Untitled California Attorney General Opinion

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

State of California

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General

_________________________

:

OPINION : No. 16-603

:

of : July 11, 2017

:

XAVIER BECERRA :

Attorney General :

:

LAWRENCE M. DANIELS :

Deputy Attorney General :

:

________________________________________________________________________

THE HONORABLE CHRIS R. HOLDEN, MEMBER OF THE STATE

ASSEMBLY, has requested an opinion on the following question:

Does the California Voter Participation Rights Act apply to charter cities, and to

local school districts whose elections are governed by city charters?

CONCLUSION

The California Voter Participation Rights Act applies to charter cities, and to local

school districts whose elections are governed by city charters.

1

16-603

ANALYSIS

California holds statewide elections in June and November of every even-

numbered year.1 Local elections held on the statewide election dates are referred to as

“consolidated,” “concurrent,” or “on-cycle,” whereas those held on other dates are

described as “nonconcurrent” or “off-cycle.”2 In 2015, faced with the problem of

substantially lower voter turnout in off-cycle elections, the Legislature enacted the

California Voter Participation Rights Act (“Act”).3

The Act, which becomes operative on January 1, 2018,4 requires any “political

subdivision” whose elections have a “significant decrease in voter turnout” to hold its

elections on a statewide election date.5 The Act defines “political subdivision” as “a

geographic area of representation created for the provision of government services,

including, but not limited to, a city, a school district, a community college district, or

other district organized pursuant to state law.”6 A “[s]ignificant decrease in voter

turnout” occurs where “the voter turnout for a regularly scheduled election in a political

subdivision is at least 25 percent less than the average voter turnout within that political

subdivision for the previous four statewide general elections.”7 And “voter turnout” is

“the percentage of voters who are eligible to cast ballots within a given political

subdivision who voted.”8 The question presented is whether charter cities (and school

1

Elec. Code, § 1001; see Elec. Code, §§ 1200 (“The statewide general election shall

be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each even-numbered

year”), 1201 (“The statewide direct primary shall be held on the first Tuesday after the

first Monday in June of each even-numbered year”).

2

Elec. Code, §§ 10403, 14052, 14053; Cal. Common Cause, Getting to 100%: How

Changing the Election Date Can Improve Voter Turnout (Feb. 2015) p. 3.

3

Stats. 2015, ch. 235, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2016, operative Jan. 1, 2018 (adding Elec. Code,

div. 14, ch. 1.7, §§ 14050-14057); see Berry & Gersen, The Timing of Elections (Winter

2010) 77 U of Chi.L.Rev 37, 55 & fn. 66 (in California, “[o]ff-cycle elections generate

systematically lower turnout”).

4

Elec. Code, § 14057.

5

Elec. Code, § 14052, subd. (a); see also Elec. Code, § 14052, subd. (b) (“A political

subdivision may hold an election other than on a statewide election date if, by January 1,

2018, the political subdivision has adopted a plan to consolidate a future election with a

statewide election not later than the November 8, 2022, statewide general election”).

6

Elec. Code, § 14051, subd. (a).

7

Elec. Code, § 14051, subd. (b).

8

Elec. Code, § 14051, subd. (c).

2

16-603

districts whose elections are governed by those charters9), by virtue of the California

Constitution’s “home-rule” provision, need not comply with the Act, or whether charter

city law must yield to the Act where the two conflict. For the reasons that follow, we

conclude that under such circumstances the Act controls.

We begin our analysis with the law on charter city autonomy. The California

Constitution, article XI, section 5 gives charter cities the power to legislate “in respect to

municipal affairs” over inconsistent state law.10 These municipal affairs include the

“conduct of city elections” and “the times at which . . . the several municipal officers . . .

whose compensation is paid by the city shall be elected . . . .”11 But a charter city’s

“home-rule” authority over municipal affairs is not absolute; state law may trump charter

law on matters of “statewide concern.”12

The California Supreme Court has set forth a four-part test to determine when a

state statute preempts a charter city law.13 Under this test, a court must determine: (1)

whether the charter city law regulates a municipal affair; (2) whether there is an actual

conflict between the charter city law and the state statute; (3) whether the state statute

addresses a matter of statewide concern; and (4) whether the state statute “is reasonably

related to resolution of that concern and narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary

interference in local governance.”14 “If the court is persuaded that the subject of the state

statute is one of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related to its

resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the conflicting charter city measure

ceases to be a ‘municipal affair’ pro tanto and the Legislature is not prohibited by article

XI, section 5(a), from addressing the statewide dimension by its own tailored

enactments.”15

9

Like charter cities, school districts within charter cities whose charters govern their

elections are normally exempt from the requirement that local elections be held on one of

four “established election dates,” which include the statewide election dates. (Elec.

Code, §§ 1000, 1002, 1003, subds. (b), (d).)

10

Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (a).

11

Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b)(3), (b)(4); see also Cal. Const., art. IX, § 16, subd.

(a) (city charter may regulate school board elections).

12

State Bldg. and Const. Trades Council of Cal., AFL-CIO v. City of Vista (2012) 54

Cal.4th 547, 552, 555-556 (Vista).

13

Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556; Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los

Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 (Cal. Fed.).

14

Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556, internal quotation marks, internal citations, and

ellipses omitted.

15

Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556, internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted.

3

16-603

In Jauregui v. City of Palmdale, the Court of Appeal utilized this preemption test

in a case concerning the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA).16 The CVRA

sought to remedy minority vote dilution—a different voting-rights problem than the one

that the Act addresses, i.e., low voter turnout in off-cycle elections. As explained in

Jauregui, the CVRA was “adopted to prevent an at-large electoral system from diluting

minority voting power and thereby impairing a protected class from influencing the

outcome of an election.”17 At issue in Jauregui was whether the CVRA applied to

charter cities.18

Using the California Supreme Court’s preemption test from Vista, the Court of

Appeal in Jauregui first determined that a charter city’s selection of at-large elections

over district-based elections was a “municipal affair” because “article XI, section 5,

subdivision (b) expressly identifies the conduct of city elections as a municipal affair.”19

Second, the court found that there was an “actual conflict” between the CVRA and the

city charter provision upon finding vote dilution of a protected class.20 Third, the court

explained that the CVRA involved a statewide concern as it implicated the constitutional

rights to vote and equal protection as well as electoral integrity.21 Finally, the court

reasoned that the CVRA was narrowly drawn and reasonably related to the resolution of

these statewide concerns since the CVRA only applied to at-large council elections when

there has been vote dilution of a protected class.22 Based on its analysis, the Court of

Appeal concluded that the “home-rule” provisions of article XI, section 5 did not prevent

the CVRA from being enforced in charter cities.23 The Court of Appeal’s analysis now

informs our own as we apply this same preemption test to the Act.

First, we also find the Act regulates a municipal affair—the decision when to hold

a local election. The state Constitution enumerates the “conduct of city elections” and

“the times at which . . . the several municipal officers . . . shall be elected” as two

16

Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 781, 795-802 (Jauregui); see

Stats. 2002, ch. 129, § 1; Elec. Code, §§ 14025-14032.

17

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 789.

18

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 788.

19

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 796, citing Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4

Cal.4th 389, 398 (Johnson).

20

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796-798.

21

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 798-801.

22

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 802.

23

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 802.

4

16-603

categories of municipal affairs.24 A charter city’s decision to hold a local election on a

date other than a statewide election date involves the conduct of city elections and may

also involve the times at which municipal officers are elected.

Second, an actual conflict exists between state and charter city law. As a threshold

matter, we find that the Legislature intended the Act to apply to charter cities and school

districts. The Act specifically includes “a city” and “a school district” under the

definition of “political subdivision.”25 A charter city is a city.26 Moreover, a charter city

and a school district fall within the definition of “political subdivision” under the Act, as

each is “a geographic area of representation created for the provision of government

services . . . .”27 The Court of Appeal in Jauregui applied the CVRA’s identical

definition of “political subdivision” to charter cities,28 and we presume that the

Legislature enacted the same language in the Act in light of this judicial ruling.29 The

presumption is bolstered here by the author’s statements during legislative hearings that

the bill covered charter cities.30 Under this interpretation, the Act actually conflicts with

24

Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subds. (b)(3), (b)(4); see Johnson, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p.

398; Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.

25

Elec. Code, § 14051, subd. (a) (“‘Political subdivision’ means a geographic area of

representation created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited

to, a city, a school district, a community college district, or other district organized

pursuant to state law”); see Elec. Code, § 14052, subd. (a) (“a political subdivision shall

not hold an election other than on a statewide election date if holding an election on a

nonconcurrent date has previously resulted in a significant decrease in voter turnout”).

26

Gov. Code, §§ 34100, 34101; Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 794 (“The

Legislature recognizes two types of cities. The first kind, a municipality organized under

a charter, is a charter city”).

27

Elec. Code, § 14051, subd. (a); see Cal. Const., art. IX, § 14, art. XI, §§ 5, 7, 9; Ed.

Code, §§ 1040, 1042, 1240, 35160, 35160.1, 35160.2.

28

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796-798; see former Elec. Code, § 14026,

subd. (c), as enacted by Stats. 2002, ch. 129, § 1. In 2015, the Legislature codified

Jauregui’s holding by expressly including “charter city” in the definition of “political

subdivision” in the CVRA. (Stats. 2015, ch. 724, § 2; Assem. Com. on Elections and

Redistricting, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 277 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb.

11, 2015, p. 8.)

29

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 (“Where a statute is framed in

language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analogous subject, and that enactment

has been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted that

construction”).

30

Assem. Standing Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Hearing (Jul. 1, 2015),

5

16-603

charter city law where the charter city’s off-cycle elections result in a significant decrease

in voter turnout. Specifically, charter city law allows off-cycle elections, yet the Act

prohibits them.31 When this happens, the conflict “is in fact a genuine one, unresolvable

short of choosing between one enactment and the other.”32

Third, the Act addresses a matter of statewide concern: low voter turnout in off-

cycle elections. To determine whether a statewide concern is present, we consider

whether there is a “a convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal

concerns, one justifying legislative supersession based on sensible, pragmatic

considerations.”33 In doing so, we must “avoid the error of ‘compartmentalization,’ that

is, of cordoning off an entire area of governmental activity as either a ‘municipal affair’

or one of statewide concern.”34 A finding of statewide concern does not mean that the

charter city law is not of municipal concern, but “rather, that under the historical

circumstances presented, the state has a more substantial interest in the subject than the

charter city.”35

testimony of Sen. Ben Hueso, available at https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/383?st

artTime=114&vid=G-cKeAHj51U, at 2:00, 3:29 (where the bill’s author states that the

Act applies to charter cities, which, according to his research, does not violate the state

Constitution); see Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 10-11 (the “almost irresistible”

presumption that the Legislature used language in the same sense as it was judicially

construed in another statute “is strengthened further by the author’s statements at the

committee hearing” supporting this construction).

31

Elec. Code, §§ 14051, subd. (b), 14052, subd. (a).

32

Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17. While the Act and charter city law are not

“entirely at odds” because a charter city may still hold off-cycle elections if there is no

significant decrease in voter turnout (Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 797), for an

actual conflict to be present, “a local enactment may only contravene some aspects of a

state law or do so only to an extent” (id. at p. 798, citing Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of

Los Angeles (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 810, 822). In Jauregui, there was an actual conflict

even though the CVRA “does not prohibit city-wide council elections” but only does so if

the charter city’s “at-large electoral system” results in “a dilution of a protected class’s

voting rights . . . .” (Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) Likewise, there is an

actual conflict whenever the charter city’s off-cycle elections meet the statutory standard

of a significant decrease in voter turnout.

33

Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 18.

34

Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 17.

35

Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 18.

6

16-603

California’s off-cycle elections generally have a substantially lower voter turnout

than its on-cycle elections.36 According to one report—cited in the legislative history

about California mayoral and councilmanic elections—“simply moving an election to be

synchronized with the even year state elections can result in a 21-36 percent boost in

voter turnout for municipal and other local elections.”37 Some commentators maintain

that off-cycle elections often have low voter turnout “because they are formally

nonpartisan and deliberately timed not to coincide with other elections, when the public’s

attention is at its peak.”38 The Act’s purpose, according to the bill’s author, was to

combat the “abysmal” voter turnout in certain off-cycle elections by holding them

“concurrently with statewide and federal elections, where voter turnout is often twice as

high.”39 Given these historical circumstances, we believe that the state has a more

substantial interest in tackling the problem of low voter turnout in off-cycle elections than

a charter city has in setting off-cycle dates for its local elections.40 Here, as in Jauregui,

there are grounds for finding a matter of statewide concern—the constitutional right to

vote and the integrity of the electoral process.41

36

Berry & Gerson, supra, 77 U of Chi.L.Rev at p. 55 & fn. 66.

37

Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen.

Bill 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun. 23, 2015, p. 11; see Hajnal, Lewis, &

Louch, Public Policy Institute of Cal., Municipal Elections in Cal.: Turnout, Timing and

Competition (2002) pp. 35-37.

38

Raam, Charter School Jurisprudence and the Democratic Ideal (Fall 2016) 50

Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 23, internal quotation marks omitted; see Cal. Const., art. II,

§ 6, subd. (a) (all school and city offices must be nonpartisan).

39

Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun.

23, 2015, p. 3.

40

It is claimed that charter cities have a “categorical” supremacy over city-officer

elections based on their constitutionally granted “plenary authority” in these matters.

(See Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b)(4).) We are particularly directed to Mackey v.

Thiel (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 362, where the Court of Appeal ruled that a state statute

mandating that the city clerk mail qualification pamphlets upon a candidate’s request

must give way to the charter city’s refusal to do so. (Id. at pp. 363-366.) In reaching its

decision, the appellate court determined that the statute at issue was not of statewide

concern as it did not “involve[] the right to vote.” (Id. at pp. 365-366.) The court’s own

rationale therefore refutes the idea that a charter city’s sovereignty over city elections is

absolute. (See also Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803-804 [“The plenary

authority identified in article XI, section 5, subdivision (b) can be preempted by a

statewide law after engaging in the four-step evaluation process specified by our Supreme

Court”].)

41

See Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 799-801, citing U.S. Const., 14th

7

16-603

As the Jauregui court observed, “[t]he right to vote is fundamental” and the

federal and state Constitutions protect it.42 The California Constitution devotes several

sections to this right, providing that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people,”43 that

any United States citizen and resident at least 18 years old may vote,44 that every vote

must count and be secret,45 and that the Legislature is responsible for providing “free

elections.”46

As at-large elections may impinge on voting by causing voter dilution, off-cycle

elections may impinge on voting by causing low voter turnout. The state’s interest in

facilitating the exercise of the people’s right of suffrage “is one that goes to the

legitimacy of the electoral process” and arises not “merely from a municipal concern.”47

Amend. & Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a), art. II, § 2. An isolated comment in the

legislative record also raises possible equal protection concerns from low voter turnout in

off-cycle elections. The bill’s author stated, “As a result of low voter turnout, the voting

population often does not look like the general public as a whole and neither does the city

council.” (Sen. Com. on Elec. & Const. Amends., analysis of Sen. Bill 415 (2015-2016

Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 15, 2015, p. 4.) It may be, as some advocates argue, that

off-cycle elections disproportionately affect the voting of certain racial groups. (See,

e.g., Burns, New Law Might Mess With Odd-Year District Elections, Santa Barbara

Independent (Sep. 17, 2015), available at http://www.independent.com/news/2015/sep/17

/new-law-might-mess-odd-year-district-elections/; Cal. Common Cause, supra, at p. 2 &

fn. 6; see also U.S. v. Village of Port Chester (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 704 F.Supp.2d 411, 444

[in a federal Voting Rights Act action, finding that “off-cycle and staggered Trustee

elections contribute to the Hispanic community’s difficulty in electing its candidates of

choice and ‘enhance the opportunity for discrimination against Hispanics’”].) At any

rate, we need not reach this issue given our other bases for finding low voter turnout to be

a matter of statewide concern.

42

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 799-800; see Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

118 U.S. 356, 370 (the right to vote is “a fundamental political right, because preservative

of all rights”); Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1226

(recognizing “the fundamental right to vote” as “obviously” a matter of statewide

concern).

43

Cal. Const., art. II, § 1.

44

Cal. Const., art. II, § 2.

45

Cal. Const., art. II, § 2.5, 7.

46

Cal. Const., art. II, § 3.

47

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 800; see O’Callaghan v. State (Alaska 1996)

914 P.2d 1250, 1263 (“The State’s interests in encouraging voter turnout . . . are

important and are legitimate objectives for a state to seek to achieve when structuring

8

16-603

Moreover, significantly lower voter turnout in off-cycle elections affects electoral

integrity. The California Supreme Court has instructed that “the integrity of the electoral

process, at both the state and local level, is undoubtedly a statewide concern.”48 In

Jauregui, in concluding that the California Voting Rights Act governed a matter of

statewide concern, the Court of Appeal reasoned, “Electoral results lack integrity where a

protected class is denied equal participation in the electoral process because of vote

dilution.”49 One meaning of “integrity” is the “[s]tate or quality of being complete,

undivided, or unbroken; entirety; as the integrity of an empire.”50 Elections are less

“complete” when there is significantly lower voter turnout because fewer eligible voters

are participating in the electoral process.51 This turnout therefore undermines electoral

integrity and thus involves a matter of statewide concern.52 This concern potentially

election procedures”); see also Assem. Standing Com. on Elections and Redistricting,

Hearing (Jul. 1, 2015), testimony of Sen. Ben Hueso, available at

https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/383?startTime=114&vid=G-cKeAHj51U, at

11:27 (the bill is “trying to create a situation in which you’re making it easier for people

to weigh in to decisions that affect their lives in a big way”).

48

Johnson, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 409, citing 35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 230, 231-232

(1960) (concluding that a state statute requiring that candidates comply with campaign

financial disclosure laws governed a matter of statewide concern because it was “aimed

at obtaining the election of persons free from domination by self-seeking individuals or

pressure groups”).

49

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 801.

50

Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1961) p. 1290, col. 3; see also Random House

Webster’s Unabridged Dict. (2d ed. 1997) p. 990, col. 2 (defining integrity as “the state

of being whole, entire, or undiminished”); Merriam-Webster online, at

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integrity (defining integrity as “the quality

or state of being complete or undivided”).

51

In other contexts, too, integrity has been construed to include completeness. (E.g.,

People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1004 [interpreting our mayhem statute]; State

v. Pratt (Neb. 2014) 842 N.W.2d 800, 810-811 [interpreting Nebraska’s DNA testing

statute]; Garelli Wong & Associates, Inc. v. Nichols (N.D. Ill. 2008) 551 F.Supp.2d 704,

709 [interpreting the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act].)

52

Analogously, in 2013, the Legislature amended other statutes to require that certain

elections on city charters occur only on established statewide general election dates.

(Stats. 2013, ch. 184, § 2; Elec. Code, §§ 1415, 9255, 9260; Gov. Code, §§ 34457,

34458.) The bill’s purpose was to increase voter participation for these elections.

(Assem. Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 311 (2013-2014

Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun. 18, 2013, pp. 3-7.) Similarly, two years earlier, the

Legislature had circumscribed the dates of these elections to a lesser degree to secure

9

16-603

arises in all off-cycle local elections, including those held in charter cities. In light of the

statewide concerns about voter participation in off-cycle elections, we readily conclude

that the Act does not solely address municipal matters.53

Finally, we find the Act to be reasonably related to the resolution of the statewide

concerns discussed above. As mentioned, election studies support the Legislature’s

determination that consolidating low-turnout off-cycle elections with statewide elections

would increase voter participation in local elections.54 The Act is also narrowly tailored

to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance. It applies only when the locality

has a quantifiably (at least a 25%) lower voter turnout in its regularly scheduled elections

than in its statewide general elections.55 So it does not affect charter cities whose off-

cycle elections do not manifest this difference in voter turnout.56

While a charter city’s constitutional sovereignty over its municipal affairs should

not be minimized, it must at times yield to statewide concerns. When off-cycle elections

result in significantly decreased voter participation, they compromise “the essence of a

democratic form of government,”57 raising an important matter of statewide concern. For

“broader voter participation.” (Id. at p. 6.) In so doing, the Legislature acted “to ensure

the statewide integrity of local government,” thereby addressing “an issue of statewide

concern.” (Stats. 2011, ch. 692, § 10.)

53

See also Cal. Fed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 24 (any doubt as to whether a matter is

solely a municipal concern “must be resolved in favor of the legislative authority of the

state,” internal quotation marks omitted).

54

It is argued that consolidating off-cycle elections with statewide elections is

counterproductive because voters often pay less or no attention to local elections near the

end of lengthy ballots as a result of “choice fatigue.” During the legislative process,

opposing positions on this issue were presented to the Legislature. (Compare Sen. Rules

Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill 415 (2015-2016 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Apr. 28, 2015, pp. 5-6 [“Voter fatigue would likely counteract any

benefit of forcing such a change as Agency elections would fall toward the end of a

crowded ballot”] with id. at p. 5 [“Elections held on the same date can help reduce voter

fatigue and make voting more habit forming”].) We need not enter into this policy

debate, which the Legislature apparently resolved, to decide that the Act reasonably

addressed the structural problem of low voter turnout in off-cycle elections.

55

Elec. Code, §§ 14051, subd. (b), 14052, subd. (a).

56

Cf. Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 802 (finding the CVRA was narrowly

tailored because it permits “citizens to challenge city-wide elections and, only if there is

vote dilution, permit[s] a court to impose reasonable remedies to alleviate the problem”).

57

Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 800.

10

16-603

these reasons, we conclude that the California Voter Participation Rights Act applies to

charter cities, and to local school districts whose elections are governed by city charters.

*****

11

16-603