“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”
How later courts described this case
- “Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”
- holding that Washington’s “emergency detention statutory scheme does not violate procedural due process”
- setting forth qualified immunity analysis
- probable cause “exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HEIDI HAZELQUIST, No. 15-35863
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00073-TOR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STEPHAN, Officer; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Thomas O. Rice, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Heidi Hazelquist appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from an
arrest and involuntary commitment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo, Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2009), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Stephan
on Hazelquist’s unlawful seizure claim because Hazelquist failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether there was no probable cause for her arrest.
See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“A
claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1023
(probable cause “exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity for defendant Hull on Hazelquist’s § 1983 claim for
involuntary commitment because it would not have been clear to every reasonable
government official that Hull’s decision to temporarily commit Hazelquist violated
her clearly established right to due process. See Sjurset v. Button, 810 F.3d 609,
615-16 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth qualified immunity analysis); see also In re
Detention of June Johnson, 322 P.3d 22, 28 (Wash Ct. App. 2014) (holding that
Washington’s “emergency detention statutory scheme does not violate procedural
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due process”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Klewin
on Hazelquist’s excessive force claim because Hazelquist failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Klewin’s actions were objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances. See Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975,
980-82 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the reasonableness standard and concluding
officers used reasonable force in pinning down and handcuffing plaintiff before her
mental health evaluation).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Stephan and Hull on Hazelquist’s malicious prosecution claim because Hazelquist
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she filed a standard
tort claim notice with the appropriate entities before commencing this action. See
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.92.100 (requirements for presentment of tort claims against
state officers); 4.92.110 (sixty-day waiting period after filing a tort claim form).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hazelquist’s state
law defamation, assault, and false imprisonment claims because Hazelquist
conceded that her claims were time-barred. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.100(1)
(setting forth two-year statute of limitations).
We reject as unsupported by the record Hazelquist’s contentions that this
court and the district court violated her right to due process.
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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
Hazelquist’s pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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