Opinion

Matal v. Tam

26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 686
582 U.S. 218
85 U.S.L.W. 4389
122 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1757
45 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1849

Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Filed: Jun 19, 2017
Status: Published
On the bench: Samuel Alito
Cited by: 337 cases
Authority: More cited than 97.3%

explaining that USCA11 Case: 24-14082 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 09/04/2025 Page: 14 of 20 14 Opinion of the Court 24-14082 the government could not be speaking through the trademark reg- istration process, because if it were, it would be “babbling prodi- giously and incoherently”

How later courts described this case

explaining that USCA11 Case: 24-14082 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 09/04/2025 Page: 14 of 20 14 Opinion of the Court 24-14082 the government could not be speaking through the trademark reg- istration process, because if it were, it would be “babbling prodi- giously and incoherently”
holding, in the context of commercial speech, that the Lanham Act's prohibition on registering offensive or disparaging trademarks constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination analogous to that in a limited public forum
recognizing that, with few exceptions, “it is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys”
holding that the Lanham Act’s prohibition on disparaging trademarks violates the First Amendment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. TAM

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 15–1293. Argued January 18, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017

Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this mon-

iker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as

a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration

of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office

(PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibit-

ing the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring

. . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15

U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through

the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the

case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately

found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the

First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

808 F. 3d 1321, affirmed.

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to

Parts I, II, and III–A, concluding:

1. The disparagement clause applies to marks that disparage the

members of a racial or ethnic group. Tam’s view, that the clause ap-

plies only to natural or juristic persons, is refuted by the plain terms

of the clause, which uses the word “persons.” A mark that disparages

a “substantial” percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group

necessarily disparages many “persons,” namely, members of that

group. Tam’s narrow reading also clashes with the breadth of the

disparagement clause, which by its terms applies not just to “per-

sons,” but also to “institutions” and “beliefs.” §1052(a). Had Con-

gress wanted to confine the reach of the clause, it could have used the

2 MATAL v. TAM

Syllabus

phrase “particular living individual,” which it used in neighboring

§1052(c). Tam contends that his interpretation is supported by legis-

lative history and by the PTO’s practice for many years of registering

marks that plainly denigrated certain groups. But an inquiry into

the meaning of the statute’s text ceases when, as here, “the statutory

language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and

consistent.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (inter-

nal quotation marks omitted). Even if resort to legislative history

and early enforcement practice were appropriate, Tam has presented

nothing showing a congressional intent to adopt his interpretation,

and the PTO’s practice in the years following the disparagement

clause’s enactment is unenlightening. Pp. 8–12.

2. The disparagement clause violates the First Amendment’s Free

Speech Clause. Contrary to the Government’s contention, trade-

marks are private, not government speech. Because the “Free Speech

Clause . . . does not regulate government speech,” Pleasant Grove

City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467, the government is not required

to maintain viewpoint neutrality on its own speech. This Court exer-

cises great caution in extending its government-speech precedents,

for if private speech could be passed off as government speech by

simply affixing a government seal of approval, government could si-

lence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.

The Federal Government does not dream up the trademarks regis-

tered by the PTO. Except as required by §1052(a), an examiner may

not reject a mark based on the viewpoint that it appears to express.

If the mark meets the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-neutral requirements,

registration is mandatory. And once a mark is registered, the PTO is

not authorized to remove it from the register unless a party moves for

cancellation, the registration expires, or the Federal Trade Commis-

sion initiates proceedings based on certain grounds. It is thus far-

fetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark is govern-

ment speech, especially given the fact that if trademarks become gov-

ernment speech when they are registered, the Federal Government is

babbling prodigiously and incoherently. And none of this Court’s

government-speech cases supports the idea that registered trade-

marks are government speech. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing

Assn., 544 U. S. 550; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460;

and Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576

U. S. ___, distinguished. Holding that the registration of a trade-

mark converts the mark into government speech would constitute a

huge and dangerous extension of the government-speech doctrine, for

other systems of government registration (such as copyright) could

easily be characterized in the same way. Pp. 12–18.

JUSTICE ALITO, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOMAS, and

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Syllabus

JUSTICE BREYER, concluded in Parts III–B, III–C, and IV:

(a) The Government’s argument that this case is governed by the

Court’s subsidized-speech cases is unpersuasive. Those cases all in-

volved cash subsidies or their equivalent, e.g., funds to private par-

ties for family planning services in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173,

and cash grants to artists in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley,

524 U. S. 569. The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like

these programs. The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking reg-

istration of a mark; it requires the payment of fees to file an applica-

tion and to maintain the registration once it is granted. The Gov-

ernment responds that registration provides valuable non-monetary

benefits traceable to the Government’s resources devoted to register-

ing the marks, but nearly every government service requires the ex-

penditure of government funds. This is true of services that benefit

everyone, like police and fire protection, as well as services that are

utilized by only some, e.g., the adjudication of private lawsuits and

the use of public parks and highways. Pp. 18–20.

(b) Also unpersuasive is the Government’s claim that the dispar-

agement clause is constitutional under a “government-program” doc-

trine, an argument which is based on a merger of this Court’s gov-

ernment-speech cases and subsidy cases. It points to two cases

involving a public employer’s collection of union dues from its em-

ployees, Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, and Ys-

ursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn., 555 U. S. 353, but these cases occupy a

special area of First Amendment case law that is far removed from

the registration of trademarks. Cases in which government creates a

limited public forum for private speech, thus allowing for some con-

tent- and speaker-based restrictions, see, e.g., Good News Club v.

Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 106–107; Rosenberger v. Rector

and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831, are potentially more

analogous. But even in those cases, viewpoint discrimination is for-

bidden. The disparagement clause denies registration to any mark

that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any

group. That is viewpoint discrimination in the sense relevant here:

Giving offense is a viewpoint. The “public expression of ideas may

not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive

to some of their hearers.” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592.

Pp. 20–23.

commercial speech subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central

Hudson Gas & Elect. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557,

need not be resolved here because the disparagement clause cannot

withstand even Central Hudson review. Under Central Hudson, a

restriction of speech must serve “a substantial interest” and be “nar-

4 MATAL v. TAM

Syllabus

rowly drawn.” Id., at 564–565 (internal quotation marks omitted).

One purported interest is in preventing speech expressing ideas that

offend, but that idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.

The second interest asserted is protecting the orderly flow of com-

merce from disruption caused by trademarks that support invidious

discrimination; but the clause, which reaches any trademark that

disparages any person, group, or institution, is not narrowly drawn.

Pp. 23–26.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE SO-

TOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN, agreed that 15 U. S. C. §1052(a) con-

stitutes viewpoint discrimination, concluding:

(a) With few narrow exceptions, a fundamental principle of the

First Amendment is that the government may not punish or suppress

speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech

conveys. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515

U. S. 819, 828–829. The test for viewpoint discrimination is wheth-

er—within the relevant subject category—the government has sin-

gled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views ex-

pressed. Here, the disparagement clause identifies the relevant

subject as “persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national

symbols,” §1052(a); and within that category, an applicant may regis-

ter a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one. The law thus

reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds

offensive, the essence of viewpoint discrimination. The Government’s

arguments in defense of the statute are unpersuasive. Pp. 2–5.

(b) Regardless of whether trademarks are commercial speech, the

viewpoint based discrimination here necessarily invokes heightened

scrutiny. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 566. To the

extent trademarks qualify as commercial speech, they are an exam-

ple of why that category does not serve as a blanket exemption from

the First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality. In the

realm of trademarks, the metaphorical marketplace of ideas becomes

a tangible, powerful reality. To permit viewpoint discrimination in

this context is to permit Government censorship. Pp. 5–7.

ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the

opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III–A, in which

ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and

KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined except for Part II,

and an opinion with respect to Parts III–B, III–C, and IV, in which

ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed

an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which

GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an

opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH,

J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–1293

_________________

JOSEPH MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED

STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

PETITIONER v. SIMON SHIAO TAM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 19, 2017]

JUSTICE ALITO announced the judgment of the Court

and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to

Parts I, II, and III–A, and an opinion with respect to Parts

III–B, III–C, and IV, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE,

JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE BREYER join.

This case concerns a dance-rock band’s application for

federal trademark registration of the band’s name, “The

Slants.” “Slants” is a derogatory term for persons of Asian

descent, and members of the band are Asian-Americans.

But the band members believe that by taking that slur as

the name of their group, they will help to “reclaim” the

term and drain its denigrating force.

The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the

application based on a provision of federal law prohibiting

the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or

bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living

or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). We now hold that this

provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First

Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment prin-

ciple: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it

2 MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

expresses ideas that offend.

“The principle underlying trademark protection is that

distinctive marks—words, names, symbols, and the like—

can help distinguish a particular artisan’s goods from

those of others.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus-

tries, Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 3); see also

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S.

205, 212 (2000). A trademark “designate[s] the goods as

the product of a particular trader” and “protect[s] his good

will against the sale of another’s product as his.” United

Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97

(1918); see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240

U. S. 403, 412–413 (1916). It helps consumers identify

goods and services that they wish to purchase, as well as

those they want to avoid. See Wal-Mart Stores, supra, at

212–213; Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469

U. S. 189, 198 (1985).

“[F]ederal law does not create trademarks.” B&B

Hardware, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3). Trademarks and

their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks

were protected at common law and in equity at the time of

the founding of our country. 3 J. McCarthy, Trademarks

and Unfair Competition §19:8 (4th ed. 2017) (hereinafter

McCarthy); 1 id., §§5:1, 5:2, 5:3; Pattishal, The Constitu-

tional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78

Trademark Rep. 456, 457–458 (1988); Pattishall, Two

Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 Trade-

mark Rep. 121, 121–123 (1978); see Trade-Mark Cases,

100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879). For most of the 19th century,

trademark protection was the province of the States. See

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U. S. 763, 780–

782 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id., at

785 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Eventually,

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

Congress stepped in to provide a degree of national uni-

formity, passing the first federal legislation protecting

trademarks in 1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, §§77–84, 16

Stat. 210–212. The foundation of current federal trade-

mark law is the Lanham Act, enacted in 1946. See Act of

July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427. By that time, trade-

mark had expanded far beyond phrases that do no more

than identify a good or service. Then, as now, trademarks

often consisted of catchy phrases that convey a message.

Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are “used in

commerce” may be placed on the “principal register,” that

is, they may be federally registered. 15 U. S. C.

§1051(a)(1). And some marks “capable of distinguishing

[an] applicant’s goods or services and not registrable on

the principal register . . . which are in lawful use in com-

merce by the owner thereof ” may instead be placed on a

different federal register: the supplemental register.

§1091(a). There are now more than two million marks

that have active federal certificates of registration. PTO

Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2016,

p. 192 (Table 15), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/USPTOFY16PAR.pdf (all Internet materials as

last visited June 16, 2017). This system of federal regis-

tration helps to ensure that trademarks are fully protected

and supports the free flow of commerce. “[N]ational pro-

tection of trademarks is desirable,” we have explained,

“because trademarks foster competition and the mainte-

nance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of

good reputation.” San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.

United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 531 (1987)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Park ’N Fly,

Inc., supra, at 198 (“The Lanham Act provides national

protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of

the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the

ability of consumers to distinguish among competing

producers”).

4 MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

Without federal registration, a valid trademark may

still be used in commerce. See 3 McCarthy §19:8. And an

unregistered trademark can be enforced against would-be

infringers in several ways. Most important, even if a

trademark is not federally registered, it may still be en-

forceable under §43(a) of the Lanham Act, which creates a

federal cause of action for trademark infringement. See

Two Pesos, supra, at 768 (“Section 43(a) prohibits a broader

range of practices than does §32, which applies to regis-

tered marks, but it is common ground that §43(a) protects

qualifying unregistered trademarks” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)).1 Unregistered trademarks

may also be entitled to protection under other federal

statutes, such as the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-

tection Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(d). See 5 McCarthy

§25A:49, at 25A–198 (“[T]here is no requirement [in the

Anticybersquatting Act] that the protected ‘mark’ be regis-

tered: unregistered common law marks are protected by

the Act”). And an unregistered trademark can be enforced

under state common law, or if it has been registered in a

State, under that State’s registration system. See 3 id.,

§19:3, at 19–23 (explaining that “[t]he federal system of

registration and protection does not preempt parallel state

——————

1 In the opinion below, the Federal Circuit opined that although “Sec-

tion 43(a) allows for a federal suit to protect an unregistered trade-

mark,” “it is not at all clear” that respondent could bring suit under

§43(a) because “there is no authority extending §43(a) to marks denied

under §2(a)’s disparagement provision.” In re Tam, 808 F. 3d 1321,

1344–1345, n.11 (en banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016). When drawing

this conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied in part on our statement in

Two Pesos that “the general principles qualifying a mark for registra-

tion under §2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in

determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection

under §43(a).” 505 U. S., at 768. We need not decide today whether

respondent could bring suit under §43(a) if his application for federal

registration had been lawfully denied under the disparagement clause.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

law protection, either by state common law or state regis-

tration” and “[i]n the vast majority of situations, federal

and state trademark law peacefully coexist”); id., §22:1

(discussing state trademark registration systems).

Federal registration, however, “confers important legal

rights and benefits on trademark owners who register

their marks.” B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,

at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Registration on

the principal register (1) “serves as ‘constructive notice of

the registrant’s claim of ownership’ of the mark,” ibid.

(quoting 15 U. S. C. §1072); (2) “is ‘prima facie evidence of

the validity of the registered mark and of the registration

of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of

the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in

commerce on or in connection with the goods or services

specified in the certificate,’ ” B & B Hardware, 575 U. S.

___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting §1057(b)); and (3) can make a

mark “ ‘incontestable’ ” once a mark has been registered for

five years,” ibid. (quoting §§1065, 1115(b)); see Park ’N

Fly, 469 U. S., at 193. Registration also enables the

trademark holder “to stop the importation into the United

States of articles bearing an infringing mark.” 3 Mc-

Carthy §19:9, at 19–38; see 15 U. S. C. §1124.

The Lanham Act contains provisions that bar certain

trademarks from the principal register. For example, a

trademark cannot be registered if it is “merely descriptive or

deceptively misdescriptive” of goods, §1052(e)(1), or if it is so

similar to an already registered trademark or trade name

that it is “likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,

or to deceive,” §1052(d).

At issue in this case is one such provision, which we will

call “the disparagement clause.” This provision prohibits the

registration of a trademark “which may disparage . . . per-

sons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,

6 MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” §1052(a).2 This

clause appeared in the original Lanham Act and has re-

mained the same to this day. See §2(a), 60 Stat. 428.

When deciding whether a trademark is disparaging, an

examiner at the PTO generally applies a “two-part test.”

The examiner first considers “the likely meaning of the

matter in question, taking into account not only dictionary

definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the

other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or

services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the

marketplace in connection with the goods or services.”

Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §1203.03(b)(i)

(Apr. 2017), p. 1200–150, http://tmep.uspto.gov. “If that

meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institu-

tions, beliefs or national symbols,” the examiner moves to

the second step, asking “whether that meaning may be

disparaging to a substantial composite3 of the referenced

group.” Ibid. If the examiner finds that a “substantial

composite, although not necessarily a majority, of the

referenced group would find the proposed mark . . . to be

disparaging in the context of contemporary attitudes,” a

prima facie case of disparagement is made out, and the

burden shifts to the applicant to prove that the trademark

is not disparaging. Ibid. What is more, the PTO has

specified that “[t]he fact that an applicant may be a mem-

ber of that group or has good intentions underlying its use

of a term does not obviate the fact that a substantial

composite of the referenced group would find the term

objectionable.” Ibid.

Simon Tam is the lead singer of “The Slants.” In re

Tam, 808 F. 3d 1321, 1331 (CA Fed. 2015) (en banc), as

——————

2 The disparagement clause also prevents a trademark from being

registered on the supplemental register. §1091(a).

3 By “composite,” we assume the PTO means component.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

corrected (Feb. 11, 2016). He chose this moniker in order

to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of stereotypes about

people of Asian ethnicity. Ibid. (internal quotation marks

omitted). The group “draws inspiration for its lyrics from

childhood slurs and mocking nursery rhymes” and has

given its albums names such as “The Yellow Album” and

“Slanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts.” Ibid.

Tam sought federal registration of “THE SLANTS,” on

the principal register, App. 17, but an examining attorney

at the PTO rejected the request, applying the PTO’s two-

part framework and finding that “there is . . . a substan-

tial composite of persons who find the term in the applied-

for mark offensive.” Id., at 30. The examining attorney

relied in part on the fact that “numerous dictionaries

define ‘slants’ or ‘slant-eyes’ as a derogatory or offensive

term.” Id., at 29. The examining attorney also relied on a

finding that “the band’s name has been found offensive

numerous times”—citing a performance that was canceled

because of the band’s moniker and the fact that “several

bloggers and commenters to articles on the band have

indicated that they find the term and the applied-for mark

offensive.” Id., at 29–30.

Tam contested the denial of registration before the

examining attorney and before the PTO’s Trademark Trial

and Appeal Board (TTAB) but to no avail. Eventually, he

took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal

Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially

unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free

Speech Clause. The majority found that the clause en-

gages in viewpoint-based discrimination, that the clause

regulates the expressive component of trademarks and

consequently cannot be treated as commercial speech, and

that the clause is subject to and cannot satisfy strict scru-

tiny. See 808 F. 3d, at 1334–1339. The majority also

rejected the Government’s argument that registered

trademarks constitute government speech, as well as the

8 MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

Government’s contention that federal registration is a

form of government subsidy. See id., at 1339–1355. And

the majority opined that even if the disparagement clause

were analyzed under this Court’s commercial speech

cases, the clause would fail the “intermediate scrutiny”

that those cases prescribe. See id., at 1355–1357.

Several judges wrote separately, advancing an assort-

ment of theories. Concurring, Judge O’Malley agreed with

the majority’s reasoning but added that the disparage-

ment clause is unconstitutionally vague. See id., at 1358–

1363. Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented in part.

He argued that trademark registration is a government

subsidy and that the disparagement clause is facially

constitutional, but he found the clause unconstitutional as

applied to THE SLANTS because that mark constitutes

“core expression” and was not adopted for the purpose of

disparaging Asian-Americans. See id., at 1363–1374. In

dissent, Judge Lourie agreed with Judge Dyk that the

clause is facially constitutional but concluded for a variety

of reasons that it is also constitutional as applied in this

case. See id., at 1374–1376. Judge Reyna also dissented,

maintaining that trademarks are commercial speech and

that the disparagement clause survives intermediate

scrutiny because it “directly advances the government’s

substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce.” See

id., at 1376–1382.

The Government filed a petition for certiorari, which we

granted in order to decide whether the disparagement

clause “is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of

the First Amendment.” Pet. for Cert. i; see sub. nom. Lee

v. Tam, 579 U. S. ___ (2016).

Before reaching the question whether the disparage-

ment clause violates the First Amendment, we consider

Tam’s argument that the clause does not reach marks that

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

disparage racial or ethnic groups. The clause prohibits the

registration of marks that disparage “persons,” and Tam

claims that the term “persons” “includes only natural and

juristic persons,” not “non-juristic entities such as racial

and ethnic groups.” Brief for Respondent 46.

Tam never raised this argument before the PTO or the

Federal Circuit, and we declined to grant certiorari on this

question when Tam asked us to do so, see Brief Respond-

ing to Petition for Certiorari, pp. i, 17–21. Normally, that

would be the end of the matter in this Court. See, e.g., Yee

v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534–538 (1992); Freytag v.

Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 894–895 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

But as the Government pointed out in connection with

its petition for certiorari, accepting Tam’s statutory inter-

pretation would resolve this case and leave the First

Amendment question for another day. See Reply Brief 9.

“[W]e have often stressed” that it is “importan[t] [to]

avoid[d] the premature adjudication of constitutional

questions,” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 690 (1997), and

that “we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality

. . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable,” Spector

Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105

(1944). See also Alabama State Federation of Labor v.

McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461 (1945); Burton v. United

States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 (1905). We thus begin by ex-

plaining why Tam’s argument about the definition of

“persons” in the Lanham Act is meritless.

As noted, the disparagement clause prohibits the regis-

tration of trademarks “which may disparage . . . persons,

living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam points to a

definition of “person” in the Lanham Act, which provides

that “[i]n the construction of this chapter, unless the

contrary is plainly apparent from the context . . . [t]he

term ‘person’ and any other word or term used to desig-

nate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privi-

10 MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

lege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter

includes a juristic person as well as a natural person.”

§1127. Because racial and ethnic groups are neither

natural nor “juristic” persons, Tam asserts, these groups

fall outside this definition. Brief for Respondent 46–48.

Tam’s argument is refuted by the plain terms of the

disparagement clause. The clause applies to marks that

disparage “persons.” A mark that disparages a “substan-

tial” percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group,

Trademark Manual §1203.03(b)(i), at 1200–150, necessar-

ily disparages many “persons,” namely, members of that

group. Tam’s argument would fail even if the clause used

the singular term “person,” but Congress’ use of the plural

“persons” makes the point doubly clear.4

Tam’s narrow reading of the term “persons” also clashes

with the breadth of the disparagement clause. By its

terms, the clause applies to marks that disparage, not just

“persons,” but also “institutions” and “beliefs.” 15 U. S. C.

§1052(a). It thus applies to the members of any group

whose members share particular “beliefs,” such as politi-

cal, ideological, and religious groups. It applies to marks

that denigrate “institutions,” and on Tam’s reading, it also

reaches “juristic” persons such as corporations, unions,

and other unincorporated associations. See §1127. Thus,

the clause is not limited to marks that disparage a partic-

ular natural person. If Congress had wanted to confine

——————

4 Tam advances a convoluted textual argument that goes as follows.

The definition of a “person” in 15 U. S. C. §1127 does not include a

“non-juristic person,” i.e., a group that cannot sue or be sued in its own

right. Brief for Respondent 46–47. Such groups consist of multiple

natural persons. Therefore, the members of such groups are not

“persons” under the disparagement clause. Id., at 46–48.

This argument leads to the absurd result that no person is a “person”

within the meaning of the disparagement clause. This is so because

every person is a member of a “non-juristic” group, e.g., right-handers,

left-handers, women, men, people born on odd-numbered days, people

born on even-numbered days.

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the reach of the disparagement clause in the way that

Tam suggests, it would have been easy to do so. A neigh-

boring provision of the Lanham Act denies registration to

any trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises a name,

portrait, or signature identifying a particular living indi-

vidual except by his written consent.” §1052(c) (emphasis

added).

Tam contends that his interpretation of the disparage-

ment clause is supported by its legislative history and by

the PTO’s willingness for many years to register marks

that plainly denigrated African-Americans and Native

Americans. These arguments are unpersuasive. As al-

ways, our inquiry into the meaning of the statute’s text

ceases when “the statutory language is unambiguous and

the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Barn-

hart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002) (inter-

nal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that the

prohibition against registering trademarks “which may

disparage . . . persons,” §1052(a), prohibits registration of

terms that disparage persons who share a common race or

ethnicity.

Even if resort to legislative history and early enforce-

ment practice were appropriate, we would find Tam’s

arguments unconvincing. Tam has not brought to our

attention any evidence in the legislative history showing

that Congress meant to adopt his interpretation. And the

practice of the PTO in the years following the enactment

of the disparagement clause is unenlightening. The ad-

mitted vagueness of the disparagement test5 and the huge

——————

5 The PTO has acknowledged that the guidelines “for determining

whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and

the determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is

necessarily a highly subjective one.” In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16

USPQ 2d 1653, 1654 (TTAB 1990) (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted). The PTO has similarly observed that whether a mark

is disparaging “is highly subjective and, thus, general rules are difficult

12 MATAL v. TAM

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volume of applications have produced a haphazard record

of enforcement. (Even today, the principal register is

replete with marks that many would regard as disparag-

ing to racial and ethnic groups.6) Registration of the

offensive marks that Tam cites is likely attributable not to

the acceptance of his interpretation of the clause but to

other factors—most likely the regrettable attitudes and

sensibilities of the time in question.

III

Because the disparagement clause applies to marks that

disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group, we

must decide whether the clause violates the Free Speech

Clause of the First Amendment. And at the outset, we

must consider three arguments that would either elimi-

nate any First Amendment protection or result in highly

permissive rational-basis review. Specifically, the Gov-

ernment contends (1) that trademarks are government

speech, not private speech, (2) that trademarks are a form

of government subsidy, and (3) that the constitutionality

of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new

“government-program” doctrine. We address each of these

arguments below.

The First Amendment prohibits Congress and other

government entities and actors from “abridging the free-

dom of speech”; the First Amendment does not say that

Congress and other government entities must abridge

their own ability to speak freely. And our cases recognize

that “[t]he Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate gov-

ernment speech.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555

——————

to postulate.” Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737 (TTAB

1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (DC 2003), rev’d and remanded in part,

415 F. 3d 44 (CADC 2005) (per curiam).

6 See, e.g., App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae.

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U. S. 460, 467 (2009); see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing

Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 553 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s own

speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”);

Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,

529 U. S. 217, 235 (2000).

As we have said, “it is not easy to imagine how govern-

ment could function” if it were subject to the restrictions

that the First Amendment imposes on private speech.

Summum, supra, at 468; see Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of

Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015)

(slip op., at 5–7). “ ‘[T]he First Amendment forbids the

government to regulate speech in ways that favor some

viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others,’ ” Lamb’s

Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508

U. S. 384, 394 (1993), but imposing a requirement of

viewpoint-neutrality on government speech would be para-

lyzing. When a government entity embarks on a course

of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint

and rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not re-

quire government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when

its officers and employees speak about that venture.

Here is a simple example. During the Second World

War, the Federal Government produced and distributed

millions of posters to promote the war effort.7 There were

posters urging enlistment, the purchase of war bonds, and

the conservation of scarce resources.8 These posters ex-

pressed a viewpoint, but the First Amendment did not

demand that the Government balance the message of

these posters by producing and distributing posters en-

couraging Americans to refrain from engaging in these

activities.

But while the government-speech doctrine is im-

portant—indeed, essential—it is a doctrine that is suscep-

——————

7 See, e.g., D. Nelson, The Posters That Won the War (1991).

8 Ibid.

14 MATAL v. TAM

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tible to dangerous misuse. If private speech could be

passed off as government speech by simply affixing a

government seal of approval, government could silence or

muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For this

reason, we must exercise great caution before extending

our government-speech precedents.

At issue here is the content of trademarks that are

registered by the PTO, an arm of the Federal Government.

The Federal Government does not dream up these marks,

and it does not edit marks submitted for registration.

Except as required by the statute involved here, 15

U. S. C. §1052(a), an examiner may not reject a mark

based on the viewpoint that it appears to express. Thus,

unless that section is thought to apply, an examiner does

not inquire whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is

consistent with Government policy or whether any such

viewpoint is consistent with that expressed by other

marks already on the principal register. Instead, if the

mark meets the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-neutral require-

ments, registration is mandatory. Ibid. (requiring that

“[n]o trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the

principal register on account of its nature unless” it falls

within an enumerated statutory exception). And if an

examiner finds that a mark is eligible for placement on the

principal register, that decision is not reviewed by any

higher official unless the registration is challenged. See

§§1062(a), 1071; 37 CFR §41.31(a) (2016). Moreover, once

a mark is registered, the PTO is not authorized to remove

it from the register unless a party moves for cancellation,

the registration expires, or the Federal Trade Commission

initiates proceedings based on certain grounds. See 15

U. S. C. §§1058(a), 1059, 1064; 37 CFR §§2.111(b), 2.160.

In light of all this, it is far-fetched to suggest that the

content of a registered mark is government speech. If the

federal registration of a trademark makes the mark gov-

ernment speech, the Federal Government is babbling

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prodigiously and incoherently. It is saying many unseemly

things. See App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus

Curiae. It is expressing contradictory views.9 It is una-

shamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial products

and services. And it is providing Delphic advice to the

consuming public.

For example, if trademarks represent government

speech, what does the Government have in mind when it

advises Americans to “make.believe” (Sony),10 “Think

different” (Apple),11 “Just do it” (Nike),12 or “Have it your

way” (Burger King)13? Was the Government warning

about a coming disaster when it registered the mark

“EndTime Ministries”14?

The PTO has made it clear that registration does not

constitute approval of a mark. See In re Old Glory Con-

dom Corp., 26 USPQ 2d 1216, 1220, n. 3 (TTAB 1993)

(“[I]ssuance of a trademark registration . . . is not a gov-

ernment imprimatur”). And it is unlikely that more than

a tiny fraction of the public has any idea what federal

registration of a trademark means. See Application of

National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 49 C. C. P. A. (Pat.)

854, 863, 297 F. 2d 941, 949 (1962) (Rich, J., concurring)

(“The purchasing public knows no more about trademark

registrations than a man walking down the street in a

——————

9 Compare “Abolish Abortion,” Registration No. 4,935,774 (Apr. 12,

2016), with “I Stand With Planned Parenthood,” Registration No.

5,073,573 (Nov. 1, 2016); compare “Capitalism Is Not Moral, Not Fair,

Not Freedom,” Registration No. 4,696,419 (Mar. 3, 2015), with “Capital-

ism Ensuring Innovation,” Registration No. 3,966,092 (May 24, 2011);

compare “Global Warming Is Good,” Registration No. 4,776,235 (July

21, 2015), with “A Solution to Global Warming,” Registration No.

3,875,271 (Nov. 10, 2010).

10 “make.believe,” Registration No. 4,342,903 (May 28, 2013).

11 “Think Different,” Registration No. 2,707,257 (Apr. 15, 2003).

12 “Just Do It,” Registration No. 1,875,307 (Jan. 25, 1995).

13 “Have It Your Way,” Registration No. 0,961,016. (June 12, 1973)

14 “EndTime Ministries,” Registration No. 4,746,225 (June 2, 2015).

16 MATAL v. TAM

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strange city knows about legal title to the land and build-

ings he passes” (emphasis deleted)).

None of our government speech cases even remotely

supports the idea that registered trademarks are govern-

ment speech. In Johanns, we considered advertisements

promoting the sale of beef products. A federal statute

called for the creation of a program of paid advertising “ ‘to

advance the image and desirability of beef and beef prod-

ucts.’ ” 544 U. S., at 561 (quoting 7 U. S. C. § 2902(13)).

Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture provided guide-

lines for the content of the ads, Department of Agriculture

officials attended the meetings at which the content of

specific ads was discussed, and the Secretary could edit or

reject any proposed ad. 544 U. S., at 561. Noting that

“[t]he message set out in the beef promotions [was] from

beginning to end the message established by the Federal

Government,” we held that the ads were government

speech. Id., at 560. The Government’s involvement in the

creation of these beef ads bears no resemblance to any-

thing that occurs when a trademark is registered.

Our decision in Summum is similarly far afield. A small

city park contained 15 monuments. 555 U. S., at 464.

Eleven had been donated by private groups, and one of

these displayed the Ten Commandments. Id., at 464–465.

A religious group claimed that the city, by accepting do-

nated monuments, had created a limited public forum for

private speech and was therefore obligated to place in the

park a monument expressing the group’s religious beliefs.

Holding that the monuments in the park represented

government speech, we cited many factors. Governments

have used monuments to speak to the public since ancient

times; parks have traditionally been selective in accepting

and displaying donated monuments; parks would be over-

run if they were obligated to accept all monuments offered

by private groups; “[p]ublic parks are often closely identi-

fied in the public mind with the government unit that

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owns the land”; and “[t]he monuments that are accepted

. . . are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a

government message.” Id., at 472.

Trademarks share none of these characteristics.

Trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a

Government message. With the exception of the enforce-

ment of 15 U. S. C. §1052(a), the viewpoint expressed by a

mark has not played a role in the decision whether to

place it on the principal register. And there is no evidence

that the public associates the contents of trademarks with

the Federal Government.

This brings us to the case on which the Government

relies most heavily, Walker, which likely marks the outer

bounds of the government-speech doctrine. Holding that

the messages on Texas specialty license plates are gov-

ernment speech, the Walker Court cited three factors

distilled from Summum. 576 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at

7–8). First, license plates have long been used by the

States to convey state messages. Id., at ___–___ (slip op.,

at 9–10). Second, license plates “are often closely identi-

fied in the public mind” with the State, since they are

manufactured and owned by the State, generally designed

by the State, and serve as a form of “government ID.” Id.,

at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, Texas “maintain[ed] direct control over the mes-

sages conveyed on its specialty plates.” Id., at ___ (slip

op., at 11). As explained above, none of these factors are

present in this case.

In sum, the federal registration of trademarks is vastly

different from the beef ads in Johanns, the monuments in

Summum, and even the specialty license plates in Walker.

Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the

mark into government speech would constitute a huge and

dangerous extension of the government-speech doctrine.

For if the registration of trademarks constituted govern-

ment speech, other systems of government registration

18 MATAL v. TAM

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could easily be characterized in the same way.

Perhaps the most worrisome implication of the Govern-

ment’s argument concerns the system of copyright regis-

tration. If federal registration makes a trademark gov-

ernment speech and thus eliminates all First Amendment

protection, would the registration of the copyright for a

book produce a similar transformation? See 808 F. 3d, at

1346 (explaining that if trademark registration amounts

to government speech, “then copyright registration” which

“has identical accoutrements” would “likewise amount to

government speech”).

The Government attempts to distinguish copyright on

the ground that it is “ ‘the engine of free expression,’ ” Brief

for Petitioner 47 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S.

186, 219 (2003)), but as this case illustrates, trademarks

often have an expressive content. Companies spend huge

amounts to create and publicize trademarks that convey a

message. It is true that the necessary brevity of trade-

marks limits what they can say. But powerful messages

can sometimes be conveyed in just a few words.

Trademarks are private, not government, speech.

We next address the Government’s argument that this

case is governed by cases in which this Court has upheld

the constitutionality of government programs that subsi-

dized speech expressing a particular viewpoint. These

cases implicate a notoriously tricky question of constitu-

tional law. “[W]e have held that the Government ‘may not

deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his

constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he

has no entitlement to that benefit.’ ” Agency for Int’l De-

velopment v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S.

___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 8) (some internal quotation

marks omitted). But at the same time, government is not

required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to

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promote. Ibid. Determining which of these principles

applies in a particular case “is not always self-evident,”

id., at ___ (slip op., at 11), but no difficult question is

presented here.

Unlike the present case, the decisions on which the

Government relies all involved cash subsidies or their

equivalent. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991), a

federal law provided funds to private parties for family

planning services. In National Endowment for Arts v.

Finley, 524 U. S. 569 (1998), cash grants were awarded to

artists. And federal funding for public libraries was at

issue in United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539

U. S. 194 (2003). In other cases, we have regarded tax

benefits as comparable to cash subsidies. See Regan v.

Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540

(1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S 498 (1959).

The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like

the programs at issue in these cases. The PTO does not

pay money to parties seeking registration of a mark.

Quite the contrary is true: An applicant for registration

must pay the PTO a filing fee of $225–$600. 37 CFR

§2.6(a)(1). (Tam submitted a fee of $275 as part of his

application to register THE SLANTS. App. 18.) And to

maintain federal registration, the holder of a mark must

pay a fee of $300–$500 every 10 years. §2.6(a)(5); see also

15 U. S. C. §1059(a). The Federal Circuit concluded that

these fees have fully supported the registration system for

the past 27 years. 808 F. 3d, at 1353.

The Government responds that registration provides

valuable non-monetary benefits that “are directly trace-

able to the resources devoted by the federal government to

examining, publishing, and issuing certificates of registra-

tion for those marks.” Brief for Petitioner 27. But just

about every government service requires the expenditure

of government funds. This is true of services that benefit

everyone, like police and fire protection, as well as services

20 MATAL v. TAM

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that are utilized by only some, e.g., the adjudication of

private lawsuits and the use of public parks and highways.

Trademark registration is not the only government

registration scheme. For example, the Federal Govern-

ment registers copyrights and patents. State governments

and their subdivisions register the title to real property

and security interests; they issue driver’s licenses, motor

vehicle registrations, and hunting, fishing, and boating

licenses or permits.

Cases like Rust and Finley are not instructive in analyz-

ing the constitutionality of restrictions on speech imposed

in connection with such services.

Finally, the Government urges us to sustain the dispar-

agement clause under a new doctrine that would apply to

“government-program” cases. For the most part, this

argument simply merges our government-speech cases

and the previously discussed subsidy cases in an attempt

to construct a broader doctrine that can be applied to the

registration of trademarks. The only new element in this

construct consists of two cases involving a public employ-

er’s collection of union dues from its employees. But

those cases occupy a special area of First Amendment case

law, and they are far removed from the registration of

trademarks.

In Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177,

181–182 (2007), a Washington law permitted a public

employer automatically to deduct from the wages of em-

ployees who chose not to join the union the portion of

union dues used for activities related to collective bargain-

ing. But unless these employees affirmatively consented,

the law did not allow the employer to collect the portion of

union dues that would be used in election activities. Id.,

at 180–182. A public employee union argued that this law

unconstitutionally restricted its speech based on its con-

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tent; that is, the law permitted the employer to assist

union speech on matters relating to collective bargaining

but made it harder for the union to collect money to sup-

port its election activities. Id., at 188. Upholding this law,

we characterized it as imposing a “modest limitation” on

an “extraordinary benefit,” namely, taking money from the

wages of non-union members and turning it over to the

union free of charge. Id., at 184. Refusing to confer an

even greater benefit, we held, did not upset the market-

place of ideas and did not abridge the union’s free speech

rights. Id., at 189–190.

Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn., 555 U. S. 353 (2009), is

similar. There, we considered an Idaho law that allowed

public employees to elect to have union dues deducted

from their wages but did not allow such a deduction for

money remitted to the union’s political action committee.

Id., at 355. We reasoned that the “the government . . .

[was] not required to assist others in funding the expres-

sion of particular ideas.” Id., at 358; see also id., at 355

(“The First Amendment . . . does not confer an affirmative

right to use government payroll mechanisms for the pur-

pose of obtaining funds for expression”).

Davenport and Ysursa are akin to our subsidy cases.

Although the laws at issue in Davenport and Ysursa did

not provide cash subsidies to the unions, they conferred a

very valuable benefit—the right to negotiate a collective-

bargaining agreement under which non-members would

be obligated to pay an agency fee that the public employer

would collect and turn over to the union free of charge. As

in the cash subsidy cases, the laws conferred this benefit

because it was thought that this arrangement served

important government interests. See Abood v. Detroit Bd.

of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 224–226 (1977). But the challenged

laws did not go further and provide convenient collection

mechanisms for money to be used in political activities. In

essence, the Washington and Idaho lawmakers chose to

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confer a substantial non-cash benefit for the purpose of

furthering activities that they particularly desired to

promote but not to provide a similar benefit for the pur-

pose of furthering other activities. Thus, Davenport and

Ysursa are no more relevant for present purposes than the

subsidy cases previously discussed.15

Potentially more analogous are cases in which a unit of

government creates a limited public forum for private

speech. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central

School, 533 U. S. 98, 106–107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rec-

tor and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831 (1995);

Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U. S., at 392–393. See also Legal

Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 541–544

(2001). When government creates such a forum, in either

a literal or “metaphysical” sense, see Rosenberger, 515

U. S., at 830, some content- and speaker-based restrictions

may be allowed, see id., at 830–831. However, even in

such cases, what we have termed “viewpoint discrimina-

tion” is forbidden. Id., at 831.

Our cases use the term “viewpoint” discrimination in a

broad sense, see ibid., and in that sense, the disparage-

ment clause discriminates on the bases of “viewpoint.” To

be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement

of all groups. It applies equally to marks that damn Dem-

ocrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and

those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue. It

denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a

substantial percentage of the members of any group. But

in the sense relevant here, that is viewpoint discrimina-

tion: Giving offense is a viewpoint.

We have said time and again that “the public expression

——————

15 While these cases resemble subsidy cases insofar as the free speech

rights of unions and their members are concerned, arrangements like

those in these cases also implicate the free speech rights of non-union

members. Our decision here has no bearing on that issue.

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of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas

are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street

v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969). See also Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock

principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the

government may not prohibit the expression of an idea

simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or

disagreeable”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S.

46, 55–56 (1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615

(1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 567 (1970);

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School

Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 509–514 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379

U. S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S.

229, 237–238 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1,

4–5 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311

(1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S.

147, 161 (1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365

(1937).

For this reason, the disparagement clause cannot be

saved by analyzing it as a type of government program in

which some content- and speaker-based restrictions are

permitted.16

Having concluded that the disparagement clause cannot

be sustained under our government-speech or subsidy

cases or under the Government’s proposed “government-

program” doctrine, we must confront a dispute between

the parties on the question whether trademarks are com-

mercial speech and are thus subject to the relaxed scrutiny

outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public

Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980). The Govern-

ment and amici supporting its position argue that all

——————

16 We leave open the question whether this is the appropriate frame-

work for analyzing free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham

Act.

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trademarks are commercial speech. They note that the

central purposes of trademarks are commercial and that

federal law regulates trademarks to promote fair and

orderly interstate commerce. Tam and his amici, on the

other hand, contend that many, if not all, trademarks

have an expressive component. In other words, these

trademarks do not simply identify the source of a product

or service but go on to say something more, either about

the product or service or some broader issue. The trade-

mark in this case illustrates this point. The name “The

Slants” not only identifies the band but expresses a view

about social issues.

We need not resolve this debate between the parties

because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even

Central Hudson review.17 Under Central Hudson, a re-

striction of speech must serve “a substantial interest,” and

it must be “narrowly drawn.” Id., at 564–565 (internal

quotation marks omitted). This means, among other

things, that “[t]he regulatory technique may extend only

as far as the interest it serves.” Id., at 565. The dispar-

agement clause fails this requirement.

It is claimed that the disparagement clause serves two

interests. The first is phrased in a variety of ways in the

briefs. Echoing language in one of the opinions below, the

Government asserts an interest in preventing “ ‘un-

derrepresented groups’ ” from being “ ‘bombarded with

demeaning messages in commercial advertising.’ ” Brief

for Petitioner 48 (quoting 808 F. 3d, at 1364 (Dyk, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part)). An amicus

supporting the Government refers to “encouraging racial

——————

17 As with the framework discussed in Part III–C of this opinion, we

leave open the question whether Central Hudson provides the appro-

priate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the

Lanham Act. And nothing in our decision should be read to speak to

the validity of state unfair competition provisions or product libel laws

that are not before us and differ from §1052(d)’s disparagement clause.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 25

Opinion

Opinion of

of the Court

ALITO, J.

tolerance and protecting the privacy and welfare of indi-

viduals.” Brief for Native American Organizations as

Amici Curiae 21. But no matter how the point is phrased,

its unmistakable thrust is this: The Government has an

interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend.

And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart

of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the

basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or

any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast

of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the

freedom to express “the thought that we hate.” United

States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes,

J., dissenting).

The second interest asserted is protecting the orderly

flow of commerce. See 808 F. 3d, at 1379–1381 (Reyna, J.,

dissenting); Brief for Petitioner 49; Brief for Native Amer-

ican Organizations as Amicus Curiae 18–21. Commerce,

we are told, is disrupted by trademarks that “involv[e]

disparagement of race, gender, ethnicity, national origin,

religion, sexual orientation, and similar demographic

classification.” 808 F. 3d, at 1380–1381 (opinion of Reyna,

J.). Such trademarks are analogized to discriminatory

conduct, which has been recognized to have an adverse

effect on commerce. See ibid.; Brief for Petitioner 49;

Brief for Native American Organizations as Amici Curiae

18–20.

A simple answer to this argument is that the dispar-

agement clause is not “narrowly drawn” to drive out

trademarks that support invidious discrimination. The

clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person,

group, or institution. It applies to trademarks like the

following: “Down with racists,” “Down with sexists,”

“Down with homophobes.” It is not an anti-discrimination

clause; it is a happy-talk clause. In this way, it goes much

further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.

The clause is far too broad in other ways as well. The

26 MATAL v. TAM

Opinion

Opinion of

of the Court

ALITO, J.

clause protects every person living or dead as well as every

institution. Is it conceivable that commerce would be

disrupted by a trademark saying: “James Buchanan was a

disastrous president” or “Slavery is an evil institution”?

There is also a deeper problem with the argument that

commercial speech may be cleansed of any expression

likely to cause offense. The commercial market is well

stocked with merchandise that disparages prominent

figures and groups, and the line between commercial and

non-commercial speech is not always clear, as this case

illustrates. If affixing the commercial label permits the

suppression of any speech that may lead to political or

social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered.

* * *

For these reasons, we hold that the disparagement

clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First

Amendment. The judgment of the Federal Circuit is

affirmed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–1293

_________________

JOSEPH MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED

STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

PETITIONER v. SIMON SHIAO TAM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 19, 2017]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG,

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring

in part and concurring in the judgment.

The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has denied the

substantial benefits of federal trademark registration to

the mark THE SLANTS. The PTO did so under the man-

date of the disparagement clause in 15 U. S. C. §1052(a),

which prohibits the registration of marks that may “dis-

parage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any

“persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national

symbols.”

As the Court is correct to hold, §1052(a) constitutes

viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech suppression so

potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional

scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on

which it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.

The Court is correct in its judgment, and I join Parts I,

II, and III–A of its opinion. This separate writing explains

in greater detail why the First Amendment’s protections

against viewpoint discrimination apply to the trademark

here. It submits further that the viewpoint discrimination

rationale renders unnecessary any extended treatment of