Corbett v. The County of Lake

2017 IL 121536

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 121536)

KATHY CORBETT, Appellee, v. THE COUNTY OF LAKE et al.

(City of Highland Park, Appellant).

Opinion filed November 30, 2017.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 At issue in this appeal is the meaning of section 3-107(b) of the Local

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS

10/3-107(b) (West 2012)). The plaintiff filed a complaint at law in the circuit court

of Lake County against the County of Lake (County) and the city of Highland Park

(City) for personal injuries arising out of a bicycling accident on the Skokie Valley

Bike Path. Defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment alleging

various immunities under the Act. The circuit court allowed both motions and

entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed the judgment

with respect to the City only.

¶2 The appellate court reversed the part of the circuit court’s judgment pertaining

to the City and remanded the cause to the circuit court. 2016 IL App (2d) 160035.

The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in holding that the Skokie

Valley Bike Path is a riding “trail” within the meaning of section 3-107(b) of the

Act. Id. ¶ 33. Thus, the City could not assert absolute immunity under section

3-107(b). Id. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court but for different

reasons.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 21, 2013, plaintiff, Kathy Corbett, was riding her bicycle with a

group of other cyclists on the Skokie Valley Bike Path. 1 The group was riding south

on a portion of the path running parallel to Skokie Valley Road (U.S. Route 41),

between Park Avenue West and Old Deerfield Road, within the city of Highland

Park. Plaintiff alleged that, prior to that date, defendants had been informed of a

dangerous condition on that section of the path, in which “weeds and other

vegetation were growing up through the asphalt ***, causing portions of the path to

be broken, bumpy and elevated.” Plaintiff alleged that she was thrown off her

bicycle while riding over the defective portion of the path, causing her to sustain

severe injuries. She alleged that her injuries were proximately caused by the willful

and wanton acts or omissions of defendants.

¶5 According to documents in the record, at the time of plaintiff’s accident the

County was a party to a recreational lease agreement over the Skokie Valley Bike

Path with Commonwealth Edison (ComEd). ComEd was the owner of the

right-of-way encompassing the path, and the County was a tenant. Other

documents in the record reveal that the County and the City were parties to a

maintenance agreement, which provided that the City was responsible for routine

maintenance on the portion of the path within the corporate limits of Highland

1

Portions of the record refer to the path as the “Old Skokie Bike Path” or the “Skokie Valley

Bikeway.”

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Park. According to the agreement, “routine maintenance” included all activities

necessary to keep the path in a reasonably safe and serviceable condition for

bicycle and pedestrian traffic.

¶6 In its answer to plaintiff’s complaint, the City raised various affirmative

defenses, including immunity under section 3-107(b) of the Act. Defendants filed

separate motions for summary judgment. 2 Relevant to this appeal, the City asserted

in its motion that it was absolutely immune from liability, even for willful and

wanton conduct, pursuant to section 3-107(b). That section provides, in part:

“[n]either a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused

by a condition of: *** (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.” 745 ILCS

10/3-107(b) (West 2012). The City attached several exhibits in support of its

motion. The exhibits included deposition transcripts of plaintiff and other

witnesses.

¶7 Plaintiff testified in her deposition that, on the date of the accident, she was

riding her bicycle with a group of people with whom she regularly rode. She had

previously ridden on the particular stretch of path where the accident occurred.

Plaintiff testified that section of the path was surrounded by shrubs and wild

grasses. It was separated from residences and commercial businesses and set back

from the highway. Plaintiff testified that the group was riding south on the path at a

speed of 15 to 17 miles per hour as they approached a stop sign at Old Deerfield

Road. The rider two places in front of her, Hasan Syed, hit a bump, lost control of

his bicycle, and crashed. Plaintiff testified that the rider directly in front of her

veered off, but she was not able to do so. Instead, she rode over Syed and flew off

her bicycle, landing on the asphalt and sustaining multiple injuries.

¶8 Yves Roubaud testified in his deposition that he was riding with plaintiff and

the others on August 21, 2013. He described the path as a bicycle path used by

cyclists and walkers for recreational purposes. It had a yellow dividing line on it.

Roubaud testified that the stretch of the path where the accident occurred was

separated from residences and commercial businesses and set back from the

highway. Roubaud stated that he was riding between Syed and plaintiff when Syed

2

Lake County’s motion was uncontested, was not appealed, and is not at issue in these

proceedings. The County is not a party to the appeal before this court.

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fell to the ground. Roubaud stated that he swerved to the left and rolled over Syed’s

leg but did not fall down. He then turned around and saw plaintiff lying on the

ground, moaning in pain.

¶9 In his deposition, Syed testified that the path was used for recreational

bicyclists riding at slow speeds and for walkers. He stated that the path was not

intended to be used by professional riders but was “just for fun.” Syed stated that

the path had shrubs on both sides. Syed testified consistently with plaintiff and

Roubaud regarding the events surrounding plaintiff’s accident.

¶ 10 John Stevens testified in his deposition that he was riding with plaintiff and the

others on August 21, 2013. He described the path as approximately six feet wide,

paved with asphalt, and “lined by some type of growth most of the way, whether

hedges or bushes.” He stated that the path was not connected to any particular park.

He also testified that the path was separated from commercial businesses and from

traffic other than bicycles, walkers, and runners.

¶ 11 In her response to the City’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argued

that the path is not a “riding trail” under section 3-107(b) of the Act because it is

paved and runs through a busy, developed commercial and industrial area of the

city rather than a forest or mountainous region. Plaintiff attached her affidavit, in

which she averred that she was familiar with the exact location on the path where

the incident occurred, having ridden her bicycle through the area many times. She

also attached photographs in support of her statements describing the path.

¶ 12 Plaintiff alleged the following facts. The path is not located in a wooded,

natural scenic area. The path passes by a city park called Buckthorn Park. At the

specific location where the accident occurred, there are commercial and industrial

businesses, parking lots, and buildings abutting both sides of the path. Many of the

businesses have cyclone fences that are adjacent to the path. Behind these fences

are stacks of industrial materials such as pipes and cement blocks. There are some

large bushes and grass but no trees present in the area where the incident occurred.

Near the site of the accident, the path intersects with Old Deerfield Road, which is a

busy city street with motor vehicles regularly crossing the path. As bicyclists

approach the road from the north and south, there are stop signs for the bicyclists

but no stop signs for the cars. The path is sandwiched between U.S. Route 41,

which is less than one block to the east, and railroad tracks, which are less than one

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block to the west. There are large ComEd utility poles that run alongside the entire

path, with multiple power lines overhead.

¶ 13 In its reply, the City did not dispute the facts averred by plaintiff. It argued,

however, that the decisions of neighboring landowners to develop their property

and the fact that the path is adjacent to a road did not defeat the immunity conferred

by section 3-107(b) of the Act. The City argued that the nature of the path itself is

determinative of whether it is a “riding trail” under section 3-107(b). The City

contended that the undisputed evidence, i.e., that the path is surrounded by grass,

shrubs, hedges, and bushes, shows that it is a “riding trail” as contemplated by

section 3-107(b).

¶ 14 The circuit court allowed both defendants’ motions and granted summary

judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, plaintiff did not challenge the

judgment for the County. She argued that the grant of summary judgment for the

City was error because the path was not a “riding trail,” as that term has been

construed by the appellate court.

¶ 15 The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of the City and remanded the case to the circuit court for further

proceedings. 2016 IL App (2d) 160035, ¶¶ 33-34 (affirming in part and reversing in

part the circuit court’s judgment). The appellate court reviewed the relevant case

law and found that the judicially accepted definition of the word “trail” is “ ‘a

“marked path through a forest or mountainous region.” ’ ” Id. ¶¶ 23, 29 (quoting

Brown v. Cook County Forest Preserve, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1101 (1996),

quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981)). The court

concluded that the presence of industrial and residential development completely

surrounding the path defeated the City’s argument that it runs through a forest or

mountainous region. 2016 IL App (2d) 160035, ¶¶ 29-30. Therefore, the immunity

provided by section 3-107(b) did not apply. Id.

¶ 16 This court allowed the City’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 315. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). We also allowed

the Park District Risk Management Agency to file a brief as amicus curiae in

support of the City.

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¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 This appeal requires us to review the circuit court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of the City. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, and other matters on file establish that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). This court reviews the circuit court’s

summary judgment ruling de novo. Bremer v. City of Rockford, 2016 IL 119889,

¶ 20. Issues involving statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are also

reviewed de novo. Moon v. Rhode, 2016 IL 119572, ¶ 22.

¶ 19 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City on the basis that it is

immune from liability for plaintiff’s injuries under section 3-107(b) of the Act.

Section 3-107 of the Act provides, in its entirety:

“Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury

caused by a condition of: (a) Any road which provides access to fishing,

hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a

(1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a

township or other road district highway. (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or

hunting trail.” (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/3-107 (West 2012).

¶ 20 There is no question that, if section 3-107(b) applies, the City is completely

immune from liability, even for willful and wanton conduct. See DeSmet v. County

of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 514 (2006) (when the plain language of an

immunity provision in the Act contains no exception for willful and wanton

conduct, it means that the legislature intended to immunize both negligence and

willful and wanton conduct). Furthermore, there is no dispute that plaintiff’s injury

was caused by a condition of the path. The parties disagree, however, as to whether

the Skokie Valley Bike Path is a “trail” within the meaning of section 3-107(b). The

statute itself does not provide a definition of the term.

¶ 21 Before addressing the meaning of the statutory language, we note that the

Skokie Valley Bike Path is considered a “shared-use trail” by the Illinois

Department of Transportation (IDOT). IDOT is the state agency responsible for

officially designating bikeways throughout the state pursuant to the Bikeway Act.

605 ILCS 30/2 (West 2012). Manuals published by IDOT provide that a shared-use

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trail is physically separated from the roadway and intended for use by bicycles and

other non-motorized forms of transportation, including pedestrians, disabled

persons in wheelchairs, and in-line skaters. See Illinois Department of

Transportation, Bureau of Design and Environment Manual, 17-1.01 (2011);

Illinois Department of Transportation, Bureau of Local Roads and Streets Manual,

42-1.01 (2013).

¶ 22 The Skokie Valley Bike Path, in particular, is a type of shared-use path called a

“rail-with-trail” because it runs parallel to train tracks located about 40 feet to the

west of the path. Skokie Valley Trail (Lake County) Illinois, TrailLink by

Rails-toTrails Conservancy, https://www.traillink.com/trail/skokie-valley-trail­

(lake-county)/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2017). Running parallel to the path on the east

side is U.S. Route 41. The path is approximately 10 miles long and paved with

asphalt. It runs from the village of Lake Bluff at the northern end to the city of

Highland Park at the southern end. Id. There are several major road crossings,

which are marked and include crosswalks. The path has a yellow, painted line

dividing it into two lanes and has signs with mile markers for users of the path.

Because the path shares a right-of-way with ComEd, high-voltage electrical wires

run overhead along the entire path. Id. The path connects to other shared-use paths,

including the North Shore Bike Trail, the Des Plaines River Trail, and the Robert

McClory Bike Path. Id.

¶ 23 The appellate court below concluded that the Skokie Valley Bike Path was not a

“trail” within the meaning of section 3-107(b). In so holding, the appellate court

relied on the analytical framework adopted in a previous case, Brown v. Cook

County Forest Preserve, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1098 (1996). In Brown, the court

determined the meaning of the word “trail” in the statute by reference to a

dictionary. The dictionary definition chosen by the court defined a “trail” as a

“ ‘marked path through a forest or mountainous region.’ ” Id. at 1101 (quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981)). The Brown court held

that, since that the bicycle path at issue in that case ran through a forest or a “natural

and scenic wooded area[ ],” it was a “riding trail” under section 3-107(b). Id. The

fact that the path was paved did not alter the court’s analysis since, according to the

court, the only relevant characteristic of the path was that it traversed a forested

area. Id.

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¶ 24 The appellate court in this case used the same analytical framework as the

Brown court, holding:

“the case law that we follow does require that, to be within section 3-107(b), a

path not only be used by bicyclists (or hikers or both) but be located within a

‘ “forest or mountainous region” ’ [Citations.] As a matter of law, this

restriction defeats the City’s assertion that the path is a riding or hiking trail. No

contention has been made that the path is located in a mountainous region

(mountains being scarce in Lake County). No serious contention can be made

that the path is located in a forest; no reasonable person who views the

photographs of the path and its surroundings, or even reads their descriptions by

those who have seen them, would describe those surroundings as a forest. The

path is bordered by narrow bands of greenway that sport some shrubs and a few

trees; these narrow bands are surrounded by industrial development, residential

neighborhoods, parking lots, railroad tracks, and major vehicular thoroughfares

(to the east and south of the area of the accident). The case for considering the

path a riding trail would not succeed even if utility poles could be considered

trees with power lines for branches.” (Emphasis in original.) 2016 IL App (2d)

160035, ¶ 29.

Accordingly, under the appellate court’s approach, the application of the statute

and the existence of blanket immunity turn on whether the trail runs through a

forest or “natural and scenic wooded area.”

¶ 25 Without expressing any view on the correctness of the result in the Brown case,

we believe the analytical framework adopted by that court was misguided. First,

when using a dictionary to help determine statutory meaning, it is appropriate to

use one in existence at the time of the statute’s enactment. See Sayles v. Thompson,

99 Ill. 2d 122, 125 (1983) (“[t]he meaning of a statute or constitutional provision

depends upon the intent of the drafters at the time of its adoption, and it is a

long-standing principle of statutory construction that it is the court’s duty to

ascertain and effectuate that intent” (emphasis added)). The Brown court used a

definition from a dictionary published in 1981, well after section 3-107(b) was

enacted in 1965.

¶ 26 Second, Brown misquoted the definition of the word “trail” in the dictionary it

cited. The entire definition is “a blazed or otherwise marked path through a forest or

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mountainous region.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981).

From the same dictionary, the word “blaze” means “a mark made on a tree usu. by

chipping off a piece of the bark.” Id. at 232. To “blaze” a trail means to “to mark out

(as a path) by making blazes on trees.” Id. Thus, a “blazed or otherwise marked

path” is one made by chipping pieces out of trees. In other words, the definition

used by Brown has nothing to do with shared-use trails or designated bicycle paths.

¶ 27 Third, and most importantly, the appellate court in Brown erred in viewing the

word “trail” outside the context of the statute in order to determine its meaning. It is

a “fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself)

that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn

from the context in which it is used. [Citations.]” Deal v. United States, 508 U.S.

129, 132 (1993). “The terms in a statute are not to be considered in a vacuum.”

M.I.G. Investments, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 122 Ill. 2d 392, 400

(1988). Rather, the words and phrases in a statute must be construed in light of the

statute as a whole, “ ‘with each provision construed in connection with every other

section.’ ” Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273,

291 (2004) (quoting Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997)); 2A Norman

Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:5

(7th ed. 2007).

¶ 28 Instead of considering the meaning of the word “trail” in the context of the

statute as a whole, the Brown court isolated the word from the statute and assigned

to it a definition from a dictionary. But dissecting an individual word or phrase

from a statutory provision and mechanically applying to it a dictionary definition is

clearly not the best way of ascertaining legislative intent. See Whelan v. County

Officers’ Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558 (1994). As Judge Learned

Hand observed:

“Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the

primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of

any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest

indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of

the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or

object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the

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surest guide to their meaning.” Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.

1945).

¶ 29 The appellate court’s decision to define the word “trail” using a general

dictionary definition of the term distorts the meaning of the statute by divorcing the

term from its context. Under the appellate court’s rationale, a governmental entity

is immune from liability for conditions on a trail only if there is sufficient foliage or

a certain number of trees surrounding the trail to constitute a “forest” or “scenic

wooded area.” This analysis is both subjective and arbitrary and has nothing to do

with whether a governmental entity should be held liable for creating a risk of

injury to users of a trail. Nevertheless, although we disagree with the appellate

court’s analysis, we agree that section 3-107(b) is not intended to apply to a bicycle

path like the one in the present case.

¶ 30 In construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the legislature’s intent. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. The best indicator

of that intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. As

we have stated, unless a word in a statutory sentence is defined in the statute, it

must be read in context in order to determine its meaning. Accordingly, a word

such as “trail” in section 3-107(b) “must be read in the context of the entire

sentence in which it appears.” Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 229

(2000).

¶ 31 Section 3-107(b) does not state that immunity applies to an injury caused by a

condition of “any riding trail.” Rather, it provides that immunity applies to an

injury caused by a condition of “[a]ny hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.” 745

ILCS 10/3-107(b). When construing a series of terms such as the ones in section

3-107(b), we are guided by the commonsense principle “that words grouped in a

list should be given related meaning.” Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac

Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977). This principle is related to the canon of statutory

construction known as noscitur a sociis, i.e., “ ‘a word is known by the company it

keeps.’ ” People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 30 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle

& Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)). In other words, “a word is given more precise

content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” United States v.

Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008).

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¶ 32 The canon of noscitur a sociis is particularly useful when construing one term

in a list, in order “to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is

inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving ‘unintended breadth to

[legislative acts].’ ” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (quoting

Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307). For example, in Gustafson, the United States Supreme

Court “interpreted the word ‘communication’ in § 2(10) of the Securities Act of

1933 [(48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10)))] to refer

to a public communication, rather than any communication, because the word

appeared in a list with other words, notably ‘notice, circular, [and] advertisement,’

making it ‘apparent that the list refer[red] to documents of wide dissemination.’ ”

Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (quoting

Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575-76). “And [the Court] did so even though the list began

with the word ‘any.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1085.

¶ 33 Utilizing these principles of statutory interpretation, we reject the City’s

argument that the Skokie Valley Bike Path is obviously a “trail” as that word is

ordinarily and popularly used. According to the City, the numerous references in

the record describing the path as a “trail” are compelling evidence that the path is a

“riding trail” as set forth in section 3-107(b). The City engages in the same flawed

analysis as the appellate court, however, removing the word “trail” from the

context of the statute and assigning to it a broad, general definition. Reading the

text as a whole, we find that the words “hiking,” “fishing,” and “hunting” dictate a

narrower construction of the term “trail.” If section 3-107(b) stated that immunity

applied to “any jogging, riding, in-line skating, or stroller trail,” then it would be

easy to find that a shared-use path such as the Skokie Valley Bike Path is a “riding

trail.” However, the inclusion of the words “hiking,” “fishing,” and “hunting” in

the same sentence as “riding” indicates that the legislature intended to apply

blanket immunity only to primitive, rustic, or unimproved trails. The word

“hunting,” in particular, leads us to this conclusion. A trail that leads to a deer blind

or other hunting spot will likely be minimal, to avoid disturbing the game. There is

no reasonable way that a hunting trail can be associated with or given a related

meaning to the type of shared-use path at issue here.

¶ 34 Further support for our interpretation of the statutory language in section

3-107(b) is found when we compare it with the language in section 3-107(a). Under

the doctrine of in pari materia, two sections of the same statute “will be considered

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with reference to each other, ‘so that they may be given harmonious effect.’ ”

Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School

Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185 (2006) (quoting Land v. Board of Education of the

City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002)). Section 3-107(a) grants immunity

from liability for an injury caused by a condition of: “(a) Any road which provides

access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and

which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or

(3) a township or other road district highway.” 745 ILCS 10/3-107(a) (West 2012).

The reference in section 3-107(a) to roads that provide access to “primitive” areas,

rather than official streets, suggests that the legislature intended section 3-107 of

the Act to apply to primitive, unfinished trails and roads. See Goodwin v.

Carbondale Park District, 268 Ill. App. 3d 489, 493 (1994) (“Reading section

3-107 as a whole indicates that the property referred to therein is unimproved

property which is not maintained by the local governmental body and which is in its

natural condition with obvious hazards as a result of that natural condition.”).

¶ 35 In addition, the City’s interpretation of the statute leads to anomalous results

when applied to a bicycle path located in a recreational area such as a public park.

In construing statutory language, we may consider the consequences that would

result in interpreting the statute one way or the other. County of Du Page v. Illinois

Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604 (2008). We also presume that the

legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Brucker v.

Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514 (2007). Many shared-use paths run through public

parks and other recreational areas. Under section 3-106 of the Act, injuries

occurring due to a condition of recreational land are subject to immunity only for

negligent conduct and not for willful and wanton conduct. See Moore v. Chicago

Park District, 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 10. Section 3-106 of the Act provides:

“Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where

the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property

intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not

limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other enclosed

recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of

willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such injury.” 745 ILCS

10/3-106 (West 2012).

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If a bicycle path winding through a public park were subject to blanket immunity

under section 3-107(b), a pedestrian would be barred from suing for an injury

caused by a condition of the path, while being able to sue for the exact same injury

occurring on park grounds next to the path. This inconsistent treatment can be

avoided, however, by construing the Act so that a shared-use trail in a public park

or recreational area is subject to section 3-106 of the Act rather than section

3-107(b).

¶ 36 The City also contends that construing the statute broadly to grant blanket

immunity for all bicycle paths would promote the public policy underlying the

statute. According to the City, the public policy behind section 3-107(b) is to

promote the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of creating greater access

to riding trails, rather than to divert those funds to pay damage claims stemming

from the condition of those trails. Cf. Moore, 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 22 (discussing the

public policy rationale for section 3-106 of the Act). But public policy also points

the other way. After all, it seems strange to say that a local public entity can build

and maintain a bike trail, encourage people to use it, and represent that it is safe but

then escape all liability for injuries caused by even the most egregious misconduct

in failing to maintain it.

¶ 37 At the same time, it makes sense to apply blanket immunity to undeveloped,

unimproved trails that are left in their natural state as a feature of those trails.

Requiring public entities to maintain such trails “would defeat the very purpose of

these types of recreational areas, that is, the enjoyment of activities in a truly

natural setting.” Goodwin, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 493. A law review article published

shortly after section 3-107 was enacted makes a similar point:

“There is at least one situation in which it may be undesirable to require a

public entity to maintain its land in safe condition, and that is as to those lands

set aside for hiking, camping, fishing, and hunting. The users of these lands

desire to have the property maintained in its natural condition. To maintain this

land in a reasonably safe condition would, to some degree, defeat the purpose

for which such lands have been provided.” Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act:

A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U. L.

Rev. 265, 287 n.102 (1966).

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Because there are legitimate policy reasons for giving the statute a narrow

application, the policy reasons offered by the City cannot overcome the language of

the statute. Furthermore, the Act is in derogation of the common law and must be

strictly construed against the governmental entity claiming immunity. Van Meter v.

Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 368 (2003).

¶ 38 The City makes an additional argument that the definition of a “recreational

trail” in section 10 of the Recreational Trails of Illinois Act (20 ILCS 862/10 (West

2012)) should be read into section 3-107(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. (defining

a “recreational trail,” in part, as “a thoroughfare or track across land or snow”). We

reject this argument. The two statutes have different purposes and different

contexts, and it is inappropriate to import the definition of the term “trail” from one

statute to another, since “the context in which a term is used obviously bears upon

its intended meaning.” People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H.

Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 29.

¶ 39 Accordingly, we hold that section 3-107(b) of the Act was intended to apply

only to primitive or rustic trails. These include any designated hiking, riding,

fishing, or hunting trail that retains its original, natural surface and is not improved

with asphalt, concrete, crushed aggregate, or similar finishes and is not intended for

ordinary “on-road” type bicycles, bicyclists pulling children in trailers, pedestrians

pushing strollers, or similar forms of transportation. The Skokie Valley Bike Path is

a 10-mile-long, shared-use path, paved with asphalt and held out for the use of

bicycles, pedestrians, and in-line skaters. It is not a “trail” within the meaning of the

statute as this court has interpreted the term. Thus, section 3-107(b) does not apply

in this case, and summary judgment for the City was improper.

¶ 40 As a final matter, in light of our holding that immunity under section 3-107(b) is

inapplicable to the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, we need not address

plaintiff’s alternative argument that the City waived its tort immunity defense

through its maintenance agreement with the County.

¶ 41 CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the circuit court’s order entering

summary judgment in favor of the City was in error. We thus affirm the appellate

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court’s judgment. The matter is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

¶ 43 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 44 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 45 Cause remanded.

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