Russo v. City of New York

17-233-cv

Russo v. City of New York

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the

1st day of December, two thousand seventeen.

Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

PETER W. HALL,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________________________

ANTHONY JOHN RUSSO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 17-233-cv

CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK STATE,

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________________________

Appearing for Appellant: Anthony John Russo, pro se, East Elmhurst, N.Y.

Appearing for Appellee: No appearance.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Mauskopf,

J.).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

1

Anthony John Russo, proceeding pro se, appeals from the July 19, 2016 judgment of the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Mauskopf, J.), dismissing

Russo’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Russo was a tenured teacher with the New York

City Board of Education who was terminated as the result of an arbitration conducted pursuant to

New York Education Law 3020-a. Russo initiated an Article 75 proceeding in the Supreme

Court of New York County to appeal the termination decision. The termination was ultimately

affirmed by the New York State Court of Appeals in 2015. Russo v. New York City Dep’t of

Educ., 25 N.Y.3d 946, 948 (N.Y. 2015). Russo filed his federal complaint against New York

City and New York State on February 4, 2016.

On July 19, 2016, the district court sua sponte dismissed Russo’s complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and the doctrine of res judicata. The district court also determined that

amendment to the pleadings would be futile and any appeal taken of that order would not be

taken in good faith and thus denied in forma pauperis status to Russo for the appeal. Russo

subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the district court on

January 4, 2017. The district court determined that appeal of that order would not be taken in

good faith and denied in forma pauperis status to any appeal of the denial of the motion for

reconsideration, as well. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining underlying facts,

procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally

and interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir.

2006)). We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). Our review of a district court’s denial of leave to amend based on

futility is reviewed de novo. Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2015). The district

court’s denial of Russo’s motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.

Finally, the district court’s application of the principles of res judicata is reviewed de novo. EDP

Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007). “We may affirm on

any ground supported by the record.” Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir.

2012).

We affirm the decisions of the district court to dismiss Russo’s complaint and deny his

motion for reconsideration on the ground that Russo’s claims are barred by the doctrine of claim

preclusion. We note at the outset that “the failure of a defendant to raise res judicata does not

deprive a court of the power to dismiss a claim on that ground” in large part because of “the

strong public policy in economizing the use of judicial resources by avoiding relitigation.” Doe

v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1998). We find that dismissal on the basis of res judicata

is appropriate in this case because Russo raises claims that are premised entirely on the same set

of facts and alleged misconduct as the facts and misconduct alleged in his state court action, and

because the initial state forum had the power to award the full measure of relief sought in this

Section 1983 action. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (1986). Cf. Davis v. Halpern, 813

F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that Section 1983 plaintiffs may seek damages despite

prior Article 78 Proceedings requesting injunctive or affirmative relief).

2

In Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that

the “settled” rule “that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive

effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was

rendered” applied to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).

Russo argues that he cannot be barred from raising his federal claims because he never raised

them in the state court actions, but Migra demonstrates that the doctrine of claim preclusion does

not function in such a manner.

Pursuant to the instruction of the Supreme Court, we apply the doctrine of res judicata

“under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered” when evaluating the preclusive

effects of a state court judgment. Id. at 81. This Court has noted that “New York law has adopted

a ‘transactional approach’ to claim preclusion.” McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir.

2007) (citing Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1986)). A transactional approach

dictates that “[o]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the

same transaction or series of transaction are barred.” Id. at 104 (quoting O’Brien v. City of

Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357 (N.Y. 1981)).

Russo’s complaint in the federal district court alleged that he suffered constitutional

violations involving his termination, including the legal standards applied to his termination

decision and the actual decision to terminate. Each of these constitutional violations was alleged

to have occurred during the arbitration process and related procedures that were the subject of

the state court judgment. Accordingly, even though Russo’s federal claims were not raised and

litigated in his state action, there was no error in the district court’s decision to dismiss these

claims on the grounds that they were barred by the state court judgment.

We have considered the remainder of Russo’s arguments and find them to be without

merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its

own costs.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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