Gotoimoana Summers v. Nancy A. Berryhill

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 16-3849

GOTOIMOANA SUMMERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Secu-

rity,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:15-cv-00118 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 17, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2017

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Gotoimoana Summers appeals

from the judgment of the district court affirming the Social

Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disabil-

ity insurance benefits. We affirm.

2 No. 16-3849

I.

On February 24, 2012, Gotoimoana Summers was fired

from her job as a production-line worker in Elkhart, Indiana.

She applied for disability insurance benefits shortly after-

wards, alleging that she became disabled on the date she was

fired. The Social Security Administration denied the applica-

tion and scheduled a hearing before an administrative law

judge at Summers’s request. Summers attended the hearing

with counsel and testified that she was unable to work be-

cause of headaches, difficulty breathing, atrial fibrillation,

and dizziness with blackouts. She also submitted medical ev-

idence indicating that she suffered from depression, anxiety,

obesity, and sleep apnea. She testified that before her most re-

cent job, she worked for an RV supply company assembling

lightweight parts in an assembly line. Asked to describe a typ-

ical day, Summers replied, “Sometimes, I have bad days.

Sometimes, I don’t think. Sometimes, I get depressed.”

Summers also made several inconsistent statements dur-

ing the hearing, mostly about her work history and her use of

drugs and alcohol. For instance, she initially testified that she

left work for health reasons but then later admitted that she

was fired. And she retracted her testimony that she had never

used marijuana when the ALJ confronted her with records

documenting her own previous admission to the contrary.

Toward the end of the hearing, the ALJ asked a Vocational

Expert whether a hypothetical individual who was limited to

No. 16-3849 3

a restricted range of light work 1 could perform any of Sum-

mers’s past jobs. The VE responded that such an individual

could perform Summers’s past job as an assembler, as well as

other jobs (such as inspector and hand packager, photocopy

machine operator, and palletizer) that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy.

In November 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision con-

cluding that despite her medical impairments, Summers re-

tained the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform a

substantially limited range of light work, 2 including her past

work as an assembler and the other work identified by the VE.

The ALJ also found that Summers was “not entirely credible”

in light of her repeated inconsistent statements. Ultimately,

the ALJ determined that Summers was not disabled from the

time of her alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s

decision.

The ALJ’s decision was upheld by the Social Security Ap-

peals Council and became the final decision of the Commis-

sioner. Summers appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the

1 Light work is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 20

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up

to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.

2An individual’s RFC is what she can still do despite her limitations. SSR

96-8p.

4 No. 16-3849

district court, and the district court affirmed the Commis-

sioner’s denial of benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II.

We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it ap-

plies the correct legal standard and is supported by substan-

tial evidence. Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasona-

ble mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Id. Our review is deferential; we will not reweigh the evidence

or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Shideler v.

Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012).

Summers raises five issues on appeal. She raised the same

issues below, and the district court very ably handled them in

a thorough and lucid opinion. Because Summers has chosen

to ignore the reasoning of the district court’s opinion and in-

stead focus exclusively on the merits of the ALJ’s decision,

we’ll keep our remarks short. See Castile, 617 F.3d at 926 (not-

ing that an appellant who fails to address the district court’s

analysis of the ALJ’s decision engages in a “‘risky tactic,’ espe-

cially … where the district court [] issued a ‘thorough and per-

suasive opinion’”) (quoting White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658

(7th Cir. 2005)).

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Assess-

ment

Summers argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is incom-

plete because it fails to include restrictions (like avoiding

moving machinery and sharp objects) that would account for

No. 16-3849 5

the risk of excessive bleeding potentially associated with her

use of blood thinners.

We conclude that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported

by substantial evidence. In a detailed 18-page, single-spaced

decision, the ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical and other

evidence and carefully considered each of Summers’s impair-

ments and related functional deficits. The ALJ then assessed

an RFC limiting Summers to a significantly reduced range of

light work. For example, the ALJ found that Summers was

substantially limited in her ability to push, pull, stand, walk,

climb, crouch, crawl, kneel, sit, balance, and stoop; that she

could perform only simple, repetitive tasks in a low-stress, so-

cially undemanding work environment; and that she had to

avoid concentrated exposure to humidity, extreme tempera-

tures, and irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gas, and chem-

icals. These limitations generously account for the functional

limitations that could reasonably be expected to result from

Summers’s medical impairments. Summers offered no evi-

dence that her use of blood thinners put her at risk of hemor-

rhaging or otherwise necessitated additional functional re-

strictions beyond those already incorporated in the RFC. We

defer to the ALJ’s well-founded RFC assessment.

B. The ALJ Adequately Developed the Record

Summers next argues that the ALJ failed to adequately de-

velop the record by neglecting to inquire further into her tes-

timony that she had “bad days.” According to Summers, fur-

ther questioning may have revealed that her bad days were

so severe or frequent as to preclude full-time work.

This argument is frivolous. It was Summers’s burden, not

the ALJ’s, to prove that she was disabled. See Meredith v.

6 No. 16-3849

Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. §

404.1512(a)(1). The ALJ extensively questioned Summers at

the hearing and gave her every opportunity to meet that bur-

den by elaborating on the nature, frequency, and intensity of

her symptoms and related functional limitations. Moreover,

because Summers was represented by counsel at the hearing,

she is presumed to have made her best case before the ALJ.

Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007); cf. Nelson v.

Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen the claimant

is unrepresented by counsel, the ALJ has a duty to ‘scrupulously

and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all

relevant facts.’”) (emphasis added). In short, the record in-

cludes ample evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision, and

Summers has not identified any missing evidence that ren-

ders the record incomplete. Summers’s “[m]ere conjecture or

speculation that additional evidence might have been ob-

tained in the case is insufficient to warrant a remand.” See

Binion v. Shalala, 13 F.3d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1994).

C. The ALJ Properly Considered Summers’s Obesity

Summers also argues that the ALJ failed to adequately

consider her obesity. We see no basis for this argument. The

ALJ identified Summers’s obesity as a severe impairment and

thoroughly discussed its functionally limiting effects

throughout the decision. The ALJ noted that Summers was

5’2’’ and weighed at least 270 pounds since her alleged onset

date, that her BMI was between 49 and 54, and that she was

advised by her physicians to exercise and eat a healthy diet to

lose weight. The ALJ also explicitly stated that the various

postural and exertional limitations of the RFC “account for

periods of shortness of breath, and [] recognize the mobility

No. 16-3849 7

challenges that likely arise from obesity.” The ALJ even disa-

greed with the state-agency consultative physician’s opinion

that Summers could perform work at the medium exertional

level, explaining that the “extreme” “level of [Summers’s]

obesity alone would likely result in decreased stamina that

would make work at [the medium] level of exertion a chal-

lenge.” Finally, the ALJ noted that Summers weighed over 280

pounds well before her alleged onset date but was still able to

work during that time despite her obesity. The ALJ ade-

quately considered the limiting effect of Summers’s obesity in

combination with her other impairments, and reasonably

concluded that Summers was capable of a reduced range of

light work. See SSR 02-1p.

D. The ALJ Properly Found That Summers Was Not Tem-

porarily Disabled

Summers argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that

she was at least temporarily disabled from February 24, 2012,

to May 21, 2013. 3 Summers suggests that the ALJ failed to con-

sider her heart problems during that time.

This argument is without merit. The ALJ meticulously dis-

cussed the evidence regarding Summers’s heart problems

(and other health issues) from February 2012 up through the

date of the ALJ’s decision. For example, the ALJ noted that,

though Summers was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation in

February 2012, she had no heart attacks or coronary artery

disease, her cardiac exams showed mostly benign results, and

her condition was controlled when she took her medications

3 A claimant may receive an award of temporary benefits if she is disabled

for 12 months or longer, even if she later recovers sufficient health to re-

turn to work. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594.

8 No. 16-3849

as prescribed. For these reasons and the reasons discussed in

the district court’s opinion, substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s decision that Summers was not disabled at any time af-

ter she was fired from her job in February 2012.

E. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility

Finding

Summers next takes issue with the ALJ’s partially adverse

credibility finding. She argues that the ALJ should have found

her credible in light of her “consistent and arduous work his-

tory.”

We give the ALJ’s credibility finding “special deference”

and will overturn it only if it is “patently wrong.” Eichstadt v.

Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2008). As the ALJ noted,

Summers made a number of inconsistent statements concern-

ing such questions as (1) when she stopped smoking; (2) when

she stopped drinking alcohol and how much she used to

drink; (3) whether she ever used marijuana; (4) whether (and

why) she was fired from her most recent job; and (5) whether

she returned to work after her alleged onset date. The ALJ

added that Summers’s allegations of disabling limitations

were also frequently inconsistent with the objective medical

evidence. To name just one example among many, the ALJ

noted that Summers’s allegations of dizziness, headaches, and

blackouts conflicted with medical records showing that she

consistently denied those symptoms. The ALJ properly took

these inconsistencies into consideration when concluding that

Summers’s subjective complaints of disabling limitations

were “not entirely credible.”

The ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to ex-

plicitly discuss Summers’s work history when evaluating her

No. 16-3849 9

credibility. See Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2016)

(“An ALJ is not statutorily required to consider a claimant’s

work history[.]”). Although a consistent work history weighs

in favor of a positive credibility finding, it is still just “one fac-

tor among many, and it is not dispositive.” Loveless v. Colvin,

810 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016). See also Pepper v. Colvin, 712

F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ’s adequate discussion

of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation

of every piece of evidence.”) (internal marks omitted).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.