Morgan v. United States

oRlCIlNAt

lln tbe @nrte! $.tutes @ourt of jfe[ersl @tsrms

No. l6-1510

Filed: June 30,2017 FILED

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JUN 3 0 20t7

U.S. COURT OF

FEDERAL CI-AIMS

WILLIAM H. MORGAN,

Plaintiff, pro se,

28 U.S.C. g 1491 (Tucker Act

Jurisdiction);

Rules ofthe United States Court of

Federal Claims C'RCFC)

12(bX I ) (Subject Matter

THE T]NITED STATES,

Jurisdiction), I 2(b)(6) (Failure

To State A Claim Upon Which

Defendant.

Relief Can Be Granted), 4l(b)

(Failure to Prosecute).

,l' * :f * * * * * *,t * * + :! * * *,t,* * * * * * + * * * * * * * {. :t *+*** *

William H. Morgan, La Pine, Oregon, Plaintiff, pro se .

Isaac B. Rosenberg, united states Department of Justice, civil Division, washington, D.c.,

Counsel for the Government.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

BRADEN, ChiefJudge.

I. RELEVANTFACTUALBACKGROUND.I

on october 28,2015, the Klamath county circuit court of oregon, convicted william H.

Morgan of resisting anest and contempt of court. compl. App. at Ez-sz. Mr. Morgan was

sentenced to twelve months of probation and required to pay a $500 fine. compl. app.

ai Ez-El.

Mr. Morgan was scheduled 1o be released from probation on october 11,2016. compl. at

2*3; compl. App. at E2-E3. on November 7,2016, Mr. Morgan called the southem oregon

I

The relevant facts discussed herein are derived from the November 14,2016 Complaint

("Compl.") and attached Appendices (..Compl. App. A_E',).

?E1? 1q50 0Bn0 13qb 0e3a

Monitoring Services, LLC2 to request written confirmation that he completed probation, without

any violations. Compl. App. El1. The SOMS informed Mr. Morgan that he successfully

completed probation on October 11,2016, however, he did not receive written confirmation.

Compl. at 2-3; Compl. App. at El l.

II. PROCEDURALHISTORY.

on November 14,2016, Mr. Morgan ("Plaintiff') filed a complaint in the united states

court of Federal claims against the United states, oregon Supreme court, oregon court of

Appeals, Klamath county circuit court, Klamath county Defenders office, Klamath county

District Attomey, and the SOMS. Compl. at 1.

The November 14,2016 Complaint alleges that the Govemment:

(1) violated the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. $$ 2671-80, by acting negligently

and intentionally inflicting emotional distress on plaintiff, Compl. at 2_3;

(2) violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment, Eighth

Amendment, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due process clauses, and Fifth

Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, Compl. at2,4,5,6;

(3) violated Plaintiff s rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans

with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. S 12101, Compl. at 1,3, 4,6;

(4) violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. g 1051, the Hobbs Act, lS U.S.C. g l95l,and

the Racketeer Influenced and Comrpt Organizations Act (,,RICO Act"i, lg U.S.C

$$ 1961-68, Compl. at2, 4,5,6,7;

(5) violated the Fifth Amendment Takings clause, by taking the Morgan family

property, Compl. at 6; and

(6) breached various contracts and waranties under the Contracts Dispute act

C'CDA), 41 U.S.C. gg 7101-09, Compt. at 4, 5, 6.

The November 14,2016 Complaint also requests the United States Court of Federal Claims

to reconsider a different complaint, filed on August 2,2016.3 Compl. at 6.

. ' The Southem oregon Monitoring Services, LLC ("soMs') is a bench probation

monitoring service for Klamath County Court. The SOMS monitors defendants to ensure they

complete bench probation conditions, e.g. treatment, community service, and payment of

court

fines and fees.

Although the November 14,2016 complaint does not specify the case name or number

in which the August 2,2016 complaint *as fiI"d, the court believes the referenced case is

Morgan v. united states, No. 16-937. on october 24,2016, the united States Court of Federal

claims dismissed Morgan, No. 16-937, pursuant to Rules of the united states court of Federal

On November 14,2016, Plaintiff also filed a Motion For Leave To Proceed In Forma

Pauperis. ECF No. 1. On December 16,2016, the court granted Plaintiff s motion. ECF No. 6.

On January 13,2017,the Govemment filed a Motion To Dismiss ("Gov't Mot."), pursuant

to RCFCF 12(bX1) and 12(bX6). ECF No. 7. On February 22,2017, nine days after plaintiffs

response was due, the court issued a Show Cause Order, to ascertain why this case should not be

dismissed for failure to prosecute, pursuant to RCFC 41(b). ECF No. 8.

On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Response to the February 22,2017 Show Cause Order,

but did not respond to the January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss. ECF No. 9.

On April 4, 2017,the court issued a Scheduling Order directing Plaintiffto file a Response

to the January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss by April lS,20lj. ECF No. 10.

On May 2,2017, Plaintiff filed a Response to the January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss

("P1. Resp."). ECFNo. 12. On May 18,201"1, the Govemment filed a Reply (,,Gov't Reply,,).

ECFNo. 15.

m. DISCUSSION.

A. Jurisdiction.

The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

$ 1491' "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the

constitution, or any Act of congress or any regulation of an executive department. or uDon anv

express or implied contract with the United States. or lor liquidated or uniiquidated damages

in

cases not sounding in tort." 28u.s.c. g lagl(a\1). The Tucker Act, however, is..a

iurisdictional

statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United Stares for money

.

damages . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon

[the United States Court of Federal

claims] whenever the substantive right exists." united siates v. Testan, 424 u.s. 392, 3gg (lg7 6).

To pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead an

independent contractual relationship, Constitutional provision, federal statute, an-d,/or

executive

agercy regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages. See Todd v. United States,

386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[J]urisdiction under the Tuiker Act requires the liuganr

to

idenlif! a substantive right for money damages against the United States ."p*ut" fiom the Tucker

Act[.]"); see also Fisher v. (Jnited states,4O2 F.3d 1167,1112 (Fed. cir. 2005) (en banc) (,,The

TuckerAct... does not create a substantive cause ofaction; . . . a plaintiff must idintify a separate

source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages. . . . [T]hat source must be

'money-mandating'"'). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the source of subsranuve

law upon which he relies "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

Government[.]" Testan, 424 u.S. at 400. And, the plaintiff bears the burden oi establishins

claims ("RCFC') 12(bxl). ECF No. 13. on November 7,2016, Morgan, No. 16-937 was

appealed to the united states court ofAppeals for the Federal circuit. ECFNo.

16. on April 5,

2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the court,s

dismissal.

ECF No. 20.

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,

846F.2d,746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[O]nce the [trial] courr's subject matter jurisdiction [is] put

in question . . . . [the plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence.").

B, Standard Of Review For Pra Se Litigants.

Pro se plaintiffs' pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those of litigants

represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding that pro se

complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers"). The court traditionally examines the record "to see if pro se]

[a

plaintiff has a cause ofaction somewhere displayed." Ruderer v. united states,412F.2d 12g5,,

1292(Ct. Cl. 1969).

C. Standard Of Review For Motion To Dismiss, pursuant to RCFC l2(bxl).

A challenge to the United States Court ofFederal Claims' "general power to adjudicate in

specific areas of substantive law. . . is properly raised by a [Rule] l2(b)(l) motionf.]', palmer v.

unitedstates,168F.3dl3l0, 1313(Fed.cir.'t999);seealsoRCFCl2(bX1)("Evliydefenseto

a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading. . . . But a party may

assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]").

When considering whether to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ,.a

court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiffls complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor ofthe plaintiff." Trusted Integration, Inc.v. United States,65g F.3d

1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 201l).

D. Standard Of Review For Motion To Dismiss, pursuant To RCFC l2(bx6).

A claim is subject to dismissal under RCFC 12(bX6), if it does not provide a basis for the

court to grant relief. ,see Bell Atl. corp. v. Twombly,550 u.s. 544, ss5-56 (2007) (,.[A well-

pleaded complaint] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitatlon

of the

elements ofa cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right of

relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegationsin the complaint are

true (even if doubtful in facQ." (intemal citations omitted)); see also iirdroy r. united states,295

F.3d' 1252' 1257 (Fed. Cir.2002) ("A motion to dismiss. . . for failure to state a claim

upon which

relief can be granted is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitie him to

a

legal remedy.").

A complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to

reliefthatisplausibleonitsface."'Ashqoftv. Iqbal,556rJ.s.66,,679(2009)(quotingTwombly,

550 U.S. at 570). The allegations contained in a complaint also must indicate to thJ court

that

there is "more than a sheer possibility that a defendani has acted unla'*fully. 1d. .,Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not

suffice." 1d. To determine whether a complaini itates a plausible claim foi relief, a coun must

engage in a context-specific analysis and "draw on itsjudicial experience and common

sense.,, 1/.

ar 678-79.

E. The Government's January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss The November 14,

2016 Complaint, Pursuant To RCFC l2(bXf) And 12(b)(6).

1. The Government's Argument.

The Govemment argues that claims in the Novemb er 14, 2016 Complaint alleging

wrongdoing by the oregon Supreme court, oregon court of Appeals, Klamath county circuit

court, Klamath county Defenders office, Klamath county District Attorney, and the soMS, must

be dismissed, because the United States Court ofFederal Claims only has jurisdiction to adjudicate

claims against the United States govemment; claims against private parties and state govemments

and their employees, cannot be adjudicated by the court. Gov't Mot. at 7.

The Govemment also points out that the court does not have jwisdiction to adjudicate the

tort claims alleged in the November 14,2016 Complaint, because neither the Federal Tort Claims

Act nor the Oregon Tort Claims Act confer jurisdiction on the court. Gov't Mot. at 9. Likewise,

the Fourth Amendment, Eight Amendment, Due process clause, and Double Jeopardy clause

claims alleged in the November 14,2016 Complaint must be dismissed, because thoie piovisions

are not money-mandating. Gov't Mot. at l0-l 1 .

In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction over statutory civil rights claims. Gov't

Mot' at 10 (citing Marlin v. IJnited States,63 Fed. Cl. 475,476 (2005) (holding-that staturory civil

rights claims reside exclusively with the district courts)). Nor does the court have iurisdiction to

adjudicate the November 14,2016 complaint's Lanham Act, Hobbs Acr, and RICb Act claims,

because those statutes either grant exclusive jurisdiction to the United States district courts or

are

criminal statutes. Gov't Mot. at 10. Finally, the court does not have jurisdiction to re-adjudicate

Morgan, No. 16-937, because that case is on appeal before the United States Court ofAppeals for

the Federal Circuit. Gov't Mot. at 12.

In addition, the Govemment argues that the November 14, 2016 complaint's Fifth

Amendment Takings Clause and Breach-of-Contract claims fail to allege facts sufficient to state

a

claim for reliefabove the speculative level and should be dismissed, p-ursuant to RcFc l2(bX6).

Gov't Mot. at 11-12. Regarding the Takings clause claim, the November 14,2016 complaint

does not identify a property interest that was taken or allege any other specific

facts to supporr a

takings claim. Gov't Mot. at 8. Regarding the Breach-of-Contract claim, the November

14,2016

Complaint does not allege any contractual agreement between Plaintiff and the United

States.

Gov't Mot. at 8.

2. The plaintifps Response.

Plaintiff responds that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the state

_

Oregon, because Oregon is an agent of the United States. Pi. Resp. at Z. In'addition, plaintiff

of

raises a new claim, alleging that the United States Court of Federal'Claims

is conspirin! with the

Democratic National Committee C,DNC,) to deny his claims. pl. Resp. at 3.

3. The Government's Reply.

The Govemment replies that, as a matter of law, the state of oregon is not an

_ agent of the

United States for the purpose of esta.blishing Tucker Acr jurisdiction. dov,t Repty

stebbins v. united states,l05 Fed. cl. gt, 84-85 (2012) ( ..plaintiff cannot recoveiin

at i-i iciting

the court of

Federal Claims simply by arguing that the United States is responsible, under the doctrine of

respondeat superior[.]")). And, Plaintiffs new allegation that the court is conspiring with the DNC

to deny his claims is not properly before the court, because Plaintiff may not allege new claims or

amend his November 14, 2016 complaint in a response to a motion to dismiss. Gov't Reply at 2.

(quoting Driessen v. united states, 116 Fed. c|.33,44 n.l0 (2014) (stating that "[i]t is generally

improper for a party to raise new claims not included in its complaint in an opposition to a motion

to dismiss.")). In the alternative, the allegation should be dismissed, because it sounds in tort and

is frivolous. Gov't Reply at 2.

4. The Court's Resolution.

a. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Claims Against States And Their

Agencies And Officials.

The November 14,2016 Complaint alleges that agencies and officials of Oregon violated

Plaintiffs rights. The United States Court of Federal Claims, however, only has juiisdiction to

adjudicate claims made against the united states. see united states v. sherwood,'312 u.s. 5g4,

588 (1941) ("[The court's] jurisdiction is confined to the rendition of money judgments in suit

brought for that relief against the United States . . . and if the relief sought is agai"-st others than

the united states the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction ofthe court.,,).

For these reasons, the court has detcrmined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

the November 14,2016 Complaint,s claims against Oregon, its agencies, or officials.

b. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Tort Claims.

The November 14, 2016 Complaint's negligence claim and intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim sound in :ort. see 24 Stuart M. Speiser et al., AMERICAN

LAw oF

TORTS $ 9:1 (2017) (explaining that negligence is an extensive part of tort law);

44 Stuart M.

Speiser et al., AMERICAN LAw oF TORTS g 16:16 (2016) (describing

intentional infliction of

emotional distress as a tort). The United States Court of Federal Claims]however,

does not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate cases sounding in tort. see 28

u.s.c. g lagl(a)(1) 1..The united states

court of Federal claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment ;"y claim against the

United States . . . in cases not so-unding in rorr ." {emphasis aide-cl)); see"d;

irso Kiene Corp.'u. unirca

sos u.s. 200, 214 (1993) ("[T]ort cases are outside the jurisdiction of the

{.ot.r"' court ofFederal

Claims.").

- For these reasons, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

the November 14, 2016 Complaint's negligence claim or intentionai infliction

of emotional

distress claim.

c. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate plaintiff s Constitutional Claims.

The November 14, 2016 Complaint alleges that the Govemment

violated plaintiff s rights

under the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendmint, Fifth Amendment,s

Due process and Double

Jeopardy clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due process

clause. compl. at2,4,5, 6. .r-he

court does not have judsdiction to adjudicate claims based on the Fourth or Eighth Amendments,

because neither is money-mandating. see Brown v. united states, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. cir.

1997) (holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not mandate the payment of

money); see also Trafny v. united states, 503 F.3d 1339, l34o (Fed. cir. 2007) Qter curiam)

(holding that the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims

arising under the Eighth Amendment because it is not money-mandating). Nor does the court have

jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on the Due Process or the Double Jeopardy Clauses.

See

smith v. united states, 709 F .3d I I 14, 1 I 16 (Fed. cir. 2013) ("The law is well settied that the Due

Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the payment of

money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act."); see also Bernaugh v.

United States,38 Fed. Cl. 538, 541 (1997) (determining that the courr does not have iurisdiition

over Double Jeopardy claims because they are not money-mandating).

For these reasons, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

the November 14,2016 complaint's Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Due process clause

or Double Jeopardy Clause claims.

d, The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate PlaintifPs Civit Rights Claims.

The November 14, 2016 Complaint alleges violations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964

and the ADA. compl. at 1,3, 4, 6. But, the court does not have jurisdiction ovlr claims arising

under the civil Rights Act. ,See Anderson v. unitetl states, 22 cl. c1. 17g, 179

n.2 (1990)

("Jurisdiction over such cases resides in the district courts relative

to violations ofany provision

of the civil Rights Act."). In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction over Abi craims

because they are not money-mandating. searres v. united statei, gg Fed.

cl. g01, g05 (2009)

("The ADA is not a statute mandating payment by the United States.,,)

For these reasons' the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

the November 14,2016 Complaint's civil rights claims.

e. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate plaintifps Lanham Act, Hobbs Act.

Or RICO Act Claims.

The November 14,2016 Complaint alleges that the Government

violated the Lanham Act,

Hobbs Act, and RICO Act. Compl. at2,4,5,6,7.

The court, however, does not have jurisdiction over Lanham

Act claims, because l 5 u. s.c.

gt-"ltl exclusive jurisdiction to th; united States District court and territorial

9-lJ?i courts. s'ee

l5 U'S'c $ l12l(a) ("The district and territorial courts of the United States

jurisdiction and the courts ofappeal of the shall have original

united States (other than the united States coul of

Appeals for the Federal circuit) shall have appellate jurisdiction,

ofall actions arisinf unoer lthe

L,gftam Act.l"); see arso proxtronics Dosiieily Lic v. united

states, r2g Fed. cr. 656, 672

(2016) ("It is an unremarkable proposition that the

Court of Federal Claims lacks jurlJi"iion ou",

Act claims. congressional authorization to entertain claims arising

!d*

Act extends only to district and tenitorial courts.',.).

urra". G Lanham

In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14,2016

Complaint's Hobbs Act or RICO Act claims, because the Hobbs Act and RICO Act are criminal

statutes under United States Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. See Joshua v. United States,

17 F.3d378,379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The [United States Court of Federal Claims] has no jurisdiction

to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code[.]").

For these reasons, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate

the November 14,2016 Complaint's Lanham Act, Hobbs Act or RICO Act claims.

f. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Review A Decision By The United States Court

of Appeals For The Federal Circuit.

The November 14,2016 Complaint also requests reconsideration of a different

complaint

alleging an "assault on the Morgan family[,]" Plainiiff does allege any facts that identify

the case

of concem. Compl. at 6. The court, however, believes that the comilaint referred

to is Morgan,

No' 16-937' On October 24, 2016, the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed

the

complaint in Morgan, No. 16-937 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . see

Morgan, No. 16-

9.37 ECF. N.9. 13-. on appeal, the United States Court

' of Appeals for the Federal Ciiuit affirmed

the court's dismissal. see Morgan, No. 16-937, ECF No. 2b. The

court does not have jr,6isdiction

to review decisions of the United Slates court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit. See iilda In4us.,

Inc. v. united stares, 5il F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. cii. 2008) (,,ordinarily,

the act orfiiing a notice

of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court and divests the triai

court ofiu.irai"'tron ou.'.

matters related to the appeal.',).

For this reason, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction

to adjudicate the

November 14,2016 Complaint's request for reconsideration

of Mor[an,No. 16_937.

g. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate plaintiff s Conspiracy To Commit

Fraud Claim.

Plaintiffs claim that "the DEMoGRATIC NATIONAL coNVENTIoN

in consprracy to

the FEDERAL couRT of cLA IMS_plan to deny

any claim[,]', was improperty raiseJin piaintifrs

May 2,2017 Response' see 35A c.l.s.

tzoril g :lz 1"rurti"s

through briefing or oral advocac{. Thur, a comptaini

um"na *ei. co.pruints

may not"arulot

be amended by the iriefs in

opposition to a motion to dismiss[.]"). But, even if the

conspiracy-to-commif fraud claim was

properly raised, the court must d-ismiss it for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, because it sounds

in tort. Pl. Reply at 3. See Huffordv. United Stares,gZ

fea. Ct. eSe,nefZOOqii;if,. b"".t

Federal claims does not have jurisdiction over

"f

. . . claims of fraud, . . . because these claims sound

in tort.").

For these reasons, the court has determined that the

..

alleged in Plaintiff s May 2,2017 Response must

conspiracy-to-commilfraud craim

Ue aismissea.

h. Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and CDA Claims

Do Not State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.

To the extent that the November 14,2016 Complaint alleges a Takings Clause claim or a

Breach-of-Contract claim, no facts are alleged from which the court can ascertain whether a

plausible claim for relief exists. Compl. a|4,5,6. The November 14,2016 Complaint states that

"no person shall be deprived oflife liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall private

property be taken for public use without just compensation." compl. at 5. Because the November

14,2016 Complaint's Takings claim does not identify any property interest that was taken, rt must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Adsms v, lJnited

states,391 F.3d 1212,1218 (Fed. cir. 2004) (,,[A] claimant under ihe Takings clause must

show

that the govemment, by some specific action, took a private property inteiest for a public

use

without just compensation."); see also Am. pelagic ttiihing co., i.p.-r. unitrd

stotes',379 F,3d

1363' 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that as a threshold matter, a plaintiff allegini

a taking,

must allege a legally cognizable property interest or the court's determination

cannot continue)

i

of uilio tatins

The November 14, 2016 complaint states that "the Defendants

have created multiple

breaches of contract, by misconduct that continues[.]" compl. at 5. This Breach-of-contract

claim, however, does not alrege any of the requisite elementi

of contract formation: (l) offbr,

@^acceptance, and (3) consideration. ,See Maier v. United States,314 F.3d 600;

2002) Nor does it identifu any express or implied contracts between plaintiffand A; fted. Cir.

the Government.

Therefore, the November 14,2or5 compiaint's Breach-of-contract

claim does not .,contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim

to reliefthat is plausible on it, fu.".,,,

Iqbal,556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombty,550 U.S. at

570j.

For these reasons' the court has determined that the

Novem ber 14,2016 compraint,s

Taking clause and Breach-of-contract claims do

not state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

IV. CONCLUSION.

For these reasons' the Government's January

13,20ri Motion To Dismiss is granted. sce

i!l%lfli?li,];.r2(bx6).

rhe crerk is directed t;'",'t;,r;ls;;;;;ilJi"il"'N:#i,ue. r+,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/e",4,4/f

'4

SUSAN G. BRADEN,

-"t-'-

Chief Judge