Opinion

Morrison v. Department of the Nayy

  • 876 F.3d 1106
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Nov 29, 2017
Status
Published
On the bench
Newman, Clevenger, Bryson
Cited by
6 cases
Authority
More cited than 63.4%

deeming order not “final” where the Board simply forwarded a case to another decisionmaker for further pro- ceedings

How later courts described this case

  • deeming order not “final” where the Board simply forwarded a case to another decisionmaker for further pro- ceedings
  • “As a general rule, an order is final only when it ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

JOHN W. MORRISON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Respondent

______________________

2016-2542

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection

Board in No. PH-0752-14-0669-B-1.

______________________

Decided: November 29, 2017

______________________

MICHAEL KATOR, Kator Parks Weiser & Harris, PLLC,

Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also represented

by DANIEL R. CLARK; JEREMY WRIGHT, Austin, TX.

RENEE BURBANK, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-

ton, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by

CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON

KIDD-MILLER.

______________________

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

2 MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

PER CURIAM.

John W. Morrison petitions for review of a decision of

the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”)

relating to his retirement from a civilian position with the

Department of the Navy. Because the Board’s ruling was

not a “final order” or a “final decision” in his case, we

dismiss Mr. Morrison’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

BACKGROUND

Mr. Morrison worked as a firefighter at the Naval

Submarine Base New London in Groton, Connecticut.

Mr. Morrison’s position was designated as “Non-Critical

Sensitive.” As a condition of his employment, he was

required to maintain a security clearance. In August

2011, the Navy revoked Mr. Morrison’s eligibility for a

security clearance, citing concerns regarding his personal

finances. Mr. Morrison appealed the revocation to the

Navy’s Personnel Security Appeals Board. The revocation

was upheld based on Mr. Morrison’s history of financial

delinquency and his continued debt of more than $36,000.

The Navy subsequently initiated removal proceedings

for Mr. Morrison. It issued him a notice of proposed

removal on March 28, 2012, based on his failure to main-

tain the requisite security clearance. Mr. Morrison pro-

tested the proposed removal, but on July 13, 2012,

Regional Fire Chief Stephan Cox wrote a letter finalizing

the decision to remove him. In the letter, Regional Fire

Chief Cox wrote: “I . . . find that the charge of ‘Denied

Eligibility to Access Non-Critical Sensitive Areas’ is fully

supported by the evidence and your removal is warranted

and will be effected on 13 July 2012.”

Although Regional Fire Chief Cox signed the letter, it

was not formally issued to Mr. Morrison at that time.

Instead, District Fire Chief Thomas Clapsadle, who was

to deliver the letter of decision, offered Mr. Morrison the

MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 3

option to retire preemptively, in lieu of the termination.

Mr. Morrison had expressed concern that his retirement

benefits would be jeopardized if he were fired, and he

chose to retire effective as of July 13, 2012.

In reality, Mr. Morrison’s retirement benefits were

never at risk due to his pending termination, as he would

have received his retirement benefits regardless of

whether he retired or was terminated. See 5 U.S.C.

§§ 8312-8315 (identifying particular circumstances, not

present here, in which a government employee may lose

entitlement to retirement pay). After learning that his

retirement benefits were not at risk, Mr. Morrison filed an

appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming

that his retirement was involuntary, and thus he had, in

effect, been unlawfully removed from his position.

The administrative judge who was assigned to the

case initially dismissed Mr. Morrison’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction on the ground that he had failed to make a

non-frivolous showing that his retirement was involun-

tary. On Mr. Morrison’s petition for review, the full

Board held that Mr. Morrison’s allegations that an agency

manager had told him he would lose his retirement bene-

fits if he were terminated were sufficient to call for a

jurisdictional hearing. The Board therefore remanded the

case to the administrative judge for that purpose.

On remand, the administrative judge conducted a

hearing and determined that Mr. Morrison’s retirement

was involuntary. The administrative judge found that

Mr. Morrison had entertained the belief that he would

lose his retirement benefits if he were removed, and that

District Fire Chief Clapsadle had not corrected that

misinformation or referred Mr. Morrison to a knowledge-

able person who could correct that misinformation so that

Mr. Morrison could make an informed choice concerning

his retirement. Based on those findings, the administra-

tive judge concluded that Mr. Morrison “did not make an

4 MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

informed choice when he chose to retire based on the

mistaken assumption that he would lose his retirement

benefits if he was issued a letter of termination, which the

agency failed to correct.”

The administrative judge ruled that Mr. Morrison was

entitled to be returned to the status quo ante: reinstate-

ment as of July 13, 2012. The administrative judge

added, however, that “further consideration of the status

quo ante is warranted under the circumstances of this

case.” The administrative judge noted that Mr. Morrison

involuntarily resigned “immediately preceding the issu-

ance of a decision letter removing him effective that day,”

and concluded that, although Mr. Morrison should be

restored to the status quo ante, he “cannot be placed in a

better position than he would have enjoyed if he had not

resigned on July 13, 2012.”

The Navy petitioned for review by the full Board,

which affirmed the administrative judge’s decision re-

garding Mr. Morrison’s involuntary retirement. As to

that issue, the Board ruled that “an agency is required to

provide employees with adequate information in order to

make an informed retirement decision.” Applying that

standard, the Board found no reason to disturb the ad-

ministrative judge’s determination that Mr. Morrison’s

retirement was involuntary.

With regard to the remedy, however, the Board modi-

fied the administrative judge’s decision “to clarify how the

facts of this case may affect the status quo ante relief.”

The Board explained that “status quo ante relief requires

that the agency first determine if and when the appellant

would have been removed had he not retired. . . . If, as

suggested by the unissued decision letter in the record,

the agency would have removed [Mr. Morrison] effective

July 13, 2012, then [his] retirement effective that date

would not be cancelled [and Mr. Morrison] would not be

entitled to reinstatement or any back pay based on the

MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 5

involuntary retirement action at issue in this appeal . . . .”

The Board added that if Mr. Morrison “would not have

been removed, or the effective date of the removal would

have occurred after July 13, 2012, then the appropriate

relief in this appeal would be to cancel the involuntary

retirement, restore him with appropriate back pay and

other benefits from July 13, 2012, until the date he

otherwise would have separated from service by either a

removal action or the mandatory retirement age, and to

adjust his retirement annuity accordingly, i.e., potentially

a later retirement date.” 1

Mr. Morrison petitions this court for review of the

Board’s decision. He argues that the Board improperly

permitted the Navy to reconstruct what would have

happened if his involuntary retirement had not occurred.

Instead, he contends that he is entitled to back pay as a

matter of law for the period between July 13, 2012, and

the date of his mandatory retirement in June 2014.

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction over petitions for review of orders of

the Merit Systems Protection Board appeals derives from

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). That statute provides that this

court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal “from

a final order or final decision” of the Board. See also 5

U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (“[A] petition to review a final order

1 Although not part of the record in this case, the

parties have informed us that the Navy subsequently

found that Mr. Morrison would have been terminated as

of July 13, 2012, and took the steps necessary to complete

the removal action. The Navy therefore did not award

Mr. Morrison any back pay. Mr. Morrison has filed a

separate appeal from that action to the Board. That

appeal was dismissed without prejudice pending the

outcome of this proceeding.

6 MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”). Our

jurisdiction over a petition therefore turns on whether the

determination that the petitioner seeks to appeal “consti-

tutes a ‘final order or final decision’ for purposes of section

1295(a)(9).” Weed v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 F.3d 1359,

1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Haines v. Merit Sys. Prot.

Bd., 44 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

The statutory requirement that we limit our review to

“final” orders and decisions of the Board parallels the

familiar “final judgment rule” in appellate proceedings,

which is aimed at curbing “piecemeal appellate review of

trial court decisions which do not terminate the litiga-

tion.” United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S.

263, 265 (1982). As a general rule, an order is final only

when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves

nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”

Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

The same policy underlies the principle that “an order

remanding a matter to an administrative agency for

further findings and proceedings is not final.” Cabot

Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir.

1986); see also Caesar v. West, 195 F.3d 1373, 1374 (Fed.

Cir. 1999) (“Remands to administrative agencies, because

they mark a continuation of the case, are not generally

considered final decisions for jurisdictional purposes.”);

see generally 15B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Prac-

tice and Procedure § 3914.32, at 237-38 (2d ed. 2006)

(“The general rule is that a remand is not appealable as a

final decision . . . . Since the remand is not final, it can be

reviewed on appeal from the eventual final disposi-

tion . . . .”).

In determining whether an agency has remanded the

case for further proceedings, we look to whether the

agency has required further administrative adjudication;

we do not base our decision on whether the agency has

MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 7

formally denominated its action as a “remand.” If the

agency’s order contemplates further adjudication or other

proceedings beyond the ministerial implementation of the

agency’s directive, the order will be treated as a remand.

See Weed, 571 F.3d at 1362 (dismissing appeal for lack of

jurisdiction where the Board’s decision was “in essence[] a

remand” because it forwarded the petition to the Board’s

regional office for “further adjudication” and ordered the

Social Security Administration to reconstruct the hiring

process for the position for which the petitioner had

applied); Cummings v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 500 F. App’x

941, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“While the MSPB’s decision

does not explicitly remand the case to [the agency], in

substance, it acts as a remand for further adjudication

regarding Mr. Cummings’ total years of service. . . .

Given that proceedings continue in [the agency], the

MSPB’s decision was not ‘final’ because it failed to dispose

of the ‘entire action.’ We therefore lack jurisdiction over

Mr. Cummings’ appeal at this time.” (internal citation

omitted)). 2

Although the Board concluded that Mr. Morrison’s

retirement was involuntary and that he should be re-

turned to the status quo ante, the Board did not “dispos[e]

of [the] entire action.” Haines, 44 F.3d at 1000. Rather,

the Board stated that, to ascertain the appropriate relief,

2 Mr. Morrison argues that the Board’s order was

final because the Board denominated its decision as its

“final order.” The Board’s characterization of its order

does not, however, govern our jurisdiction under our

jurisdictional statutes. In the Weed case, for example, the

Board characterized its order as a “final decision,” see

Weed v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 107 M.S.P.R. 142, 149 (2007),

but we nonetheless held that the Board’s action was not

final for purposes of our jurisdiction, Weed, 571 F.3d at

1361.

8 MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY

“the agency [must] first determine if and when [Mr.

Morrison] would have been removed had he not retired.”

The Board then outlined various potential outcomes,

depending on how the Navy ultimately decided that

question. Because it is not the case that the Board’s

decision left “nothing for the [agency] to do but execute

judgment,” the Board’s ruling was not a final order or

decision, and we lack jurisdiction over the petition for

review. See Cabot, 788 F.2d at 1543 (an order seeking

“additional findings, determination, and redetermination”

from the agency is not final for purposes of appellate

review); see also Gingery v. Dep’t of Def., 392 F. App’x 855,

856 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] Board decision directing an

agency to reconstruct the hiring process does not qualify

as a final judgment for purposes of invoking our jurisdic-

tion.”); Marshall v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 587

F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Mr. Marshall could not

have appealed the MSPB’s first reconstruction order

[because] . . . ‘an order remanding a matter to an adminis-

trative agency for further findings and proceedings is not

final.’” (quoting Cabot, 788 F.2d at 1542)).

Mr. Morrison argues that the Board merely sent this

case back to the Navy to implement and comply with the

Board’s decision, not to conduct any further proceedings.

We disagree. As the Board’s opinion makes clear, the

Board required the Navy to decide, in the first instance,

whether and when Mr. Morrison would have been termi-

nated if he had not retired. That was the critical modifi-

cation that the Board made to the initial decision, in

which the administrative judge had ruled that Mr. Morri-

son “would have been separated effective July 13, 2012.”

The Board directed that such a determination had to be

made by the agency. 3 As such, the Board’s decision was

3 Mr. Morrison suggests that on remand the agency

was virtually certain to decide that he would have been

MORRISON v. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 9

not final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9), and we

therefore dismiss the petition without reaching the mer-

its.

No costs.

DISMISSED

removed as of July 13, 2012, and that subsequent events

have proved that to be true. But our jurisdiction cannot

turn on a party’s estimate of the probability of losing on

remand. And the fact that there has been a decision by

the agency on remand, which has been appealed to the

Board, is a further indication that it is not this appeal,

but the subsequent one, which includes the full record of

the remand proceedings, that is the proper vehicle for

determining whether Mr. Morrison is entitled to back pay

for any or all of the period between July 13, 2012, and his

mandatory retirement date in June 2014.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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