Opinion

Art+com Innovationpool Gmbh v. Google LLC

  • 712 F. App'x 976
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Oct 20, 2017
Status
Unpublished
Author
O'Malley'
On the bench
Lourie, O'Malley, O'Malley', Taranto
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 48.4%

holding that the Supreme Court’s “ready for patenting test” set forth in Pfaff, a case concerning § 102(b)’s on-sale bar, “applies to the public use bar under § 102(b)”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the Supreme Court’s “ready for patenting test” set forth in Pfaff, a case concerning § 102(b)’s on-sale bar, “applies to the public use bar under § 102(b)”
  • invalidity finding where evidence showed that the “system was publicly demonstrated at two technical confer- ences to attendees with knowledge of the art and without any restriction or effort to maintain confidentiality”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2017-1016

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Delaware in No. 1:14-cv-00217-TBD, Circuit

Judge Timothy B. Dyk.

______________________

Decided: October 20, 2017

______________________

SCOTT F. PARTRIDGE, Baker Botts LLP, Houston, TX,

argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by

MICHAEL HAWES, L. GENE SPEARS.

DARYL JOSEFFER, King & Spalding LLP, Washington,

DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by

JOSHUA NATHANIEL MITCHELL.

______________________

2 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit

Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Art+Com Innovationpool GmbH (“Art+Com”) appeals

the district court’s entry of judgment following a jury

trial. The jury found that Appellee Google LLC (“Google”)

did not infringe claims 1, 3, 14, and 28 (the “asserted

claims”) of U.S. Patent No. RE44,550 (“the ’550 patent”),

and that each of the asserted claims is invalid as antici-

pated and/or obvious. The district court entered judgment

consistent with these verdicts and denied Art+Com’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding

that each is supported by substantial evidence.

Because we find that substantial evidence supports

the jury’s conclusion that each of the asserted claims is

invalid, we affirm the district court’s denial of Art+Com’s

motions for judgment as a matter of law. In light of this

conclusion, we need not and do not consider the judgment

of noninfringement.

I. BACKGROUND

Art+Com is the owner by assignment of the ’550 pa-

tent, titled “Method and Device for Pictorial Representa-

tion of Space-Related Data.” Broadly speaking, the ’550

patent is directed to methods for displaying geographic—

i.e., topographic or meteorological—data, such as satellite

images, to a user who has a selectable viewpoint, taking

into account the user’s location and direction of view. The

’550 patent claims priority to a U.S. patent application

filed on December 17, 1996. Accordingly, it is undisputed

that the critical date for purposes of anticipation under 35

U.S.C. § 102(b) is December 17, 1995.

Claim 1, on which asserted claims 3, 14, and 28 de-

pend, recites the following:

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 3

1. A method of providing a pictorial representa-

tion of space-related data of a selectable object,

the representation corresponding to a view of

the object by an observer with a selectable lo-

cation and a selectable direction of view com-

prising:

(a) providing a plurality of spatially dis-

tributed data sources for storing

space-related data;

(b) determining a field of view including

an area of the object to be represent-

ed through a selection of a distance of

the observer to the object and an an-

gle of view of the observer to the ob-

ject;

(c) requesting data for the field of view

from at least one of the plurality of

spatially distributed data sources;

(d) centrally storing the data for the

field of view;

(e) representing the data for the field of

view in a pictorial representation

having one or more sections;

(f) using a computer, dividing each of

the one or more sections having im-

age resolutions below a desired im-

age resolution into a plurality of

smaller sections, requesting higher

resolution space-related data for each

of the smaller sections from at least

one of the plurality of spatially dis-

tributed data sources, centrally stor-

ing the higher resolution space-

related data, and representing the

4 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

data for the field of view in the picto-

rial representation; and

(g) repeating step (f), dividing the sec-

tions into smaller sections, until eve-

ry section has the desired image

resolution or no higher image resolu-

tion data is available.

’550 patent col. 10, ll. 16–44. 1 Throughout the trial,

Google and its witnesses referred to the asserted claims

as requiring “coarse-to-fine” zooming, in which the device

iteratively “divides” parent nodes into at least two child

nodes that point to higher resolution image data, then

requests, stores, and displays the data for these child

nodes until either the desired image resolution for each

parent node is achieved or no higher image resolution

data is available. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 1229 ll. 8–23, ECF

Nos. 418–23.

Art+Com filed suit against Google in February 2014,

alleging that Google’s “Google Earth, Version 7” and

related software products infringe the asserted claims of

the ’550 patent. Trial commenced on May 23, 2016,

during which Google sought to prove that the invention

was placed in public use prior to December 17, 1995, and

that the ’550 patent, therefore, is invalid under § 102(b).

Google introduced several forms of evidence in sup-

port of this effort. First, it called Stephen Lau as a wit-

ness, who testified that, while he was employed at the

federally funded, not-for-profit company Stanford Re-

search Institute (“SRI”), he helped develop SRI Ter-

1 Because the ’550 patent is a reissue patent, its

claims contain certain language in brackets and in bold or

italics that reflect additions, deletions, and modifications

from prior applications. To assist the reader, we only

include the operative language.

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 5

raVision, “an earth visualization application” that “used a

co[arse-to-fine] algorithm to retrieve images [sic] data

across the network from multiple servers.” Trial Tr. 1029

ll. 9–18. He further testified that SRI TerraVision was

part of the “MAGIC project,” an “umbrella federally

funded research project” that focused on terrain visualiza-

tion. Id. at 1030 ll. 9–12, 1043 ll. 5–10. He also testified

both that he wrote about 89 percent of the source code

underlying SRI TerraVision and that the project was

meant to be put into the public domain. Id. at 1030–32,

1151. Lau further testified that SRI TerraVision allowed

a user to navigate around a two- or three-dimensional

representation of a graphical area and to zoom in and out

to different levels of detail, and described how SRI Ter-

raVision drew its image data from a network of multiple

servers spread across the country. Id. at 1034–35, 1051.

While Lau was on the stand, Google displayed a 1994

VHS tape in which the narrator walks the viewer through

the operation of SRI TerraVision. J.A. 2565. In the tape,

the narrator describes how a user can move from a low-

resolution picture of a larger geographic area to a higher-

resolution picture of a smaller geographic area using a

“multi-resolution pyramid.” J.A. 2565, 3532–33. The

narrator continues:

At each level of the resolution pyramid, groups of

four tiles from the next higher resolution are av-

eraged down into a single tile. Consequently,

each level of the pyramid covers the entire ter-

rain, but uses only a quarter as many tiles as the

previous level. The pyramid is built layer by layer

until the entire terrain is represented by a single

tile. . . .

But what if some of the tiles needed for a given

view are not in local memory when they are need-

ed for a display? . . . . Notice that, each time we

click on the map, the image first seems out of fo-

6 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

cus, and then becomes clearer. What’s happening

is that, when we first move to a new area, the

high resolution tiles are not available in local

memory, so TerraVision is forced to use lower res-

olution tiles. At the same time as the display is

being processed, TerraVision is requesting higher

resolution tiles from the server. As they arrive,

TerraVision uses these higher resolution tiles, and

the image becomes progressively better focused.

Id. Lau corroborated the narrator’s description of how

SRI TerraVision operates. He testified that, where the

program “couldn’t predict where the user was going to go

such as if a user clicked in an unexpected place,” the

program would “use[] a course [sic] to fine algorithm . . .

to come up with the best display it could” beginning with

a “frustrum, a field of view” and using “quadtrees” ar-

ranged in a “resolution pyramid” to enhance the image

resolution. Trial Tr. 1036–37.

Lau testified that he demonstrated SRI TerraVision to

an audience of more than 100 people at the 1994 MAGIC

Technical Symposium held at the University of Kansas in

August 1994 and to an audience of more than 500 people

at the SIGGRAPH ’95 conference held in Los Angeles in

August 1995, the latter of which was attended by at least

two members of Art+Com. Id. at 1048–50, 1058–59. Lau

explained that he gave individuals from Art+Com copies

of the SRI TerraVision “source code, walked them through

it, and talked to them about it.” Id. at 1050–51. Google

also introduced into evidence an overview of the MAGIC

project and a draft technical paper coauthored by Lau,

both of which described how TerraVision functioned. J.A.

3158–3271, 1758–77.

Google’s expert, Dr. Goodchild, testified that, based on

his review of the 1994 VHS tape and the publications

introduced into evidence, it was his opinion that SRI

TerraVision anticipates the asserted claims. Trial Tr.

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 7

1133–35, 1150. Dr. Goodchild walked through each claim

limitation and pointed to evidence demonstrating why he

believed SRI TerraVision disclosed these limitations. Id.

at 1135–50. On cross-examination, counsel for Art+Com

took issue with Dr. Goodchild’s purported reliance on the

MAGIC project overview, which contemplated using

servers co-located at a facility in Sioux Falls, South Dako-

ta and highlighted several “research issues” that re-

mained to be solved. Id. at 1201–04. In response to these

questions, Dr. Goodchild testified that “the system

demonstrated in 1994 and 1995 was the system that [he]

analyzed and that system as I shown [sic] meets all the

claims.” J.A. 1331.

The jury reached a verdict on May 27, 2016, finding,

among other things, that Google proved by clear and

convincing evidence both that SRI’s TerraVision system

was publicly used before December 17, 1995 and that this

system anticipates each of the asserted claims. The

district court denied Art+Com’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law and entered judgment in

favor of Google. Art+Com timely appealed. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This court reviews a denial of JMOL following a jury

verdict by reapplying the district court’s standard of

review.” Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303

F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting SIBIA Neurosci-

ences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1354

(Fed. Cir. 2000)). Thus, a motion for JMOL should be

granted if either (1) “the jury’s factual findings, presumed

or express, cannot be supported by substantial evidence,”

or (2) “the legal conclusions implied from the jury’s verdict

cannot be supported by the jury’s factual findings.” Id.

When reviewing a district court’s denial of JMOL fol-

lowing a jury verdict, we must determine whether, “view-

ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

8 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

moving party,” and giving the non-movant “the benefit of

all reasonable inferences,” there is sufficient evidence in

the record to support a jury verdict in favor of the non-

movant. Id. at 1300–01 (quoting Sw. Software, Inc. v.

Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).

Anticipation is a question of fact, and a jury determi-

nation of anticipation is reviewed for substantial evi-

dence. Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 253

F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Under pre-AIA

§ 102, one way in which a patent is anticipated is where

“the invention was patented or described in a printed

publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or

on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the

date of the application for patent in the United

States. . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Public use under

pre-AIA § 102(b) includes any use of the claimed inven-

tion by a person other than the inventor who is under no

limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inven-

tor. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315,

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Art+Com outlines three reasons why it claims Google

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that SRI

TerraVision placed the invention of the asserted claims in

public use. First, it submits that, because Google did not

present any evidence to corroborate Lau’s “vague” testi-

mony regarding the features and operation of SRI Ter-

raVision, Dr. Goodchild should not have been permitted to

rely on this testimony to “cherry-pick selected excerpts to

stitch together the claimed invention.” Appellant Br. 49.

Second, it contends that, even assuming there was an

adequate foundation for Lau’s testimony, Dr. Goodchild’s

opinions do not demonstrate that SRI TerraVision dis-

closed each claim limitation. Third, Art+Com argues that

Google failed to demonstrate either that SRI TerraVision

was “ready for patenting” under the Supreme Court’s

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 9

decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60

(1998), or that “the public could actually discern the

patented invention in SRI TerraVision,” as required

under this court’s precedents. Id. at 54–58.

We find none of these contentions persuasive. Alt-

hough Art+Com is correct that we have emphasized the

importance of corroboration in the context of § 102(b)

challenges, see Finnigan Corp. v. International Trade

Commission, 180 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999), Lau’s

testimony was sufficiently corroborated by both documen-

tary and videographic evidence. First, the jury watched

the 1994 VHS tape that Lau testified he had helped

create and display in public fora prior to the critical date

of December 17, 1995. Second, the jury received two

papers describing the features and operation of SRI

TerraVision—the more recent of which Lau coauthored.

Google argued at trial that one skilled in the art

would understand from watching the 1994 VHS tape and

from reading these two papers that every claim element

was disclosed therein. But Art+Com ignores the VHS

tape. And it provides no legal support for its claim that

Lau himself was required to specifically identify where in

the corroborating evidence each claim element can be

found. Finally, to the extent Art+Com claims Lau was

biased because he was compensated by Google for his

consulting work, the jury was free to weigh this evidence

and conclude that Lau’s testimony was not unduly influ-

enced by these payments. We conclude that the documen-

tary and videographic evidence of record was sufficient to

corroborate Lau’s testimony and provided an adequate

foundation from which Dr. Goodchild could offer his

opinions.

Art+Com’s argument that Google failed to demon-

strate that SRI TerraVision disclosed each claim limita-

tion—in particular, steps (b), (c), (f), and (g) of claim 1 and

the additional limitations of claim 3—also misses the

10 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

mark. “[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation

is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably under-

stand or infer from the prior art reference’s teaching that

every claim element was disclosed in that single refer-

ence.” Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329

F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Google submit-

ted evidence from which the jury reasonably could con-

clude that SRI TerraVision provided a basis for such an

understanding.

Steps (b) and (c) of claim 1 require “(b) determining a

field of view including an area of the object to be repre-

sented through a selection of a distance of the observer to

the object and an angle of view of the observer to the

object; [and] (c) requesting data for the field of view from

at least one of the plurality of spatially distributed data

sources.” ’550 patent col. 10, ll. 23–28. Art+Com claims

that the jury did not receive substantial evidence that

step (b), “which is very specific in defining what data the

application will request in step (c),” was performed, and

questions how Dr. Goodchild could “‘f[in]d’ this step in

DTX1023’s bare reference to ‘incremental retrieval of the

database,’ . . . a reference he concedes does not ‘state what

increment is being used to retrieve the data, whether it’s

been done in increments of field of view or some other

type of increment.’” Appellant Br. 52.

These limitations, however, are disclosed by the evi-

dence. For example, portions of a draft technical note

titled TerraVision: A Terrain Visualization System, which

the parties refer to as DTX1023, and the 1994 VHS tape:

(1) reveal that users can choose different viewpoint sce-

narios within SRI TerraVision; (2) explain that the pro-

gram fetches geographic data “across the network as it is

needed while the user moves about the terrain;” and (3)

show how the program displays geographic data at a

particular distance and from the user’s angle of view—

and, just as importantly, does not display data outside

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 11

that field of view. J.A. 1758–77, 2565, 3532–33. Art+Com

fails to address any of this evidence. Art+Com also dis-

counts Lau’s testimony that SRI TerraVision computes

what data to display using “a frustrum, a field of view”

and then “project[s] out where you’re looking in the ter-

rain and where you’re at [and] figure[s] out how far away

each of the tiles should be.” Trial Tr. 1036. But the jury

was entitled to believe Lau’s testimony, as well as Dr.

Goodchild’s opinions on these questions, Art+Com’s

skepticism of that testimony notwithstanding.

As stated above, steps (f) and (g) of claim 1 require it-

eratively “dividing” parent nodes into at least two child

nodes that point to higher resolution image data and then

requesting, storing, and displaying geographic data for

these child nodes until either the desired image resolution

for each parent node is achieved or no higher image

resolution data is available. Art+Com argues that the

jury heard “no evidence, much less substantial evidence,”

that these steps are implemented in SRI TerraVision.

Appellant Br. 52. It also claims that the following sen-

tence from the draft technical paper reveals that SRI

TerraVision does not practice these steps:

TerraVision basically uses an incremental re-

trieval of the data base as required by the user,

rather than forcing the user to copy a part of the

database to local storage, visualizing that part,

and repeating this until he/she has found the por-

tion of the terrain that was of interest . . .

Id. (citing J.A. 1760) (emphasis in brief).

When asked on cross-examination how he interprets

that sentence, however, Dr. Goodchild testified that, in

his opinion, the sentence means: “once we get to [‘]visual-

izing that part[,] and repeating this until he/she has

found a portion of interest,[’] that now follows the first

part of the sentence rather than following the section

after the comma.” Trial Tr. 1211 ll. 4–14. We do not find

12 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

Dr. Goodchild’s interpretation to be unreasonable, and

conclude that the jury was entitled to believe his opinion

on this issue.

Other evidence presented to the jury also shows that

SRI TerraVision does perform the “coarse-to-fine” zooming

required by steps (f) and (g). First, DTX1023 teaches a

“search algorithm” that uses “recursive subdivision” for

each node, where “a test is applied to determine whether

or not the node should be sub-divided into its four chil-

dren. If so, the search is carried on. Otherwise, it is

stopped.” J.A. 1766. Second, Lau testified that Ter-

raVision used quadtrees to perform coarse-to-fine zooming

on resolution pyramids by “subdividing” the quadtree tiles

“until you got to the . . . highest resolution that you had.”

Trial Tr. 1036–37. Third, the 1994 VHS tape visually and

audibly demonstrates that SRI TerraVision uses a “reso-

lution pyramid” where “each level of the pyramid covers

the entire terrain, but uses only 1/4 as many tiles as the

previous level,” and that when using this pyramid to

“request[] higher-resolution tiles from the server, . . . the

image becomes progressively better focused.” J.A. 2565,

3532–33. It was within the jury’s purview to credit Dr.

Goodchild’s opinion that TerraVision used a “quadtree” to

perform a coarse-to-fine search that would “successively

divide and request” image data in a manner that discloses

steps (f) and (g). Trial Tr. 1141–42.

With respect to claim 3, Art+Com argues that Dr.

Goodchild’s opinion that this claim was practiced in SRI

TerraVision is based on a reference in DTX1037 to “the

transformation that’s necessary as it is in any computer

graphic system from the 3D coordinate to the 2D coordi-

nate system of the screen.” Appellant Br. 53. According

to Art+Com, “these routine transformations” are not those

defined by claim 3; rather, the “claimed coordinate trans-

formation is one that follows—per claim 2 from which

claim 3 depends—a change in the selectable location, such

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 13

that the data and co-ordinates of the data are determined

in terms of new co-ordinates.” Id.

Fatal to Art+Com’s argument is that other evidence

was presented at trial regarding whether the additional

limitations present in claim 3 were disclosed in SRI

TerraVision. For example, the jury heard from Lau that

SRI TerraVision performed coordinate transformation

that normalized the newly selected coordinates. Trial Tr.

1047. When asked why the system operated this way,

Lau explained that it helped avoid precision errors when

moving from one location to another. Id. This testimony

explains how SRI TerraVision “alter[s] the selectable

location and perform[s] the steps (b) through (g)” and

“determin[es] the data and/or the co-ordinates of the data

in terms of a new co-ordinate system.” ’550 patent col. 10,

ll. 45-50.

Finally, we reject Art+Com’s contention that Google

failed to demonstrate that SRI TerraVision was “ready for

patenting” and that the invention was “discernable” in

SRI TerraVision. Appellant Br. 54–58. The public use

bar applies when, before the critical date, the claimed

invention is “publicly used” and is “ready for patenting.”

Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374,

1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the Supreme

Court’s “ready for patenting test” set forth in Pfaff, a case

concerning § 102(b)’s on-sale bar, “applies to the public

use bar under § 102(b)”). The latter condition “may be

satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to

practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to

the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or

other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently

specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the

invention.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67–68.

Under this court’s precedent, an “invention is reduced

to practice when it works for its intended purpose”—that

is, “when there is a demonstration of its workability or

14 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

utility.” Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,

516 F.3d 1361, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Atlanta

Attachment, we found that a prior art device was ready

for patenting when a “prototype” of the device “demon-

strated the workability and utility of the invention . . .

during [a] demonstration.” Id. at 1367. In Hamilton

Beach Brands, Inc. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., we similar-

ly found a prior art product ready for patenting when

there were “working prototypes” that “met all the limita-

tions of the asserted patent claims” and retail customers

were provided with “specific descriptions” and “drawings”

of the device. 726 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Here, Lau testified that he and his team demonstrat-

ed the SRI TerraVision system shown in the 1994 VHS

tape to audiences at both the 1994 MAGIC Technical

Symposium and the SIGGRAPH ’95 conference. Trial Tr.

1048–50, 1058–59. Lau further testified that, at the

SIGGRAPH ’95 conference, he performed live demonstra-

tions of SRI TerraVision to at least 500 people, and in fact

“gave [] the source code to TerraVision” to Art+Com

employees who were in attendance and “walk[ed] them

through the source code.” Id. at 1050 l. 21–1052 l. 3.

Lau’s testimony regarding his demonstrations at these

conferences and his provision of source code to individuals

at Art+Com constitutes substantial evidence that SRI

TerraVision was “ready for patenting.”

Art+Com nevertheless states that “[n]either Dr. Good-

child nor Lau said anything about the development goals

or performance criteria targeted by SRI, about metrics

evaluated through testing of the system, or about when

the system was considered complete.” Appellant Br. 56.

An invention may be reduced to practice for purposes of

the public use bar “even though it may later be refined or

improved.” New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg.

Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Although

Art+Com notes that SRI identified certain “research

issues” it believed needed to be resolved at a future point

ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC 15

in time, we nevertheless conclude that substantial evi-

dence supports the jury’s implicit determination that SRI

TerraVision was “ready for patenting.”

Art+Com’s argument that Google “did not attempt to

prove that the public could actually discern the patented

invention in SRI TerraVision,” but instead “tried to prove

the invention was ‘discernable’ in cherry-picked excerpts

from documents purporting to describe the system” is no

more persuasive. Appellant Br. 54. Art+Com cites Dey,

L.P. v. Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 715 F.3d 1351

(Fed. Cir. 2013), and Delano Farms Co. v. California

Table Grape Commission, 778 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2015),

for the proposition that the “claimed invention must be

discernable to the public from a purported public use.” Id.

at 55. These cases are inapposite, however, as both

involve circumstances that created an expectation of

secrecy similar to that imposed by confidentiality agree-

ments. Dey, 715 F.3d at 1357–59; Delano Farms, 778

F.3d at 1249–50.

Here, by contrast, the jury heard testimony that the

SRI TerraVision system was publicly demonstrated at two

technical conferences to attendees with knowledge of the

art and without any restriction or effort to maintain

confidentiality. Indeed, Google presented evidence that

both the papers on which Dr. Goodchild relied in forming

his opinions and the source code itself were made publicly

available. Trial Tr. 1043–44, 1051. In light of Dr. Good-

child’s testimony that source code “essentially defines

what the computer does,” id. at 1097, the jury was enti-

tled to find that the claimed inventions were discernable

in SRI TerraVision.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the

jury’s verdict that claims 1, 3, 14, and 28 are each antici-

pated by SRI TerraVision. We therefore affirm the dis-

trict court’s entry of judgment of invalidity on that

ground. Because we hold that there was adequate sup-

16 ART+COM INNOVATIONPOOL GMBH V. GOOGLE LLC

port for the jury’s conclusion that each of the asserted

claims is anticipated by SRI TerraVision, we affirm the

district court’s judgments without considering Art+Com’s

remaining arguments or the parties’ debates over the

jury’s noninfringement finding. Cf. Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC

Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended on

reh’g in part, 366 F. App’x 154 (Fed. Cir. 2009); No-

belpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d

1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district

court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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