Opinion

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.

  • 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 638
  • 582 U.S. 79
  • 85 U.S.L.W. 4346
  • 198 L. Ed. 2d 177
  • 137 S. Ct. 1718
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 12, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Gorsuch
On the bench
Neil Gorsuch
Cited by
578 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.9%

holding that entities that regularly purchase debts originated by someone K. Claims Under State Law else and then seek to collect those debts for their own account *10 A district court may decline to exercise supplemental are not necessarily debt collectors subject to the FDCPA

How later courts described this case

  • holding that entities that regularly purchase debts originated by someone K. Claims Under State Law else and then seek to collect those debts for their own account *10 A district court may decline to exercise supplemental are not necessarily debt collectors subject to the FDCPA
  • explaining that a court must have a “persuasive reason” to “abandon our usual presumption that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same statute’ carry ‘the same meaning’” (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005))
  • holding that debt purchaser “may indeed collect debts for its own account without triggering the statutory definition” in the FDCPA
  • holding that a debt purchaser that collects debts for its own account is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HENSON ET AL. v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–349. Argued April 18, 2017—Decided June 12, 2017

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act authorizes private lawsuits and

weighty fines designed to deter the wayward practices of “debt collec-

tor[s],” a term embracing anyone who “regularly collects or attempts

to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6).

The complaint filed in this case alleges that CitiFinancial Auto

loaned money to petitioners seeking to buy cars; that petitioners de-

faulted on those loans; and that respondent Santander then pur-

chased the defaulted loans from CitiFinancial and sought to collect in

ways petitioners believe violated the Act. The district court and

Fourth Circuit held that Santander didn’t qualify as a debt collector

because it did not regularly seek to collect debts “owed . . . another”

but sought instead only to collect debts that it purchased and owned.

Held: A company may collect debts that it purchased for its own ac-

count, like Santander did here, without triggering the statutory defi-

nition in dispute. By defining debt collectors to include those who

regularly seek to collect debts “owed . . . another,” the statute’s plain

language seems to focus on third party collection agents regularly col-

lecting for a debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts

for itself.

Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary do not dislodge the statute’s

plain meaning. Petitioners point out that the word “owed” is the past

participle of the verb “to owe,” and so suggest that the debt collector

definition must exclude loan originators (who never seek to collect

debts previously owed someone else) but embrace debt purchasers

like Santander (who necessarily do). But past participles like “owed”

are routinely used as adjectives to describe the present state of a

thing. Congress also used the word “owed” to refer to present debt re-

lationships in neighboring provisions of the Act, and petitioners have

2 HENSON v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

Syllabus

not rebutted the presumption that identical words in the same stat-

ute carry the same meaning. Neither would reading the word “owed”

to refer to present debt relationships render any of the Act’s provi-

sions surplusage, contrary to what petitioners suggest.

Petitioners also contend that their interpretation best furthers the

Act’s perceived purposes because, they primarily argue, if Congress

had been aware of defaulted debt purchasers like Santander it would

have treated them like traditional debt collectors because they pose

similar risks of abusive collection practices. But it is not this Court’s

job to rewrite a constitutionally valid text under the banner of specu-

lation about what Congress might have done had it faced a question

that, on everyone’s account, it never faced. And neither are petition-

ers’ policy arguments unassailable, as reasonable legislators might

contend both ways on the question of how defaulted debt purchasers

should be treated. This fact suggests for certain but one thing: that

these are matters for Congress, not this Court, to resolve. Pp. 3–11.

817 F. 3d 131, affirmed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–349

_________________

RICKY HENSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2017]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Disruptive dinnertime calls, downright deceit, and more

besides drew Congress’s eye to the debt collection indus-

try. From that scrutiny emerged the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, a statute that authorizes private lawsuits

and weighty fines designed to deter wayward collection

practices. So perhaps it comes as little surprise that we

now face a question about who exactly qualifies as a “debt

collector” subject to the Act’s rigors. Everyone agrees that

the term embraces the repo man—someone hired by a

creditor to collect an outstanding debt. But what if you

purchase a debt and then try to collect it for yourself—

does that make you a “debt collector” too? That’s the nub

of the dispute now before us.

The parties approach the question from common ground.

The complaint alleges that CitiFinancial Auto loaned

money to petitioners seeking to buy cars; that petitioners

defaulted on those loans; that respondent Santander then

purchased the defaulted loans from CitiFinancial; and

that Santander sought to collect in ways petitioners be-

lieve troublesome under the Act. The parties agree, too,

2 HENSON v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

Opinion of the Court

that in deciding whether Santander’s conduct falls within

the Act’s ambit we should look to statutory language

defining the term “debt collector” to embrace anyone who

“regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or

due . . . another.” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6).

Even when it comes to that question, the parties agree

on at least part of an answer. Both sides accept that third

party debt collection agents generally qualify as “debt

collectors” under the relevant statutory language, while

those who seek only to collect for themselves loans they

originated generally do not. These results follow, the

parties tell us, because debt collection agents seek to

collect debts “owed . . . another,” while loan originators

acting on their own account aim only to collect debts owed

to themselves. All that remains in dispute is how to clas-

sify individuals and entities who regularly purchase debts

originated by someone else and then seek to collect those

debts for their own account. Does the Act treat the debt

purchaser in that scenario more like the repo man or the

loan originator?

For their part, the district court and Fourth Circuit

sided with Santander. They held that the company didn’t

qualify as a debt collector because it didn’t regularly seek

to collect debts “owed . . . another” but sought instead only

to collect debts that it purchased and owned. At the same

time, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that some circuits

faced with the same question have ruled otherwise—and it

is to resolve this conflict that we took the case. Compare

817 F. 3d 131, 133–134, 137–138 (2016) (case below);

Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N. A., 797 F. 3d

1309, 1315–1316 (CA11 2015), with McKinney v. Cal-

deway Properties, Inc., 548 F. 3d 496, 501 (CA7 2008);

FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F. 3d 159, 173–174 (CA3

2007).

Before attending to that job, though, we pause to note

two related questions we do not attempt to answer today.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

First, petitioners suggest that Santander can qualify as a

debt collector not only because it regularly seeks to collect

for its own account debts that it has purchased, but also

because it regularly acts as a third party collection agent

for debts owed to others. Petitioners did not, however,

raise the latter theory in their petition for certiorari and

neither did we agree to review it. Second, the parties

briefly allude to another statutory definition of the term

“debt collector”—one that encompasses those engaged “in

any business the principal purpose of which is the collec-

tion of any debts.” §1692a(6). But the parties haven’t

much litigated that alternative definition and in granting

certiorari we didn’t agree to address it either.

With these preliminaries by the board, we can turn to

the much narrowed question properly before us. In doing

so, we begin, as we must, with a careful examination of

the statutory text. And there we find it hard to disagree

with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretive handiwork. After

all, the Act defines debt collectors to include those who

regularly seek to collect debts “owed . . . another.” And by

its plain terms this language seems to focus our attention

on third party collection agents working for a debt owner—

not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.

Neither does this language appear to suggest that we

should care how a debt owner came to be a debt owner—

whether the owner originated the debt or came by it only

through a later purchase. All that matters is whether the

target of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect debts for its

own account or does so for “another.” And given that, it

would seem a debt purchaser like Santander may indeed

collect debts for its own account without triggering the

statutory definition in dispute, just as the Fourth Circuit

explained.

Petitioners reply that this seemingly straightforward

reading overlooks an important question of tense. They

observe that the word “owed” is the past participle of the

4 HENSON v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

Opinion of the Court

verb “to owe.” And this, they suggest, means the statute’s

definition of debt collector captures anyone who regularly

seeks to collect debts previously “owed . . . another.” So it

is that, on petitioners’ account, the statute excludes from

its compass loan originators (for they never seek to collect

debts previously owed someone else) but embraces many

debt purchasers like Santander (for in collecting pur-

chased debts they necessarily seek to collect debts previ-

ously owed another). If Congress wanted to exempt all

present debt owners from its debt collector definition,

petitioners submit, it would have used the present partici-

ple “owing.” That would have better sufficed to do the

job—to make clear that you must collect debts currently

“owing . . . another” before implicating the Act.

But this much doesn’t follow even as a matter of good

grammar, let alone ordinary meaning. Past participles

like “owed” are routinely used as adjectives to describe the

present state of a thing—so, for example, burnt toast is

inedible, a fallen branch blocks the path, and (equally) a

debt owed to a current owner may be collected by him or

her. See P. Peters, The Cambridge Guide to English

Usage 409 (2004) (explaining that the term “past partici-

ple” is a “misnomer[ ], since” it “can occur in what is tech-

nically a present . . . tense”). Just imagine if you told a

friend that you were seeking to “collect a debt owed to

Steve.” Doesn’t it seem likely your friend would under-

stand you as speaking about a debt currently owed to

Steve, not a debt Steve used to own and that’s now actually

yours? In the end, even petitioners find themselves forced

to admit that past participles can and regularly do work

just this way, as adjectives to describe the present state of

the nouns they modify. See Brief for Petitioners 28; see

also B. Garner, Modern English Usage 666 (4th ed. 2016)

(while “owing . . . is an old and established usage . . . the

more logical course is simply to write owed”).

Widening our view to take in the statutory phrase in

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

which the word “owed” appears—“owed or due . . . another”—

serves to underscore the point. Petitioners acknowledge

that the word “due” describes a debt currently due at the

time of collection and not a debt that was due only in some

previous period. Brief for Petitioners 26–28. So to rule for

them we would have to suppose Congress set two words

cheek by jowl in the same phrase but meant them to speak

to entirely different periods of time. All without leaving

any clue. We would have to read the phrase not as refer-

ring to “debts that are owed or due another” but as de-

scribing “debts that were owed or are due another.” And

supposing such a surreptitious subphrasal shift in time

seems to us a bit much. Neither are we alone in that

assessment, for even petitioners acknowledge that theirs

“may not be the most natural interpretation of the phrase

standing in isolation.” Id., at 26–27.

Given that, you might wonder whether extending our

gaze from the narrow statutory provision at issue to take

in the larger statutory landscape might offer petitioners a

better perspective. But it does not. Looking to other

neighboring provisions in the Act, it quickly comes clear

that Congress routinely used the word “owed” to refer to

present (not past) debt relationships. For example, in one

nearby subsection, Congress defined a creditor as someone

“to whom a debt is owed.” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(4). In an-

other subsection, too, Congress required a debt collector to

identify “the creditor to whom the debt is owed.”

§1692g(a)(2). Yet petitioners offer us no persuasive reason

why the word “owed” should bear a different meaning

here, in the subsection before us, or why we should aban-

don our usual presumption that “identical words used in

different parts of the same statute” carry “the same mean-

ing.” IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005).

Still other contextual clues add to petitioners’ problems.

While they suggest that the statutory definition before us

implicitly distinguishes between loan originators and debt

6 HENSON v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

Opinion of the Court

purchasers, a pass through the statute shows that when

Congress wished to distinguish between originators and

purchasers it left little doubt in the matter. In the very

definitional section where we now find ourselves working,

Congress expressly differentiated between a person “who

offers” credit (the originator) and a person “to whom a debt

is owed” (the present debt owner). §1692a(4). Elsewhere,

Congress recognized the distinction between a debt “origi-

nated by” the collector and a debt “owed or due” another.

§1692a(6)(F)(ii). And elsewhere still, Congress drew a

line between the “original” and “current” creditor.

§1692g(a)(5). Yet no similar distinction can be found in

the language now before us. To the contrary, the statutory

text at issue speaks not at all about originators and cur-

rent debt owners but only about whether the defendant

seeks to collect on behalf of itself or “another.” And, usually

at least, when we’re engaged in the business of interpret-

ing statutes we presume differences in language like this

convey differences in meaning. See, e.g., Loughrin v.

United States, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014).

Even what may be petitioners’ best piece of contextual

evidence ultimately proves unhelpful to their cause.

Petitioners point out that the Act exempts from the defini-

tion of “debt collector” certain individuals who have “ob-

tained” particular kinds of debt—for example, debts not

yet in default or debts connected to secured commercial

credit transactions. §§1692a(6)(F)(iii) and (F)(iv). And

because these exemptions contemplate the possibility that

someone might “obtain” a debt “owed or due . . . another,”

petitioners submit, the word “owed” must refer only to a

previous owner. Ibid. This conclusion, they say, neces-

sarily follows because, once you have “obtained” a debt,

that same debt just cannot be currently “owed or due”

another.

This last and quite essential premise of the argument,

however, misses its mark. As a matter of ordinary Eng-

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

lish, the word “obtained” can (and often does) refer to

taking possession of a piece of property without also tak-

ing ownership—so, for example, you might obtain a rental

car or a hotel room or an apartment. See, e.g., 10 Oxford

English Dictionary 669 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “obtain” to

mean, among other things, “[t]o come into the possession

or enjoyment of (something) by one’s own effort or by

request”); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U. S.

519, 532–533 (2013) (distinguishing between ownership

and obtaining possession). And it’s easy enough to see

how you might also come to possess (obtain) a debt with-

out taking ownership of it. You might, for example, take

possession of a debt for servicing and collection even while

the debt formally remains owed another. Or as a secured

party you might take possession of a debt as collateral,

again without taking full ownership of it. See, e.g.,

U. C. C. §9–207, 3 U. L. A. 197 (2010). So it simply isn’t

the case that the statute’s exclusions imply that the

phrase “owed . . . another” must refer to debts previously

owed to another.

By this point petitioners find themselves in retreat.

Unable to show that debt purchasers regularly collecting

for their own account always qualify as debt collectors,

they now suggest that purchasers sometimes qualify as

debt collectors. On their view, debt purchasers surely

qualify as collectors at least when they regularly purchase

and seek to collect defaulted debts—just as Santander

allegedly did here. In support of this narrower and more

particular understanding of the Act, petitioners point

again to the fact that the statute excludes from the defini-

tion of “debt collector” certain persons who obtain debts

before default. 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6)(F)(iii). This exclu-

sion, petitioners now suggest, implies that the term “debt

collector” must embrace those who regularly seek to collect

debts obtained after default. Others aligned with peti-

tioners also suggest that the Act treats everyone who

8 HENSON v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

Opinion of the Court

attempts to collect a debt as either a “debt collector” or a

“creditor,” but not both. And because the statutory defini-

tion of the term “creditor” excludes those who seek to

collect a debt obtained “in default,” §1692a(4), they con-

tend it again follows as a matter of necessary inference

that these persons must qualify as debt collectors.

But these alternative lines of inferential argument bear

their own problems. For while the statute surely excludes

from the debt collector definition certain persons who

acquire a debt before default, it doesn’t necessarily follow

that the definition must include anyone who regularly

collects debts acquired after default. After all and again,

under the definition at issue before us you have to attempt

to collect debts owed another before you can ever qualify

as a debt collector. And petitioners’ argument simply does

not fully confront this plain and implacable textual pre-

requisite. Likewise, even spotting (without granting) the

premise that a person cannot be both a creditor and a debt

collector with respect to a particular debt, we don’t see

why a defaulted debt purchaser like Santander couldn’t

qualify as a creditor. For while the creditor definition

excludes persons who “receive an assignment or transfer

of a debt in default,” it does so only (and yet again) when

the debt is assigned or transferred “solely for the purpose

of facilitating collection of such debt for another.” Ibid.

(emphasis added). So a company collecting purchased

defaulted debt for its own account—like Santander—

would hardly seem to be barred from qualifying as a credi-

tor under the statute’s plain terms.

Faced with so many obstacles in the text and structure

of the Act, petitioners ask us to move quickly on to policy.

Indeed, from the beginning that is the field on which they

seem most eager to pitch battle. Petitioners assert that

Congress passed the Act in large measure to add new

incentives for independent debt collectors to treat consum-

ers well. In their view, Congress excluded loan originators

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

from the Act’s demands because it thought they already

faced sufficient economic and legal incentives to good

behavior. But, on petitioners’ account, Congress never

had the chance to consider what should be done about

those in the business of purchasing defaulted debt. That’s

because, petitioners tell us, the “advent” of the market for

defaulted debt represents “ ‘one of the most significant

changes’ ” to the debt market generally since the Act’s

passage in 1977. Brief for Petitioners 8 (quoting Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act: CFPB Annual Report 2014, p. 7 (2014)). Had Con-

gress known this new industry would blossom, they say, it

surely would have judged defaulted debt purchasers more

like (and in need of the same special rules as) independent

debt collectors. Indeed, petitioners contend that no other

result would be consistent with the overarching congres-

sional goal of deterring untoward debt collection practices.

All this seems to us quite a lot of speculation. And while

it is of course our job to apply faithfully the law Congress

has written, it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally

valid statutory text under the banner of speculation about

what Congress might have done had it faced a question

that, on everyone’s account, it never faced. See Magwood

v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320, 334 (2010) (“We cannot replace

the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent”).

Indeed, it is quite mistaken to assume, as petitioners

would have us, that “whatever” might appear to “further[ ]

the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Rodri-

guez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam)

(emphasis deleted). Legislation is, after all, the art of

compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms

often the price of passage, and no statute yet known “pur-

sues its [stated] purpose[ ] at all costs.” Id., at 525–526.

For these reasons and more besides we will not presume

with petitioners that any result consistent with their

account of the statute’s overarching goal must be the law

10 HENSON v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.

Opinion of the Court

but will presume more modestly instead “that [the] legis-

lature says . . . what it means and means . . . what it says.”

Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 357 (2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted; brackets in original).

Even taken on its own terms, too, the speculation peti-

tioners urge upon us is far from unassailable. After all, is

it really impossible to imagine that reasonable legislators

might contend both ways on the question whether defaulted

debt purchasers should be treated more like loan origina-

tors than independent debt collection agencies? About

whether other existing incentives (in the form of common

law duties, other statutory and regulatory obligations,

economic incentives, or otherwise) suffice to deter debt

purchasers from engaging in certain undesirable collection

activities? Couldn’t a reasonable legislator endorsing the

Act as written wonder whether a large financial institu-

tion like Santander is any more or less likely to engage in

abusive conduct than another large financial institution

like CitiFinancial Auto? Especially where (as here) the

institution says that its primary business is loan origina-

tion and not the purchase of defaulted debt? We do not

profess sure answers to any of these questions, but ob-

serve only that the parties and their amici manage to

present many and colorable arguments both ways on them

all, a fact that suggests to us for certain but one thing:

that these are matters for Congress, not this Court, to

resolve.

In the end, reasonable people can disagree with how

Congress balanced the various social costs and benefits in

this area. We have no difficulty imagining, for example, a

statute that applies the Act’s demands to anyone collecting

any debts, anyone collecting debts originated by another,

or to some other class of persons still. Neither do we doubt

that the evolution of the debt collection business might

invite reasonable disagreements on whether Congress

should reenter the field and alter the judgments it made

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

Opinion of the Court

in the past. After all, it’s hardly unknown for new busi-

ness models to emerge in response to regulation, and for

regulation in turn to address new business models. Con-

stant competition between constable and quarry, regulator

and regulated, can come as no surprise in our changing

world. But neither should the proper role of the judiciary

in that process—to apply, not amend, the work of the

People’s representatives.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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