Opinion

Simmons v. Secretary of Health & Human Services

  • 875 F.3d 632
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Nov 7, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Prost
On the bench
Prost, Lourie, Taranto
Cited by
540 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.1%

stating of the prior Cloer decision that “we explained that this ‘statute of limitation issue,’ i.e. whether a petitioner can received attorneys’ fees despite filing a petition after the statute of limitations has expired, may be encompassed within the reasonable basis inquiry, along with ‘the underlying merits of the claim.’”

How later courts described this case

  • stating of the prior Cloer decision that “we explained that this ‘statute of limitation issue,’ i.e. whether a petitioner can received attorneys’ fees despite filing a petition after the statute of limitations has expired, may be encompassed within the reasonable basis inquiry, along with ‘the underlying merits of the claim.’”
  • concluding that the special master abused her discretion in finding that an “impending statute of limitations deadline” can be used to establish a reasonable basis for a claim
  • indicating that “[a]lthough an impending statute of limitations deadline may relate to whether ‘the petition was brought in good faith’ by counsel, the deadline does not provide a reasonable basis for the merits of the petitioner’s claim.”
  • concluding that reasonable basis was “unrelated to counsel’s conduct,” when counsel filed quickly to toll the statue of limitations despite lacking evidence

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

HENRY SIMMONS,

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2017-1405

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in No. 1:13-vv-00825-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B.

Firestone.

______________________

Decided: November 7, 2017

______________________

JOSEPH PEPPER, Conway Homer, PC, Boston, MA,

argued for petitioner-appellant. Also represented by

RONALD C. HOMER.

VORIS EDWARD JOHNSON, JR., Vaccine/Torts Branch,

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,

Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also

represented by CHAD A. READLER, C. SALVATORE

D’ALESSIO, CATHARINE E. REEVES.

2 SIMMONS v. HHS

JENNIFER ANNE MAGLIO, Maglio Christopher & Toale

PA Law Firm, Sarasota, FL, for amici curiae Vaccine

Injured Petitioners Bar Association, The George Washing-

ton University Law School Vaccine Injury Litigation

Clinic.

______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge.

Appellant Henry Simmons appeals the decision of the

Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”), Simmons v.

Sec’y of HHS, 128 Fed. Cl. 579 (2016) (“Claims Court

Decision”), denying attorneys’ fees and costs for his vac-

cine case. Because the Claims Court properly concluded

that there was no reasonable basis for Mr. Simmons’s

claim, we affirm.

I

Mr. Simmons first contacted counsel in August 2011,

claiming that he developed Guillain-Barre Syndrome

(“GBS”) as a result of his October 26, 2010 flu vaccination.

He provided his vaccination record to counsel and counsel

agreed to represent him. After the August conversation,

counsel was unable to contact Mr. Simmons despite

making several attempts. In light of Mr. Simmons’s

failure to respond, counsel sent Mr. Simmons a letter in

March 2013 notifying him that their attorney-client

relationship had been terminated. The termination letter

was returned as undeliverable.

Then, on October 17, 2013, nearly two years after his

previous communication and shortly before the three-year

statute of limitations on his Vaccine Act claim might have

expired, Mr. Simmons contacted counsel’s firm and ex-

pressed that he would like to move forward with his

petition. Counsel spoke with Mr. Simmons one additional

SIMMONS v. HHS 3

time on October 21, 2013. The next day, on October 22,

2013, counsel filed Mr. Simmons’s petition for compensa-

tion. The petition did not include any medical records or

other supporting evidence showing that Mr. Simmons had

been diagnosed with GBS. In January 2014, the special

master ordered counsel to produce Mr. Simmons’s medical

records. Counsel informed the special master that coun-

sel had once again lost all contact with Mr. Simmons and

that despite making numerous attempts, they were

unable to acquire his medical records. The special master

dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

After the special master dismissed Mr. Simmons’s pe-

tition, counsel filed two fee petitions seeking a total of

$8,267.89 in fees and costs. The special master found that

Mr. Simmons’s petition had been filed in good faith and

there was a reasonable basis for the claim. In particular,

the special master noted that because there was no direct

evidence of bad faith, counsel had satisfied the good faith

requirement. Further, the special master found that

counsel had satisfied the reasonable basis requirement

because Mr. Simmons “provided Counsel with a vaccina-

tion receipt”; “after consulting with Petitioner, Counsel

judged the claim potentially meritorious”; and “[w]hile

that alone may not have provided a reasonable basis for

filing a claim, Petitioner then disappeared for almost two

years and reemerged less than ten days before the statute

of limitations expired” at which point “[t]o not file a

petition . . . would be tantamount to an ethical violation.”

Simmons v. Sec’y of HHS, 2016 WL 2621070, at *3 (Fed.

Cl. Apr. 14, 2016) (“Special Master’s Decision”). On this

basis, the special master awarded the attorneys’ fees. Id.

The government appealed the special master’s deci-

sion to the Claims Court. On review, the court reversed

the special master’s decision, concluding that the special

master erred in finding that counsel had a reasonable

basis for Mr. Simmons’s claim. Claims Court Decision,

128 Fed. Cl. at 583. In particular, the Claims Court noted

4 SIMMONS v. HHS

that “[c]ounsel failed to produce any evidence, either at

the time the petition was filed or in the five months before

the special master dismissed the case for failure to prose-

cute, to support the claim that petitioner suffered from

GBS caused by his flu vaccine.” Id. Further, the Claims

Court held that “[t]he fact that the statute of limitations

was about to expire did not excuse counsel’s obligation to

show he had some basis for the claim beyond his conver-

sation with the petitioner.” Id. at 584.

On appeal to this court, Mr. Simmons’s counsel ar-

gues that the special master did not abuse her discretion

in awarding attorneys’ fees and that we should affirm her

award. The government, on the other hand, argues that

the special master’s rationale improperly conflated the

subjective good faith analysis with the objective reasona-

ble-basis inquiry. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.

§ 300aa–12(f). Because we agree with the government

that the special master conducted an improper reasona-

ble-basis inquiry, we affirm the Claims Court’s decision.

II

A

Under the Vaccine Act, an unsuccessful petitioner

may be awarded attorneys’ fees “if the special master or

court determines that the petition was brought in good

faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for

which the petition was brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–

15(e)(1) (emphasis added). As the Claims Court has

previously noted, “good faith and reasonable basis” are

“two distinct facets.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed.

Cl. 276, 289 (2014). And “only ‘good faith’ is subjective;

‘reasonable basis’ is objective.” Id.

In cases brought under the Vaccine Act, we review a

decision of the special master to determine if it is “arbi-

trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of HHS, 632

SIMMONS v. HHS 5

F.3d 1381, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera v. Sec’y

of HHS, 515 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “An abuse

of discretion may be found when (1) the court’s decision is

clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the deci-

sion is based on an erroneous conclusion of the law;

(3) the court’s findings are clearly erroneous; or (4) the

record contains no evidence upon which the court ration-

ally could have based its decision.” Hendler v. United

States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “‘Not in

accordance with the law’ refers to the application of the

wrong legal standard, and the application of the law is

reviewed de novo.” Rodriguez, 632 F.3d at 1384 (citing

Markovich v. Sec’y of HHS, 477 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir.

2007)).

B

In her attorneys’ fees decision, the special master con-

cluded that Mr. Simmons could receive attorneys’ fees

because the “Petitioner had a reasonable basis for submit-

ting his petition.” Special Master’s Decision, 2016 WL

2621070, at *3. In particular, she noted that while the

evidence of Mr. Simmons’s claim “alone may not have

provided a reasonable basis for filing a claim,” the fact

that “Petitioner then disappeared for almost two years

and reemerged less than ten days before the statute of

limitations expired” factored heavily into her analysis. Id.

According to the special master, counsel had a reasonable

basis for filing Mr. Simmons’s petition because “[t]o not

file a petition at that point . . . would be tantamount to an

ethical violation.” Id.

The government argues that this analysis is improper

because “by considering [the] attorney’s conduct as part of

the reasonable basis assessment, [the special master]

folded the subjective good faith provision into the reason-

able basis requirement, and effectively either rendered

the ‘good faith’ language [in § 300aa–15(e)(1)] superflu-

ous, or the ‘reasonable basis’ language meaningless.”

6 SIMMONS v. HHS

Appellee Br. 28. According to the government, “a looming

statute of limitations may excuse an attorney’s ethical

duty to investigate a claim prior to filing a Vaccine Act

petition, but that does not create a reasonable basis for

the claim in the petition.” Id. at 37.

We agree with the government’s argument. The Vac-

cine Act provides that there must be a “reasonable basis

for the claim for which the petition was brought” before

the special master may exercise her discretion in award-

ing attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(e)(1) (emphasis

added). Whether there is a looming statute of limitations

deadline, however, has no bearing on whether there is a

reasonable factual basis “for the claim” raised in the

petition. That is an objective inquiry unrelated to coun-

sel’s conduct. Although an impending statute of limita-

tions deadline may relate to whether “the petition was

brought in good faith” by counsel, the deadline does not

provide a reasonable basis for the merits of the petition-

er’s claim. Id.

Mr. Simmons’s counsel argues that the government’s

position is inconsistent with our decisions in Cloer v.

Secretary of HHS, 654 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

(en banc) (“Cloer I”) and Cloer v. Secretary of HHS, 675

F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Cloer II”).

Reply Br. 8–9. In Cloer I, we addressed Dr. Cloer’s peti-

tion for compensation under the Vaccine Act and in

Cloer II, we addressed her motion for attorneys’ fees. We

held in Cloer I that the Vaccine Act’s statute of limita-

tions is not jurisdictional and that some claims brought

under the Vaccine Act are subject to equitable tolling.

654 F.3d at 1344. In Cloer II, we held that because the

statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, a petitioner

may receive attorneys’ fees even for an untimely petition

so long as “the petition was brought in good faith and

there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the

petition was brought.” 675 F.3d at 1360. In this context,

we explained that this “statute of limitations issue,” i.e.,

SIMMONS v. HHS 7

whether a petitioner can receive attorneys’ fees despite

filing a petition after the statute of limitations has ex-

pired, may be encompassed within the reasonable basis

inquiry, along with “the underlying merits of the claim.”

Id. at 1362. We therefore held that “[a] petitioner who

asserts an unsuccessful but nonfrivolous limitations claim

should be eligible for a determination of whether reasona-

ble attorneys’ fees and costs . . . should be awarded.” Id.

at 1364.

Unlike in Cloer II, the issue here is not whether coun-

sel had a reasonable basis for Mr. Simmons’s claim de-

spite the expiration of the statute of limitations. Instead,

the issue here is whether counsel may establish a reason-

able basis for the merits of Mr. Simmons’s claim based on

the fact that there was an impending statute of limita-

tions deadline. We conclude that counsel may not use this

impending statute of limitations deadline to establish a

reasonable basis for Mr. Simmons’s claim. Because the

special master only found that there was a reasonable

basis for Mr. Simmons’s claim because of the impending

statute of limitations deadline, we conclude that she

abused her discretion by misapplying the law. According-

ly, we affirm the Claims Court’s decision.

AFFIRMED

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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