Billy Joe Greenwood v. Tennessee Board of Parole

10/23/2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 1, 2017

BILLY JOE GREENWOOD v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 15-1497-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

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No. M2016-02059-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of

Parole (“the Board”). The inmate was convicted in 1990 of first degree murder and first

degree burglary. The Board denied parole on the basis that the inmate’s release at the

time of the hearing would depreciate the seriousness of the crime for which he was

convicted. The inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County

Chancery Court (“trial court”), alleging violations of due process and equal protection.

The trial court denied relief, determining that no grounds existed to disturb the Board’s

decision. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RICHARD H.

DINKINS, J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Billy Joe Greenwood, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor

General; and Thomas J. Aumann, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee

Board of Parole.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Billy Joe Greenwood is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of

Correction, currently housed at the Morgan County Correctional Complex. In 1990, Mr.

Greenwood was convicted of first degree murder and first degree burglary. He was

sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction and six years of incarceration for the

burglary conviction, with such sentences to be served concurrently.1 On direct appeal,

Mr. Greenwood’s convictions were affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Criminal

Appeals, which recited the following facts underlying Mr. Greenwood’s original

convictions:

The record establishes that in April 1989, the defendant was quite

distraught over his recent divorce from Alice Evonne Dishman and

resulting separation from his young daughter. While in this troubled state

of mind, the defendant began to consume excessive amounts of alcoholic

beverages and drugs. During the day of 22 April 1989, he drank

approximately two cases of beer, smoked marijuana, and ingested cocaine

and valium.

That evening, Greenwood broke into the home of Sherry Dishman,

Alice Evonne Dishman’s sister, and took a loaded .30-.30 caliber rifle.

Rifle in hand, he sat on the hood of his car in front of her home waiting for

his former wife to stop by.

Sherry Dishman arrived first. She was accompanied by a male

friend, Charles Haney. They did not observe Greenwood, and he permitted

them to pass without incident.

A short time later, David Dishman drove up, and Greenwood

confronted him. After saying to Dishman, “You ain’t Evonne, you son-of-

a-bitch,” he shot Dishman in the stomach. Leaving Dishman on the ground

where he had fallen, the defendant went to the front door of the home,

kicked it in, and entered.

Once inside, he was met by Sherry Dishman and Haney. The rifle

discharged as the three of them struggled over it. Unable to cock the rifle

again, the defendant produced a knife and threatened to use it to kill them.

Haney and Dishman were able to eject the defendant. Outside again,

the defendant noticed that David Dishman was attempting to stand.

Dishman reached out to the defendant, called his name, and apologized for

whatever he had done to him. In response, the defendant said that they

would die together and thereupon shot Dishman a second time. Dishman

1

Mr. Greenwood was initially sentenced to consecutive sentences, which were later modified by the

Court of Criminal Appeals to run concurrently. See State v. Greenwood, No. 01C01-9108-CC-00228,

1992 WL 38054, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 1992).

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later succumbed to these wounds, and the defendant was arrested two days

later.

State v. Greenwood, No. 01C01-9108-CC-00228, 1992 WL 38054, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Mar. 3, 1992) (reinstated op.).2

According to Tennessee Board of Parole records, a parole hearing regarding Mr.

Greenwood was held on July 14, 2009, following which the Board denied parole upon

finding that Mr. Greenwood’s release from custody at that time would have depreciated

the seriousness of his crime. The Board recommended that Mr. Greenwood complete or

participate in “anger [management], substance abuse [treatment], criminal thinking, etc.

programs,” and a review hearing was scheduled for July 2015.

This second parole hearing, held on July 23, 2015, is at issue now on appeal. Mr.

Greenwood spoke during the hearing and requested that the Board release him from

custody on parole. Evidence presented at the hearing included the factual circumstances

concerning the criminal offense for which Mr. Greenwood is incarcerated, in addition to

signatures supporting and in opposition to parole; oral statements in support of parole

presented by Mr. Greenwood, two prison employees, and a friend of Mr. Greenwood’s;

certificates of completion from various programs in which Mr. Greenwood had

participated while incarcerated, including Change Companies Residential Drug Abuse

Program, Victim Impact Program, Pro-Social Life Skills Program, and Behavioral

Therapeutic Community; letters both in support of and in opposition to Mr. Greenwood’s

release on parole; and oral statements from Alice Dishman, Sherry Dishman, Charles

Haney, and a representative of the district attorney’s office in opposition to Mr.

Greenwood’s release.

Following the parole hearing, the hearing officer, Board member Tim Gobble,

informed Mr. Greenwood that he was voting to deny parole, having concluded that the

seriousness of Mr. Greenwood’s crime would be depreciated by his release at that time.

When informing Mr. Greenwood of his recommendation, Mr. Gobble stated:

Mr. Greenwood, after considering the totality of the circumstances here and

your file, there [are] some things I want to commend you on. I do want to

commend you on your institutional behavior and your efforts there.

2

The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals regarding Mr. Greenwood’s original convictions was

vacated and reinstated twice, each time to allow Mr. Greenwood to file a delayed Rule 11 Application to

the Tennessee Supreme Court regarding his original convictions. Mr. Greenwood filed an application for

permission to appeal to the Supreme Court on December 15, 1999, which was subsequently denied on

May 15, 2000. See Greenwood v. State, No. 01C01-9803-CR-00134, 1999 WL 975116, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.

Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 15, 2000); Greenwood v. Newberry, No.

01C01-9803-CR-00134, 1999 WL 105099 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 1999).

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I want to commend you on your program participation and your

efforts there with your substance abuse and addiction issues and your

admitted anger issues that you were no doubt dealing with at the point of

this offense.

But I also cannot overcome at this time the seriousness of this

offense where a young man was ruthlessly and needlessly gunned down by

you not once, but twice, and the 18-year-old young man had no

involvement in anything at all with what you were angry about, and had a

full life ahead of him that was taken away from him senselessly and

needlessly.

And you having served less than 30 years of a life conviction

prevents me from voting to parole you at this time because of the

seriousness of the offense in which you were convicted of.

To do so at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime

of which you’ve been convicted and promote disrespect for the law. So my

vote is to deny your parole and review it again in July of 2020. That’s five

years from now.

I do want to commend you on the efforts that you are making

towards rehabilitation. I think you are showing some progress. I want to

see that continue.

I appreciate the comments that the prison officials have made, and I

know they don’t do that lightly.

And so I think you have made some strides. But again, the

seriousness of this offense just prevents [me from] voting to parole you at

this time, having served less than 30 years of a life sentence.

Three additional Board members adopted Mr. Gobble’s reasoning and voted unanimously

to deny parole. On August 4, 2015, the Board provided Mr. Greenwood with written

notice that parole had been denied and that his next parole hearing would be scheduled

for July 2020. Mr. Greenwood filed an administrative appeal with the Board, which was

ultimately denied. Following a review of the Board’s file and an audio recording of the

hearing, the Board reasoned that Mr. Greenwood’s allegation that significant procedural

errors had occurred at the parole hearing was unsubstantiated.

Mr. Greenwood subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial

court. Upon the Board’s notice of no opposition to the issuance of a writ of certiorari, the

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trial court granted Mr. Greenwood’s petition.3 In the trial court, Mr. Greenwood alleged

that the Board’s denial of parole violated “his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process of law under the United States Constitution and article one sections eight and

nine of the Tennessee Constitution.” Mr. Greenwood also alleged that his equal

protection rights were violated, arguing that other inmates who were similarly situated

had been released on parole.

The trial court subsequently entered an order dismissing Mr. Greenwood’s petition

upon finding that “[t]he declination of parole based upon seriousness of the offense is

supported by evidence in the hearing transcript in this case, describing [Mr.

Greenwood’s] murder of a defenseless eighteen year old who was not involved in the

dispute between [Mr. Greenwood] and his ex-wife.” The court concluded that “the

Board’s final decision to decline parole based on the seriousness of the offense was

proper pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) and Arnold [v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles,

956 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. 1997).].” The trial court further found that the Board’s deferral

of parole for five years was “not unlawful or arbitrary.” Regarding Mr. Greenwood’s

equal protection argument, the trial court concluded that a petition for writ of certiorari

was “an improper vehicle for such a claim.” Mr. Greenwood timely appealed to this

Court.

II. Issue Presented

Mr. Greenwood presents one issue on appeal, which we have restated as follows:

Whether the trial court erred by denying relief to Mr. Greenwood upon his

petition for writ of certiorari.

III. Standard of Review

Inmates may use the common law writ of certiorari to seek review of decisions

made by prison disciplinary boards, parole eligibility review boards, and other similar

tribunals. Willis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003). The

common law writ of certiorari has been used to “remedy (1) fundamentally illegal

rulings; (2) proceedings inconsistent with essential legal requirements; (3) proceedings

that effectively deny a party his or her day in court; (4) decisions beyond the lower

tribunal's authority; and (5) plain and palpable abuses of discretion.” Id.

3

We note that the trial court’s issuance of a writ of certiorari did not adjudicate the issues presented

within the petition. Gore v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 132 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Instead,

the issuance of the writ of certiorari was “simply an order to the lower tribunal to file the complete record

of its proceedings so the trial court can determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief.” Keen v.

Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2007-00632-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 539059, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25,

2008) (citing Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 127 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Hall v.

McLesky, 83 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).

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The decision of whether to grant or deny parole to an inmate is vested with the

Board, not the courts. Hopkins v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles & Prob., 60 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, judicial review of a Board’s decision concerning parole is

limited. Id. Our Supreme Court has elucidated:

Judicial review of a parole decision made by the Board is narrow; it is

limited to consideration of whether the Board exceeded its jurisdiction or

acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101;

Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d 457, 463 (Tenn. 2012); Willis v. Tenn.

Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003). The reviewing court

does not inquire into the intrinsic correctness of the Board’s decision,

reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Board. State

v. Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2008); Robinson v. Clement, 65

S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The court considers only the

manner in which the decision was made. Stewart, 368 S.W.3d at 463

(citing Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997);

Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1994)).

Brennan v. Bd. of Parole, 512 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Tenn. 2017). Consequently, “the courts

will not use the common-law writ to grant relief when the Board’s decision was arrived at

in a constitutional and lawful manner.” Hopkins, 60 S.W.3d at 82 (citing Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-28-115(c) (1997); Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn.

1997); Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1994)).

Furthermore, we recognize that Mr. Greenwood is a pro se litigant and respect his

decision to proceed self-represented. With regard to self-represented litigants, this Court

has explained:

Pro se litigants who invoke the complex and sometimes technical

procedures of the courts assume a very heavy burden. Gray v. Stillman

White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R. I. 1987). Conducting a trial with a pro se

litigant who is unschooled in the intricacies of evidence and trial practice

can be difficult. Oko v. Rogers, 125 Ill. App.3d 720, 81 Ill. Dec. 72, 75,

466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1984). Nonetheless, trial courts are expected to

appreciate and be understanding of the difficulties encountered by a party

who is embarking into the maze of the judicial process with no experience

or formal training.

Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Parties

proceeding without benefit of counsel are “entitled to fair and equal treatment by the

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courts,” but we “must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same

substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.”

Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). This Court must “be

mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se

litigant’s adversary.” Id. Furthermore, “[p]ro se litigants are not . . . entitled to shift the

burden of litigating their case to the courts.” See Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482,

487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 20, 2010) (quoting Whitaker v.

Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).

IV. Due Process

Mr. Greenwood contends that the Board erred by denying his right to due process

by failing to provide specific reasons for the denial of parole and that the Board did not

afford proper deference to Mr. Greenwood’s progress while in prison or his ability to

successfully reintegrate into society. Mr. Greenwood also argues that the Board erred by

improperly considering his original offense when making its parole determination. Upon

careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying relief to Mr.

Greenwood in this regard.

Regarding due process, our Supreme Court has explained:

Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions protect the right to due

process of law. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides, “No State shall make or enforce any law

which . . . deprive[s] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law . . . .” Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution

states, “[N]o man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,

liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or

deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or

the law of the land.” We have determined that this provision of the

Tennessee Constitution is “synonymous” with the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Gallaher [v. Elam], 104 S.W.3d [455,] 463

[Tenn. 2003)] (citing Riggs [v. Burson], 941 S.W.2d [44,] 51 [(Tenn.

1997)]).

Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 514 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Tenn. 2017).

Moreover, as our Supreme Court has further elucidated:

Prisoners do not have an absolute right to be released on parole.

Hopkins v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles & Prob., 60 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001) (citing Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423, 304 S.W.2d 622, 623–24

(1957)). Parole is a privilege, not a right. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-

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117(a)(1), 40-35-503(b); Tenn. Bd. Parole R. 1100-01-01-.02(2); see also

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99

S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (“There is no constitutional or inherent

right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the

expiration of a valid sentence.”).

Brennan, 512 S.W.3d at 873.

Mr. Greenwood claims that he has a liberty interest in the grant of parole. It is

well settled that an inmate convicted of a crime has no fundamental right to be released

on parole prior to the expiration of his or her sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

503(b) (2014); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7

(1979); Hughes, 514 S.W.3d at 719. Although an inmate has no fundamental right or

liberty interest in being released on parole prior to the expiration of his or her sentence,

this Court has determined that “the Board of Paroles is obligated to follow the laws of the

State of Tennessee as well as its own rules, and that inmates are entitled to whatever due

process arises as a result of the proper application of the state statutes and the rules.”

Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 909 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

We first address Mr. Greenwood’s argument that the Board should have provided

him with the reasons for denial of parole “in detail and not in conclusory terms.”

Tennessee Board of Parole Rule 1100-01-01-.08(3) provides in pertinent part that the

Board “shall notify the inmate, in written form, of its final decision and reasons for the

decision.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.08(3). As a state prisoner in Tennessee,

Mr. Greenwood has no right to receive a specific and detailed statement of reasons for the

denial of parole. See Perry v. Bd. of Paroles, No. M1998-01018-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL

46990, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2001). In a similar appeal, this Court determined as

follows:

[The inmate] argues that the Board erred by failing to provide him with an

adequate statement of the evidence that the Board relied on in making its

decision. This argument fails . . . because the Board gave two adequate,

legally-supported justifications for denying [the inmate’s] parole, namely

the severity of his offense and the risk of adverse effects on institutional

discipline. No more definite statement was required.

Hopkins, 60 S.W.3d at 83 (emphasis added); see also Brennan, 512 S.W.3d at 876.

At the conclusion of Mr. Greenwood’s parole hearing, the hearing officer

informed Mr. Greenwood of his recommendation that the Board deny parole because Mr.

Greenwood’s release from incarceration at the time of the hearing would depreciate the

seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect of the law. The Board subsequently

delivered its official decision to deny parole to Mr. Greenwood on August 4, 2015,

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providing as reason for denial that Mr. Greenwood’s release from prison at that time

“would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which [Mr. Greenwood] stands

convicted or promote disrespect of the law.” Upon our review of the record, we

determine that the trial court correctly found that the Board provided a legally sufficient

reason for its denial of Mr. Greenwood’s parole. Mr. Greenwood was not entitled to

receive a more detailed or specific statement.

Mr. Greenwood also argues that the decision made by the Board was arbitrary,

illegal, or fraudulent because there was no “meaningful consideration of [Mr.

Greenwood’s] eligibility to reintegrate into society.” The Board may consider the

following factors when making parole determinations:

(a) The nature of the crime and its severity;

(b) The inmate’s previous criminal record, if any;

(c) The inmate’s institutional record;

(d) The views of the appropriate trial Judge and the District Attorney

General, who prosecuted the case;

(e) The inmate’s circumstances if returned to the community;

(f) Any mitigating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the

offense;

(g) The views of the community, victims of the crime or their family,

institutional staff, probation and parole officers, or other interested

parties;

(h) The inmate’s training, including vocational and educational

achievements;

(i) The inmate’s employment history, his or her occupational skills,

including any military experience, and the stability of his or her past

employment;

(j) The inmate’s past use of narcotics, or past habitual and excessive use

of alcohol;

(k) The inmate’s behavior and attitude during any previous experience

on probation or parole and the recentness of such experience;

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(l) An objective advisory parole predication guideline system to

adequately assess the risk an inmate poses to society and his or her

potential for parole success;

(m) Any other factors required by law to be considered or the Board

determines to be relevant.

Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.07(1). Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-503(b)

and the Rules of the Tennessee Board of Parole further provide that after applying the

various factors for consideration,

the Board shall deny the inmate’s release on parole if it determines that:

(a) There is a substantial indication that the inmate will not conform to

the conditions of his or her parole;

(b) Release from custody at this time would depreciate the seriousness

of the crime of which the person stands convicted or promote

disrespect for the law;

(c) Release at this time would have a substantially adverse effect on

institutional discipline; or

(d) The person’s continued correctional treatment, medical care, or

vocational or other training in the institution, will substantially

enhance the person’s capacity to lead a law-abiding life when given

release at a later time.

Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.07(4).

The record in this action reflects that the hearing officer considered both the

severity of the offense and Mr. Greenwood’s accomplishments during incarceration.

Although the Board was permitted to consider whether Mr. Greenwood would be able to

successfully reintegrate into society as a factor when making its parole determination, the

Board was not required to consider this factor. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-

.07(1). At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Gobble informed Mr. Greenwood of his

vote and recommendation to the Board that parole be denied but commended Mr.

Greenwood on his “institutional behavior and [his] efforts there,” specifically mentioning

Mr. Greenwood’s participation and efforts in addressing “substance abuse and addiction

issues and [his] admitted anger issues.” According to Mr. Gobble, however, when

making his decision to recommend that parole be denied, he was unable to “overcome at

this time the seriousness of this offense where a young man was ruthlessly and needlessly

gunned down by [Mr. Greenwood], not once, but twice.” Pursuant to Tennessee Code

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Annotated § 40-35-503(b), the Board was permitted to deny parole based on the

seriousness of Mr. Greenwood’s crime. Accordingly, Mr. Greenwood’s argument that

the Board’s decision was arbitrary, illegal, or fraudulent because it did not consider his

ability to reintegrate into society is without merit.

Mr. Greenwood further argues that no evidence supports the Board’s decision to

deny parole. However, upon a review of the record, we disagree. In writ of certiorari

proceedings, a court does not have the authority to reweigh the evidence presented to the

Board or substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. See Young v. City of

LaFollette, 353 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). However, if no material

evidence exists to support the Board’s decision, it is arbitrary or illegal. Id. Courts have

consistently determined that the Board is permitted to deny parole if the Board concludes

that the inmate’s release on parole at that time would depreciate the seriousness of the

crime for which he or she stands convicted. See Brennan, 512 S.W.3d at 875; Arnold,

956 S.W.2d at 482; Hopkins, 60 S.W.3d at 83; Robinson v. Traughber, 13 S.W.3d 361,

363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Ergo, the seriousness of the crime constitutes material

evidence upon which the Board may rely to deny parole. In fact, Tennessee Code

Annotated § 40-35-503(b)(2) specifically requires the Board to deny parole when the

inmate’s release would depreciate the seriousness of the inmate’s crime or promote

disrespect for the law. Although Mr. Gobble commended Mr. Greenwood for his efforts

during his incarceration, he and the Board members were unable to recommend release

on parole at that time. We discern no error concerning the basis on which the Board

made its decision and determine that material evidence existed to support the Board’s

decision.

Additionally, Mr. Greenwood argues that the Board’s decision to deny parole is a

“fundamentally improper re-consideration of the original sentence.” According to Mr.

Greenwood, his sentence “intrinsically incorporated the minimum number of years the

sentencing judge and the statute demanded.” He argues that “[a]fter the minimum

passed, the only rational considerations and factors that should be considered . . . were the

conduct of [Mr. Greenwood] during his confinement and his likelihood of a proper

reintegration into society” (emphasis in original). The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected

a similar argument posited by an inmate in Arnold, 956 S.W.2d at 482. In Arnold, the

Court determined that “consideration of the seriousness of the offense at both sentencing

and parole does not violate double jeopardy principles because denial of parole does not

constitute ‘another’ punishment, but rather perpetuates a validly imposed sentence.” Id.

(citing Kell v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 26 F.3d 1016, 1020 (10th Cir. 1994); Averhart v.

Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 1980)).

In contrast to Mr. Greenwood’s argument that the Board erred in considering his

original offense when making its parole determination, the law requires the Board to

consider the severity of the original offense to determine if the inmate’s release would

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depreciate the seriousness of his crime. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b). Therefore,

we find Mr. Greenwood’s argument in this regard to be without merit.

Finally, to the extent that Mr. Greenwood argues that the Board’s decision to defer

parole for a period of five years is arbitrary or illegal, we also determine this argument to

be without merit. The Board’s decision of when to schedule a rehearing date following a

denial of parole is a fact-intensive inquiry, the intrinsic correctness of which is not

reviewable by the court. See Turner v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. M2009-01908-

COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3928617, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2010) (citing Powell v.

Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). The trial

court may only review the Board’s decision to defer parole consideration for five years to

determine if it acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. See Brennan, 512 S.W.3d at

873.

This Court has previously determined that a five-year deferral for parole

consideration is not an arbitrary decision by the Board. See Gordon v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob.

& Parole, No. M2006-01273-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2200277, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.

July 30, 2007); Berleue v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. M2005-00363-COA-R3-CV,

2006 WL 1540255, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 2006). Additionally, this Court has also

determined in multiple appeals that a six-year deferral of parole consideration is also not

an arbitrary decision. See Bibbs v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole, No. M2015-01755-COA-R3-CV,

2016 WL 1650302, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2016); Hendricks v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob.

& Parole, No. M2010-01651-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2135445, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App.

May 25, 2011); York v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. M2005-01488-COA-R3-CV,

2007 WL 1541360, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2007). However, this Court has

determined that deferring parole consideration for a period of ten or twenty years is

arbitrary. See Baldwin v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 125 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2003) (determining that a twenty-year deferral of parole “constitute[d] an arbitrary

withdrawal of the power to parole from future Board members.”); York v. Tenn. Bd. of

Prob. & Parole, No. M2003-00822-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 305791, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Feb. 17, 2004) (determining that “to postpone a review of [parole] for a decade is . .

. an arbitrary decision.”). In the case at bar, we determine that the trial court did not err

by failing to provide relief to Mr. Greenwood on this issue.

Upon a thorough review of the record, we determine that Mr. Greenwood’s right

to due process of law was not violated and that the trial court did not err in declining to

provide relief to Mr. Greenwood in this regard.

V. Equal Protection

Mr. Greenwood further contends that the Board violated his constitutional right to

receive equal protection under the law. The United States Constitution provides: “No

State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

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U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. As the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained regarding equal protection:

To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the

government treated the plaintiff “disparately as compared to similarly

situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a

fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” Club

Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, Mich., 470

F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006). As we have held, the “threshold element of

an equal protection claim is disparate treatment; once disparate treatment is

shown, the equal protection analysis to be applied is determined by the

classification used by government decision-makers.” Scarbrough v.

Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006).

Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Tennessee Constitution also guarantees equal protection of the laws. Article

I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: “That no man shall be taken or

imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or

in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment

of his peers or the law of the land.” Article XI, section 8 further provides:

The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the

benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of

individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass any

law granting to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges,

immunitie[s], or exemptions other than such as may be, by the same law

extended to any member of the community, who may be able to bring

himself within the provisions of such law.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has instructed:

This Court has concluded that Article I, section 8 and Article XI,

section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution provide “essentially the same

protection” as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States

Constitution. Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152

(Tenn. 1993). Moreover, when analyzing the merit of an equal protection

challenge, this Court has utilized the three levels of scrutiny—strict

scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and reduced scrutiny, which applies a rational

basis test—that are employed by the United States Supreme Court

depending on the right that is asserted. State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823,

828 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted). “Strict scrutiny applies when the

classification at issue: (1) operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect

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class; or (2) interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right.” Gallaher,

104 S.W.3d at 460 (citation omitted). Heightened scrutiny applies to cases

of state sponsored gender discrimination. See United States v. Virginia,

518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (quoting Miss.

Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d

1090 (1982)); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tenn. 1980).

Reduced scrutiny, applying a rational basis test, applies to all other equal

protection inquiries and examines “whether the classifications have a

reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Tenn. Small Sch.

Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 153 (quoting Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 841

(Tenn. 1988)).

Hughes, 514 S.W.3d at 715-16.

In the instant action, the trial court found, inter alia, regarding Mr. Greenwood’s

equal protection claim: “To the extent that Petitioner attempts to claim that the Board

violated the Equal Protection Cla[use], the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is an improper

vehicle for such a claim.” The trial court is correct that a petition for writ of certiorari is

not the proper vehicle for an original claim seeking damages for an equal protection

violation. See Brown v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. M2005-00449-COA-R3-CV,

2007 WL 2097548, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2007) (“An appellate cause of action

(i.e., a petition for common-law writ of certiorari) cannot be joined with an original cause

of action (i.e., a complaint for inverse condemnation).”) (citing Winkler v. Tipton Cty. Bd.

of Educ., 63 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Emory v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 514 S.W.3d 129 (Tenn.

2017); Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1983)). Nevertheless, Mr. Greenwood refers to the government’s “arbitrary actions” in

his equal protection argument. Inasmuch as Mr. Greenwood argues that his equal

protection rights were violated by the Board and that the Board’s decision to deny parole

was discriminatory and thereby arbitrary or illegal, we determine that his equal protection

argument should be considered. See, e.g., Brown, 2007 WL 2097548, at *4-5. Because

the issue is one of law, we will consider whether Mr. Greenwood’s equal protection

rights were violated by the Board’s decision to deny parole.

Mr. Greenwood claims that “similarly situated individuals were actually granted

parole by the same board members in cases which satisfied less of a positive candidate

than he.” Despite Mr. Greenwood’s conclusory allegations that he was treated differently

than other inmates, the record before us does not contain any evidence to support his

argument. Mr. Greenwood has failed to present the trial court or this Court with any

specific examples which would have supported the existence of any similarly situated

individuals to whom he refers.

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Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Greenwood was denied parole while other similarly

situated inmates were granted parole, we determine that the Board had a rational basis for

denying parole. We review the Board’s decision for rationality, and the Board’s decision

will be upheld unless the Board lacks a rational basis for its decision. See Harrison v.

Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1978) (“Under [the rational basis] standard, if

some reasonable basis can be found for the classification, or if any state of facts may

reasonably be conceived to justify it, the classification will be upheld.”); see also State v.

Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tenn. 1994); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851

S.W.2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993). We note that for purposes of equal protection, inmates

are not a suspect class, such as race, nationality, or alienage, which would mandate strict

scrutiny, or a quasi-suspect class, such as gender or illegitimacy, which would require

heightened scrutiny. See Hughes, 514 S.W.3d at 720; Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455,

461 (Tenn. 2003). Furthermore, because inmates do not have a fundamental right or

liberty interest in parole, strict scrutiny would not apply in this matter. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-503(b); Hughes, 514 S.W.3d at 720.

Parole hearings are fact-intensive proceedings and focus specifically on the

original crime and circumstances surrounding the individual seeking parole. See

Hopkins, 60 S.W.3d at 83. Following a hearing, the Board in this instance considered the

evidence presented and determined that parole should be denied due to the seriousness of

Mr. Greenwood’s crime. The Board’s decision to deny Mr. Greenwood’s parole based

on its determination that releasing Mr. Greenwood on parole would depreciate the

seriousness of the crime for which he was convicted and promote disrespect of the law

was a rational basis for denying parole.

Because the Board had a rational basis for its decision denying Mr. Greenwood’s

parole, the Board’s decision was not illegal or arbitrary. Therefore, although the trial

court should have considered Mr. Greenwood’s equal protection claim insofar as it was a

claim of discrimination that if successful, would have rendered the Board’s decision

illegal or arbitrary, we determine any error in this regard to be harmless because Mr.

Greenwood’s equal protection argument is unavailing.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying

relief to Mr. Greenwood in this matter. This case is remanded to the trial court for

collection of costs below. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Billy Joe

Greenwood.

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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