The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 9 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL FERNANDEZ, No. 16-55471
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
8:15-cv-00021-JLS-DFM
v.
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, an MEMORANDUM *
agency of the State of California; DANIEL
HOWARD,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: KELLY,** CALLAHAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
On the night of September 20, 2013, Officer Daniel Howard (“Howard”), of
the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), stopped Daniel Fernandez (“Fernandez”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
for driving on southbound Interstate 5 at excessive speed—at 120 mph, almost
twice the speed limit—and for splitting lanes, impounded his motorcycle (because
Fernandez did not have the appropriate driver’s license), and released him.
Fernandez sued Howard and the CHP under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 renders actionable, and California’s
negligence law. Howard and the CHP moved for summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity.
The district court denied summary judgment, holding that there are genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Howard endangered Fernandez’s safety and
whether Howard was deliberately indifferent towards Fernandez. Howard appeals
from the denial of summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as construed by the collateral-order doctrine.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
An official defendant loses his qualified immunity only if: (1) the defendant
violated a plaintiff’s legal rights; and (2) those rights were clearly established when
the violation occurred so that a reasonable officer had notice that he was acting
unlawfully. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Under Woods v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), an officer may not
be entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff was released into a “known or
obvious danger.” Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011)
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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, we hold that in this
case the uncontested facts show that a reasonable officer would not have had notice
that he was releasing Fernandez into a dangerous situation. Fernandez was
released after waiting some time for the tow truck, on a surface street, around
10:00 p.m., within walking distance of open commercial establishments.
Fernandez told Howard that he lived nearby and would walk home. Moreover,
Fernandez, who told Howard that he was sober, walked a mile from where he was
released and onto a freeway before he came to harm. The undisputed facts show
that “as a reasonable officer [Howard] could have believed his actions toward
[Fernandez] were constitutional.” Woods, 879 F.2d at 591. This remains true even
if Howard’s actions violated a constitutional right belonging to Fernandez, an issue
we need not, and do not, reach. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236—37 (discouraging
“substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that
have no effect on the outcome of the case.”).
Accordingly, Howard is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.
The district court’s denial of summary judgment on this claim is REVERSED and
this matter is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with our disposition.
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