Brown v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ali F. Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 262 C.D. 2017

: Argued: October 17, 2017

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and :

Parole, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge (P)

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: December 14, 2017

Ali F. Brown petitions for review of the February, 16, 2017 Order of the

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying Brown’s

administrative appeal from the revocation of his parole based on a November 21,

2013 federal conviction. The Board found that Brown’s revocation hearing was

timely because it was held within 120 days of his return to a State Correctional

Institution (SCI) after the completion of his federal sentence, which is when Brown

became available to the Board. On appeal, Brown asserts he was available to the

Board when he was convicted and his unavailability was the result of the Board’s

inaction, which made him serve his new federal sentence before completing the

balance of his original state sentence in contravention of Section 6138(a)(5.1) of the

Prisons and Parole Code (Code).1 Brown argues that, because his unavailability was

caused by the Board, the delay in holding his revocation hearing was unreasonable,

and that hearing should be deemed untimely and the parole violation charges against

him dismissed. However, because Brown was in federal custody when he pled guilty

and was sentenced, and the Board had no means of acquiring him from that custody,

Brown was not available until his return to the SCI and his revocation hearing, held

within 120 days of his return, was timely. Therefore, we affirm the Board’s Order.

On March 30, 2010, the Board paroled2 Brown, and he was released on June

3, 2010, subject to, among others, the standard parole condition that he not leave the

district without the prior written permission of his parole supervision staff

(Condition #1). Brown’s maximum date when he was paroled was May 12, 2013.

The Mifflin County Regional Police Department arrested Brown on March 26, 2011,

he was charged with possession with intent to deliver (PWID), and, unable to post

bail, he remained confined in the Mifflin County Correctional Facility (County Jail).

The Board issued a Warrant to Commit and Detain (Warrant to Detain) Brown on

March 26, 2011. On March 31, 2011, Brown admitted to violating Condition #1.

By Notice of Board Decision mailed on May 20, 2011, the Board recommitted

Brown as a technical parole violator (TPV) “to serve 6 months backtime, when

available, pending resolution of your new criminal charges.” (C.R. at 114-15.)

On May 4, 2011, Brown was indicted in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Pennsylvania (District Court) on two counts of using a

1

Section 6138(a)(5.1) states: “If the parolee is sentenced to serve a new term of total

confinement by a Federal court or by a court of another jurisdiction because of a verdict or plea

under paragraph (1), the parolee shall serve the balance of the original term before serving the new

term.” 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(5.1).

2

Brown was serving concurrent two-to-five year sentences for possession with intent to

deliver and aggravated assault, and a concurrent one-to-two-year sentence for unlawful restraint.

2

communication facility to facilitate drug trafficking in violation of Section 843(b) of

Title 21 of the United States Code, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania withdrew its PWID charge on May 10, 2011. A Magistrate Judge of

the District Court issued a detainer for Brown on May 24, 2011. Brown pled guilty

to both counts on April 1, 2013. On November 21, 2013, Brown was sentenced to a

total of 64 months (32 months for each count) and remanded into the custody of the

United States Marshal. The Board received official verification of Brown’s

conviction on November 26, 2013, five days after his sentencing.

On January 27, 2014, the Board issued a “Warrant for Arrest of Paroled

Prisoner” (Warrant for Arrest), authorizing any of the Board’s parole agents to arrest

and detain Brown for a parole violation. (C.R. at 122.) Also prepared on that date

was a new Notice of Charges and Hearing for Brown, which identified the new

federal conviction but did not include a hearing date or any indication that it was

sent to Brown. Notwithstanding the outstanding Warrant for Arrest and Notice of

Charges and Hearing, the Board did not attempt to acquire Brown from the federal

authorities, and he remained in federal prison until his release. In January 2015, due

to a change in the federal sentencing guidelines, Brown’s sentence was reduced from

64 months to 52 months. However, because the resentencing could not take effect

until November 1, 2015, Brown was released on October 30, 2015, having already

served more than the 52 months now required. Brown returned to the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC) on or about October 31, 2015.

On January 28, 2016, Brown signed the January 27, 2014 Notice of Charge

and Hearing based on the federal conviction, which now listed a hearing date of

February 18, 2016. The revocation hearing was held that date, at which Brown was

represented by counsel. At the hearing, the Board’s parole agent testified that,

3

because Brown was in federal prison, the March 2011 Warrant to Detain had never

been lifted, even though Brown’s maximum date was May 12, 2013. The Agent

stated the Board would have detained Brown had he made bail on the federal

charges. However, the Agent also stated that the federal detainer took precedence

until Brown completed his federal time. (Id. at 229-30.) The Agent explained that,

as far as he was concerned, Brown had been detained by the federal government and

was unavailable to the Board beginning March 26, 2011.3 Brown did not dispute his

conviction, but argued, inter alia, that, had he served his state sentence first, he

would have received the full benefit of his reduced federal sentence.

The Board recommitted Brown as a convicted parole violator (CPV) to serve

six months concurrently with the prior six months imposed for his technical parole

violation. The Board recalculated Brown’s maximum date to August 10, 2018,

giving him 59-days credit for his confinement from March 26, 2011, to May 24,

2011. Brown filed a timely administrative appeal, arguing that the February 18,

2016 revocation hearing was untimely.4 The Board affirmed its decision, concluding

that the revocation hearing was timely because it was held within 120 days of

Brown’s return to a SCI as required by Section 71.4(1)(i) of its regulations, 37 Pa.

Code § 71.4(1)(i). The Board acknowledged it had received official verification of

Brown’s conviction on November 26, 2013, but, because Brown was in federal

3

This date is the date Brown was arrested on the state charges, and the date the Board

issued its Warrant to Detain. Thus, it is unclear why the Agent believed Brown became unavailable

on this date.

4

Brown’s administrative remedies form is not in the record having inadvertently not been

scanned when the Board transitioned to electronic files and destroyed with the remaining paper

copies of the record following the transition.

4

custody, it based the timeliness of the revocation hearing on the date Brown was

returned to a SCI. (Id.) Brown now petitions this Court for review.5

Relying on several recent cases from this Court, including Fumea v.

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 147 A.3d 610 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016),

and Baasit v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 90 A.3d 74 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2014),6 Brown argues that, pursuant to Section 6138(a)(5.1), he was to serve the

balance of his original state term before serving the new federal sentence imposed

on November 21, 2013. Brown asserts he was available to the Board when he was

convicted of the federal charges on November 21, 2013, and, as in Fumea, the Board

did not ensure that he serve the balance of his original state sentence in accordance

with Section 6138(a)(5.1), which resulted in an unreasonable delay in the holding of

his revocation hearing. Due to having to serve his federal sentence first, Brown

argues, he served more time in federal prison than he otherwise would have been

5

This Court’s “review over actions of the Board is limited to determining whether the

decision was supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law occurred or whether

constitutional rights were violated.” Ramos v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 954 A.2d 107, 109 n.1

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

6

Baasit addressed the allocation of pre-sentence confinement credit where a parolee is

confined on both a Board detainer and new federal charges and held that such credit should be

applied to the parolee’s original state sentence pursuant to, inter alia, Section 6138(a)(5.1). Baasit,

90 A.3d at 83. The Supreme Court expressly disapproved of Baasit in Smith v. Pennsylvania

Board of Probation and Parole, __ A.3d __, __ n.19 (Pa., No. 82 MAP 2016, filed Oct. 18, 2017),

slip op. at 21 n.19. In Smith, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s determination, based on

Baasit and Section 6138(a)(5.1), that the parolee was entitled to pre-sentence confinement credit

where he was confined on both a Board detainer and on new federal charges. Smith, __ A.3d at

__, slip op. at 21-22. The Supreme Court held, among other things, that this Court “improperly

interpreted Section 6138(a)(5.1),” “as requiring credit to be applied to a convicted parole violator’s

original sentence” and stated that Martin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 840

A.2d 299, 309 (Pa. 2003), and Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 412 A.2d

568, 571 (Pa. 1980), requiring that credit for a parolee who is detained on both a Board detainer

and on new charges be applied to the new charges and not the original sentence, unless the

parolee’s new sentence is shorter than the period of pre-confinement, “remain the rule in this

Commonwealth for how credit is applied.” Id. at __, slip op. at 18-19.

5

required had he served his sentences in the order mandated by the Code. According

to Brown, Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s regulations should not apply to

determine the timeliness of his revocation hearing because his unavailability was

due to the Board’s non-compliance with Section 6138(a)(5.1).

The Board responds that the timeliness of a revocation hearing is governed by

Section 71.4 of its regulations, which provides that if a parolee is confined to a

federal prison, the revocation hearing does not have to be held until 120 days from

when the Board receives official verification of the parolee’s return to a SCI. 37 Pa.

Code § 71.4(1)(i). According to the Board, because Brown was not confined at a

SCI until October 31, 2015, Brown’s revocation hearing, held within 120 days of his

return, was timely. The Board maintains that Brown’s reliance on Section

6138(a)(5.1) disregards the facts that Brown was in federal custody until October

31, 2015, and that the Board had no ability to take Brown from the federal authorities

to conduct a revocation hearing and recommit him as a CPV. Finally, the Board

argues, Fumea is distinguishable because, unlike in that case, there was no

opportunity for the Board to obtain custody of Brown after his sentencing and prior

to his entering federal custody. Therefore, the Board maintains, Brown was

unavailable and all it could do was lodge its detainer and await his return to a SCI.

37 Pa. Code § 71.5(a).

When a parolee challenges the timeliness of a revocation hearing, the Board

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the hearing was,

in fact, timely. Ramos v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 954 A.2d 107, 109 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2008). If the Board does not present substantial evidence to establish the

timeliness of a revocation hearing, the parole violation charges are dismissed with

prejudice. Id. at 109. An unreasonable and unjustifiable delay in holding a

6

revocation hearing, which is “not attributable to the parolee or his counsel[,] do[es]

not toll the running of the 120-days.” Jacobs v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 24

A.3d 1074, 1080 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting Williams v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and

Parole, 579 A.2d 1369, 1372 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)).

To meet its burden, the Board relies on its regulations addressing the timing

of and procedures related to revocation hearings to argue that Brown’s revocation

hearing was timely and any delay in Brown serving his original state sentence

because of his unavailability is not relevant. Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s

regulations states, in relevant part, that:

The following procedures shall be followed before a parolee is

recommitted as a convicted violator:

(1) A revocation hearing shall be held within 120 days from the date

the Board received official verification[7] of the plea of guilty or

nolo contendere or of the guilty verdict at the highest trial court level

except as follows:

(i) If a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of the

Department of Corrections, such as confinement out-of-state,

confinement in a Federal correctional institution or

confinement in a county correctional institution where the

parolee has not waived the right to a revocation hearing by a

panel in accordance with Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v.

Rundle, . . . 314 A.2d 842 ([Pa.] 1973), the revocation hearing

shall be held within 120 days of the official verification of the

return of the parolee to a State correctional facility.

37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) (emphasis added). Section 71.5(a) and (c)(1) offers

additional guidance, stating:

7

Official verification is the “[a]ctual receipt by a parolee’s supervising parole agent of a

direct written communication from a court in which a parolee was convicted of a new criminal

charge attesting that the parolee was so convicted.” Section 61.1 of the Board’s regulations, 37

Pa. Code § 61.1.

7

(a) If the parolee is in . . . Federal custody, the Board may lodge its

detainer but other matters may be deferred until the parolee has

been returned to a State correctional facility in this Commonwealth.

***

(c) In determining the period for conducting hearings under this

chapter, there shall be excluded from the period, a delay in any stage

of the proceedings which is directly or indirectly attributable to one

of the following:

(1) The unavailability of a parolee or counsel.

37 Pa. Code § 71.5(a), (c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, under the regulations, when

a parolee is in federal custody, confined in a federal facility, or is otherwise

unavailable, the Board’s duty to hold a revocation hearing, or take other action

beyond issuing a detainer, is deferred until the parolee is returned to a SCI regardless

of when the Board received official verification of a parolee’s new conviction.

Brown asserts these regulations are inapplicable due to the General

Assembly’s October 2010 addition of Section 6138(a)(5.1) to the Code,8 which

8

The General Assembly also amended Section 6138(a)(5) of the Code as follows, with the

added language emphasized:

(5) If a new sentence is imposed on the parolee, the service of the balance of the

term originally imposed by a Pennsylvania court shall precede the

commencement of the new term imposed in the following cases:

(i) If a person is paroled from a State correctional institution and the new

sentence imposed on the person is to be served in the State correctional

institution.

(ii) If a person is paroled from a county prison and the sentence imposed

upon him is to be served in the same county prison.

(iii) In all other cases, the service of the new term for the latter crime shall

precede commencement of the balance of the term originally imposed.

61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(5) (emphasis added).

8

provides “[i]f the parolee is sentenced to serve a new term of total confinement

by a Federal court or by a court of another jurisdiction because of a verdict or plea

under paragraph (1), the parolee shall serve the balance of the original term

before serving the new term.” 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(5.1) (emphasis added). This

Court recently addressed the interplay between the revocation hearing provisions of

Section 71.4(1)(i) of the regulations and the new order-of-sentences requirements of

Section 6138(a)(5.1).

In Fumea, federal authorities arrested the parolee while on parole from a state

sentence, and, after his release on bond on the federal charges, the Board detained

him pending the disposition of those charges. Fumea, 147 A.3d at 611. He remained

in a SCI on the Board’s detainer until his original maximum sentence expired, at

which time the Board lifted its warrant and he was released. Because he was no

longer on the Board’s detainer and was out on bail on the federal charges, the parolee

was at liberty while awaiting his federal trial. Id. After a federal jury found him

guilty on July 8, 2011, the parolee remained on bail until his sentencing on

November 21, 2011. The parolee’s parole agent attended the sentencing hearing,

and the Board issued a warrant to commit and detain him on that day. However,

the agent did not take the parolee into custody, and the parolee was remanded into

the custody of the United States Marshal. The parolee was not released from federal

custody until December 24, 2014, and he was returned to a SCI. The Board held a

revocation hearing after his return, the timeliness of which the parolee challenged.

The parolee asserted that he had been available to the Board at the time of his

sentencing and the Board had not taken custody of him thereby making him serve

his federal sentence first in contravention of Section 6138(a)(5.1). The Board

9

concluded the revocation hearing was timely under Section 71.4(1)(i) of the

regulations, and the parolee petitioned this Court for review.

We framed the issue in Fumea as “whether Section 6138(a)(5.1) imposes [a]

duty upon the Board to assert its jurisdiction over a parolee who, upon his conviction

in federal court, becomes a convicted parole violator but who is not yet in federal

custody under these circumstances.” Fumea, 147 A.3d at 615. The Court held that,

despite the expiration of the parolee’s maximum date, the Board retained jurisdiction

to recommit him as a CPV pursuant to Section 6138(a)(1),9 and he became available

to the Board upon his conviction in federal court. Id. at 616 (citing Thomas v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 279 C.D. 2015, filed March 7, 2016), slip

op. at 5). Further, noting that the Court has interpreted Section 71.4 of the

regulations to “attempt[] to strike a balance, adhering to the letter of the regulations

while remaining cognizant of the due process concerns that drove [its] . . .

promulgation” to ensure timely revocation hearings, we rejected the Board’s

argument that the parolee could not rely on the date of his sentencing to begin the

120-day period because that date was not the date the Board received official

verification of the parolee’s new conviction. Id. at 617. Because the Board’s actual

knowledge of the conviction, as evidenced by the agent’s presence at the sentencing

hearing, effectuated the purpose of official verification, this Court held that the

9

61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(1). This section provides:

A parolee under the jurisdiction of the board released from a correctional facility

who, during the period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits a crime

punishable by imprisonment, for which the parolee is convicted or found guilty by

a judge or jury or to which the parolee pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time

thereafter in a court of record, may at the discretion of the board be recommitted as

a parole violator.

Id.

10

revocation hearing, held more than 120 days after the Board had notice of the

conviction and could have, but did not, take custody of the parolee, was untimely.

Fumea, 147 A.3d at 619-20. Importantly, we added that the General Assembly

clearly intended to change the order of service of sentences through its enactment of

Section 6138(a)(5.1), and that “the Board’s delay in acquiring ‘official verification’

or its inaction at a parolee’s sentencing, as occurred here, can render [that section] a

nullity, thus defeating the legislative intent.” Id. at 615, 619.

Brown argues that, pursuant to this new section, he must serve the remainder

of his original sentence first and, like the parolee in Fumea, he became available to

the Board at the time of his federal conviction and, therefore, a revocation hearing

should have been held within 120 days of the Board’s receipt of the official

verification of that conviction. However, the parolee in Fumea was not in federal

custody when he became available to the Board because he was on bail from the

federal charges. It was not until after the parole agent did not take the parolee

into custody at his sentencing hearing that he was remanded into federal custody.

Brown does not dispute that he was in federal custody both before and after

his federal sentencing and when the Board received official verification of his

conviction. His argument presumes that the Board had the ability to obtain him

from federal custody in order to hold a revocation hearing and recommit him as a

CPV to serve the remainder of his original sentence in accordance with Section

6138(a)(5.1). However, the Board asserts that it does not have the ability to acquire

a Pennsylvania parolee from the custody of another jurisdiction in order to recommit

the parolee to serve the remainder of the original sentence. Brown has not provided

any legal authority that grants the Board this authority. Thus, unlike the parolee in

Fumea over whom the Board’s agent could have immediately taken custody, but did

11

not, thereby allowing the parolee to be placed into federal custody, Brown was

already unavailable to the Board when he pled guilty and was sentenced, as well

as when it received official verification of his conviction. The Board could not have

acquired Brown until after his release from federal custody in October 2015. Under

these circumstances, we are not persuaded by Brown’s argument that Section

71.4(1)(i) of the regulations is inapplicable based on Section 6138(a)(5.1) and

Fumea.

Applying the general revocation hearing provisions of the regulations,

because Brown was confined outside the jurisdiction of the DOC, the revocation

hearing had to be held within 120 days of the date he was returned to a SCI to be

timely. 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i). Brown’s February 18, 2016 revocation hearing

was held 110 days after his October 31, 2015 return to the SCI. Thus, there was no

error in the Board’s conclusion that Brown’s revocation hearing was timely.

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

12

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ali F. Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 262 C.D. 2017

:

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and :

Parole, :

Respondent :

ORDER

NOW, December 14, 2017, the February 16, 2017 Order of the Pennsylvania

Board of Probation and Parole is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge