Opinion

Harold Harden v. Monninghoff

  • 703 F. App'x 522
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Nov 20, 2017
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Canby, Trott, Graber
Nature of suit
Prisoner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.0%

liability under § 1983 requires showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation

How later courts described this case

  • liability under § 1983 requires showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAROLD D. HARDEN, No. 16-17204

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00377-APG-PAL

v.

MEMORANDUM*

MONNINGHOFF, Dr.; AGULAR, S/O at

NDOC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 15, 2017**

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Nevada state prisoner Harold D. Harden appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process

violation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the

district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011).

We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant

Moninghoff (erroneously sued as Monninghoff) because Harden failed to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Moninghoff personally participated

in the alleged rights deprivation. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th

Cir. 2002) (liability under § 1983 requires showing of personal participation in the

alleged rights deprivation).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant

Aguilera (erroneously sued as Agular) because it would not have been clear to

every reasonable officer that carrying out a transfer order was unlawful under the

circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (discussing

qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established only if “every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as without merit Harden’s contention that the parties reached a

settlement on which defendants later reneged.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

2 16-17204

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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