Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

GOOGLE INC.,

Appellant

v.

INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC,

Cross-Appellant

______________________

2016-1543, 2016-1545

______________________

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trade-

mark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No.

IPR2014-00787.

______________________

Decided: July 10, 2017

______________________

DARYL JOSEFFER, King & Spalding LLP, Washington,

DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by JOSHUA

NATHANIEL MITCHELL.

BRENTON R. BABCOCK, Knobbe, Martens, Olson &

Bear, LLP, Irvine, CA, argued for cross-appellant. Also

represented by EDWARD M. CANNON.

______________________

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

2 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Google Inc. sought inter partes review of

claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12–14, 19–22, and 24–30 of U.S.

Patent No. 6,121,960 before the U.S. Patent and Trade-

mark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The Board

instituted review and, in its final written decision, found

claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14 neither anticipated nor

obvious over the prior art. It also determined that claims

19–22 and 24–30 were anticipated and obvious over the

considered prior art.

Google appeals the Board’s determinations that

claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14 of the ’960 patent are

neither anticipated nor obvious over the prior art. Intel-

lectual Ventures II LLC (“IV”), the owner of the ’960

patent, cross-appeals the Board’s determinations that the

prior art anticipates and renders obvious claims 19–22

and 24–30. We vacate and remand the Board’s anticipa-

tion and obviousness determinations as to claims 1–3, 5,

7–10, and 12–14, and affirm the Board’s anticipation and

obviousness determinations as to claims 19–22 and 24–30.

BACKGROUND

I.

The ’960 patent discloses “a screen peripheral system”

that includes “a touch-activated input device for generat-

ing and displaying a composite image,” which “simultane-

ously includes a representation of at least one key, for

example a . . . keyboard” and a “main image provided by

the computing device.” ’960 patent col. 1 l. 65 – col. 2 l. 6.

The keyboard representation is preferably laid over the

main image. Id. at col. 2 ll. 2–7. Figure 5 of the ’960

patent illustrates an exemplary composite image:

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 3

Id. at Fig. 5.

According to the patent, while “[i]t is known in the art

to superimpose a keyboard over an image that is output

by an application being executed on a computer, i.e. to

form a ‘phantom’ keyboard,” id. at col. 1 ll. 25–27, prior

art systems “suffer a number of disadvantages,” id. at

col. 1 l. 45. For example, one prior art system generates a

“phantom” keyboard by flickering between the keyboard

and the background images “in alternation” so as to

“create the illusion that both images are being displayed

continuously” but suffers from disadvantages including

compromised image quality, and the requirement for

additional hardware and communication bandwidth. Id.

at col. 1 ll. 38–61. The patented invention produces a

“blended” effect by allowing individual pixels to be dedi-

cated to both the keyboard and the main image, id. at

col. 4 ll. 39–41, and purports to overcome these disad-

vantages.

To produce the “blended” effect, the patent discloses

“software-based variable-pixel controls” to “determine and

control which pixels of the touch screen will be used for

4 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

displaying the keyboard representation and which pixels

[will be used] for displaying the main image.” Id. at col. 4

ll. 31–37. While in some cases, “touch screen pixels may

be dedicated to both the keyboard and the main image,

producing a ‘blended’ effect,” in other cases, “each pixel of

the screen is 100% dedicated to either the keyboard or the

main image.” Id. at col. 4 ll. 34–39.

The patent discloses that the blending of the keyboard

image with the background image “can occur by a variety

of methods and programming schemes,” including “bit-

block or bit-block-type transfer operations, i.e. BitBlt

operations.” Id. at col. 4 ll. 43–49. The patent explains

that BitBlt operations “provide an efficient method of

performing logical combination[s] of up to three sets of

pixels,” id. at col. 4 ll. 50–52, and allow the virtual key-

board to be combined with the display “using a variety of

effects,” id. at col. 4 l. 65. The patent summarizes the

typical BitBlt operations that can be performed in the

table below:

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 5

Id. at col. 5 ll. 1–19.

The independent claims at issue are claims 1, 19, and

26. Claims 1 and 19 1 recite:

1. A screen peripheral system, comprising:

a computing device for providing a main image;

and

a touch-activated input device for generating and

displaying a composite image visible to a user of

the screen peripheral system, the touch-activated

input device comprising a plurality of pixels, the

composite image simultaneously including:

a representation of at least one key, the represen-

tation of at least one key activating an input func-

tion; and

the main image provided by the computing device,

the representation of at least one key being laid

over the main image;

wherein the screen peripheral system implements

variable-pixel control to form the representation

of at least one key and to form the main image,

the variable-pixel control causing pixels selected

to form the representation of at least one key in

the composite image to depend on and be activat-

ed simultaneously with pixels selected to form the

main image, such that the main image and the

representation of at least one key are displayed

simultaneously to form the composite image;

1 As relevant to this appeal, claim 19 is representa-

tive of claim 26.

6 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

further wherein the variable-pixel control includes

logical operators to provide different blend-

ing/merging effects such that individual pixels of

the touch-activated input device can be dedicated

simultaneously to both the main image and the

representation of at least one key.

Id. at col. 12 ll. 2–29 (emphasis added to highlight disput-

ed claim limitation).

19. A method of superimposing a representation

of at least one key over a main image provided by

a computing device, the method comprising:

(a) using variable-pixel control to form a represen-

tation of at least one key, the representation of at

least one key activating an input function, and to

form the main image, the variable-pixel control

causing pixels selected to form the representation

of at least one key to be activated simultaneously

with pixels selected to form the main image; and

(b) generating and displaying a composite image

visible to a user of the screen peripheral system,

the composite image simultaneously including the

representation of at least one key and the main

image produced by the computing device, the rep-

resentation of at least one key being superimposed

on the main image;

wherein the variable-pixel control allows individ-

ual pixels to be dedicated simultaneously to both

the main image and the representation of at least

one key.

Id. at col. 13 ll. 46–64 (emphasis added to highlight dis-

puted claim limitations).

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 7

II.

Google asserted that all claims of the ’960 patent are

anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,638,501 (“Gough”) under

35 U.S.C. § 102 and obvious in view of U.S. Patent No.

6,118,427 (“Buxton”) 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 3 Gough

teaches a method and apparatus for “providing a translu-

cent overlay image over a base image on the screen of a

computer system,” Gough, Abstract, and Buxton teaches

“graphical user interfaces [(GUIs)] providing variably-

transparent (transparent/semitransparent) layered ob-

jects,” Buxton col. 1 ll. 18–20.

More specifically, Gough teaches a “Blending Engine”

that blends a background image with an overlay image,

which may be a keyboard image. Gough col. 8 l. 67 –

col. 9 l. 5. Figure 4 of Gough illustrates such a blended

image:

2 Google asserted that the claims are obvious in

view of Buxton and two other references not relevant to

this appeal.

3 The versions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that ap-

ply here are those in force preceding the changes made by

the America Invents Act, given the effective filing dates of

the claims of the ’960 patent. See Leahy–Smith America

Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011).

8 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

Id. at Fig. 4.

Gough explains that blending can be performed on a

pixel level using a “computer-implemented blending

process,” id. at col. 3 ll. 64–65, conceptually illustrated in

Figure 10a–10f below:

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 9

Id. at Figs. 10a–10f.

Gough explains that Fig. 10a represents the random

access memory (“RAM”) buffer that stores a copy of the

background image, Fig. 10b represents the RAM screen

overlay buffer that stores a copy of the overlay image, and

the buffers are “divided into 16 individually-blendable

units” arranged in a four-by-four matrix for blending.

Id. at col. 10 l. 24–31. Gough further discloses that a

blendable unit “can be anywhere in the range of 1 to 32

pixels.” Id. at col. 10 ll. 2–3. Figs. 10c–10f illustrate the

blending of corresponding rows from Fig. 10a and 10b.

Gough alternatively teaches that blending can be per-

formed using a “color look-up table,” which provides the

resultant blended values from all possible combinations of

two given pixels. Id. at col. 14 ll. 13–22.

10 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

Buxton discloses a graphical user interface that uses

“variable transparency to merge images (or layers) of

objects onto a graphical display,” such as a transparent

palette superimposed on an image. Buxton col. 3 ll. 40–

41; see id. at col. 5 ll. 63–65, Fig. 1. To achieve this merg-

ing of images, Buxton teaches that “a number of well

known techniques (methods or algorithms)” can be used,

including, for example, a discrete algorithm “which uses a

bit-mask” and a continuous algorithm known as “alpha

blending.” Id. at col. 16 ll. 1–4, 8–10.

Regarding discrete algorithms, Buxton teaches that

they “create a transparency effect by turning off and on

various pixels thereby creating a ‘mask’,” and “have been

called dithering, stippling, XORing, and ‘screen-door

transparency.’” Id. at col. 16 ll. 13–16. Regarding contin-

uous algorithms, Buxton discloses an alpha blending

algorithm to compute “resulting pixels” based on a combi-

nation of variables for both the foreground and back-

ground image pixels. Id. at col. 17 ll. 17–34.

III.

Google challenges the Board’s determinations that (1)

Gough does not anticipate claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14,

and (2) Buxton in combination with two other patents

does not render obvious claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14,

and IV cross-appeals the Board’s determinations that (1)

Gough anticipates claims 19–22, 24, and 26–30, and (2)

the Buxton combination renders obvious claims 19–20, 22,

and 24–30. We possess subject matter jurisdiction pursu-

ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012).

DISCUSSION

Anticipation is a question of fact reviewed for sub-

stantial evidence, Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815

F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and obviousness is a

legal conclusion consisting of “underlying factual findings”

reviewed for substantial evidence. Tyco Healthcare Grp.

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 11

LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 974 (Fed.

Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is

something less than the weight of the evidence but more

than a mere scintilla of evidence,” meaning that “[i]t is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re NuVasive,

Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). We address the

issues on an appeal-by-appeal basis.

I. Google’s Appeal

Google’s main argument on appeal centers on a par-

ticular limitation in independent claim 1 and claims 2–3,

5, 7–10, and 12–14, which depend from claim 1. 4 In

relevant part, the claims recite “variable-pixel control[s]”

that use “logical operators to provide different blend-

ing/merging effects such that individual pixels of the

touch-activated input device can be dedicated simultane-

ously to both the main image and the representation of at

least one key.” ’960 patent col. 12 ll. 25–29 (emphasis

added). The Board construed “logical operators” to mean

“operators that manipulate binary values at the bit level.”

Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2014-

00787, 2015 WL 10378100, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2015).

Neither party disputes the Board’s construction.

Google nonetheless alleges that the Board committed

two principal errors when it found that the prior art does

4 Google additionally raises an argument predicated

on the Board’s institution decision to institute on some

but not all grounds. We do not address the merits of this

argument. See, e.g., Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated

Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.

denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (declining to review the Board’s

institution decision that denied a proposed ground).

12 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

not disclose or teach “logical operators” and, therefore,

does not anticipate or render obvious claims 1–3, 5, 7–10,

and 12–14 of the ’960 patent. First, Google argues that

substantial evidence does not support the Board’s antici-

pation findings because Gough discloses logical operators,

and the Board failed to adequately explain its contrary

finding. Second, Google argues that substantial evidence

does not support the Board’s obviousness determination

because Buxton teaches logical operators and the Board

failed to adequately explain its contrary finding. We

agree with Google that the Board failed to adequately

explain its findings on both points.

In several recent decisions, we have explained what

the Board must do to permit meaningful judicial review of

its final written decisions. See, e.g., Pers. Web Techs.,

LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2017)

(describing the “basic principles of administrative law”

with which the Board must comply). In particular, the

Board (1) “must make the necessary findings and have an

adequate evidentiary basis for its findings” and (2) “must

examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory

explanation for its action including a rational connection

between the facts found and the choice made.” Icon

Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043

(Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In the anticipation

findings and obviousness determinations relevant here,

the Board failed to comport with these principles.

With respect to its anticipation findings, the Board

stated that it did “not agree” with Google “that either

Gough’s description of the blending process depicted in

Figures 10a–10f . . . or Gough’s description of using the

color look-up table . . . expressly discloses using logical

operators.” Google, 2015 WL 10378100, at *7 (citing

Gough col. 10 ll. 23–41, col. 14 ll. 9–19) (emphasis added).

Stating a disagreement with Google, however, does not

amount to a satisfactory explanation for its findings. See

NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1383 (explaining that the Board

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 13

cannot “summarize and reject arguments without explain-

ing why the PTAB accepts the prevailing argument”).

To anticipate a patent, a reference “need not satisfy

an ipsissimis verbis test.” See Whitserve, LLC v. Comput.

Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting

In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The

Board needed to show that its anticipation determinations

were not based purely on a word search for “logical opera-

tors.” Other than finding that Gough does not “expressly”

recite “logical operators,” however, the Board failed to

provide any meaningful rationale for its finding.

For example, the Board did not explain why it dis-

missed Google’s expert testimony and evidence purporting

to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have

understood Figures 10a through 10f in Gough to depict an

OR operation, a logical operation, when “description for

the purposes of anticipation can be by drawings alone as

well as by words.” In re Watts, 58 F.2d 841, 842 (C.C.P.A.

1932). The Board also did not explain why it disagreed

with Google’s argument that Gough’s teaching of a “color

look-up table . . . loaded with 256 entries which detail

each possible combination of bits from the 4 bit screen

and the 4 bit overlay,” Gough at col. 14 ll. 13–16, reads on

a manipulation of “binary values at the bit level,” which is

the Board’s own construction of “logical operators,”

Google, 2015 WL 10378100, at *4.

Nor did the Board explicitly adopt any substantive ev-

idence from IV to disprove Google’s evidence or discredit

Google’s expert. The Board only found that “[a]t best,

[Google]’s arguments suggest how Gough could be envi-

sioned as using logical operators.” Google, 2015 WL

10378100, at *7. But that does not constitute an “affirma-

tive narrative” explaining how and why the Board

reached its conclusion. In re Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc.,

832 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

14 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

The Board’s obviousness determination suffers from

similar defects. In relevant part, the Board found that

Google’s “arguments do not persuade us that Buxton’s

alpha blending equation uses operators that manipulate

binary values at the bit level, consistent with our con-

struction of ‘logical operators.’” Google, 2015 WL

10378100, at *11. The Board further explained that “[t]he

alpha blending equation unquestionably involves arith-

metic operations, which we find differ from logical opera-

tions.” Id. Although the Board made several fact findings

as to the scope and content of Buxton, it did not provide

any rationale for those findings, including its findings

that (1) Buxton’s alpha blending equation does not use

operators that manipulate binary values at the bit level;

and (2) arithmetic operations “differ from logical opera-

tions.” Id.

Google provided expert testimony showing that Bux-

ton’s “alpha-blending algorithm” is implemented using

one or more logical operations. J.A. 1221 ¶ 60. The

expert cited numerous references as support, including

textbooks entitled “Computer Architecture a Quantitative

Approach” and “Digital Integrated Circuits,” prior art

patents, and IEEE dictionary definitions, and explained

that logical operations are “[a]t the heart of any equation

involving addition, subtraction, or multiplication or

division.” Id. The Board, however, did not acknowledge

any of Google’s evidence, let alone explain why it consid-

ered such evidence unconvincing. Instead, the Board

merely stated that it considered “all evidence and argu-

ments” and “[agreed] with [IV].” Google, 2015 WL

10378100, at *12. IV, however, relied on a single diction-

ary definition to argue that Buxton’s “alpha-blending

algorithm” does not describe or suggest logical operations,

J.A. 24 (citing J.A. 1133 ¶ 106). In view of the opposing

evidence provided by Google and the complexity and

closeness of the factual issues before it, the Board’s mere

“agree[ment] with IV” does not constitute a satisfactory

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 15

explanation of a rational connection between the facts

found and the choice made.

Finally, we cannot review the Board’s findings when

we do not know the scope of “all evidence and arguments”

considered by the Board. Id. For example, we do not

know whether the Board relied on IV Exhibit 2018, which

includes a table from the book Computer Organization

and Design purporting to list arithmetic operations as a

category separate from logical operations. See JA 1820-

1825 (citing John L. Hennessy & David A. Patterson,

Computer Organization and Design: The Hard-

ware/Software Interface 106-109 (Morgan Kaufmann

Publishers, Inc., 2nd ed. 1998)). Google had filed a motion

to exclude the exhibit, but the Board dismissed the motion

as moot, stating that it did not rely on Exhibit 2018 in

rendering its final decision. It seems that the Board did

consider the evidence, however, as IV discussed the table

at length during the oral hearing before the Board, and

the Board posed a substantive question about the table to

confirm its understanding of it. At oral argument before

this court, IV’s counsel suggested that the Board did not

exclude this evidence. See Oral Arg. at 24:13–25:33,

oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/ default. aspx?fl=2016-

1543.mp3 (IV’s counsel asserting that the Table “wasn’t

excluded”).

Even more troubling is the Board’s treatment of

Google’s alternative argument that Buxton’s discrete

algorithms embodiment, which uses “XORing” to blend

images, discloses logical operators. According to Google,

it is undisputed that XOR is a Boolean logical operator.

The Board did not acknowledge, let alone address this

argument.

Our precedent demands more than what the Board’s

opinion provided here. See NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1383.

We cannot affirm findings that lack an adequate ra-

tionale. See Icon, 849 F.3d at 1043. In a close factual

16 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

dispute where reasonable minds may differ in their

findings based on opposing evidence, the Board must

provide rationale for its findings to facilitate our review.

See Pers. Web Techs., 848 F.3d at 992 (“the amount of

explanation needed will vary from case to case, depending

on the complexity of the matter and the issues raised in

the record”). This is one such case, as highlighted by the

fact that IV itself argued, in its infringement contentions

against another party with similar products in district

court proceedings, the opposite of what it argues on

appeal. See J.A. 1370 (IV contending that an accused

device infringes claim 10 of the ’960 patent, which de-

pends from claim 1, by practicing alpha-blending).

On remand, the Board must provide additional fact

findings and explanations for its findings relating to the

anticipation and obviousness determinations as to claims

1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14 of the ’960 patent. We take no

position on whether the prior art, taken as a whole,

anticipates or renders obvious the disputed claims. See

Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d

1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[W]e must not ourselves

make factual and discretionary determinations that are

for the [Board] to make.” (citations omitted)).

II. IV’s Cross-Appeal

IV challenges the Board’s anticipation and obvious-

ness determinations as to claims 19–22 and 24–30 of the

’960 patent based its construction of limitations in inde-

pendent claims 19 and 26.

In particular, IV asserts that claim 19, as properly

construed, requires the “variable-pixel control” to be able

to create composite images in which “some of the pixels

are selected entirely from the main image, some of the

pixels are selected entirely from the representation of the

key, and some of the pixels are blended.” Cross-

Appellant’s Br. 85. IV arrived at its argument by constru-

ing part (a) of the claim to require a selecting—not blend-

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 17

ing—of pixels, and part (b) of the claim to require a blend-

ing—not selecting—of pixels. Referring to part (a) as the

“pixel selection limitation” and part (b) as the “pixel

blending limitation,” IV asserts that “[t]he pixel selection

limitation and the pixel blending limitation are two

separate limitations” and “[t]he claims do not recite the

pixel selection limitation or the pixel blending limitation;

they require both functions.” Id. at 86. IV argues that

the Board improperly “inserted an ‘or’ between the pixel

selection limitation and the pixel blending limitation,

finding that the claims can be satisfied by the perfor-

mance of only one of the two claimed functions.” 5 Id.

The Board did not construe part (a) or part (b) of

claim 19. It explained that it construes “claim terms in

controversy . . . only to the extent necessary to resolve the

controversy.” J.A. 6–7. We agree with the Board that

parts (a) and (b) of claim 19 do not require construction

other than ordinary meaning to resolve the parties’ pa-

tentability arguments. Furthermore, we reject IV’s

proposed claim construction, which finds no support in

the intrinsic evidence.

Claim 19 recites “[a] method of superimposing a rep-

resentation of at least one key over a main image” includ-

ing a step “(a),” ’960 patent col. 13 ll. 49-55, and a step

“(b),” id. at col. 13 ll. 56-61. Step (a) “[forms] a represen-

tation of at least one key” and “the main image,” id. at col.

13 ll. 49–55, and step (b) “[generates] and [displays] a

5 IV asserts that, “[f]or similar reasons, claim 26

should be interpreted to require variable-pixel control to

perform both the pixel selection limitation and the pixel

blending limitation.” Id. at 91. Because IV’s position as

to claim 26 relies solely on its position as to claim 19, our

analysis below of claim 19 applies with equal force to

claim 26.

18 GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC

composite image” that “simultaneously [includes] the

representation of” the at least one key and the main

image formed in step (a), id. at col. 13 ll. 56–61. That is,

step (b) generates and displays a composite image using

the representation of the at least one key and the main

image formed in step (a).

A reasonable reading of the claim would not result in

interpreting step (a) as a “pixel selection limitation” that

requires pixels to be selected but not blended, and step (b)

as a “pixel blending limitation” that requires pixels to be

blended but not selected. The word “selected,” which IV

emphasized in order to coin the phrase “pixel selection

limitation,” is merely used in step (a) to describe that the

pixels selected to form the representation of the at least

one key should be “activated simultaneously” with the

pixels selected to form the main image. As for the phrase

“pixel blending limitation,” IV imports limitations from

the “wherein” clause of claim 19 to argue that step (b)

requires “pixel blending.” Step (b), however, does not

recite blending. Nor does the “wherein” clause require

blending. The “wherein” clause merely requires that the

variable-pixel control have the capability to allow blend-

ing. Id. at col. 13 ll. 46–64 (“Wherein the variable-pixel

control allows individual pixels to be dedicated simulta-

neously to both the main image and the representation of

at least one key.”). Thus, IV’s proposed interpretation is

not a reasonable interpretation of the claim.

Because IV does not contend that claims 19–22 and

24–30 are otherwise valid, we affirm the Board’s findings

with respect to their invalidity.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, while we

affirm the Board’s anticipation and obviousness determi-

nations as to claims 19–22 and 24–30, we vacate and

GOOGLE INC. v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC 19

remand the Board’s anticipation and obviousness deter-

minations as to claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COSTS

No Costs.