Sosa v. Commissioner of Correction

ANDRES R. SOSA v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION ET AL.

(AC 38585)

Sheldon, Mullins and Sullivan, Js.

Syllabus

The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff brought this action against the

defendants, employees of the Department of Correction, including the

Commissioner of Correction, claiming that the defendants wrongly

revoked his visitation privileges in violation of his constitutional rights.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims

for monetary damages as to all of the defendants in their official and

individual capacities on the basis of sovereign immunity, and it dismissed

all of the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against

the defendants in their individual capacities due to insufficient service

of process. The court denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims

for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants

in their official capacities. From the judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff

appealed to this court. Held:

1. Because the trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the

plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defen-

dants in their official capacities, those claims remained pending, and,

therefore, the court did not render a final judgment disposing of all

causes of action against the defendants in their official capacities;

accordingly, because there was no final judgment as to all of the plain-

tiff’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities, this court

lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal from the dismissal of his

claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official

capacities.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

dismissed his claims for monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief

against the defendants in their individual capacities, which was based

on his claim that the court improperly dismissed those claims for insuffi-

cient service of process and determined that those claims were barred

by qualified immunity; the plaintiff’s challenge to the court’s qualified

immunity determination was inadequately briefed and, thus, was not

reviewable, and where, as here, the defendants were served at the Office

of the Attorney General, not at their usual places of abode, they were

properly served in their official capacities only and, therefore, the trial

court properly dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the defen-

dants in their individual capacities for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Argued May 30—officially released August 29, 2017

Procedural History

Action, inter alia, to recover damages for the alleged

deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional

rights, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New Britain, where the court,

Gleeson, J., granted in part the defendants’ motion to

dismiss, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.

Andres R. Sosa, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Robert S. Dearington, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney gen-

eral, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented, incarcerated

plaintiff, Andres R. Sosa, brought this action for mone-

tary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against employees of the

Department of Correction, including Commissioner of

Correction Scott Semple, Warden Carol Chapdelaine,

and District Administrator Angel Quiros, individually

and in their official capacities. The plaintiff claimed

that the defendants wrongly revoked his visitation privi-

leges in violation of his rights under the first and four-

teenth amendments to the United States constitution.

The trial court granted in part and denied in part a

motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. The court

granted the motion to dismiss as to all claims for mone-

tary damages as to all of the defendants in their official

and individual capacities. The court also granted the

motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive

and declaratory relief against the defendants in their

individual capacities, but denied the motion to dismiss

his claims for prospective declarative and injunctive

relief against the defendants in their official capacities.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal of

all of his claims against the defendants in their individ-

ual capacities and his claim for monetary damages in

their official capacities. Because there is no final judg-

ment as to the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants

in their official capacities, we dismiss the plaintiff’s

appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing

his claim for monetary damages against the defendants

in their official capacities. We affirm the judgment of

the trial court dismissing all of the claims against the

defendants in their individual capacities.

The trial court set forth the following relevant proce-

dural history. ‘‘The action primarily concerns the consti-

tutionality of a portion of Department of Correction

administrative directive § 10.6 prohibiting prisoners

from receiving contact visits for a two year period for

each individual class A or B disciplinary report.

‘‘On December 5, 2014, the plaintiff filed a complaint,

dated November 18, 2014, against the defendants. The

plaintiff alleges that, on August 9, 2014, he was given

a class A disciplinary report for masturbating inside his

own cell. The plaintiff alleges that he was issued several

sanctions, including an automatic two year loss of con-

tact visits, pursuant to administrative directive § 10.6.

The plaintiff claims that the two year restriction on

contact visits is not a permissible penalty under admin-

istrative directive § 9.5.

‘‘The plaintiff further alleges that during his seventeen

years of incarceration, he has been deprived of physical

contact with family and friends for a period of twelve

or more years, and was not provided with a due process

hearing in which to appeal the denial of his contact

visits. The plaintiff claims that this fact show[s] that

the defendants have created an unconstitutional ‘cus-

tom policy.’

‘‘The plaintiff alleges that the only notice provided

by the defendants was in 2001, and the notice stated

that the plaintiff will be deprived of contact visits for

(1) intoxication, (2) assault, (3) refusal to give urine

specimen, (4) visiting room misconduct, and (5) contra-

band. The plaintiff states that the only listed violation

that he is actually guilty of was fighting in 2001.

‘‘On March 12, 2015, the defendants filed a motion

to dismiss the entire action. On April 22, 2015, the plain-

tiff filed an objection to the motion. The matter was

heard at short calendar on June 22, 2015.’’ (Foot-

notes omitted.)

By way of memorandum of decision filed on October

8, 2015, the trial court granted in part and denied in

part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court

granted the motion to dismiss as to all claims for mone-

tary damages as to all of the defendants in their official

capacities on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

claims against the defendants in their individual capaci-

ties on the basis of qualified immunity because none

of the plaintiff’s claims invoked a protected liberty inter-

est in contact visitation, which has been held to be

a privilege rather than an entitlement. The court also

determined that the plaintiff had not properly served his

action upon the defendants in their individual capacities

and thus that it lacked personal jurisdiction over all of

his claims against the defendants in their individual

capacities. Accordingly, the court dismissed all of the

plaintiff’s individual capacity claims on the basis of

insufficiency of service of process. This appeal

followed.

‘‘A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the juris-

diction of the court . . . . A motion to dismiss tests,

inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court

is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the trial

court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [decision

to grant] . . . the motion to dismiss will be de novo.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 668, 998 A.2d 1

(2010).

The plaintiff first challenges the trial court’s judgment

dismissing its claims against the defendants for mone-

tary damages on the basis of sovereign immunity. In

ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court denied

the motion as to the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief, granting the motion only as to

monetary damages. The statutory right to appeal is lim-

ited to appeals by parties aggrieved by final judgments.

General Statutes § 52-263; State v. Curcio, 191 Conn.

27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983).1 Practice Book § 61-3 pro-

vides in relevant part that a judgment that does not

fully dispose of a complaint is a final judgment only if

it ‘‘disposes of all causes of action in [the] complaint

. . . brought by or against a particular party or parties.

. . .’’ Because the court denied the motion to dismiss

the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief, those claims remain pending, and thus the court

did not render a final judgment disposing of all causes

of action brought against the defendants in their official

capacities. Because there is no final judgment as to all

of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their

official capacities, this court lacks jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment of dismissal of his

claim for monetary damages.

The plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred in

dismissing his claims for monetary, declaratory and

injunctive relief against the defendants in their individ-

ual capacities. The plaintiff first challenges the court’s

determination that his claims against the defendants

in their individual capacities were barred by qualified

immunity. The court based its qualified immunity deter-

mination on the ground that the plaintiff had no consti-

tutional liberty interest in visitation. Purporting to

challenge that determination, the plaintiff argued: ‘‘The

[defendants’] conduct did violate clearly . . . constitu-

tional rights in which a reasonable person would have

know[n], making the defendants not entitle[d] to quali-

fied immunity.’’ Other than an additional bald statement

that his ‘‘interest in having contact visits is among the

interest[s] protected by the fourteenth amendment’s

due process clause,’’ the plaintiff provides no additional

factual or legal analysis in support of his challenge to

the trial court’s thorough and amply supported ruling.

We conclude that the plaintiff’s challenge to the court’s

qualified immunity determination is inadequately

briefed, and thus we decline to address it. See State v.

Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016).

Finally, the plaintiff challenges the trial court’s find-

ing of insufficiency of service of process on the defen-

dants in their individual capacities, and its resulting

judgment dismissing his claims against the defendants

in their individual capacities. ‘‘[T]he Superior Court

. . . may exercise jurisdiction over a person only if

that person has been properly served with process, has

consented to the jurisdiction of the court or has waived

any objection to the court’s exercise of personal juris-

diction. . . . [S]ervice of process on a party in accor-

dance with the statutory requirements is a prerequisite

to a court’s exercise of [personal] jurisdiction over that

party.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn. App. 513,

529–30, 89 A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 917, 94

A.3d 642 (2014). Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-57

(a),2 a defendant in any civil action must be served in

hand or at his usual place of abode. This requirement

includes civil suits brought against state defendants

who are sued in their individual capacities. See Edel-

man v. Page, 123 Conn. App. 233, 243, 1 A.3d 1188, cert.

denied, 299 Conn. 908, 10 A.3d 525 (2010).

Thus, a plaintiff who serves a state defendant pursu-

ant to General Statutes § 52-64 (a)3 by leaving a copy

of the process at the Office of the Attorney General has

properly served the defendant only in his or her official

capacity and has failed to properly serve the defendant

in his or her individual capacity. See id.

Here, the defendants were served at the Office of the

Attorney General, not at their usual places of abode,

and they thus were properly served in their official

capacities, not in their individual capacities. Accord-

ingly, we conclude that the court properly dismissed

all of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their

individual capacities for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The appeal from the judgment of dismissal of the

plaintiff’s claim against the defendants in their official

capacities is dismissed. The judgment is affirmed in all

other respects.

1

Prior to oral argument before this court, we ordered the parties ‘‘to be

prepared to address at oral argument whether the portion of the appeal that

challenges the dismissal of the claim for money damages asserted against

the defendants in their official capacities should not be dismissed for lack

of a final judgment because the court did not dispose of all causes of action

asserted against the defendants in their official capacities.’’

2

General Statutes § 52-57 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided,

process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true and attested

copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or

at his usual place of abode, in this state.’’

3

General Statutes § 52-64 (a) provides: ‘‘Service of civil process in any

civil action or proceeding maintainable against or in any appeal authorized

from the actions of, or service of any foreign attachment or garnishment

authorized against, the state or against any institution, board, commission,

department or administrative tribunal thereof, or against any officer, servant,

agent or employee of the state or of any such institution, board, commission,

department or administrative tribunal, as the case may be, may be made

by a proper officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process,

including the declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General at the

office of the Attorney General in Hartford, or (2) sending a true and attested

copy of the process, including the summons and complaint, by certified

mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney General at the office of the

Attorney General in Hartford.’’