard of

proof when it stated, “[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that the marinas are used

for a public purpose.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13. Specifically, Lessees contend that:

The burden is on the taxing bodies to establish that the

public purpose exemption does not apply. This requires

proof that the properties are not used for a public purpose.

The so-called determination that the record is ‘devoid’ of

any evidence that they are used for a public purpose would

apply if the burden were on the marina operators. It is not.

Lessees’ Br. at 52-53.

At page 11 of its opinion, the trial court explicitly acknowledged that the

taxing authorities have the burden to prove that the properties are subject to taxation.

Further, immediately prior to the trial court’s challenged statement about the absence

of public purpose evidence, the trial court noted: “As reflected by the evidence,

*‘Free Public Access way’ - A constructed passage located within a

Waterfront District designed for use by the general public for such

activities as walking, jogging, fishing, etc., and made available for the

public's use during daylight hours, and as mandated by City Council.

24

Our conclusion is also consistent with the policy behind the public property exemption:

The policy underlying the public property exemption is that by taxing

government-owned property, the government would in effect be

taxing itself. ‘[T]he exemption of the property of a municipality is

founded on the fact that the municipality is a governmental agency of

the State, vested by the State with a part of its sovereignty, and

employed in aiding the State in matters of government and the

execution of its laws. . . .’ Y.M.C.A. of Germantown v. Phila[.], . . .

187 A. 204, 210 ([Pa.] 1936).

Granville, 900 A.2d at 1015. In the instant matter, there is no concern of the government taxing

itself. Lessees are to pay the taxes on the properties they use in the operation of their private

businesses.

26

these properties are utilized as private, for-profit marinas and inure to the sole

benefit of [Lessees] and its subtenants. The public has either limited or

restricted access to the marinas.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, it is clear that the trial court did not improperly apply the burden, but

rather, found that the Authority met its burden by proving that the marinas are

“utilized as private, for-profit marinas and inure to the sole benefit of [Lessees] and

[their] subtenants.” Id. Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial court’s

conclusion that the public purpose exemption did not apply to the Parcels given

Lessees’ use.

Lessees next contend that the trial court should have examined each

Parcel and individual part thereof to determine if the public access areas were exempt

from taxation. Citing to Lehigh-Northampton, Lessees focus on the Supreme Court’s

statement that “[a]ny parcel -- or part thereof -- which is ultimately adjudged to be

outside of the scope of the Authority’s tax immunity will then be subject to local real

estate taxes for the tax years in question only if it was deemed non-exempt in the

bifurcated trial which has already occurred[.]” Id. at 1179-80 (emphasis added).

Lessees assert that in light of this Court’s holding in Norwegian Township and

Granville that “the distinction between tax immunity and tax exemption is

unnecessary in the context of government-owned property[,]” the same analysis

should be applied to tax exemption claims involving government-owned property.

Norwegian Twp., 74 A.3d at 1131.

In response, the District argues that the Parcels’ public access areas

should not be exempt because

the public access areas and/or the Bay Harbor West boat

launch occupy a small area located within the lease

premises. [Lessees] acquired their leasehold interest subject

to these areas which are not sufficient to declare any portion

of the subject properties tax exempt.

27

That the public access areas, boat launch, restaurant and

repair shop may be a convenience or incidental benefit to

the public, does not rise to the level of or constitute public

use and do not give rise to an exemption

District’s Br. at 46 (citation omitted). Although the District argues that the particular

areas are not used for a public purpose, the District fails to provide support for its

position.

The City, also opposing the separate evaluation and consideration of the

Parcels’ public access areas, contends that the Lehigh-Northampton decision is

inapposite because the Court did not hold that the lower court erred in its approach to

parcel review, but simply remanded the case to the trial court to apply the SEPTA

factors to evaluate the immunity claim. The City further maintains, in reliance upon

In re Koppel Steel Corp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 849 A.2d 303 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2004), that the trial court properly viewed the marinas as contiguous parcels.

In In re Koppel, this Court held that the trial court incorrectly rejected an

appraiser’s valuation of appellant’s 11 parcels where the appraiser valued the

property as one integrated economic unit. In reversing the trial court, this Court held

that “although a statute may require the assessment of separate tracts of land,

contiguous tracts that are under single ownership and used for a common purpose

may be joined into one large tract for assessment purposes.” In re Koppel, 849 A.2d

at 306.

The instant action is distinguishable from In re Koppel. Here, the

question is whether leased Commonwealth property is subject to tax exemption, not

the assessed value thereof. Importantly, Section 8812(a)(8) of the CCAL exempts

from taxation “[a]ll other public property used for public purposes . . . .” 53 Pa.C.S.

§ 8812(a)(8) (emphasis added). We can discern no reason that the Lehigh-

Northampton Court’s procedure should not be applied to land, a portion of which is

used for a public purpose. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s holding that the entirety

28

of the Parcels are subject to taxation, and remand this matter for the trial court to

determine whether portions of the Parcels are exempt.

The Court next addresses whether the District’s cross-appeals of the trial

court’s July 13, 2016 order are properly before this Court, where the District was not

aggrieved by it. Although the District prevailed before the trial court, the District’s

cross-appeals challenge the trial court’s conclusion in its footnote 6 pertaining to the

applicable burden of proof.

Our Supreme Court has explained:

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501 permits any

‘aggrieved party’ to file an appeal. Pennsylvania case law

also recognizes that a party adversely affected by earlier

rulings in a case is not required to file a protective cross-

appeal if that same party ultimately wins a judgment in its

favor; the winner is not an ‘aggrieved party.’ See Hosp[.]

& Healthsystem Ass’n, . . . (holding that [the Department of

Public Welfare] was not an aggrieved party, as the

prevailing party, and it did not need to file a cross-appeal).

Our holding is further supported by the Note to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 511 which states,

‘[a]n appellee should not be required to file a cross[-]appeal

because the Court below ruled against it on an issue, as long

as the judgment granted Appellee the relief it sought.’

Pa.R.A.P. 511, Note.

Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 973 A.2d 417, 421-22 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis added;

footnote omitted). Similarly, in Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Commonwealth, 83

A.3d 107 (Pa. 2013), the Supreme Court stated:

‘Pennsylvania case law also recognizes that a party

adversely affected by earlier rulings in a case is not

required to file a protective cross-appeal if that same party

ultimately wins a judgment in its favor; the winner is not an

‘aggrieved party.’’ Basile . . . , 973 A.2d [at] 421 . . .

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, several

Justices of this Court have gone a step further and suggested

such appeals should not be permitted. See id., at 424

(Saylor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (asserting

29

‘[protective] cross-appeals generally should not be

permitted’ given that ‘the collective burden of screening

and addressing such cross-appeals may outweigh the

benefits from the opportunity for an appellate court to

advance the resolution of the litigation in individual cases’);

id., at 426-27 (Baer, J., concurring) (writing ‘separately to

second Justice Saylor’s inclinations to deem protective

cross-appeals impermissible’ because ‘refusing to hear

[them] will streamline cases on appeal and prevent

prevailing parties from deluging the courts with

unnecessary protective cross-appeals[,]’ and noting such

practice would ‘eliminate[ ] the question of whether a non-

aggrieved party filing a protective cross-appeal must raise

every potential appealable issue for fear of waiver’).

Lebanon Valley, 83 A.3d at 112; but see Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck,

PLLC v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2016).

Based on the above-quoted Supreme Court precedent, this Court agrees

that the District was not aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling on the burden of proof

issue, and was not required to file a cross-appeal to prevent its waiver. Given our

disposition of this appeal, the issue was preserved because it was necessary thereto,

and the Court has addressed it herein in footnote 20. Accordingly, the District’s

cross-appeals (Docket Nos. 1389 and 1391 C.D. 2016) are quashed.

Finally, the Court addresses the question of whether the trial court’s July

18, 2016 order, issued after the trial court’s July 13, 2016 order granted the District’s

Motion and denied Lessees’ summary judgment motion, and which denied the

District’s Burdens Motion, is an appealable order. The District provides two

rationales to support its appeals from the trial court’s July 18, 2016 orders. First, it

contends that the July 18, 2016 order was an appealable collateral order. Second, it

asserts that the July 13, 2016 opinion and order and the July 18, 2016 order should be

treated as a single appealable order.

30

“It is fundamental law in this Commonwealth that an appeal will lie only

from final orders, unless otherwise expressly permitted by statute.” T.C.R. Realty,

Inc. v. Cox, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (Pa. 1977).

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 states:

(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from

a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower

court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable

from and collateral to the main cause of action where the

right involved is too important to be denied review and the

question presented is such that if review is postponed

until final judgment in the case, the claim will be

irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313 (text emphasis added). Based on the above-quoted collateral order

definition alone, since the trial court’s July 18, 2016 order was issued after final

judgment was entered on July 13, 2016, the July 18, 2016 order was not a collateral

order. Further, our Supreme Court has held that an order postdating the grant of

summary judgment has no effect. See Sidkoff, Pincus, Greenberg & Green, P.C. v.

Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 1284 (Pa. 1989). Additionally, the District

does not provide any legal authority to support its position that the July 13 and July

18, 2016 orders should be treated as one. Accordingly, the Court holds that the July

18, 2016 order was not an appealable order, and dismisses the District’s appeals

pertaining to the same (Docket Nos. 1388 and 1390 C.D. 2016).25

25

Notwithstanding, the Court notes that the substance of the District’s appeals have been

addressed herein at footnote 21.

31

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

32

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bay Harbor Marina Limited :

Partnership, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, and The School District : No. 1377 C.D. 2016

of the City of Erie, and City of Erie :

Marina Holdings Limited, and Bay :

Harbor Marina Limited Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, and The School District :

of the City of Erie, and City of Erie :

: No. 1387 C.D. 2016

Appeal of: Marina Holdings Limited :

Marina Holdings Limited and Bay :

Harbor Marina Limited Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, The School District of the :

City of Erie and the City of Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1388 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

Marina Holdings Limited and :

Bay Harbor Marina Limited :

Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, The School District of the :

City of Erie and the City of Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1389 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

Bay Harbor Marina Limited Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals, The School District of the :

City of Erie and the City of Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1390 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

Bay Harbor Marina Limited :

Partnership :

:

v. :

:

Erie County Board of Assessment :

Appeals and The School District of :

The City of Erie and the City of :

Erie :

:

Appeal of: The School District of the : No. 1391 C.D. 2016

City of Erie :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 10th day of January, 2018, the Erie County Common

Pleas Court’s (trial court) July 13, 2016 order is reversed in part and the matter is

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the public

access portions of the subject parcels are immune and/or exempt from taxation.

Further, the trial court is directed to return the Erie-Western Pennsylvania Port

Authority’s name to the caption. The trial court’s order is affirmed in all other

respects.

Moreover, the School District of the City of Erie’s (District) appeals

docketed at Nos. 1388 and 1390 C.D. 2016 are dismissed, and the District’s cross-

appeals docketed at 1389 and 1391 C.D. 2016 are quashed.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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