People v. Stanley

Filed 11/20/17; pub order 12/12/17 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H043445

(Santa Clara County

Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. C1510381)

v.

REESE ALLEN STANLEY,

Defendant and Respondent.

The superior court granted defendant Reese Allen Stanley’s suppression motion

and dismissed the criminal action against him after it found that the detention of

defendant by a sheriff’s deputy was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The

prosecution challenges that finding. We conclude that the deputy’s detention of

defendant was reasonable, and we therefore reverse the superior court’s order.

I. Facts

On the afternoon of May 7, 2015, Deputy Brian Tanaka responded to a dispatch

telling him that a bus driver had spotted the suspect in “a 288 case” (lewd act on a child)

on a VTA bus in San Jose. Tanaka was aware of the “288 case” because he had seen a

report on the news that included a video of the suspect. He also knew that the sheriff’s

department distributes “Be on the Lookout” fliers to VTA bus drivers. Tanaka responded

to the bus, which was parked, boarded the bus, and spoke with the driver. The bus driver

told Tanaka that he had seen a “picture” on a “Be on the Lookout” flier, and the picture

“matched” a passenger on the bus. The “Be On the Look-out (BOLO)” flier issued by

the San Jose Police Department on May 7, 2015 concerned a child sexual assault that had

occurred on an afternoon two days earlier in the San Jose area. The flier described the

suspect as “WMA, Age: 30, 5’10”, 155 lbs, dark or brown shaggy hair w/beard, tan

complexion, black shoes, black socks and a black beanie.” The flier also contained three

color photographs, two of which showed the suspect’s face.

Tanaka had never seen the flier, but he recalled from the video he had seen on the

news that the suspect was a white male. The bus driver pointed out defendant, who was

asleep on a seat halfway back on the bus, as the man matching the picture the bus driver

had seen on the flier. Tanaka awakened defendant, identified himself, handcuffed

defendant, and removed him from the bus. Tanaka had defendant sit on a bus bench

outside the bus. Defendant identified himself, and Tanaka learned from dispatch that

defendant was on parole.

Other deputies, who arrived after Tanaka had detained defendant, had been

informed by dispatch of the description given in the flier. Upon their arrival, they

observed that, “[j]ust by the descriptors alone, [defendant] did match.” The deputies

were unable to access the flier themselves due to technical problems.

Defendant was subjected to a parole search, which turned up narcotics. About 10

to 15 minutes after the deputies searched defendant, they received clear photos of the

suspect on the flier and determined that defendant was not the person depicted on the

flier.

II. Procedural Background

Defendant was charged with possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350)

and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). He

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moved to suppress the fruits of the search on the ground that Tanaka lacked reasonable

suspicion to detain him.

The trial court granted defendant’s suppression motion. “I think that the

descriptors that law enforcement had are far, far, far, far too vague under these

circumstances to have initiated a detention. [¶] I do think it does alter the equation

somewhat that a citizen is saying that’s the person I recognize. [¶] But I don’t think the

law enforcement officer can then delegate the duty of ascertaining the likeness of a

description simply to that.” The prosecution stated that it could not proceed, and the

court dismissed the case.

III. Analysis

“In reviewing the trial court’s suppression ruling, we defer to its factual findings if

supported by substantial evidence. We independently assess the legal question of

whether the challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment.” (People v.

Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975.) Because the relevant facts are undisputed in this

case, we exercise de novo review.

“The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention

is ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of

a citizen’s personal security.’ [Citations.] In making our determination, we examine ‘the

totality of the circumstances’ in each case.” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078,

1083 (Wells).) “But to be reasonable, the officer’s suspicion must be supported by some

specific, articulable facts that are ‘reasonably “consistent with criminal activity.” ’ (In re

Tony C. [(1978)] 21 Cal.3d [888,] 894.) The officer’s subjective suspicion must be

objectively reasonable, and ‘an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere

curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete

good faith. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] But where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

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exists, ‘the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances

“in the proper exercise of the officer’s duties.” [Citation.]’ ” (Wells, at p. 1083.)

At the outset, we reject defendant’s and the trial court’s reliance on this court’s

decision in People v. Walker (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372 (Walker). In Walker, a

sheriff’s detective had circulated an e-mail about a sexual assault that had occurred a

week earlier at a downtown San Jose light rail station. The e-mail contained a description

of the two suspects and photographs of the suspects taken from a surveillance video. The

description of one suspect was: “ ‘[B]lack male adult, approximately in his 20’s,

approximately six[-]one, 195, short afro, clean shaven, light complected, appeared

unkempt[,] wearing a backpack.’ ” The description of the second suspect was: “ ‘[B]lack

male adult, 30’s, approximately five[-]five, 195, short hair[,] unkempt with a body odor[,]

wearing a black sweatshirt jacket with a hood and black pants.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1378.)

A deputy who had reviewed the e-mail, the photographs, and the video saw the

defendant at the same downtown San Jose light rail station where the sexual assault had

occurred a week earlier. “[D]efendant was 19 years old; was five feet 10 inches tall;

weighed approximately 180 pounds; had short black hair; was of medium to dark

complexion; had a mustache and a slight goatee; was well groomed; and was wearing a

gray sweatshirt, blue jeans, and blue and white shoes” and “a cap or a hat.” (Walker,

supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379.) The deputy detained the defendant. At the

suppression hearing, the deputy testified that he thought the defendant resembled one of

the suspects based on height, weight, age, hairline, and shape of nose. The trial court

denied the defendant’s suppression motion. (Ibid.)

On appeal, this court held that the “defendant’s alleged resemblance to one or both

of the suspects” did not provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to detain him

because the defendant was not objectively a substantial match for either of the suspects.

“[I]t is objectively clear that the 19-year-old, five-foot-10, 180-pound, well-groomed

defendant could not have reasonably been considered to resemble Suspect Two—who

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was described as being a Black male in his 30’s, unkempt (with body odor), and

‘approximately five[-]five, 195 [pounds].’ ” (Walker, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 1385-1386.) This court concluded that the deputy’s belief that the defendant

resembled the other suspect also was not objectively reasonable because the only

similarities were race, age, and weight. “[T]here were significant differences between

Suspect One and defendant. Suspect One was described as approximately six feet one

inches tall, while defendant is five feet 10 inches tall. . . . Further, Suspect One was

described as ‘clean shaven, light complected, [and] appeared unkempt,’ while defendant

is of medium to dark complexion, and at the time of the detention was well groomed and

had a mustache and slight goatee.” (Walker, at p. 1386.)

This court further concluded that the photographs reviewed by the deputy could

not have provided support for a reasonable suspicion because those “photographs provide

such poor depictions of the suspects’ faces that their noses are not (or, charitably, are

barely) discernible” and “comparing these photographs with defendant’s booking

photograph—one which Deputy Thrall testified was a fair and accurate depiction of

defendant’s appearance at the time of the arrest—there is no basis for concluding that

defendant bore a close resemblance to either suspect. Thus, any opinion that Deputy

Thrall held that defendant resembled one of the suspects in the photographs—whether

based upon nose shape or otherwise—was not objectively reasonable.” (Walker, supra,

210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387.) “Given the absence of a match between defendant and the

physical descriptions or photographs depicting the suspects, Deputy Thrall’s bases for

connecting defendant to the one-week-old sexual battery were his race and age,” which

were not sufficient to support a detention. (Walker, at p. 1388.)

Unlike Walker, this case does not involve the unusual situation where a deputy’s

claimed basis for a detention is belied by all of the facts other than race, age, and weight.

Although the deputy in Walker claimed that the defendant resembled one of the two

suspects, this court found that there was no factual basis for his claim other than race,

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age, and weight. The photographs that the deputy had reviewed were “poor depictions”

of the suspects’ faces, and there was no evidence of any other similar characteristics.

Here, in contrast, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that

defendant matched not only the age, race, and weight of the suspect but also that he was

the same height and had the shaggy hair and beard described in the flier. In addition,

unlike in Walker, the color photographs in the flier in this case provided good depictions

of the suspect’s face. Hence, unlike the situation addressed by this court in Walker, this

case was not one in which a person was detained based solely on his age, race, and

weight. Consequently, we reject the assertion that Walker controls the result in this case.

Defendant contends that the information that the bus driver gave to Tanaka could

not support a detention because this information was from a “secondary source.” The

United States Supreme Court long ago rejected the argument that a detention “can only

be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by

another person. Informants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman

on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability.” (Adams v. Williams (1972)

407 U.S. 143, 147 (Adams).) “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who

lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply

shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary,

[the law] recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an

intermediate response. [Citation.] A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to

determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more

information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the

time.” (Id. at pp. 145-146.) Therefore, the bus driver’s information could supply the

basis for a detention.

Defendant maintains that the bus driver’s information was insufficient to support a

detention because it was analogous to an anonymous tip like the one that was found

insufficient to support a detention in Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266 (J.L.). He

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contends that a report by an identified citizen, like the bus driver, must be treated the

same as an anonymous tip because both involve reliance by law enforcement on a

“secondary source.” We disagree. “[P]rivate citizens who are witnesses to or victims of

a criminal act, absent some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their information,

should be considered reliable. This does not, of course, dispense with the requirement

that the informant—whether citizen or otherwise—furnish underlying facts sufficiently

detailed to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed and the

named suspect was the perpetrator; and the rule also presupposes that the police be aware

of the identity of the person providing the information and of his status as a true citizen

informant. . . . [N]either a previous demonstration of reliability nor subsequent

corroboration is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal activities

report their observations in detail to the authorities.” (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d

263, 269.)

Here, while the bus driver was not a witness to criminal activity, he was a “true

citizen informant” because he voluntarily provided Tanaka with information that

appeared to link defendant to a crime. Unlike information provided by an anonymous tip,

information from a true citizen informant is considered reliable because a citizen

informant “can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated.” (J.L.,

supra, 529 U.S. at p. 270.) Consequently, the anonymous tip cases do not provide the

appropriate framework for analyzing the propriety of the detention in this case.

We conclude that the information provided by the bus driver to Tanaka was

sufficient to reasonably justify a brief stop of defendant to determine if he was actually

the suspect sought in the “288 case.” Tanaka knew that pictures of the suspect in the

“288 case” had been widely disseminated. The bus driver told Tanaka that he had seen a

picture of the suspect on a “Be on the Lookout” flier and that the picture on the flier

“matched” a passenger on his bus. That flier had just been issued on the very day that the

bus driver saw the passenger, so the picture must have been fresh in the bus driver’s

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mind. Although Tanaka had only a vague recollection of the video he had seen, it was

not inconsistent with the man identified by the bus driver as the suspect in the “288 case.”

And Tanaka had no reason to suspect that the bus driver had any motivation other than

good citizenship. Just because Tanaka lacked “the precise level of information necessary

for probable cause to arrest,” he was not required “to simply shrug his shoulders and

allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” (Adams, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 145.) The

information that Tanaka possessed was sufficient to support a brief detention. “[T]he

grave risks posed by” a person who appeared to be the man sought for sexually assaulting

a child justified “the minimal intrusion of a brief investigatory” detention to determine if

he in fact was the person sought. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)

IV. Disposition

The superior court’s order dismissing the case is reversed, and the matter is

remanded with directions to vacate that order and the order granting defendant’s

suppression motion and to enter a new order denying defendant’s suppression motion.

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_______________________________

Mihara, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________

Elia, Acting P. J.

_____________________________

Premo, J.

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Filed 12/12/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H043445

(Santa Clara County

Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. C1510381)

v.

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST

REESE ALLEN STANLEY, FOR PUBLICATION

Defendant and Respondent.

BY THE COURT:

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b), the request for publication is

hereby granted. It is ordered that the opinion in this matter, filed on November 20, 2017,

shall be certified for publication.

Date: _____________________________

Mihara, J.

_____________________________

Elia, Acting P. J.

_____________________________

Premo, J.

Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Helen E. Williams

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant: Kamala D. Harris

Attorney General of California

Gerald A. Engler

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence

SeniorAssistant Attorney General

Laurence K. Sullivan

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Bridget Billeter

Deputy Attorney General

Attorney for Defendant and Respondent: Eric Cioffi

Law Office of Eric Cioffi

People v. Stanley

H043445