State v. Megos

***********************************************

The “officially released” date that appears near the be-

ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-

lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-

ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions

and petitions for certification is the “officially released”

date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of

discrepancies between the advance release version of an

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to

be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not

be reproduced and distributed without the express written

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-

tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

***********************************************

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ZANE R. MEGOS

(AC 38967)

Lavine, Mullins and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who previously had pleaded guilty to six counts of larceny

in the fourth degree and was serving probation in connection with that

conviction, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

revoking his probation and imposing a sentence of sixty months incarcer-

ation. The defendant had been charged with violating his probation

following his arrest on charges of larceny in the third degree and criminal

impersonation, which involved an incident in which he was alleged

to have wrongfully obtained a deposit from F for a sham real estate

transaction. The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the defendant had violated his probation by committing the crimes

charged. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court

erroneously found that he had violated the condition of his probation

that he not violate any criminal law. Held:

1. The trial court’s findings that the defendant had violated his probation

by committing criminal impersonation and larceny in the third degree

were not clearly erroneous, there having been evidence presented that

demonstrated that the defendant had impersonated another individual

and acted in a manner so as to defraud F and to permanently deprive

her of her money: the evidence showed that the defendant previously

had defrauded two other victims by wrongfully retaining cash deposits

for sham real estate transactions in which he falsely promised to rent

or to sell them property in exchange for a cash deposit, that he had

attempted to repeat that scam by obtaining money from F by falsely

promising to rent her a condemned apartment, that he returned F’s

deposit only after she confronted him, and that, as part of his scheme

to defraud F, he impersonated his business partner, gave F receipts

previously signed by the business partner, and used the name of his

business partner, not his actual name, when asked directly for his name,

all of which demonstrated that he impersonated another person and

acted in such assumed character with the intent to defraud F, and that

he intended to permanently deprive F of the deposit by falsely promising

a condemned apartment that would never be ready for her to occupy;

moreover, although the defendant claimed that the court should have

credited evidence he presented showing that he did not intend to perma-

nently deprive F of her money, he did not return the deposit until F

explicitly asked for it back, and it was the exclusive province of the

court as the trier of fact to weigh conflicting testimony and to credit

some, all or none of the defendant’s testimony.

2. The defendant’s claim that the state did not establish that he wilfully or

intentionally violated his probation or any laws was without merit; our

Supreme Court has determined previously that wilfulness is not an

element of a probation violation, as the state needs to establish only

that a probationer knew of the condition and engaged in conduct that

violated it, and the defendant here did not dispute that he knew that,

as a condition of his probation, he could not violate any criminal laws

of this state, and the record demonstrated that he engaged in conduct

that violated the criminal laws of this state.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony concern-

ing two of the defendant’s six prior convictions for larceny in the fourth

degree, which was offered by the state to show a common scheme or

plan; it is well settled that probation proceedings are informal and that

strict rules of evidence do not apply to such proceedings, in which a

broad evidentiary standard is applied, and on the basis of the similarity

between the past crimes and the incident involving F, the trial court

properly determined that the evidence regarding the prior crimes was

relevant to the inference that the defendant intended to keep F’s deposit.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s

probation and imposing a sentence of sixty months incarceration; that

court, which balanced the defendant’s liberty and rehabilitation against

the protection of society, found that the defendant was not amenable

to probation, based on his similar conduct within months of the start

of his probationary period, it considered the need to protect the public

from the defendant’s conduct, and it acted within its discretion by

imposing the remainder of the defendant’s sentence, which was not

unjust or excessive.

Argued May 17—officially released September 5, 2017

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with violation of

probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of New London and tried to the court, Williams,

J.; judgment revoking the defendant’s probation, from

which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kenneth A. Leary, for the appellant (defendant).

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant

state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael

L. Regan, state’s attorney, and Rafael I. Bustamante,

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

MULLINS, J. The defendant, Zane R. Megos, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court revoking his proba-

tion pursuant to General Statutes § 53a--32 and impos-

ing a sentence of sixty months incarceration. On appeal,

the defendant claims that the trial court: (1) erroneously

found that he violated the conditions of his probation,

(2) abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior

crimes that he had committed, and (3) abused its discre-

tion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are rele-

vant to our consideration of the defendant’s claims on

appeal. On April 29, 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty

under the Alford doctrine1 to six counts of larceny in

the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-

119 and 53a-125 (a).2 His conviction on two of those

larceny counts arose from incidents in which the defen-

dant wrongfully obtained and withheld cash ‘‘deposits’’

from the victims by falsely promising to rent them an

apartment or sell them a house. In the first incident, the

defendant received $1600 from a disabled, wheelchair-

bound woman as a deposit on an apartment that he

had advertised on Craigslist. The defendant told the

victim that she would be able to move in on the first

day of the month, but the apartment was not ready on

that date. The defendant continued to tell the victim

that the apartment would be ready at various dates in

the future, but the apartment never was available when

those dates arrived. The defendant did not return the

victim’s deposit, despite her request that he do so. In

the second incident, the defendant obtained $4550 from

another victim as a deposit on the purchase of a house.

Several months after taking the deposit, the house was

sold to someone else, and the defendant kept the vic-

tim’s money.

After pleading guilty to six larceny charges, the defen-

dant was sentenced to six years incarceration, execu-

tion suspended, followed by three years of probation.

The terms of the defendant’s probation, which he signed

on April 29, 2014, included the standard condition that

he ‘‘not violate any criminal law of the United States,

this state or any other state or territory.’’ The defen-

dant’s probation began on April 29, 2014.

Several months after his probation began, the defen-

dant was involved in another incident in which he was

alleged to have wrongfully obtained a deposit for a sham

real estate transaction. Sometime in October, 2014, the

defendant posted an online advertisement offering an

apartment in Norwich for rent. At the time that the

defendant posted that advertisement, however, the

advertised apartment was condemned.

On October 29, 2014, the defendant met with Nicole

Foster. Foster, who was a disabled mother, was seeking

to rent the apartment advertised by the defendant

because a fire had destroyed her family’s house in Sep-

tember, 2014. The defendant allowed Foster to view

the apartment and told her that she would need to

provide him with a cash deposit on that same day.

Although she did not have the full deposit at that

moment, Foster decided to rent the apartment adver-

tised by the defendant and with her father, gave the

defendant $500 in cash. Later that day, Foster tendered

the rest of the cash deposit, totaling $2925 to the defen-

dant. In return, the defendant gave Foster three receipts

that had been presigned by the defendant’s business

partner, Bishop Taylor. According to the defendant, he

and Taylor agreed to use receipts signed only by Taylor

because the Norwich Building Department had a ‘‘ven-

detta’’ against the defendant: ‘‘We didn’t want to draw

attention to the building department [that] I was

involved in the building. We didn’t want them coming

out and writing . . . up the wazoo . . . new [building

code] violations. . . . It wasn’t with intent to defraud.

I said to [Taylor] we’re not gonna get this through if

it’s in my name.’’ Upon examining the receipts, Foster’s

father told the defendant that he could not read ‘‘what

your first name is,’’ and the defendant answered

‘‘Bishop.’’ (Emphasis added.)

At this meeting, the defendant also informed Foster

that the apartment was not ready because the city

needed to perform inspections. The defendant had rep-

resented to Foster that an inspection would occur on

several different dates. No inspections had been sched-

uled for the premises, however, until more than a month

later on December 12, 2014.

On November 10, 2014, Foster spoke with an

employee at the Norwich Building Department and

learned that the man to whom she had given her deposit

actually was the defendant, not Taylor. She also learned

that no inspections were scheduled for the premises.

Thereafter, Foster and her father confronted the defen-

dant and requested the return of the deposit, which the

defendant subsequently returned to Foster.

On August 4, 2015, as a result of the incident with

Foster, the defendant was arrested for larceny in the

third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124,3

and criminal impersonation in violation of General Stat-

utes § 53a-130.4 On the basis of his arrest for those

alleged crimes, the defendant was charged with vio-

lating the terms of his April, 2014 probation.

A violation of probation hearing was held over the

course of four days during February, 2016. In an oral

ruling, the court found, by a preponderance of the evi-

dence, that the defendant had violated his probation

by committing the crimes of criminal impersonation

and larceny in the third degree.5 The court then revoked

the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to sixty

months incarceration for the violation. The court rea-

soned that the defendant had failed to take ‘‘full advan-

tage’’ of his probation and had ‘‘instead decided . . .

to defraud and to deceive the people who needed imme-

diate housing.’’ Specifically, the court found that the

defendant was ‘‘not amenable to probation, based on

[his] similar criminal conduct within months of the start

of [his] probationary period.’’ This appeal followed.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the general

principles of law pertaining to revocation of probation

proceedings. ‘‘[R]evocation of probation hearings, pur-

suant to § 53a–32, are comprised of two distinct phases,

each with a distinct purpose. . . . In the evidentiary

phase, [a] factual determination by a trial court as to

whether a probationer has violated a condition of proba-

tion must first be made. . . . In the dispositional phase,

[i]f a violation is found, a court must next determine

whether probation should be revoked because the bene-

ficial aspects of probation are no longer being served.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maurice

M., 303 Conn. 18, 25–26, 31 A.3d 1063 (2011).

With respect to the evidentiary phase of a revocation

proceeding, ‘‘[t]o support a finding of probation viola-

tion, the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that

it is more probable than not that the defendant has

violated a condition of his or her probation. . . . A fact

is more probable than not when it is supported by a

fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . [T]he purpose

of a probation revocation hearing is to determine

whether a defendant’s conduct constituted an act suffi-

cient to support a revocation of probation . . . rather

than whether the defendant had, beyond a reasonable

doubt, violated a criminal law. The proof of the conduct

at the hearing need not be sufficient to sustain a viola-

tion of a criminal law.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) State v. Sherrod, 157 Conn. App.

376, 382–83, 115 A.3d 1167, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 904,

122 A.3d 633 (2015). Thus, ‘‘a probation violation need

be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.’’

(Emphasis added.) State v. Rollins, 51 Conn. App. 478,

483, 723 A.2d 817 (1999).

Regarding the second phase of a revocation proceed-

ing, the dispositional phase, if the trial court ‘‘deter-

mines that the evidence has established a violation of

a condition of probation, then it proceeds to . . . the

determination of whether the defendant’s probationary

status should be revoked. On the basis of its consider-

ation of the whole record, the trial court may continue

or revoke the sentence of probation . . . [and] . . .

require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or

impose any lesser sentence. . . . In making this second

determination, the trial court is vested with broad dis-

cretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Sherrod, supra, 157 Conn. App. 381–82.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court’s finding

that he violated the conditions of his probation requiring

him not to violate any criminal law is clearly erroneous.

This claim essentially consists of three separate chal-

lenges to the court’s finding of a violation. Specifically,

the defendant argues that the state did not establish, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that he (1) committed

criminal impersonation, (2) committed larceny in the

third degree, and (3) ‘‘wilfully and intentionally violated

his probation or any laws . . . .’’ We consider these

three challenges seriatim and conclude that they all are

without merit.

A

The defendant’s first challenge to the court’s finding

that he violated his probation is that the evidence fails

to demonstrate that he committed criminal imperson-

ation. We disagree.

We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim by

setting forth our well settled standard of review. ‘‘This

court may reverse the trial court’s initial factual deter-

mination that a condition of probation has been violated

only if we determine that such a finding was clearly

erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous

when there is no evidence to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

. . . In making this determination, every reasonable

presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s

ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Sherrod, supra, 157 Conn. App. 382.

Our analysis also is informed by a review of the statu-

tory elements of the crime of criminal impersonation.

‘‘A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when such

person: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in

such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit

or to injure or defraud another . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) General Statutes § 53a-130 (a).

After applying the applicable law to the record before

us, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the

defendant had violated his probation by committing

criminal impersonation was not clearly erroneous.

There was evidence presented that, prior to meeting

with Foster, the defendant had defrauded two other

victims by wrongfully retaining cash deposits for sham

real estate transactions. In an apparent attempt to

repeat this scam, the defendant met with Foster, offer-

ing to rent her a condemned apartment. When Foster

agreed to rent the apartment, the defendant insisted on

an immediate cash deposit. The defendant also told

Foster that, although the apartment was not yet ready,

it would soon be inspected. Afterward, Foster learned

tion, and, when she confronted the defendant about

this, he returned her deposit. As part of the defendant’s

scheme to defraud Foster, the defendant impersonated

his business partner, Bishop Taylor. The defendant gave

Foster receipts presigned by Taylor in order to avoid

‘‘draw[ing] attention to the building department [that]

[he] was involved in the building.’’ Furthermore, when

asked directly for his name, the defendant replied,

‘‘Bishop,’’ instead of his actual name.6 Accordingly, we

conclude that it was not clearly erroneous for the court

to find that the defendant had violated the terms of his

probation by impersonating another person and acting

in such assumed character with the intent to defraud

Foster.

B

The defendant next argues that it was clearly errone-

ous for the court to find that he had violated his proba-

tion by having committed larceny in the third degree.

We disagree.

We begin our analysis of the defendant’s second chal-

lenge to the court’s finding that he violated his probation

by reviewing the statutory elements of larceny in the

third degree. ‘‘A person is guilty of larceny in the third

degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section

53a-119, and . . . (2) the value of the property or ser-

vice exceeds two thousand dollars . . . .’’ General Stat-

utes § 53a-124 (a). Pursuant to § 53a-119: ‘‘A person

commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another

of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a

third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds

such property from an owner.’’ Larceny includes

obtaining property by false promises. ‘‘A person obtains

property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme

to defraud, he obtains property of another by means

of a representation, express or implied, that he . . .

will in the future engage in particular conduct, and

when he does not intend to engage in such conduct

. . . . In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false

promise, the defendant’s intention or belief that the

promise would not be performed may not be established

by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise

was not performed.’’ General Statutes § 53a-119 (3).

After applying the applicable law to the record before

us, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the

defendant had violated the terms of his probation by

having committed larceny in the third degree was not

clearly erroneous. There was evidence presented that

the defendant obtained $2925 from Foster by falsely

promising to rent her a condemned apartment. As pre-

viously set forth in considerable detail, the defendant

had perpetrated several schemes in the past in which

he defrauded victims by falsely promising to rent or to

sell them property in exchange for a cash deposit. In

one of those prior incidents, the defendant promised a

victim an apartment that he never made ready for her

to occupy, and he kept her deposit. Thus, the court

could have inferred that the defendant intended to do

the same with Foster, i.e., permanently deprive her of

the deposit by falsely promising a condemned apart-

ment that would never be ready for her to occupy.

Accordingly, we conclude that it was not clearly errone-

ous for the court to find that the defendant had violated

his probation on the foregoing basis.

We are unpersuaded by the defendant’s contention

that the court improperly disregarded evidence sug-

gesting that he did not commit larceny in the third

degree. The defendant argues that the trial court should

have credited evidence he presented that tended to

show that he had not intended to permanently deprive

Foster of her money. The defendant, however, did not

return the deposit until Foster explicitly asked for it

back. In any event, the defendant’s argument must fail

because, as previously explained in this opinion, ‘‘[i]t

is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh

conflicting testimony and make determinations of credi-

bility, crediting some, all or none of any given witness’

testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 559, 958 A.2d 1214 (2008).

C

The defendant’s final challenge to the court’s finding

that he violated his probation is that the state did not

establish that he ‘‘wilfully and intentionally violated his

probation or any laws . . . .’’ This claim is without

merit.7 Our Supreme Court has stated unequivocally

that ‘‘the language of [§ 53a-32] demonstrates that the

legislature did not intend to make wilfulness an element

of a probation violation.’’ State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412,

420, 773 A.2d 931 (2001). ‘‘[T]o establish a violation, the

state needs only to establish that the probationer knew

of the condition and engaged in conduct that violated

the condition.’’ Id., 424.

In the present case, the defendant does not dispute

that he knew that as a condition of his probation, he

could not violate this state’s criminal laws. Further-

more, we already have concluded in parts I A and B of

this opinion that the defendant engaged in conduct that

violated this state’s criminal laws and, therefore, a con-

dition of his probation. Accordingly, we conclude that

it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find

that the defendant violated the terms of his probation.

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the court

improperly admitted evidence of other crimes that he

had committed. The defendant argues that the court,

pursuant to § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evi-

dence,8 erred by admitting testimony concerning two

of his six prior convictions for larceny in the fourth

degree. The state argues, in part, that the rules of evi-

dence do not apply in violation of probation hearings,

and, therefore, the evidence did not have to satisfy

§ 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence to be

admissible. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of the defendant’s claim.

The state called Chief Probation Officer Tamara Lanier

to testify regarding two of the defendant’s prior larceny

convictions. Defense counsel objected, claiming that

the prior convictions were not relevant and would be

prejudicial. The prosecutor argued that the state

intended to offer the testimony to show a common

scheme or plan. The court overruled defense counsel’s

objection, citing § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of

Evidence.9

After Lanier had testified regarding the defendant’s

having taken $1600 from a disabled woman, defense

counsel renewed his objection to Lanier’s testimony.

The court overruled the objection again, based on the

same provision of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.

Lanier then explained the facts of the failed real estate

sale, when the defendant did not return a prospective

buyer’s deposit despite the fact that the house had been

sold to another party. At this point, defense counsel

objected again. The court overruled the objection, stat-

ing that the testimony ‘‘is relevant to the present pro-

ceedings insofar as the basis for the alleged violation

of probation is somewhat similar to the two incidents

that were just reported by Chief Lanier.’’

We begin by stressing that the Connecticut Code of

Evidence does not apply to proceedings involving pro-

bation. Section 1-1 (d) (4) of the Connecticut Code of

Evidence specifically provides: ‘‘The Code, other than

with respect to privileges, does not apply in proceedings

such as, but not limited to, the following . . . Proceed-

ings involving probation.’’ ‘‘It is well settled that proba-

tion proceedings are informal and that strict rules of

evidence do not apply to them. . . . Hearsay evidence

may be admitted in a probation revocation hearing if

it is relevant, reliable and probative. . . . At the same

time, [t]he process . . . is not so flexible as to be com-

pletely unrestrained; there must be some indication that

the information presented to the court is responsible

and has some minimal indicia of reliability.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Lanagan, 119 Conn. App. 53, 58, 986 A.2d 1113 (2010).

‘‘The evidentiary standard for probation violation pro-

ceedings is broad. . . . [T]he court may . . . consider

the types of information properly considered at an origi-

nal sentencing hearing because a revocation hearing is

merely a reconvention of the original sentencing hear-

ing. . . . The court may, therefore, consider hearsay

information, evidence of crimes for which the defen-

dant was indicted but neither tried nor convicted, evi-

dence of crimes for which the defendant was acquitted,

and evidence of indictments or informations that were

dismissed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Young, 81 Conn. App. 710, 716, 841

A.2d 737, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 901, 852 A.2d 733

(2004).

Regarding challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings, our standard of review ‘‘is that these rulings

will be overturned on appeal only where there was an

abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of

substantial prejudice or injustice. . . . In reviewing

claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great

weight is given to the trial court’s decision and every

reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correct-

ness. . . . We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only

if it could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bullock, 155 Conn.

App. 1, 38, 107 A.3d 503, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 906,

111 A.3d 882 (2015).

The evidence presented regarding the defendant’s

prior crimes was relevant. ‘‘[R]elevant evidence is evi-

dence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the

determination of an issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Mark, 170 Conn. App. 254, 262, 154

A.3d 572, cert. denied, 324 Conn. 926, 155 A.3d 1269

(2017). Indeed, in order to prove that the defendant

committed larceny in the third degree, the state needed

to prove that the defendant took a deposit from Foster

for a property that was not available and that he

intended to keep that deposit. Each incident involved

the defendant taking a deposit for a unit that was not

available for occupancy. In the prior two incidents, the

defendant refused to return the deposits. Those prior

crimes support the inference that the defendant

intended to keep Foster’s deposit. On the basis of the

similarity between the past crimes and the present inci-

dent, the court found the testimony to be relevant.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evi-

dence regarding the defendant’s prior crimes of larceny

in the fourth degree. The facts of the prior crimes were

sufficiently similar to the present circumstances to

be relevant.

III

The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court

abused its discretion in revoking his probation and

imposing a sentence of sixty months incarceration.

We disagree.

‘‘The standard of review of the trial court’s decision

at the sentencing phase of the revocation of probation

hearing is whether the trial court exercised its discre-

tion properly by reinstating the original sentence and

ordering incarceration. . . . In determining whether

there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable

presumption should be given in favor of the correctness

of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only

where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injus-

tice appears to have been done. . . . On the basis of

its consideration of the whole record, the trial court

may continue or revoke the sentence of probation . . .

[and] . . . require the defendant to serve the sentence

imposed or impose any lesser sentence. . . . In making

this second determination, the trial court is vested with

broad discretion. . . . In determining whether to

revoke probation, the trial court shall consider the bene-

ficial purposes of probation, namely rehabilitation of

the offender and the protection of society. . . . The

important interests in the probationer’s liberty and reha-

bilitation must be balanced, however, against the need

to protect the public.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-

ted.) State v. Francis, 146 Conn. App. 448, 453–54, 76

A.3d 744, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 960, 82 A.3d 628 (2013).

The record reveals that the trial court balanced the

defendant’s liberty and rehabilitation against the protec-

tion of society. Specifically, the court noted that the

defendant was ‘‘not amenable to probation, based on

[his] similar criminal conduct within months of the start

of [his] probationary period.’’ The court considered the

need to protect the public from the defendant’s conduct,

recognizing that the defendant’s latest victim was a

woman in need of immediate housing. It was within

the court’s discretion to impose the remainder of the

defendant’s sentence, and we do not find the court’s

imposition of a sixty-month sentence to be unjust,

excessive, or an abuse of the court’s discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970).

2

General Statutes § 53a-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person commits

larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate

the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or

withholds such property from an owner.’’

General Statutes § 53a-125 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is guilty

of larceny in the fourth degree when he commits larceny as defined in

section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds one thou-

sand dollars.’’

3

General Statutes § 53a-124 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is

guilty of larceny in the third degree when he commits larceny, as defined

in section 53a-119, and . . . (2) the value of the property or service exceeds

two thousand dollars . . . .’’

4

General Statutes § 53a-130 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is

guilty of criminal impersonation when such person: (1) Impersonates

another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a

benefit or to injure or defraud another . . . .’’

5

The court also found that the state proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant committed attempt to commit larceny in the

third degree. The taking of Foster’s deposit was the basis of the attempt to

commit larceny and the completed larceny. Thus, the attempted larceny

does not appear to be a separate and independent basis supporting the

court’s judgment. Also, on appeal both the defendant and the state exclu-

sively address the completed act of larceny. Therefore, we do not address

the court’s mention of the attempt to commit larceny.

6

The gravamen of the defendant’s first challenge to the court’s finding

that he violated his probation appears to be that there was conflicting

testimony regarding whether he impersonated his business partner. Foster

testified that her father told the defendant that he could not ‘‘read what

your first name is’’ and asked him for his first name. (Emphasis added.) In

contrast, the defendant testified that he heard her father ask him, ‘‘who is

the owner?’’ Thus, according to the defendant, he simply was identifying

the name of the owner on the receipt, not impersonating someone else. We

reject this argument because ‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of

fact to weigh conflicting testimony and make determinations of credibility,

crediting some, all or none of any given witness’ testimony.’’ (Internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 559, 958 A.2d 1214 (2008).

As the trier of fact, the court was free to credit the testimony indicating

that the defendant impersonated his business partner.

Indeed, the trial court expressly found the defendant not to be credible:

‘‘[T]he court notes that [the defendant] himself conceded that he is a felon

with a history of convictions for crimes of dishonesty, but it is his present

criminal conduct, rather than his criminal past, that causes the court to

disbelieve his testimony. His substantially similar criminal conduct from

years past, however, remains an unavoidable, additional obstacle that his

attempt at credibility cannot overcome.’’

7

Within this claim, the defendant also appears to repeat his arguments

that the court erroneously found that he committed the crimes of criminal

impersonation and larceny in the third degree. These arguments already

have been addressed, and they warrant no further discussion. See parts I

A and B of this opinion.

8

Section 4–5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible

. . . to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme,

absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity,

or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.’’

9

The trial court incorrectly referred to § 4-5 (b). Section 4-5 of the Connect-

icut Code of Evidence was amended in 2011, and subsection (b) involves

the admissibility of other sexual misconduct to establish that the defendant

had a tendency or propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. The court’s

reference to subsection (b) is understood to refer to subsection (c).