Opinion

People v. Gallardo

  • 226 Cal. Rptr. 3d 379
  • 4 Cal. 5th 120
  • 407 P.3d 55
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Dec 21, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Kruger
On the bench
Kruger
Cited by
199 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.9%

stating that “that the constitutionally-guaranteed right to photograph or film the activities of police officers in public may be limited by time, place, and manner restrictions so long as a reasonable officer would conclude that the individual’s action is interfering or about to interfere with the officer’s performance of his or her duties” and noting that “[a]n order that a reasonable officer would conclude is necessary to ensure the safety of all persons involved in a police stop—including the safety of the officer—would be a reasonable restriction . . . .”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that “that the constitutionally-guaranteed right to photograph or film the activities of police officers in public may be limited by time, place, and manner restrictions so long as a reasonable officer would conclude that the individual’s action is interfering or about to interfere with the officer’s performance of his or her duties” and noting that “[a]n order that a reasonable officer would conclude is necessary to ensure the safety of all persons involved in a police stop—including the safety of the officer—would be a reasonable restriction . . . .”
  • holding, in interpreting its own state criminal code, “that a court considering whether to impose an increased sentence based on a prior qualifying conviction may not determine the nature or basis of the prior conviction based on its independent conclusions about what facts or conduct realistically supported the conviction” (quotation marks omitted)
  • recognizing that the Hawai‘i Constitution affords “greater free speech protection than its federal counterpart”
  • the right to record officers is subject to restrictions “necessary to ensure that law enforcement officials are capable of carrying out their duties and maintaining the safety of both the general public and of the individual conducting the photography or videography”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Filed 12/21/17

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S231260

v. )

) Ct.App. 2/6 B257357

SULMA MARILYN GALLARDO, )

) Los Angeles County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. VA126705-01

____________________________________)

Defendant Sulma Marilyn Gallardo was convicted of various offenses

including second degree robbery and transportation of a controlled substance.

Although her offenses would ordinarily be punishable by a maximum term of

imprisonment of six years, the prosecution sought an increased sentence on the

ground that defendant had previously been convicted of a “serious felony” under

Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), that was also a strike for purposes of the

“Three Strikes” law. The conviction in question was for a crime—assault with a

deadly weapon or with force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of

Penal Code former section 245, subdivision (a)—whose statutory definition

sweeps more broadly than the definition of “serious felony”: An assault

conviction qualifies as a serious felony if the assault was committed with a deadly

weapon, but not otherwise. After reviewing the transcript of the preliminary

hearing in defendant’s assault case, the trial court determined that defendant did,

SEE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

in fact, commit the assault with a deadly weapon, and sentenced defendant to a

term of 11 years in prison.

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as

interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi), any

fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the statutorily

authorized penalty for a crime must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant contends that her increased sentence rests on an exercise in judicial

factfinding that violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

We considered a similar issue more than a decade ago, in People v. McGee

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 682 (McGee). In McGee, we held that the Sixth Amendment

permits courts to review the record of a defendant’s prior conviction to determine

whether the crime qualifies as a serious felony for purposes of the sentencing laws.

Although we made clear that the inquiry is a “limited one” that “focus[es] on the

elements of the offense of which the defendant was convicted,” we also said that a

court may review the record to determine whether “the conviction realistically

may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a serious felony under

California law.” (Id. at p. 706.) We acknowledged, however, that continued

examination of the scope of the rule announced in Apprendi—then still a relatively

recent development in the high court’s jurisprudence—might one day call for

reconsideration of this approach. (Id. at p. 686.)

Defendant argues that day has now arrived. Specifically, she contends that

the approach approved in McGee should be reconsidered in light of the high

court’s recent decisions in Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. ___ [133

S.Ct. 2276] (Descamps) and Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. ___ [136

S.Ct. 2243] (Mathis), which, in her view, make clear that the Sixth Amendment

forbids a sentencing court from reviewing preliminary hearing testimony to

2

determine what conduct likely (or “realistically”) supported the defendant’s

conviction.

We agree that it is time to reconsider McGee. Although the holdings of

Descamps and Mathis both concern the proper interpretation of a federal statute

not at issue here, their discussions of background Sixth Amendment principles

pointedly reveal the limits of a judge’s authority to make the findings necessary to

characterize a prior conviction as a serious felony. The cases make clear that

when the criminal law imposes added punishment based on findings about the

facts underlying a defendant’s prior conviction, “[t]he Sixth Amendment

contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find such facts,

unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at

p. 2288.) While a sentencing court is permitted to identify those facts that were

already necessarily found by a prior jury in rendering a guilty verdict or admitted

by the defendant in entering a guilty plea, the court may not rely on its own

independent review of record evidence to determine what conduct “realistically”

led to the defendant’s conviction. Here, the trial court violated defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial when it found a disputed fact about the conduct

underlying defendant’s assault conviction that had not been established by virtue

of the conviction itself. We disapprove People v. McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th 682,

insofar as it suggests that the trial court’s factfinding was constitutionally

permissible.

I.

In April 2014, a jury found defendant guilty of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),

being an accessory after the fact (id., § 32), and transportation of marijuana

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)). The jury also found true an allegation

that a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the robbery

(Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)).

3

The criminal information alleged that defendant had a 2005 conviction for

assault with a deadly weapon or with force likely to produce great bodily injury

(Pen. Code, former section § 245, subd. (a)(1)).1 It further alleged that this

conviction qualified as a “serious felony” conviction for purposes of Penal Code

section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Under that provision, a criminal defendant who

commits a felony offense after a prior conviction for a “serious felony” is subject

to a five-year sentence enhancement. A “serious felony” conviction is also a prior

strike for purposes of the Three Strikes law, which requires a second-strike

defendant to be sentenced to double the otherwise applicable prison term for his or

her current felony conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds.

(a)–(d).) The term “serious felony” is defined to include “assault with a deadly

weapon.” (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(31).) If defendant committed assault

with a deadly weapon, the prior conviction counted as a strike; if she committed

assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, it did not.

(People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065.)

For some time, California cases have held that such determinations are to

be made by the court, rather than by the jury, based on a review of the record of

the prior criminal proceeding. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 685; see id. at

p. 691 [citing cases].) A defendant does, however, have a statutory right to a jury

trial on “the question of whether or not the defendant has suffered the prior

conviction”—though not “whether the defendant is the person who has suffered

the prior conviction.” (Pen. Code, § 1025, subds. (b) & (c); see also id., § 1158.)

1 Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), has since been amended to

separate the prohibitions against assault “with a deadly weapon” and assault “by

any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury” into different

subdivisions. (Stats. 2011, ch. 183, § 1, p. 2394.)

4

Defendant waived her right to a jury trial on prior convictions. She did not

stipulate to the prior conviction, but she did stipulate to identity.

To determine whether defendant’s assault conviction qualified as a “serious

felony,” the trial court examined the preliminary hearing transcript from the

underlying proceeding. At the hearing, the victim testified that defendant had

“tried to scare me with the knife,” “push[ed] me aggressively to get me away from

the car,” and “punched me on the face, on the forehead . . . .” Relying on this

testimony, the trial court concluded that defendant had, in fact, been convicted of

“assault with a deadly weapon; to wit, knife.” The court sentenced defendant to

the middle term of three years for the robbery conviction, which was doubled

based on the strike, with a five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony

conviction, for a total of 11 years. The court also imposed a one-year term for the

marijuana transportation conviction, doubled based on the strike, and ordered it to

run concurrent to the principal term. The court stayed the firearm enhancement.

The Court of Appeal reversed the accessory conviction but otherwise

affirmed. It rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court’s finding that she

committed her prior assault offense with a deadly weapon abridged her Sixth

Amendment right to have a jury, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, find

the facts that made her prior assault conviction a serious felony. The Court of

Appeal explained that defendant had waived her right to a jury trial on the prior

conviction allegations, and, in any event, the trial court’s ruling was consistent

with the rule approved in McGee. The court further concluded that nothing in the

high court’s recent decision in Descamps had called into question whether a trial

court may consult a preliminary hearing transcript, as the trial court did here, to

determine the nature of a prior conviction.

In contrast to the court below, several Courts of Appeal have concluded

that the approach approved in McGee is incompatible with the understanding of

5

the reach of the Sixth Amendment reflected in the United States Supreme Court’s

opinions in Descamps and Mathis. (See People v. Eslava (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th

498, 509–510 [collecting appellate decisions reaching the same conclusion],

review granted Feb. 15, 2017, S239061 (Eslava); see also People v. Wilson (2013)

219 Cal.App.4th 500, 516 [holding that, under both Descamps and McGee, “[a]

court may not impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on disputed

facts about prior conduct not admitted by the defendant or implied by the elements

of the offense”].) We granted review to consider the issue.

II.

Before we turn to the merits, we must first consider a threshold matter. The

Attorney General argues that defendant may not now be heard to object to the trial

court’s decision on Sixth Amendment grounds because she (a) waived her right to

a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations, and (b) failed to raise her

constitutional objection in the trial court. We address each argument in turn.

We begin with the jury trial waiver. At the time of defendant’s trial,

California law made clear that a defendant’s right to a jury trial extended only to

“the question of whether or not the defendant has suffered the prior conviction.”

(Pen. Code, § 1025, subd. (b); see id., § 1158; see also People v. Epps (2001) 25

Cal.4th 19, 23 [“The right, if any, to a jury trial of prior conviction allegations

derives from sections 1025 and 1158, not from the state or federal Constitution.”].)

McGee had clearly established that defendant had no right to a jury determination

of whether her prior conviction qualified as a serious felony for purposes of the

sentencing laws. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 685.) Of course, by the time

defendant was sentenced, Descamps had been decided, and some litigants might

well have recognized that the high court’s decision would call McGee into doubt.

But the parties in this case never discussed the effect of Descamps on McGee.

Under the circumstances, defendant’s jury trial waiver is most naturally

6

understood as a waiver of the limited statutory right to have a jury decide whether

she had suffered the prior assault conviction. It is not reasonably understood as a

waiver of any constitutional right to have a jury make the findings necessary to

determine whether her prior conviction was a serious felony, much less as an

abandonment of her argument about the limits of the court’s factfinding powers as

illuminated by Descamps. (Cf. People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48

[“Defendant’s waiver of jury trial on the offenses in connection with his no contest

plea cannot reasonably be interpreted to extend to proof of aggravating

circumstances when, at the time of the plea, no right to a jury trial on such

circumstances had been recognized.”].)

It is a separate question whether defendant forfeited her Sixth Amendment

challenge by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. Although defendant did

object to the trial court’s consideration of the preliminary hearing transcript on

evidentiary grounds, she did not raise the Sixth Amendment argument she presses

here. But that is not always the end of the matter. We have previously “ ‘excused

[] failure[s] to object [on a particular ground] where to require defense counsel to

raise [that] objection “would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to

anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in

other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule . . . would be

changed on appeal.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667, fn. 4,

quoting People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23; see, e.g., People v. Rangel

(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215.) Here, as previously noted, at the time defendant

was sentenced, California law allowed a trial court to look to a preliminary hearing

transcript to determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction was “realistically” a

serious felony. To be sure, Descamps, which forms the centerpiece of defendant’s

argument to this court, had been decided by the time of defendant’s sentencing.

But Descamps did not squarely overrule existing California law; it discussed the

7

relevant Sixth Amendment principles only en route to construing the federal

statute at issue to avoid constitutional concerns. (Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at

pp. 2287–2289.) It is at least questionable whether defendant should be made to

bear the burden of anticipating potential changes in the law based on the reasoning

of a United States Supreme Court opinion addressed to the proper interpretation of

a federal statute not at issue here.

But we need not resolve that question, for the simple reason that the

Attorney General did not make his forfeiture argument to the Court of Appeal and

the Court of Appeal did not address it. Forfeiture is not a jurisdictional doctrine,

and we are under no obligation to address a forfeiture argument that was neither

raised nor addressed below. (Cf. People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 809.)

We therefore proceed to the merits.

III.

A.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, together with the

Fourteenth Amendment, “entitle[s] a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination

that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond

a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 477.) In Apprendi, the

United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial

extends to those disputed facts that may not be formally designated as “elements”

of the offense, but nevertheless expose the defendant to additional punishment.

(Id. at pp. 476–490.) The court, however, recognized a “limited exception” for the

“ ‘fact’ of prior conviction.” (Id. at p. 488 & fn. 14, citing Almendarez-Torres v.

United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224.) The court explained that “there is a vast

difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction

entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the

right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and

8

allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.”

(Apprendi, supra, at p. 496.)

In the wake of Apprendi, questions arose about the scope of the so-called

Almendarez-Torres exception to the general Sixth Amendment rule forbidding

judicial factfinding in criminal cases. This court addressed the issue in McGee,

supra, 38 Cal.4th 682. The defendant in McGee had been charged with various

crimes in connection with an armed robbery and shooting, and the prosecution

sought increased punishment based on the defendant’s prior convictions for

robbery in Nevada state court, which the prosecution contended qualified as

serious felonies for purposes of the sentencing laws. The statutory definition of

“serious felony” includes “robbery” as defined by California law. (Pen. Code,

§§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).) But Nevada’s robbery law was

broader in certain respects than California’s. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at

p. 688.) It therefore “was at least theoretically possible that defendant’s Nevada

convictions involved conduct that would not constitute robbery under California

law” and thus would not qualify as serious felonies. (Ibid.) To determine whether

the defendant’s prior convictions were strikes, the trial court examined preliminary

hearing transcripts from the two Nevada proceedings and reviewed the victims’

testimony describing the defendant’s conduct during each robbery. It also

examined the defendant’s admissions in connection with the taking of his pleas of

guilty in both cases. Based on these materials, the trial court concluded that each

of the Nevada convictions was based on conduct that would also have constituted

robbery under California law, and therefore qualified as serious felonies. (Id. at

p. 690.)

The defendant contended that the trial court’s determination violated the

Sixth Amendment as it had been interpreted in Apprendi. We rejected the

argument. Before Apprendi, we explained, our cases had held that such

9

determinations are to be made by judges, rather than juries, on the basis of the

record of the prior criminal proceeding. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 691,

citing People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 459 (Woodell), and People v.

Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355 (Guerrero).) These cases had explained that

“ ‘[b]ecause the nature of the conviction is at issue, the prosecution is not allowed

to go outside the record of conviction to “relitigat[e] the circumstances of a crime

committed years ago . . . .” ’ (Citations.)” (McGee, at p. 691, quoting Guerrero,

44 Cal.3d at p. 355.) But operating within the confines of the record of

conviction, we said, it is for the court to determine “the nature or basis of the

crime of which the defendant was convicted.” (Ibid.) A court must conduct the

inquiry “with a focus on the elements of the offense of which the defendant was

convicted,” but “[i]f the enumeration of the elements of the offense does not

resolve the issue, an examination of the record of the earlier criminal proceeding is

required in order to ascertain whether that record reveals whether the conviction

realistically may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a serious

felony under California law.”2 (Id. at p. 706, citing Woodell, supra, 17 Cal.4th at

pp. 452–461.) We did not specifically address what types of materials a judge

may consult in conducting this inquiry, but we cited with approval a prior case

holding that the materials available for consultation include preliminary hearing

transcripts. (See McGee, at p. 694, citing People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217,

220.) The trial court in McGee itself had consulted preliminary hearing

transcripts, among other materials, in making its determination.

2 In Guerrero, this court overruled People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627,

which had held that this inquiry is limited to “matters necessarily established by

the prior conviction.” (Id. at p. 629; see Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 345,

355–356.)

10

We concluded in McGee that the approach adopted in these prior cases was

not inconsistent with Apprendi. Apprendi, we noted, preserved the Almendarez-

Torres exception for “the fact of a prior conviction” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at

p. 490). (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 706–707.) And identifying the “fact of

a prior conviction,” we reasoned, necessarily entails a limited inquiry into the

“nature or basis of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.” (Id. at

p. 691.) We went on to explain: “The need for such an inquiry does not

contemplate that the court will make an independent determination regarding a

disputed issue of fact relating to the defendant’s prior conduct [citation], but

instead that the court simply will examine the record of the prior proceeding to

determine whether that record is sufficient to demonstrate that the conviction is of

the type that subjects the defendant to increased punishment under California law.

This is an inquiry that is quite different from the resolution of the issues submitted

to a jury, and is one more typically and appropriately undertaken by a court.” (Id.

at p. 706.)

While McGee was pending in this court, the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13 (Shepard). The

question in Shepard concerned the interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal

Act of 1984 (ACCA) (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)), a federal sentencing statute that

prescribes increased penalties for certain firearm offenses if the defendant has

three or more prior convictions for specified offenses, including “burglary,”

understood generically to refer to an “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or

remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” (Taylor v.

United States (1990) 495 U.S. 575, 599 (Taylor).) To determine whether a

particular state burglary offense qualifies as generic burglary for ACCA purposes,

the high court had adopted the so-called categorical approach, under which a court

looks “only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior

11

offense,” rather than “delving into particular facts disclosed by the record of

conviction.” (Id. at p. 602; Shepard, supra, at p. 17.) In Shepard, the high court

set out what has since come to be known as the modified categorical approach,

which permits courts to review certain documents underlying the conviction to

determine what facts were necessarily found, or admitted, to determine whether

the defendant was convicted of a version of a broadly defined offense that

corresponds to generic burglary under the ACCA. This approach permits courts to

review materials such as charging documents, jury instructions, and any agreed-to

factual basis for a guilty plea, but does not permit a court to make findings about

the real conduct underlying the conviction based on police reports or complaint

applications. (Shepard, supra, at pp. 22–23, 26.)

Writing for a plurality of the members of the court, Justice Souter invoked

constitutional considerations as reinforcement for the modified categorical

approach. To permit a judge to “make a disputed finding of fact about what the

defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual basis of the prior

plea . . . raises the concern underlying . . . Apprendi: the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments guarantee a jury standing between a defendant and the power of the

State, and they guarantee a jury’s finding of any disputed fact essential to increase

the ceiling of a potential sentence.” (Shepard, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 25.) While a

disputed fact about the manner in which a crime was committed might in some

sense be “described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from

the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the

findings subject to . . . Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes

a judge to resolve the dispute.” (Shepard, at p. 25.) Justice Thomas, who joined

the remainder of the opinion, did not join this portion. He instead wrote separately

to express the view that permitting judges to find disputed facts about the nature of

the defendant’s burglary offense would not merely raise serious Sixth Amendment

12

questions, but would actually violate the Sixth Amendment. (Id. at p. 28 (conc.

opn. of Thomas, J.).)

We acknowledged in McGee that “the Shepard decision may suggest that a

majority of the high court” would view California’s existing approach to the

permissible scope of judicial factfinding as “presenting a serious constitutional

issue.” (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 708.) But because the high court had not

purported to decide the case on constitutional grounds, we concluded that

“Shepard does not provide the type of clear resolution of the issue that would

justify overturning the relevant California precedents.” (McGee, at p. 708.)

Justice Kennard dissented. In her view, when a trial court examines the

record of conviction in an attempt to discern “ ‘whether the conviction realistically

may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a felony under

California law,’ ” it is necessarily making a determination that properly belongs to

a jury, not a judge. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 714–715 (dis. opn. of

Kennard, J.); id. at p. 710.)

B.

Much as the court anticipated in McGee, Shepard was not the high court’s

final word on the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception to the Apprendi rule.

Some 10 years later, in Descamps and Mathis, the high court again addressed the

issue. The high court’s discussions are persuasive evidence that the

Almendarez-Torres exception is narrower than McGee had supposed.

The question in Descamps concerned whether a California burglary

conviction qualified as a generic burglary conviction for purposes of the ACCA.

(Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at pp. 2281–2282.) Because the California burglary

statute, Penal Code section 459, does not require proof of unlawful or unprivileged

entry, it proscribes a broader range of conduct than generic burglary. (Descamps,

at pp. 2285–2286.) To determine whether the defendant’s section 459 conviction

13

nevertheless qualified as a burglary conviction for ACCA purposes, the trial court

reviewed a transcript of the defendant’s plea colloquy, in which the prosecutor

stated that “the crime ‘ “involve[d] the breaking and entering of a grocery

store.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 2282.) The defendant had not objected to that statement

before entering his plea, and the trial court relied on it in concluding that the

burglary conviction did, in fact, involve an unlawful entry and therefore was a

generic burglary conviction for purposes of the federal sentence enhancement.

(Ibid.) The court of appeals affirmed, but the high court reversed. As in Shepard,

the question before the high court was one of statutory interpretation: May a

sentencing court apply the modified categorical approach when a defendant was

convicted under an “ ‘indivisible’ statute—i.e., one not containing alternative

elements—that criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the relevant generic

offense” under the ACCA? (Id. at p. 2281.) The high court answered that

question in the negative. It explained that because California’s burglary statute is

not divided into lawful entry and unlawful entry alternatives, the prosecutor’s

reference to defendant’s breaking and entering was simply gratuitous; no legal

consequence flowed from the fact that defendant may have broken and entered the

establishment. (Id. at pp. 2285–2286.) Such extraneous facts, the high court

ruled, could play no role in the sentencing court’s efforts to determine whether the

conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. (Id. at p. 2286.)

Although this holding was grounded in the court’s ACCA jurisprudence,

the court also drew on Sixth Amendment principles. The lower court’s decisions,

the high court explained, failed to consider “the categorical approach’s Sixth

Amendment underpinnings.” (Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2288.) The court

of appeals had sanctioned an approach that permits trial courts “to discern what a

trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant’s underlying

conduct.” (Ibid.) But “[t]he Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a

14

sentencing court—will find such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable

doubt. And the only facts the court can be sure the jury so found are those

constituting elements of the offense—as distinct from amplifying but legally

extraneous circumstances.” (Ibid.)

In Mathis, supra, 136 S.Ct. 2243, the high court considered yet another

iteration of the question of when burglary is burglary for ACCA purposes. At

issue was a conviction entered under an Iowa statute that state courts had

interpreted to set out multiple means of satisfying a single element, some of which

corresponded to the generic federal definition of burglary and some of which did

not. While Iowa burglary can be committed by means of unlawful entry into

“ ‘any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle,’ ” generic burglary for

ACCA purposes is limited to unlawful entry into a “ ‘building or other

structure.’ ” (Id. at p. 2250.) After reviewing the records of the defendant’s prior

convictions, the sentencing court determined the defendant had burgled buildings,

rather than vehicles. The court of appeals affirmed, but the high court reversed,

concluding that a court may not employ the modified categorical approach to

identify the basis of a prior conviction under a statute that lists alternative means

of establishing a single element of a crime, rather than alternative elements.

In so holding, the court grounded its decision in its line of cases interpreting

the ACCA, but once again drew on Sixth Amendment principles to bolster its

analysis. The court concluded that allowing courts to look to “old record

materials” to determine whether a defendant had burgled a building or a vehicle

would “raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns” because, under the Sixth

Amendment, “a judge cannot go beyond identifying the crime of conviction to

explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense. [Citations.]

He is prohibited from conducting such an inquiry himself; and so too he is barred

from making a disputed determination about ‘what the defendant and state judge

15

must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea’ or ‘what the jury in a

prior trial must have accepted as the theory of the crime.’ ” (Mathis, supra, 136

S.Ct. at pp. 2250, 2252.)3

C.

The high court’s description of the Sixth Amendment principle at work in

these cases confirms what the dissenting opinion in McGee had already discerned.

In short: “The Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing

court—will find” the facts giving rise to a conviction, when those facts lead to the

imposition of additional punishment under a recidivist sentencing scheme.

(Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2288.) This means that a sentencing court may identify

those facts it is “sure the jury . . . found” in rendering its guilty verdict, or those

facts as to which the defendant waived the right of jury trial in entering a guilty

plea. (Ibid.) But it may not “rely on its own finding” about the defendant’s

underlying conduct “to increase a defendant’s maximum sentence.” (Id. at

p. 2289.)

We are persuaded that the approach sanctioned in McGee is no longer

tenable insofar as it authorizes trial courts to make findings about the conduct that

“realistically” gave rise to a defendant’s prior conviction. The trial court’s role is

3 Although no member of the court disagreed with the majority’s description

of general Sixth Amendment principles, several justices expressed the view that

the means/elements distinction is irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment analysis.

(See Mathis, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 2258 [“In my view, Apprendi was incorrect

and, in any event, does not compel the elements based approach. That approach is

required only by the Court’s statutory precedents, which Congress remains free to

overturn.”] (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); id. at p. 2265 [if the State charges only

one of several alternative means of committing a crime, it must prove that fact to a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and Apprendi is satisfied] (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.,

joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at pp. 2269–2270 [noting substantial practical

difficulties raised by the majority’s approach] (dis. opn. of Alito, J.).)

16

limited to determining the facts that were necessarily found in the course of

entering the conviction. To do more is to engage in “judicial factfinding that goes

far beyond the recognition of a prior conviction.” (Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at

p. 2280.)

The Attorney General resists this conclusion. He argues that the

constitutional analysis in Descamps and Mathis is no more authoritative than the

constitutional analysis in Shepard, which we had considered, and dismissed, in

McGee. We agree with him to this extent: It is true that Descamps and Mathis,

like Shepard, were decided on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds. This

is to say, the high court did not hold that the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to the

federal ACCA, forbids application of the so-called modified categorical approach

when the statute of conviction has a single, “indivisible” set of elements

(Descamps) or when it sets out alternative means, rather than alternative elements

constituting the same crime (Mathis). And indeed, as counsel confirmed at oral

argument, defendant here does not argue that California courts are constitutionally

compelled to emulate the high court’s version of the categorical approach in all of

its particulars.

But the high court’s interpretation of the relevant federal statute was

informed by an understanding of certain basic, background Sixth Amendment

principles, and the court’s explication of those principles was both considered and

unequivocal: The jury trial right is violated when a court adds extra punishment

based on factfinding that goes “beyond merely identifying a prior conviction” by

“tr[ying] to discern what a trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the

defendant’s underlying conduct.” (Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2288.) We

are persuaded, and we will follow the court’s guidance.

The Attorney General also argues that, to the extent that Descamps and

Mathis illuminate the relevant Sixth Amendment principles, those principles

17

should be understood as confined to the administration of a sentencing scheme that

prescribes additional punishment based on the elements of the crime of which the

defendant was convicted, as the high court has described the ACCA, rather than a

scheme that characterizes the offense based on the underlying conduct that gave

rise to the conviction, as this court has described California’s Three Strikes law.

(Compare Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2287, citing Taylor, supra, 495 U.S. at

p. 600, with, e.g., People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 53 [inquiry focuses on

whether the defendant’s conviction “involve[d] conduct that would qualify as a

serious felony”].) Whatever the merits of the comparison, however, the distinction

makes no difference for purposes of delimiting the constitutional bounds of

judicial factfinding. “[I]n determining the truth of an alleged prior conviction

when . . . the necessary elements of that conviction do not establish that it is a

serious felony, and thus subject to California’s Three Strikes law, the trier of fact

must decide whether the defendant’s conduct, as demonstrated in the record of the

prior conviction, shows that the crime was a serious felony.” (McGee, supra, 38

Cal.4th at pp. 714–715 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) And when the sentencing court

must rely on a finding regarding the defendant’s conduct, but the jury did not

necessarily make that finding (or the defendant did not admit to that fact), the

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated. (See Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S.

at p. 490.)

The judicial factfinding permitted under the Almendarez-Torres exception

does not extend “beyond the recognition of a prior conviction.” (Descamps,

supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2288.) Consistent with this principle, and with the benefit of

further explication by the high court, we now hold that a court considering

whether to impose an increased sentence based on a prior qualifying conviction

may not determine the “nature or basis” of the prior conviction based on its

independent conclusions about what facts or conduct “realistically” supported the

18

conviction. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 706.) That inquiry invades the jury’s

province by permitting the court to make disputed findings about “what a trial

showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant’s underlying conduct.”

(Descamps, supra, at p. 2288.) The court’s role is, rather, limited to identifying

those facts that were established by virtue of the conviction itself—that is, facts

the jury was necessarily required to find to render a guilty verdict, or that the

defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.4

IV.

Here, the trial court engaged in a form of factfinding that strayed beyond

the bounds of the Sixth Amendment. Defendant had entered a plea of guilty to

assault under a statute that, at the time, could be violated by committing assault

either with a “deadly weapon” or “by any means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury.” (Pen. Code, former § 245, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant did not specify

that she used a deadly weapon when entering her guilty plea. The trial court’s sole

basis for concluding that defendant used a deadly weapon was a transcript from a

preliminary hearing at which the victim testified that defendant had used a knife

during their altercation. Nothing in the record shows that defendant adopted the

preliminary hearing testimony as supplying the factual basis for her guilty plea.

4 Other state high courts to address the issue in the wake of Descamps have

also concluded that the Sixth Amendment bars courts from finding facts about the

conduct underlying a defendant’s prior convictions. (State v. Dickey (2015) 301

Kan. 1018, 1039–1040; see also Dorsey v. United States (D.C.Ct.App. 2017) 154

A.3d 106, 124–126 [approving of trial court’s comparison of foreign statute of

conviction to D.C. equivalent based on elements alone]; State v. Guarnero (2015)

363 Wis.2d 857, 868–872 [approving of use of guilty plea to identify basis for

defendant’s prior conviction under federal statute of conviction where statute was

divisible]; State v. Olsen (2014) 180 Wn.2d 468, 476–477 [approving of

Washington’s method of comparing foreign statutes of conviction to state

equivalents for sentencing purposes].)

19

The Court of Appeal concluded this was permissible under Descamps

because that decision allows trial courts to “consult ‘a limited class of documents,

such as indictments and jury instructions,’ ” in order to identify which elements of

the statute “formed the basis of the prior conviction.” Because “nothing in

Descamps excludes the preliminary hearing transcript from that class of

documents,” the court concluded that the sentencing court properly used the

transcript to determine that defendant’s conviction was based on assault with a

deadly weapon and thus qualified as a serious felony within the meaning of the

Three Strikes law.

While Descamps does permit courts to rely on certain documents to

identify the precise statutory basis for a prior conviction, the documents listed in

Descamps—“indictments and jury instructions” (Descamps, supra, 133 S.Ct. at

p. 2279)—differ from the preliminary hearing transcript here in a meaningful way.

An indictment or jury instructions might help identify what facts a jury necessarily

found in the prior proceeding. (See Shepard, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 20–21.) But

defendant’s preliminary hearing transcript can reveal no such thing. A sentencing

court reviewing that preliminary transcript has no way of knowing whether a jury

would have credited the victim’s testimony had the case gone to trial. And at least

in the absence of any pertinent admissions, the sentencing court can only guess at

whether, by pleading guilty to a violation of Penal Code section 245, subd. (a)(1),

defendant was also acknowledging the truth of the testimony indicating that she

had committed the assault with a knife.

By relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to determine the “nature or

basis” of defendant’s prior conviction, the sentencing court engaged in an

impermissible inquiry to determine “ ‘what the defendant and state judge must

have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.’ ” (Descamps, supra, 133

S.Ct. at p. 2284.) Because the relevant facts were neither found by a jury nor

20

admitted by defendant when entering her guilty plea, they could not serve as the

basis for defendant’s increased sentence here.

V.

The final question concerns next steps. The Attorney General argues that

we should remand the case to permit the trial court to conduct a new hearing on

the prior conviction allegations. On remand, the Attorney General contends, the

inquiry would be “confined to the record of the prior plea proceedings,” and the

trial court would only “mak[e] a determination about what facts appellant

necessarily admitted in entering her plea,” without “relitigat[ing] the prior

offense.” In the alternative, the Attorney General argues that the case should be

remanded for a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations. Defendant concedes

the first remedy is appropriate; she vigorously opposes the jury trial alternative.

The Attorney General’s request for a limited remand is reasonable, and we

will grant it. We today hold that defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial

sweeps more broadly than our case law previously recognized: While a trial court

can determine the fact of a prior conviction without infringing on the defendant’s

Sixth Amendment rights, it cannot determine disputed facts about what conduct

likely gave rise to the conviction. This is a development the parties apparently did

not anticipate at the time this case was tried. (See pt. II, ante.)

We also agree with the parties that the appropriate course is to remand to

permit the trial court to make the relevant determinations about what facts

defendant admitted in entering her plea. Our precedent instructs that

determinations about the nature of prior convictions are to be made by the court,

rather than a jury, based on the record of conviction. (See McGee, supra, 38

Cal.4th at p. 695.) We have explained that the purpose of the latter limitation is to

avoid forcing the parties to relitigate long-ago events, threatening defendants with

“harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial.” (Guerrero, supra, 44

21

Cal.3d at p. 355.) The Attorney General has not asked us to reconsider this aspect

of our precedent. His primary contention, rather, is that the trial court on remand

should review the record of conviction in order to determine what facts were

necessarily found or admitted in the prior proceeding. Such a procedure fully

reconciles existing precedent with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Chin’s concurring and dissenting opinion takes the view that we can

instead reconcile Guerrero with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by

simply reassigning the task of reviewing the record of conviction to a jury, as

opposed to a judge. This argument ventures beyond the Attorney General’s own

submission; although the Attorney General’s second-choice option is to convene a

jury trial, the Attorney General does not ask that the jury be limited to reviewing

the record of conviction. And not without reason, because such a proceeding—in

which a jury would be impaneled for the sole purpose of reading the preliminary

hearing transcript in defendant’s prior assault case—would raise significant

constitutional concerns under Apprendi. The basic rationale of Apprendi is that

facts that are used to increase the defendant’s maximum possible sentence are the

functional equivalent of elements of the offense, and they must be proved in the

same way: i.e., at a trial before a jury, and beyond a reasonable doubt. (Apprendi,

supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 476, 490.) To permit a jury to make factual findings based

solely on its review of hearsay statements made in a preliminary hearing would be

to permit facts about the defendant’s prior conviction to be proved in a way that no

other elemental fact is proved—that is, without the procedural safeguards, such as

the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine one’s accusers, that normally apply

22

in criminal proceedings.5 This kind of proceeding might involve a jury, but it

would not be much of a trial.6

5 Justice Chin’s proposal relies on our pre-Apprendi, pre-McGee decision in

People v. Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th 217, which held that the prosecution could rely

on preliminary hearing transcripts but not live witnesses to establish the nature of

the defendant’s prior conviction, but reserved the question of whether the defense

would be permitted to introduce live testimony. Shortly thereafter, a Court of

Appeal answered that question in the negative, concluding that the logic of

Guerrero bars both sides from calling live witnesses. (People v. Bartow (1996) 46

Cal.App.4th 1573, 1580–1582.)

As already noted, the underlying rationale of Guerrero, on which Reed and

Bartow both relied, is that the limitation to the record of conviction “effectively

bars the prosecution from relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed

years ago.” (Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355.) Justice Chin’s proposal would

instead appear to affirmatively authorize relitigation before a jury—so as to allow

the jury to find the facts necessary for application of the Three Strikes law, as we

now understand the Sixth Amendment requires—but based on a highly restricted

universe of documentary evidence including hearsay statements contained in a

preliminary hearing transcript.

Justice Chin says, however, that while the prosecution would be “limited”

to reliance on the preliminary hearing transcript, defendant might be free to call

witnesses if she chooses (notwithstanding Bartow). But if the preliminary hearing

witnesses are available to be called, then the prosecution may not introduce their

preliminary hearing testimony without producing the witnesses for cross-

examination. (See Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 68.) It is

not an answer to say that defendant could call the preliminary hearing witnesses to

the stand if she wished: “[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the

prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse

witnesses into court.” (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305,

324.)

6 As Justice Chin’s concurring and dissenting opinion notes, some Courts of

Appeal to consider the issue have concluded that the proper remedy for violating a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is to give that defendant a jury

trial on facts underlying a prior conviction, but to limit the evidentiary scope of

such a trial to the record of conviction. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 5; see Eslava, supra,

5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 520–521, review granted; People v. Marin (2015) 240

Cal.App.4th 1344, 1366–1367.) Other Courts of Appeal have ordered a jury trial

without specifying such an evidentiary limitation. (People v. McCaw (2016) 1

Cal.App.5th 471, 486–487, review granted Oct. 19, 2016, S236618.) And still

(Footnote continued on next page.)

23

We thus remand the case, as both parties appear to acknowledge we should,

to permit the People to demonstrate to the trial court, based on the record of the

prior plea proceedings, that defendant’s guilty plea encompassed a relevant

admission about the nature of her crime.

VI.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for a new

determination on the prior conviction allegations in accordance with this opinion.

KRUGER, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.*

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

other Courts of Appeal appear to have concluded that questions about the proper

characterization of a prior conviction are for a court to resolve, based on its

evaluation of the facts necessarily encompassed by the guilty verdict or admitted

by the defendant in pleading guilty to the prior crime. (See People v. Navarette

(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 829; People v. Saez (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1177.) The

parties in this case appear to agree that the latter course is appropriate. For the

reasons explained above, we agree as well.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,

Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the

California Constitution.

24

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J.

I agree with much of the majority opinion. I agree that defendant has not

waived or forfeited her contentions. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-8.) I also agree that

under the rationale of Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. __ [133 S.Ct.

2276] (Descamps) and Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct.

2243] (Mathis), defendant has a right to a jury trial on the nature of her prior

conviction. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16-19.) Specifically, I agree that what the

court here did — review the preliminary hearing transcript to find that the

conviction was based on defendant’s assault with a deadly weapon — “invade[d]

the jury’s province.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) To that extent, but only to that

extent, People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682 (McGee) is no longer good law.

I disagree, however, with the majority’s remedy. It remands for a new, and

very limited, court trial at which the court will not be permitted to engage in

factfinding. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21-24.) But the remand should be for a jury

trial. The proper remedy for a violation of defendant’s jury trial right is to give

her that jury trial.

The difference between remanding for a court trial and remanding for a jury

trial is critical. As the majority concludes, and I agree, the court may not engage

in factfinding. Doing so invades the jury’s province. But the jury may engage in

factfinding. That is what juries do. As the majority explains, “when the criminal

law imposes added punishment based on findings about the facts underlying a

1

defendant’s prior conviction, ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury —

not a sentencing court — will find such facts, unanimously and beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3, quoting Descamps, supra, 570 U.S.

__ [133 S.Ct. at p. 2288].)

It has long been settled that the trier of fact — it used to be the court but

now must be the jury — may “look to the record of the conviction — but no

further” to determine the conduct underlying the conviction. (People v. Guerrero

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355.) It is equally settled that the record of conviction to

which the trier of fact may look includes the transcript of the preliminary hearing.

(People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 220 (Reed); see maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)

The court here reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and determined that

defendant’s prior conviction was a serious felony and thus a strike under the

“Three Strikes” law. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1-2, 5.)

On remand, the jury should be allowed to do the same thing the court did

and, if it so finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, reach the same

result — that defendant’s prior conviction was based on assault with a deadly

weapon and is thus a strike. Remanding for another court trial, but without the

ability to make factual findings, improperly precludes this possibility.

As the majority recognizes, we have interpreted California’s recidivist

statutes differently than the statutory scheme at issue in Descamps, supra, 570 U.S.

__ [133 S.Ct. 2276] and Mathis, supra, 579 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 2243]. The high

court interpreted the scheme it considered as strictly elements based; the underlying

conduct is irrelevant. But in California, the trier of fact examines the conduct

underlying the conviction to determine whether it qualifies as a strike, although the

examination is limited to the record of conviction. (McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p.

706; Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 222-223; People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d

at p. 355; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10-11.) As the majority also correctly

2

recognizes, “California courts are [not] constitutionally compelled to emulate the

high court’s version of the categorical approach in all of its particulars.” (Maj.

opn., ante, at p. 17.) California’s conduct-based approach remains valid, except

that now the jury, not the court, must make the determination.

Both Descamps and Mathis make clear that a conduct-based approach is

permissible. (Descamps, supra, 570 U.S. at p. __ [133 S.Ct. at p. 2287] [“If

Congress had wanted to increase a sentence based on the facts of a prior offense, it

presumably would have said so; other statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that

way,” citing Nijhawan v. Holder (2009) 557 U.S. 29, 36 (Nijhawan)]; Mathis,

supra, 579 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 2252] [“Congress well knows how to

instruct sentencing judges to look into the facts of prior crimes: In other statutes,

using different language, it has done just that,” citing Nijhawan at p. 36 and

United States v. Hayes (2009) 555 U.S. 415, 421 (Hayes)].)

In Nijhawan, the high court held that an immigration statute “does not refer

to an element of the fraud or deceit crime [the crime at issue]. Rather it refers to

the particular circumstances in which an offender committed a (more broadly

defined) fraud or deceit crime on a particular occasion.” (Nijhawan, supra, 557

U.S. at p. 32; see id. at p. 36.) Nijhawan was a deportation case, not, like here, a

criminal case; as the high court noted, “the Government does not have to prove its

claim ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id. at p. 42.) Accordingly, that case might

not govern here.

But Hayes was a criminal prosecution. An indictment charged the

defendant with “possessing firearms after having been convicted of a

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” (Hayes, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 419.)

The statute the defendant was charged under prohibits a person convicted of “ ‘a

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ ” from possessing a firearm. (Id. at p.

418.) The high court held “that the domestic relationship, although it must be

3

established beyond a reasonable doubt in a . . . firearms possession prosecution,

need not be a defining element of the predicate offense.” (Ibid.) It explained that

the Government may “charge and prove a prior conviction that was, in fact, for ‘an

offense . . . committed by’ the defendant against a spouse or other domestic

victim.” (Id. at p. 421, italics added.) Accordingly, to obtain a conviction, “the

Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the predicate

offense was the defendant’s current or former spouse or was related to the

defendant in another specified way. But that relationship, while it must be

established, need not be denominated an element of the predicate offense.” (Id. at

p. 426.)

In Hayes, after the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment was

denied, he “entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.” (Hayes, supra, 555

U.S. at p. 420.) Because of the guilty plea, the high court did not explain exactly

how the prosecution was to prove the domestic relationship underlying the

predicate crime. Presumably, the trial would be before a jury, not a court.

Whether, as in California, the prosecution would be limited to the record of

conviction is not clear. (See United States v. Hill (8th Cir. 2016) 820 F.3d 1003,

1005 [agreeing with the government that, in a prosecution for failure to register as

a sex offender, the prosecution may present “any reliable evidence” regarding the

nature of the predicate offense].)

Mathis and Descamps require us now to have a jury review the record of

conviction to determine whether the conviction was based on conduct that

qualifies it as a strike. But those cases do no more. They do not affect the rest of

our longstanding jurisprudence. A jury may review the record of conviction,

including the transcript of the preliminary hearing, to determine whether

defendant’s prior conviction was based on assault with a deadly weapon.

4

Other courts have remanded for a jury trial in similar circumstances. In

People v. Eslava (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 498, review granted February 15, 2017,

S239061, the court held, as does this court today, that the defendant was entitled to

a jury trial regarding the nature of the prior conviction. But it also held the

remedy for violating the defendant’s right to a jury trial was to give him that jury

trial. It remanded for a jury trial. It “conclude[d] that Eslava has a Sixth

Amendment right to have a jury resolve the issue. Descamps and Mathis prevent a

court from looking at the record of conviction and drawing the factual inference

that Eslava admitted inflicting serious bodily injury on [the victim], but those

cases do not prevent the People from asking a jury to draw that inference . . . or to

find personal infliction of serious bodily injury on some other basis that may be

supported by the record of conviction.” (Eslava, at pp. 520-521.) Eslava is

correct in this regard.

Two other recent decisions also remanded for a jury trial in similar

circumstances. (People v. McCaw (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 471, 486-487, review

granted October 19, 2016, S236618; People v. Marin (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th

1344, 1366-1367.) McCaw and Marin are also correct in this regard.

As the majority notes, two recent cases did not remand for a jury trial or,

indeed, for any trial. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24, fn. 6.) Those cases simply reverse

or strike the conviction at issue. (People v. Navarette (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 829;

People v. Saez (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1177.) But Navarette found the evidence

insufficient under state law to support the finding regarding the conviction.

(Navarette, at pp. 835, 840, 849, 855.) A finding of legal insufficiency precludes

any retrial. (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272.) Navarette did not hold

that a jury trial is never appropriate. Saez simply reversed the finding on the

conviction. (Saez, at p. 1209.) But it did not explain why it did so rather than

remand for a jury trial.

5

The majority remands for a court trial apparently due to the way this

particular case has been litigated. If so, that presumably would permit a jury trial

in another case that was litigated differently. In that event, although this defendant

will win by avoiding jury factfinding, presumably, in other cases, the defendants

should receive the jury trial due them, complete with factfinding based on the

record of conviction.

The majority also seems to base its refusal to order a jury trial on the belief

that “it would not be much of a trial.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.) That is not a

reason to overturn decades of settled jurisprudence. I agree that a jury would

probably read the transcript of the preliminary hearing and, as the trial court

already did, reach the obvious conclusion that the underlying conviction was for

assault with a deadly weapon. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) The jurors might

wonder why they were called on to do so, just as they might in any trial limited to

the fact of a prior conviction. (Such a limited jury trial sometimes occurs, as a

defendant has always had a jury trial right on the existence of the conviction.

(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)) Defendants are entitled to such a limited jury trial if

they want one. The limited nature of the trial provides no reason to preclude it.

Additionally, defendant did have “an opportunity and incentive to cross-

examine” witnesses at the preliminary hearing (Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 229),

which was why we permitted the factfinder to consider the transcript of that

hearing, while prohibiting consideration of a probation report. (Reed, at p. 230; cf.

maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-23.) Regarding other procedural safeguards, in Reed, we

“express[ed] no opinion as to whether a defendant would be entitled to call live

witnesses to dispute circumstances of the prior offense”; we held only that “the

prosecution is not permitted to present live testimony outside the record of

conviction . . . .” (Reed, at p. 229.) It may be that defendants have the right to

present live testimony at a jury trial to dispute the nature of the conviction, should

6

they wish to do so. Only the prosecution might be limited to the record of

conviction.

Except regarding the jury trial right, the majority cites no high court

authority inconsistent with our jurisprudence in this area, including Reed, supra,

13 Cal.4th 217. As in Hayes, supra, 555 U.S. 415, a jury should be allowed to

determine the nature of the underlying conviction but, under California law, the

prosecution would be limited to the record of conviction.

I dissent from the majority’s remanding the case for a limited court trial,

rather than a jury trial.

CHIN, J.

7

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Gallardo

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 11/16/15 – 2nd Dist., Div. 6

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S231260

Date Filed: December 21, 2017

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Thomas I. McKnew, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Shawn McGahey Webb, Louis

W. Karlin and Noah P. Hill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Christian C. Buckley

Buckley & Buckley

9921 Carmel Mountain Road, #355

San Diego, CA 92129

(858) 538-6054

Noah P. Hill

Deputy Attorney General

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 269-6000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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