People v. Boykins

2017 IL 121365

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 121365)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

BYRON BOYKINS, Appellant.

Opinion filed September 21, 2017.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and

Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The issue presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court’s plea

admonishments regarding mandatory supervised release (MSR) were sufficient to

satisfy the due process rights of defendant, Byron Boykins. Defendant filed a pro se

postconviction petition in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to the

Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)), alleging that

his due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to specifically

admonish him that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of MSR after

completing the 22-year prison sentence he negotiated in exchange for his plea. The

circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed the

dismissal. 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U. For the following reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the appellate court.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 In 2007, defendant was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree

murder and six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS

5/24-1.6 (West 2006)). In March 2009, defendant entered into a negotiated plea in

which he agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder in exchange for 22 years’

imprisonment, the dismissal of the AUUW charges, and the dismissal of a separate

pending charge for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant was 20 years

old at the time of the plea hearing. Prior to accepting the plea, the following

exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: Mr. Boykins, you’re charged with the offense of first

degree murder. That event is alleged to have occurred on or about October the

16th of the year of 2006, in that you, without lawful justification, intentionally

or knowingly killed—shot and killed Carlos Mathis, M-a-t-h-i-s.

In the State of Illinois that’s referred to as—the sentencing for that case is

from 20 to 40—20 to 60 years in the Illinois State penitentiary. If I find that

you’ve been found guilty of the same or greater class felony in the last ten

years, the maximum penitentiary time in this case would be life.

Upon your release from the penitentiary, there is a period of three years

mandatory supervised release, sometimes referred to as parole.

Understanding the nature of the offense and its possible penalties, how do

you plead to this matter; guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.”

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The trial court then confirmed that defendant was aware of the rights he would be

giving up by entering a guilty plea and confirmed that he was entering the plea of

his own free will. Additionally, the court reiterated the terms of the agreement that

“in this particular situation,” defendant was agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for

“a period of 22[ ]years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.” Defendant

indicated that he had no questions.

¶4 After finding that a factual basis existed for the plea, the court accepted the plea

and ratified the agreement. Defendant waived his right to a presentence

investigation report, but the court was informed that defendant had several juvenile

adjudications, that he was 17 years old at the time of the occurrence, and that he had

no prior adult arrests. The court then imposed a sentence of 22 years in prison.

Defendant again indicated that he had no questions about the sentence. The trial

court did not mention MSR during sentencing, and the sentencing order does not

refer to MSR.

¶5 In April 2014, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his

constitutional due process rights were substantially violated because he was not

advised that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of MSR upon completion

of the 22-year prison sentence that he negotiated in exchange for his plea.

Consequently, defendant alleged that he did not receive the benefit of his bargain

because the total time he would be required to serve would exceed the term

specifically announced by the trial court. Defendant further asserted that he had not

been aware of the MSR term until he heard other inmates discussing it. As a

remedy, defendant requested that the trial court reduce his prison term by three

years or, alternatively, remove his obligation to serve the MSR term.

¶6 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the record

contradicted defendant’s allegations. The court concluded that the trial court

sufficiently admonished defendant by advising him prior to imposing the sentence

that upon his release from prison there was a three-year period of MSR.

¶7 The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s admonishment

satisfied due process where it “conveyed the necessary warning regarding the

three-year term of MSR in no uncertain terms, such that an ordinary person in

defendant’s circumstances would understand it.” 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U,

¶ 15. Although the court acknowledged disagreement among the appellate court

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districts on the sufficiency of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 1997)

admonitions, the court rejected defendant’s argument that due process required the

MSR admonishment to be specifically linked with the pronouncement of the

agreed-upon sentence. 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U, ¶¶ 17-18. We allowed

defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).

¶8 ANALYSIS

¶9 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a method to challenge a conviction

or sentence based on a substantial violation of constitutional rights. 725 ILCS

5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2014). At the first stage of the proceedings, the circuit court

must independently determine whether the petition is “frivolous or is patently

without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014). To be summarily dismissed

at the first stage as frivolous or patently without merit, the petition must have no

arguable basis either in law or in fact, relying instead on “an indisputably meritless

legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17

(2009). Meritless legal theories include those theories that are completely

contradicted by the record. Id. at 17. We review the summary dismissal of a

postconviction petition de novo. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10.

¶ 10 Defendant contends that he has sufficiently alleged a substantial violation of his

due process rights because the trial court failed to adequately admonish him

regarding the statutorily required three-year term of MSR. He maintains that

although the court mentioned MSR when admonishing him about the possible

range of penalties he could receive, under the standards set forth in People v.

Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005), and People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345 (2010), the

admonishments did not satisfy due process where the court did not “link” the

admonishment about the MSR term with his actual agreed-upon sentence to clearly

apprise defendant that MSR would apply to his bargained-for sentence. He argues

that an ordinary person in his circumstances would not understand that his sentence

included the three-year MSR term.

¶ 11 Section 5-8-1(d)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) requires that a

sentence for first degree murder must include a three-year MSR term in addition to

the term of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2008). Since the MSR

term is statutorily mandated, it is not part of the plea bargain; the State cannot offer

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to exclude it as a part of a plea negotiation, and the court has no authority to

withhold it in imposing sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 200-01.

¶ 12 The requirement that a defendant be informed of the statutorily required MSR

term arises from Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2), which mandates that in

hearings on pleas of guilty, the trial court must inform the defendant and determine

that he understands “the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law.” Ill.

S. Ct. R. 402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1997). In Whitfield, this court explained that

pursuant to Rule 402, “every defendant who enters a plea of guilty has a due

process right to be properly and fully admonished.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188.

Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must substantially comply with

Rule 402(a)(2). Id. at 195.

¶ 13 To substantially comply with Rule 402 and due process where a defendant

enters into a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, the trial court must advise the

defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a term of MSR will be added to the

sentence. Id. at 194-95. 1 Therefore, where Whitfield had bargained for a specific

sentence, and the trial court accepted his plea without advising him that an MSR

term would be added to the sentence, we held that Whitfield essentially received a

sentence that was more onerous than the sentence for which he bargained, which

violated due process notions of fundamental fairness. Id. at 201-02.

¶ 14 In Morris, we did not explicitly reach the due process issue presented here,

finding instead that Whitfield did not apply retroactively to the Morris defendants.

We sought to clarify, however, what information must be conveyed to ensure the

MSR admonishments given during a plea hearing comply with the requirements of

Rule 402 and due process after Whitfield. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 366. “Whitfield

requires that defendants be advised that a term of MSR will be added to the actual

sentence agreed upon in exchange for a guilty plea to the offense charged.” Id. at

367. “An admonition that uses the term ‘MSR’ without putting it in some relevant

context cannot serve to advise the defendant of the consequences of his guilty plea

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A “negotiated plea of guilty is one in which the prosecution has bound itself to

recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range of sentence, or where the prosecution

has made concessions relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge

or charges then pending.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006).

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and cannot aid the defendant in making an informed decision about his case.” Id. at

366.

¶ 15 To ensure that defendants understand the consequences of their plea agreement

and to avoid prolonged litigation on the issue, we strongly encouraged trial court

judges to follow best practices in admonishments. We stated that, “[i]deally,” the

admonishment about MSR would (1) be explicitly linked to the sentence to which

defendant agreed in exchange for his negotiated plea, (2) be given when reviewing

the provisions of the plea agreement, and (3) be reiterated both at sentencing and in

the written judgment. Id. at 367-68.

¶ 16 Nevertheless, we recognized that “there is no precise formula in admonishing a

defendant of his MSR obligation” and that the admonition must be read in a

practical and realistic way. Id. at 366. Consequently, we held that to satisfy due

process, “ ‘[t]he admonition is sufficient if an ordinary person in the circumstances

of the accused would understand it to convey the required warning.’ ” Id. (quoting

People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 269 (1983)).

¶ 17 Here, the record reflects that prior to accepting defendant’s plea, the trial court

advised defendant of the range of possible penalties for the offense to which he was

pleading. Defendant was told that, for the offense of first degree murder, the

sentence required a term in prison ranging between 20 and 60 years and that the

maximum period of imprisonment could be life. He was then advised that “[u]pon

your release from the penitentiary, there is a period of three years mandatory

supervised release, sometimes referred to as parole.”

¶ 18 From this information, an ordinary person in defendant’s circumstances would

understand that the penalty for the offense to which he was pleading guilty required

a period of imprisonment in the range of at least 20 to 60 years and that any term he

served in prison would be followed by a 3-year period of MSR. Defendant does not

dispute, and the record reflects, that he understood the concept of MSR or parole.

Where defendant was informed that MSR was a required part of any sentence that

would be imposed upon his release from prison, a reasonable person would

understand that his negotiated prison sentence would be followed by a term of

MSR. When read in a practical and realistic manner and judged by an objective

standard, the record reveals that defendant’s due process rights were satisfied.

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¶ 19 Additionally, as required by Rule 402, defendant was made aware that the

minimum possible penalty for the offense to which he was pleading guilty was 20

years in prison plus a 3-year term of MSR, which is a total period of 23 years. Thus,

an ordinary person in defendant’s circumstances would understand that the

minimum possible penalty was 23 years. Therefore, defendant’s allegation—that

his understanding was that the full extent of his penalty was 22 years—is

contradicted by the record.

¶ 20 Consistent with our conclusion, several post-Morris appellate court cases have

found admonitions similar to those presented here satisfied due process. People v.

Lee, 2012 IL App (4th) 110403, ¶¶ 4, 23 (admonition sufficient where the

defendant was informed that “ ‘[a]ny term in prison would be followed by a period

of mandatory, supervised release of at least three years’ ”); People v. Hunter, 2011

IL App (1st) 093023, ¶¶ 4, 19 (admonishment that “ ‘[a]ny period of incarceration

would be followed by a period of mandatory supervised release of two years

following your discharge from the Department of Corrections’ ” satisfied due

process); People v. Dorsey, 404 Ill. App. 3d 829, 831, 836-38 (2010) (affirming

first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition where the trial court admonished

the defendant that “ ‘[i]f you’re sent to prison, there’s a period of mandatory

supervised release of three years’ ”); People v. Davis, 403 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465,

466 (2010) (admonition sufficient where the trial court advised the defendant that if

he pleaded guilty the court was required to sentence him to between 6 and 30 years

in the penitentiary and that he “ ‘would have to serve at least three years mandatory

supervised release’ ” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Andrews, 403 Ill. App. 3d 654,

656 (2010) (defendant received all of the notice and due process to which he was

entitled regarding MSR where the trial court advised him that “ ‘[i]f convicted and

sentenced to prison, there would then be 1 year [of MSR], or what used to be known

as parole’ ” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Thomas, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1133-34

(2010) (admonition sufficient where trial court advised the defendant of the range

of penalties for each offense without the benefit of a negotiated plea and told him

that any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a period of MSR upon

release from prison).

¶ 21 Those cases that have found a violation of due process are cases in which the

MSR admonitions did not convey unconditionally that an MSR term would follow

those bargained-for sentences. For example, in People v. Burns, 405 Ill. App. 3d

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40, 42 (2010), the defendant was advised that a conviction “ ‘could result’ ” in a

prison sentence for a period of time and that there was a “ ‘potential’ ” fine “ ‘with

a period of three years mandatory supervised release.’ ” The court held that due

process was not satisfied where the admonition “could have fostered a reasonable

belief that MSR attached only to a particular contingency that might or might not

happen.” Id. at 44-45; see also People v. Daniels, 388 Ill. App. 3d 952, 959 (2009)

(admonition failed to satisfy Rule 402 and due process where it linked MSR “only

to the maximum sentences authorized by law” (emphasis omitted)); People v.

Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d 846, 850 (2007) (admonition was insufficient where the

MSR term was phrased as a contingency); People v. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d 473,

482 (2008) (insufficient admonishment where defendant was only advised that he

could be sentenced to 20 to 60 years, he could be fined, and he could be subject to

MSR). Moreover, to the extent that these cases have been interpreted to hold that

Morris established a bright-line rule that to satisfy due process the admonishments

must expressly link MSR during the pronouncement of the agreed-upon sentence,

we reject such a rigid interpretation as inconsistent with our decision in Morris. To

the extent that the foregoing cases applied a bright-line rule requiring a link of MSR

to the pronouncement of the agreed-upon sentence, we expressly overrule them.

¶ 22 Our conclusion is not altered by United States ex rel. Miller v. McGinnis, 774

F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1985), on which defendant additionally relies. There, the trial

court informed the defendant that an MSR term could be added to the sentences for

his crimes other than murder. Id. at 820. The court then sentenced him to 20 years

for the murder to run concurrently with other lesser sentences for his other crimes.

Id. at 823. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant’s due process rights

were violated because he was told he would receive a maximum sentence of 20

years, when in fact his sentence included the additional 3-year MSR period. Id. at

823-24. In contrast, here the trial judge told defendant that a sentence for murder

necessarily included a three-year term of MSR.

¶ 23 Finally, we recognize that in this case the trial court did not have the benefit of

our guidance in Morris when it provided the Rule 402 admonishments. We trust

that going forward the trial court will seek to follow the guidelines set forth in

Morris to avoid any potential for confusion in the future and to insulate the plea

from subsequent attack. Additionally, we note that the Code now requires judges to

include MSR in their written sentencing orders. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2012).

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¶ 24 CONCLUSION

¶ 25 In sum, we hold that the summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction

petition was proper where the record refutes his claim that the trial court’s

admonishment regarding the requisite statutory MSR term fell short of

constitutional due process requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

the appellate court.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

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