Michael Williams v. Audrey King

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS, No. 15-15259

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 1:13-cv-01253-

MJS

AUDREY KING, Executive Director,

Coalinga State Hospital; COALINGA

STATE HOSPITAL, OPINION

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Michael J. Seng, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 14, 2017

San Francisco, California

Filed November 9, 2017

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and N. Randy Smith,

Circuit Judges, and Susan P. Watters,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

*

The Honorable Susan P. Watters, United States District Judge for

the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

2 WILLIAMS V. KING

SUMMARY**

Prisoner Civil Rights / Civil Procedure

The panel vacated a magistrate judge’s dismissal of an

action brought by a civil detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and remanded for further proceedings.

After plaintiff consented to have his case decided by a

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the

magistrate judge dismissed plaintiff’s complaint prior to

service of process for failure to state a claim. The panel held

that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the consent of all

plaintiffs and defendants named in the complaint—

irrespective of service of process—before jurisdiction may

vest in a magistrate judge to hear and decide a civil case that

a district court would otherwise hear. Because consent was

not obtained from the defendants in this case, the magistrate

judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint. The panel

therefore vacated the dismissal and remanded.

COUNSEL

Andrew Bentz (argued), Jones Day, Washington, D.C., for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Karli A. Eisenberg (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Niromi W. Pfeiffer, Supervising Deputy Attorney General;

Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Senior Assistant Attorney General;

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

WILLIAMS V. KING 3

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney

General, Sacramento, California; for Amicus Curiae

California Attorney General.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the consent of all plaintiffs

and defendants named in the complaint—irrespective of

service of process—before jurisdiction may vest in a

magistrate judge to hear and decide a civil case that a district

court would otherwise hear. Because consent was not

obtained from the defendants in this case, we vacate the

magistrate judge’s dismissal and remand.

I

Under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act

(SVPA), inmates, approaching the end of their sentence or

nearing eligibility for supervised release, may be referred for

evaluation to determine if they pose a continuing risk of

committing sexually violent offenses. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6601(a). If, after these evaluations, it is determined that the

individual is a sexually violent predator, the government may

request a probable cause hearing to establish a basis for

tolling parole eligibility or release until the resolution of a

jury trial to prove that the individual is a sexually violent

predator. See id. § 6601(h)–(j); id. § 6601.5; id. § 6603.

Williams was convicted of three counts of rape in 1991.

As he neared the completion of his sentence, Williams was

evaluated and identified as a potential sexually violent

4 WILLIAMS V. KING

predator. In December 2000, the San Francisco District

Attorney’s office initiated a probable cause hearing to

establish that Williams was a sexually violent predator. At the

December 21, 2000 hearing, the judge found probable cause

to believe Williams was a sexually violent predator. Since

this initial determination, Williams has raised challenges to

his continued confinement, including seeking to set aside the

probable cause determinations and filing successive habeas

petitions in California state court. Though temporarily

successful in setting aside initial probable cause

determinations, subsequent evaluations and probable cause

determinations have reaffirmed the propriety of Williams’s

detention as a potential sexually violent predator. However,

Williams has yet to have a trial to establish whether he is a

sexually violent predator.

In August 2013, Williams filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

asserting that this continued detention violated the First and

Fifth Amendments, naming Audrey King and the Coalinga

State Hospital as defendants. Pursuant to the district court’s

local rules, Williams was sent a standard form asking if he

would consent to have his case decided by a magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Nobody disputes that

Williams consented. Thereafter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the magistrate judge conducted a standard

screening of Williams’s § 1983 action and dismissed the

complaint for failure to state a claim. However, the named

defendants in Williams’s complaint had not yet been served.

Accordingly, they had not consented to jurisdiction to have

WILLIAMS V. KING 5

the case decided by a magistrate judge. Williams timely

appealed the dismissal of his complaint.1

Williams first challenges the magistrate judge’s

jurisdiction to dismiss his complaint without preliminarily

obtaining consent to jurisdiction from the defendants named

in the complaint. He also challenges the merits of the

dismissal. Because we agree with Williams that the

magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss, we do not

address Williams remaining arguments.

II

We review de novo “whether the magistrate judge validly

entered judgment on behalf of the district court.” See Allen v.

Meyer, 755 F.3d 866, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2014). “[O]ur

jurisdiction on appeal ‘depends on the magistrate judge’s

lawful exercise of jurisdiction.’” Id. at 867 (quoting Anderson

v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 351 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.

2003)). Magistrate judges exercise jurisdiction in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 636. United States v. Rivera-Guerrero,

377 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004). They “may conduct any

or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order

the entry of judgment in the case” only “[u]pon the consent

of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

73 (“[A] magistrate judge may, if all parties consent, conduct

a civil action or proceeding, including a jury or nonjury

trial.”).

1

This court requested the participation of the California State

Attorney General (the State) to defend the dismissal, as amicus or on

behalf of King and the Coalinga State Hospital. The State appeared as

amicus and participated in briefing and oral argument.

6 WILLIAMS V. KING

Williams consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction

consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Therefore, the

magistrate judge screened and dismissed the complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which “provides

that a district court ‘shall dismiss’ an in forma pauperis

complaint ‘if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)). When his complaint was dismissed, Williams

had yet to serve it on the named defendants (and they had

accordingly not yet consented to have the magistrate judge

hear and decide the case).

Williams asserts that his consent alone could not vest the

magistrate judge with jurisdiction under § 636(c)(1). He

argues that the term “parties” in § 636(c)(1) includes all

named plaintiffs and defendants in the complaint. Thus, he

contends that the absence of consent from the unserved

defendants deprived the magistrate judge of jurisdiction to

dismiss his complaint. We agree.

Section 636 does not define the term “parties,” so we turn

to the principles of statutory interpretation to identify its

meaning. The term “party” or “parties” is a legal term of art.

See, e.g., United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1438

(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The term ‘party’ is a technical term having

a particular meaning in legal parlance.”). “[A]nd it is a

‘cardinal rule of statutory construction’ that, when Congress

employs a term of art, ‘it presumably knows and adopts the

cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in

the body of learning from which it was taken.’” F.A.A. v.

Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012) (quoting Molzof v. United

States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992)); see also Huffman v. C.I.R.,

WILLIAMS V. KING 7

978 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Dec. 4,

1992) (“Words with a fixed legal or judicially settled

meaning, where the context so requires, must be presumed to

have been used in that sense.”). Accordingly, we examine

contemporaneous sources to determine the legal meaning of

the term at the time Congress employed it in the statute. Cf.

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (identifying

the principle that we look for the meaning of terms as they

would have been understood “at the time Congress enacted

the statute”).

Congress adopted § 636(c)(1) in 1979. See S. Rep. 96-74

(1979). At that time, Black’s Law Dictionary defined

“[p]arties” as “[t]he persons who take part in the performance

of any act, or who are directly interested in any affair,

contract, or conveyance, or who are actively concerned in the

prosecution and defense of any legal proceeding.” Parties,

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Black’s also

confirmed the term’s status as a term of art (“‘[p]arty’ is a

technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance”)

and stated that “it refers to those by or against whom a legal

suit is brought . . . .” Party, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.

1979).

This definition has not significantly changed since 1979.

See Party, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). However,

that language has since been adopted by our circuit and the

Supreme Court. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313

(2011) (“In general, ‘[a] “party” to litigation is “[o]ne by or

against whom a lawsuit is brought”’ or one who ‘become[s]

a party by intervention, substitution, or third-party practice.’”

(alterations in original) (citations omitted)); Robert Ito Farm,

Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, 842 F.3d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]

‘party,’ as that term is used in federal law, is ‘[o]ne by or

8 WILLIAMS V. KING

against whom a lawsuit is brought.’” (second alteration in

original) (quoting United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of

New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009)). Accordingly, all

plaintiffs and defendants named in the complaint are “parties”

within the meaning of § 636(c)(1)—irrespective of whether

the complaint has been properly served.

Section 636(c)(1) also requires consent of all parties—not

a subset of them—for jurisdiction to vest in the magistrate

judge. Section 636(c) identifies consent as “the decision of

the parties.” § 636(c)(2). Moreover, the statute directs the

court to “advise the parties that they are free to withhold

consent without adverse substantive consequences” and

requires implementation of “procedures to protect the

voluntariness of the parties’ consent.” Id. Taken together, this

language conveys that any party’s objection is sufficient to

prevent jurisdiction from vesting in the magistrate judge.

Accordingly, jurisdiction cannot vest until the court has

received consent from all parties to an action.

Our decision is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s

decision in Coleman v. Labor and Industry Review

Commission, 860 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2017). After extensive

analysis of many of the same issues we have addressed, it

also concluded that consent of all parties (including unserved

defendants) is a prerequisite to a magistrate judge’s

jurisdiction to enter dispositive decisions under § 636(c)(1).

See Coleman, 860 F.3d at 470–73. We agree with the Seventh

Circuit’s sound reasoning that this interpretation is the most

consistent with the use of the term “parties” in the Federal

WILLIAMS V. KING 9

Rules of Civil Procedure and the other provisions in § 636.

See id.2

The State argues that a plaintiff’s consent alone is

sufficient to satisfy § 636(c)(1) in some cases. We disagree.

The State asserts that this case is analogous to United States

v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998), where we

determined that a property owner’s consent to magistrate

judge jurisdiction was not a prerequisite to entry of default

against his interest in the subject property. Id. at 1316–17.

Real Property is distinguishable. It was an in rem action. Id.

at 1313. Because the action was against the property, the

2

The dissent in the Seventh Circuit rested its views on the practical

application of the majority’s interpretation and a strained concept of

implied consent. 860 F.3d at 475–77. It made no effort to address the

majority’s analysis of the technical meaning of the term “parties” or the

contextual clues from the statute itself. See id. When rehearing en banc

was denied, the dissenting judges to such denial likewise failed to address

the Coleman majority’s analysis of the text of § 636. See id. at 477–80.

Instead, the en banc dissenters argued that earlier Seventh Circuit

precedent required service as a prerequisite to party status for purposes of

§ 636(c) and that maintaining this rule would best avoid practical

limitations of the Coleman majority’s interpretation. Id. Though we

acknowledge the practical impact of our interpretation, Congress

constrains our decision. We are bound by the language employed in the

statute.

The en banc dissent also suggested that our interpretation would

preclude consent where one party has been dismissed from the suit by a

district judge (without giving consent to have a magistrate judge decide

the case) and the remaining parties desire to have their claims against each

other heard and decided by a magistrate judge. Id. That case is not before

us, but we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that this conclusion

necessarily follows from the rule we adopt today. Once a party has been

dismissed entirely from a lawsuit, it would be a strained reading to suggest

that the individual or entity remains a “party” as that term is understood

in its technical legal sense.

10 WILLIAMS V. KING

interested property owner was not a named party. Id. at 1317.

We held that “absent the filing of a claim to a property

subject to forfeiture, a ‘putative claimant is not a party to the

action.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 8136 S. Dobson Street,

125 F.3d 1076, 1082 (7th Cir. 1997)). The same principle

does not apply here. King and the Coalinga State Hospital

were named as defendants in the complaint. Accordingly,

they became parties to the action when Williams filed the

complaint. Thus, their consent was required under § 636(c)(1)

from the outset.

The State next points to Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530

(5th Cir. 1995), and several lower court decisions, identifying

various circumstances where consent of unserved parties was

unnecessary to establish jurisdiction. See id. at 532; Lester v.

J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1085 n.2

(N.D. Cal. 2013); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–888, 809

F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Trujillo v. Tally,

Case No. CV03-533-S-MHW, 2007 WL 4261928, at *1 (D.

Idaho Nov. 30, 2007). First, these non-binding decisions did

not address the issue before us in much detail, and the

analysis there is unpersuasive. Without explanation, the Fifth

Circuit declared that, because the defendants “had not been

served, they were not parties to [the] action at the time the

magistrate entered judgment,” concluding that “lack of

written consent from the defendants did not deprive the

magistrate judge of jurisdiction.” Neals, 59 F.3d at 532. We

cannot fault our interpretation where the Fifth Circuit has not

explained the basis for its contrary holding. The lower court

opinions merely cite Neals or Real Property without

additional analysis. See Lester, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 n.2;

Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1155; Trujillo,

2007 WL 4261928, at *1. Accordingly, we reject the State’s

argument. We find no basis for an exception to the general

WILLIAMS V. KING 11

requirement that all parties must consent for jurisdiction to

vest under § 636(c)(1).

III

Because the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to

dismiss Williams’s complaint, we vacate the dismissal and

remand. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED AND REMANDED.