Opinion

MARC LARKINS, ETC. VS. GEORGE J. SOLTER, JR.(C-108-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

Court
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Filed
Jun 15, 2017
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 3.8%

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2573-15T2

MARC LARKINS, ACTING STATE

COMPTROLLER, STATE OF NEW

JERSEY, OFFICE OF THE STATE

COMPTROLLER,

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

Plaintiff-Respondent, June 15, 2017

v. APPELLATE DIVISION

GEORGE J. SOLTER, JR.,

SUPERINTENDENT, NORTH BERGEN

DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION

and NORTH BERGEN DISTRICT

BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________________

Argued June 6, 2017 – Decided June 15, 2017

Before Judges Yannotti, Fasciale and Gilson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Hudson County, Docket No.

C-108-15.

Michael D. Witt argued the cause for

appellants (Chasan, Leyner & Lamparello,

P.C., attorneys; Mitchell L. Pascual,

Cheyne R. Scott and Mr. Witt, of counsel and

on the briefs).

James A. Carey, Jr., Deputy Attorney

General, argued the cause for respondent

(Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,

attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Paul Davis,

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FASCIALE, J.A.D.

Defendants George J. Solter, Jr., Superintendent

(Superintendent), North Bergen District Board of Education

(NBBOE), and the NBBOE, appeal from two December 22, 2015

orders: one granting summary judgment to plaintiff Marc Larkins,

Acting State Comptroller (the State Comptroller), State of New

Jersey, Office of the State Comptroller (the OSC); and the other

denying defendants' cross-motion to compel production of

documents. Defendants also appeal from a February 11, 2016

order denying reconsideration of the orders.

The State Comptroller established objective criteria,

gathered voluminous information, and weighed various factors

before deciding to conduct a performance audit of the NBBOE.

Defendants insisted that the State Comptroller was obligated to

disclose his reasons for the audit before it commenced. As a

result, they conditioned their cooperation on receiving that

information.

In entering the orders, the judge determined the parties'

obligations by interpreting N.J.S.A. 52:15C-1 to -24 (the Act or

Enabling Statute). Based on his review of the Act, the judge

concluded that the State Comptroller had no obligation to

explain his reasons for the audit. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15C-

2 A-2573-15T2

14(a), the judge compelled defendants to fully assist and

cooperate with the audit.

The legal issue presented on appeal is whether the State

Comptroller was obligated to disclose his reasons for selecting

the NBBOE for a performance audit before commencing the audit.1

We hold that the Enabling Statute does not impose any such

requirement. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose of

the Act; render meaningless an auditee's unambiguous statutory

obligation to provide full assistance and cooperation with any

audit; and unduly delay the conduct of audits. We therefore

affirm.

I.

We begin by summarizing the State Comptroller's role,

responsibility, and broad administrative powers. Doing so

informs our holding that the State Comptroller is not obligated

to justify, in advance of the audit, his reasons for selecting

the NBBOE for the performance audit. Undertaking this summary

provides further support for our conclusion that imposing such a

condition would substantially undermine the State Comptroller's

independent oversight role in safeguarding efficient and

independent public financial control and accountability

statewide.

1

The performance audit is ongoing.

3 A-2573-15T2

In 2007, the Legislature recognized that the size of

governmental agencies had been steadily growing for decades

because of new and escalating societal needs. N.J.S.A. 52:15C-

1. Although the size of governmental agencies and authorities

had been expanding, the Legislature acknowledged that the

State's ability to manage the governmental accountability

systems had not matched its responsibility to subject

governmental financial activities to public scrutiny. Ibid.

Consequently, the Legislature declared it had a fundamental duty

to the taxpayers to oversee and promote the "professional

conduct of internal audits, [the] assurance on the adequacy of

internal financial controls within agencies of government, [and

the] assess[ment] [of] the adequacy of controls over financial

management, contracting, financial reporting and the delivery of

government programs and activities with due regard to

efficiency, effectiveness and economy." Ibid.

The Legislature determined there existed a compelling need

to ensure "independence and integrity in the financial oversight

of the discharge of its duties and responsibilities [to be]

carried out in a manner and under a structure that safeguards

the fiscal resources with which it has been entrusted[.]" Ibid.

As a result, the Legislature established the OSC, which the

State Comptroller administers, to satisfy these

4 A-2573-15T2

responsibilities. Ibid. It also created the OSC to "subject

governmental financial activities to uniform, meaningful, and

systematic public scrutiny[.]" Ibid.

To strengthen the integrity of the State Comptroller's

statutory duties, the Legislature established an independent

governmental framework. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15C-2, and to

comply with the provisions of article V, section IV, paragraph 1

of the New Jersey Constitution,2 the Legislature declared that

the OSC "shall be allocated in, but not of, the Department of

the Treasury. Notwithstanding this allocation, the [OSC] shall

be independent of any supervision or control by the State

Treasurer, or the department or by any division, board, office,

or other officer thereof." In this independent Executive Agency

2

This provision addresses the organization of various

administrative offices and states:

All executive and administrative offices,

departments, and instrumentalities of the

State government, including the offices of

Secretary of State and Attorney General, and

their respective functions, powers and

duties, shall be allocated by law among and

within not more than twenty principal

departments, in such manner as to group the

same according to major purposes so far as

practicable. Temporary commissions for

special purposes may, however, be

established by law and such commissions need

not be allocated within a principal

department.

[N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 1.]

5 A-2573-15T2

capacity, the Legislature required the State Comptroller to

"report directly to the Governor." N.J.S.A. 52:15C-2(b).

The State Comptroller's duties include a wide range of

responsibilities under the Act. Under his direction, the OSC is

responsible for conducting routine, periodic, and random audits

of entities with executive branch authority including "public

institutions of higher education, independent State authorities,

units of local government and boards of education." N.J.S.A.

52:15C-5(a). Likewise, the OSC is responsible for "conducting

assessments of the performance and management of programs of

. . . public institutions of higher education, independent State

authorities, units of local government and boards of education

and the extent to which they are achieving their goals and

objectives." Ibid.

The Legislature consolidated within the OSC coordination

responsibility for internal and external audit functions.

N.J.S.A. 52:15C-7. It therefore authorized the State

Comptroller to establish an independent "full-time program of

audit and performance review[.]" N.J.S.A. 52:15C-7(a). Such a

program would be in addition to any audit or review conducted by

entities other than the OSC. The Legislature also designed the

consolidation of these functions to "provide increased

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accountability, integrity, and oversight of . . . all . . .

units of local government and boards of education[.]" Ibid.

To fulfill his statutory obligations under the Act, the

Legislature directed the State Comptroller to establish various

guidelines. The Legislature directed the State Comptroller to

adopt rules and regulations in accordance with the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15,

"as shall be necessary to implement the provisions of this

[A]ct." N.J.S.A. 52:15C-19; see also N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(a)

(stating in part that the State Comptroller "shall, pursuant to

the provisions of the [APA], adopt rules and regulations

necessary to effectuate the purposes of this [A]ct").

The State Comptroller enjoys broad powers under the Act.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(a), the State Comptroller "shall

have all the powers necessary" to carry out his statutory

duties, functions, and responsibilities. The State Comptroller

has authority to conduct financial audits pursuant to N.J.S.A.

52:15C-8(c)(2), and performance audits pursuant to N.J.S.A.

52:15C-8(c)(3).

In accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)(3), and pertinent

to this appeal, the State Comptroller is required to establish

objective criteria for analyzing whether to undertake a

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performance audit. In deciding whether to conduct a performance

audit, the State Comptroller must use that criteria and

weigh relevant risk factors, including, but

not limited to: (a) the size of the entity's

budget, (b) the entity's past performance,

(c) the frequency, scope, and quality of any

audits or reviews that have been performed

regarding the entity's financial condition

or performance, (d) assessments or

evaluations of the entity's management,

performance or financial condition such as

those undertaken as part of the New Jersey

Quality Single Accountability Continuum for

school districts, and (e) other credible

information which suggests the necessity of

a review.

[N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)(3).]

In this section, reference to "entity" means "any unit in the

Executive branch of State government, including all entities

exercising executive branch authority, public institutions of

higher education, independent State authorities, units of local

government and boards of education or their vendors." N.J.S.A.

52:15C-8(c)(4).

II.

On March 31, 2015, a Director of the Audit Division in the

OSC (the Audit Director) wrote the Superintendent and explained

that the OSC had been analyzing whether to review the operations

of certain school districts statewide. In his letter, the Audit

Director explained the OSC had focused on those school districts

8 A-2573-15T2

receiving fifty percent or more of their fiscal year 2013

budgets from State aid. The NBBOE fell into that category.

To determine whether to conduct the performance audit of

the NBBOE, the Audit Director requested the NBBOE produce the

following documentation for the period between July 2012 and

March 2015:

1. Organizational Chart (including names of

key personnel).

2. Written policies and procedures governing

expenditures (including payroll).

3. Employment contracts for all bargaining

units.

4. Board meeting minutes.

5. List, including vendor name, description

of services and total amount paid, of all

contracts exceeding $500,000.

6. Download of financial and payroll data.

The NBBOE produced a majority but not all of the requested

information.

On May 21, 2015, the Audit Director notified the

Superintendent that it intended to conduct the performance audit

of "selected fiscal and operating practices of the [NBBOE]." A

Deputy State Comptroller (the Deputy Comptroller) informed the

NBBOE that the OSC would conduct the audit in accordance with

applicable governmental auditing guidelines. The OSC then

9 A-2573-15T2

scheduled a June 10, 2015 opening conference to address its

agenda.

In anticipation of that conference, the OSC provided the

Superintendent with a pamphlet, which contained a full

description of the OSC's mission, authority, and audit process.

The pamphlet listed such things as the dates the audit would

cover; the OSC's intention to examine the NBBOE's fiscal and

operating practices; and its plan to analyze the NBBOE's related

accounting information system and controls. The pamphlet

identified defendants' outstanding document responses, and the

OSC's request for additional documents:

Outstanding [document] Request:

a. Financial Data – Download (Excel format

preferred) of check register, purchase order

journal and general ledger identifying

specific transaction information including

but not limited to vendor/payee name and

number; purchase order/check date, number,

amount; account number charged, etc. for

Fiscal Years 2013-2015. Provide file layout

explaining data headings[;]

b. Year-end payroll report for Fiscal Years

2013-2015 (PDF or paper copy)[;]

c. Policies 6422-6832 noted on table of

contents or written confirmation that they

are not used by the District[.]

Additional [document] Request:

d. Committee Report on the Administrative

Reorganization of the North Bergen Public

Schools[;]

10 A-2573-15T2

e. Tuition Contract Agreements with

Guttenberg Board of Education for Fiscal

Years 2013-2015[;]

f. All Job Description Manuals for Fiscal

Years 2013-2015[;]

g. Copy of Collective Bargaining Agreement

covering Fiscal Year 2013 between North

Bergen Council of Administrators and

Supervisors and [the NBBOE;]

h. Copy of Collective Bargaining Agreement

covering Fiscal Year 2013 between [the

NBBOE] and North Bergen Education

Association for Custodial and Maintenance

Employees, Housekeeping, Audiovisual

Technicians, Security Officers, Computer

Technicians, Attendance Officers, and Bus

Drivers[;]

i. All Executive Employment

Agreements/Contracts for Fiscal Years 2013-

2015 (not covered under a Collective

Bargaining Agreement)[;]

j. Copy of contract with the Alamo Insurance

Group for the administration of prescription

services to Benecard Services, Inc[;]

k. Meeting Minutes for January 2013 (we only

received page [one])[.]

In addition to providing its agenda, the OSC submitted to the

Superintendent an Audit Engagement Information Technology

Questionnaire.

In advance of the opening conference, the NBBOE's counsel

communicated with the Deputy Comptroller as to why the State

Comptroller had selected the NBBOE for the audit. He demanded

11 A-2573-15T2

that she explain the State Comptroller's reasons for picking the

NBBOE out of approximately seventy school districts, which

purportedly fell within the OSC's target group. According to

the NBBOE's counsel, the Deputy Comptroller explained to him

that the OSC's goal was to sample a school district from an area

in North Jersey and a school district from an area in South

Jersey.

Defendants then made multiple requests for documents

pursuant to Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to

-13. The NBBOE's counsel certified that he sought "information

on the selection process [for the performance audit] and the

identity of other districts . . . contacted by the OSC." In its

OPRA responses, the OSC withheld or redacted documents pursuant

to OPRA's advisory, consultative, deliberative process, and

investigation in progress exemptions.3

On June 9, 2015, the NBBOE's counsel wrote the OSC and

stated "the [NBBOE] believes that it is entitled to know how it

was selected for an audit and what, if any, weaknesses,

3

Under a different docket number, the NBBOE challenged the

adequacy of plaintiff's OPRA responses. On March 15, 2016, a

Law Division judge entered an order rejecting the NBBOE's

challenge, concluding plaintiff properly redacted and withheld

certain documents under OPRA and the deliberative process

privilege. The Law Division judge dismissed that matter with

prejudice. Defendants did not appeal from that order of

dismissal.

12 A-2573-15T2

inadequacies or failures [existed] in the entities['] financial

controls." He stated that the State Comptroller's power to

conduct audits "appears to be limited" by N.J.S.A. 52:15C-

8(c)(2), which unlike here, pertains to financial audits, not

performance audits. He asserted that pursuant to N.J.S.A.

18A:23-1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-10, the NBBOE "(1) ha[d] certified

financial audits performed on an annual basis[,] and (2) [was]

subject to review by the State of New Jersey Department of

Education [(NJDOE)] under the New Jersey Quality Single

Accountability Continuum [(NJQSAC)]."

On June 10, 2015, the NBBOE's counsel attended the

scheduled opening conference, but he maintained that the NBBOE

was entitled to know the State Comptroller's reasons for the

audit before it commenced. Later that day, the NBBOE's counsel

wrote to the OSC and stated that "[t]he [NBBOE] has essentially

asked two simple questions of the OSC: (1) how was the [NBBOE]

selected for this audit; and (2) has the OSC met the

requirements necessary under its own enabling legislation to

authorize the audit that it seeks to perform." The NBBOE

counsel contended that the State Comptroller's authority to

proceed with the audit is statutorily "triggered by findings of

deficiency as to the [NBBOE] certified audit reports." After

the NBBOE counsel refused to allow the performance audit to

13 A-2573-15T2

proceed as planned, the State Comptroller directed the OSC audit

team to leave the opening conference.

On June 11, 2015, the Deputy Comptroller issued a two-page

informal letter to the NBBOE's counsel. She explained that the

NBBOE was not entitled to the information requested by its

counsel. She stated that the OSC had "absolute, unfettered

authority" to conduct a performance audit of the NBBOE pursuant

to the Act. She further explained that the Enabling Statute did

not impose an obligation for the State Comptroller to disclose

an "identification of weaknesses" to the NBBOE as a condition to

conducting the performance audit. Defendants did not

administratively appeal to the State Comptroller from the June

11 letter.

In her June 11 letter, the Deputy Comptroller asked counsel

whether the NBBOE intended to submit to the performance audit

without conditions "as required by law." The NBBOE reiterated

its position that it was entitled to the information requested,

especially because the NBBOE had recently undergone audits by

the NJQSAC, and had received a purportedly favorable

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) from an independent

consultant. The NBBOE counsel certified that the NBBOE would

"not proceed[] with the opening conference unless and until the

14 A-2573-15T2

OSC ha[d] complied with [his interpretation of] the [Enabling

Statute]."

III.

In July 2015, plaintiff filed an order to show cause (OTSC)

and this verified complaint. In the verified complaint,

plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that it had "unfettered

authority to conduct a performance audit [of the NBBOE] pursuant

to N.J.S.A. 52:15-1, -5, -7, and -8(c)(3), without having to

demonstrate . . . that it has satisfied any preconditions before

commencing such performance audit[.]" Plaintiff sought an order

compelling defendants' full cooperation with the performance

audit.

In its proposed OTSC, plaintiff identified Rule 4:67-1(b)

(allowing summary applications under certain circumstances where

the matter may be completely disposed of in a summary manner).

The proposed OTSC sought various declarations interpreting

N.J.S.A. 52:15-1, -5, -7, and -8(c)(3). Plaintiff withdrew the

OTSC,4 defendants filed their answer to the verified complaint,

and the matter proceeded to pre-trial discovery.

In pre-trial discovery, defendants demanded production of

all documents relating to the audit; propounded interrogatories

4

The parties agree that plaintiff withdrew the OTSC for lack

of proper service.

15 A-2573-15T2

seeking a detailed description of "the protocol, procedure,

and/or process utilized by [plaintiff] in selecting the NBBOE

for the audit"; and served deposition notices for the State

Comptroller, Deputy Comptroller, and Supervising Audit Manager

of the OSC.

Plaintiff explained that it had produced the demanded

documents in response to defendants' numerous OPRA requests, and

that the deliberative process privilege protected the remaining

items sought. At this point, plaintiff categorized this lawsuit

as an "enforcement action seeking an order compelling

[d]efendants' [full] cooperation with [plaintiff's] performance

audit as mandated by [the Enabling Statute]." Thereafter,

plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment, and defendants

cross-moved to compel production of discovery.

At oral argument before the judge, a Deputy Attorney

General (DAG) stated that plaintiff sought summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 4:67-6 (governing the process for enforcing

agency orders). The DAG stated to the judge that "the State is

. . . moving under [Rule 4:67-6(c)(2)] to enforce the State's

[']order['] . . . to undergo and cooperate with an audit." The

DAG attempted to enforce the June 11, 2015 letter, and requested

an order compelling defendants to cooperate unconditionally with

the audit.

16 A-2573-15T2

The judge granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

without relying on Rule 4:67-6, denied the NBBOE's cross-motion

for production of discovery, and rendered a written decision.

As to the cross-motion, the judge determined that the

deliberative process privilege precluded production of the

requested discovery. Then the judge concluded the NBBOE's

conditional cooperation contravened the Act's statutory scheme.

He found that the State Comptroller established and weighed

objective criteria, which justified the performance audit

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)(3). Relying on his

interpretation of the Act, the judge rejected the NBBOE's

attempt to impose preconditions to its statutory obligation to

cooperate with the State Comptroller's audit.

The NBBOE moved for reconsideration contending primarily

that the State Comptroller had failed to comply with the Act by

providing his reasons for selecting the NBBOE for the audit.

Plaintiff repeated its position that no such statutory

requirement existed, and cross-moved to enforce litigant's

rights pursuant to Rule 1:10-3. As to the reconsideration

motion, the judge stated that the

Enabling Statute "simply establishes

objective criteria and other factors which

[the State Comptroller] must consider during

its selection process." I further held that

the [Enabling] Statute does not require [the

State Comptroller] "to make any disclosure

17 A-2573-15T2

or provide some rationale to the auditee

before conducting its audit, or to provide

some rationale that i[t] has complied with

its statutory obligations." . . .

Defendants argue once again, without

offering any support for their argument,

that [the State Comptroller] must satisfy

preconditions before [d]efendants are

required to comply with the audit. Again, I

reject this argument.

The judge denied reconsideration, and enforced the court's

December 22, 2015 order.

IV.

On appeal, the NBBOE argues generally that plaintiff failed

to comply with the Enabling Statute; genuine issues of material

fact preclude summary judgment; the deliberative process

doctrine is inapplicable; and the court failed to conduct an in

camera review of records.

A.

Before reaching the merits of defendants' contentions, we

briefly address the procedural posture of the appeal. At no

point did the NBBOE administratively appeal to the State

Comptroller from the informal determination contained in the

June 11 letter of the Deputy Comptroller. Thus, the State

Comptroller never rendered a final agency determination from

which the NBBOE could appeal to us. Instead, as evidenced in

the OSC's verified complaint and OTSC, plaintiff sought a

18 A-2573-15T2

summary declaration to enforce its rights under the Act pursuant

to Rule 4:67-1(b).

At oral argument before the judge, plaintiff erroneously

relied in part on Rule 4:67-6, which vests in the trial court

jurisdiction for agency enforcement proceedings and

simultaneously preserves our exclusive jurisdiction to review

the merits of agency determinations pursuant to Rule 2:2-

3(a)(2). Rule 4:67-6 generally applies to actions brought by an

agency to enforce "an order already entered by it." Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 4:67-6(a)(1)

(2017). Here, there is no such order from the State Comptroller

to enforce.

Under certain circumstances, which do not exist here, a

trial court may simultaneously address whether to enforce an

agency order and consider an objection that the order is

invalid. For example, Rule 4:67-6(c)(2) states in part that

"[i]f enforcement of an order is sought pursuant to [Rule] 1:9-6

and no proceeding is pending in the Appellate Division to review

or seeking to review its validity, [then] such review shall be

had in the trial court by way of defense to enforcement." Rule

4:67-6(c)(2), however, pertains to enforcement of an order

sought pursuant to Rule 1:9-6. Plaintiff did not seek

19 A-2573-15T2

enforcement of an order pursuant to Rule 1:9-6. As a result,

plaintiff's reliance on Rule 4:67-6(c)(2) is misplaced.

Nevertheless, plaintiff correctly filed its verified

complaint and OTSC seeking to enforce defendant's statutory

obligation to cooperate with the State Comptroller's audit under

the Act pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(b). The judge properly

adjudicated the controversy and entered declaratory relief. As

a result, we consider the matter on the merits.

B.

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply

"the same standard governing the trial court." Oyola v. Liu,

431 N.J. Super. 493, 497 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 216 N.J.

86 (2013). We owe no deference to the motion judge's

conclusions on issues of law. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Applying these

standards, we conclude there was no error.

It is undisputed that defendants refused to proceed until

the State Comptroller explained why he selected the NBBOE for

the audit. On June 11, 2015, the NBBOE's counsel stated in

writing that the NBBOE "did not proceed on June 10, 2015 because

[in his view] the OSC has refused to comply with the

requirements of N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)." On June 17, 2015, the

NBBOE's counsel wrote the Deputy Comptroller repeating his

20 A-2573-15T2

position that there existed "conditions precedent to the

exercise of the performance audit[.]" He attached a legal

analysis to his letter, which further concluded that

"fundamental fairness and the mutual respect owed by

governmental entities" required the State Comptroller to give

his rationale for the audit request. As a result, we turn our

attention to the issue of whether the State Comptroller is

required to disclose his reasons for seeking a performance

audit. We review that legal issue de novo.

Well-settled legal principles govern our interpretation of

the Act. "The Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when

interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of

that intent is the statutory language." DiProspero v. Penn, 183

N.J. 477, 492 (2005). In interpreting a statute, we give words

"'their ordinary meaning and significance,' recognizing that

generally the statutory language is 'the best indicator of [the

Legislature's] intent.'" Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467

(2014) (alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183

N.J. at 492). We read each statutory provision "in relation to

other constituent parts so that a sensible meaning may be given

to the whole of the legislative scheme." Wilson ex rel. Manzano

v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012). "[I]f there

is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than

21 A-2573-15T2

one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence,

'including legislative history, committee reports, and

contemporaneous construction.'" DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at

492-93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J.

64, 75 (2004)).

The plain text of the Act demonstrates that unconditional

cooperation by an auditee is essential to the State Comptroller

fulfilling his statutory duties and responsibilities.

Unconditional cooperation is also fundamental to achieving the

goal of "subject[ing] governmental financial activities to

uniform, meaningful, and systematic public scrutiny[.]"

N.J.S.A. 52:15C-1. The Legislature unambiguously declared in

N.J.S.A. 52:15C-14(a) that

[a]ll units in the Executive branch of State

government, including entities exercising

Executive branch authority, independent

State authorities, public institutions of

higher education, units of local government

and boards of education and their employees

shall provide full assistance and

cooperation with any audit, performance

review or contract review by the State

Comptroller.

[(Emphasis added).]

An auditee is therefore unambiguously required to fully

cooperate and assist the State Comptroller with any audit. Such

cooperation and assistance is mandatory.

22 A-2573-15T2

An auditee may not condition its cooperation and assistance

on the State Comptroller first explaining why he selected the

auditee for the performance audit. Such a contingency would

compromise the State Comptroller's role of providing independent

financial oversight. And it would potentially delay the audit,

like here, by requiring the State Comptroller to justify his

reasons for the performance audit before it commenced; respond

to numerous OPRA requests; litigate a separate OPRA lawsuit

against the OSC; review extensive document demands and multiple

interrogatories; and object to deposition notices of several OSC

individuals, including the State Comptroller himself. Nothing

in the Act indicates that the Legislature envisioned such a

protracted process when it created the position of State

Comptroller and the OSC.

Rather, the State Comptroller employed the procedure

outlined in the Act for deciding whether to conduct the

performance audit. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)(3), he

established and weighed various factors before selecting the

NBBOE for the performance audit. Among other things, the State

Comptroller analyzed organizational charts, written policies and

procedures governing expenditures, specific employment contracts

for bargaining units, board meeting minutes, vendor names and

services for contracts exceeding $500,000, payroll data,

23 A-2573-15T2

committee reports, job description manuals, and other executive

employment agreements. The judge was satisfied, and so are we,

that the State Comptroller adhered to the procedure listed in

N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)(3).

The Legislature could have required the State Comptroller

disclose to a prospective auditee the risk factors that it

considered when evaluating whether to conduct a performance

review. It could have tied an auditee's cooperation and

assistance to disclosure by the State Comptroller of his reasons

for selecting that auditee before commencing the audit. But the

Legislature did not impose any such requirements. And for good

reason: requiring conditional cooperation would telecast the

State Comptroller's concerns to the auditee; hinder the State

Comptroller's fundamental role of providing independent

oversight and ensuring public financial control and

accountability statewide; and would have a substantial adverse

impact upon the goal of transparently managing the State's

increased governmental systems.

Imposing such a requirement would also require us to re-

write the Enabling Statute, a function that is not ours to

perform. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492. Requiring the

State Comptroller to provide his reasons for conducting a

performance audit before commencing the audit would therefore

24 A-2573-15T2

fly in the face of the Act's central purpose and statutory

scheme.

C.

We reject defendants' contention that the judge erred by

denying their cross-motion for production of discovery.

Defendants assert that the judge misapplied the deliberative

process privilege. Defendants argue that the judge should have

conducted an in camera review of documents.

Defendants demanded documents revealing plaintiff's

"protocol, procedure, and/or process" employed by the State

Comptroller to select the NBBOE for the audit. As we have

previously stated, the Legislature established a statutory

scheme intending to promote fiscal responsibility and

accountability at all levels of government. Requiring the OSC

to reveal its internal reasons for selecting an auditee would

significantly undermine the State Comptroller's independent

oversight role in safeguarding efficient and independent public

financial control and accountability statewide. For these

reasons alone, defendants are not entitled to this type of

discovery.

As to the judge's application of the deliberative process

privilege, we note the following longstanding principles. The

doctrine existed before OPRA was enacted in 2001, see In re

25 A-2573-15T2

Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 75, 83-85 (2000),

and was since codified as an OPRA exemption in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-

1.1. "Although OPRA rather broadly defines what is a

'government record,' it expressly provides that the term 'shall

not include inter-agency or intra-agency advisory, consultative

or deliberative material.'" Ciesla v. N.J. Dep't of Health &

Sr. Servs., 429 N.J. Super. 127, 137 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1). "This exemption has been construed to

encompass the deliberative process privilege, which has its

roots in the common law." Ibid. (citing Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J.

Dep't of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 284 (2009)).

Under the doctrine, the government may withhold documents

that include "advisory opinions, recommendations, and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which [its]

decisions and policies are formulated." Id. at 137 (alteration

in original) (quoting Integrity, supra, 165 N.J. at 83). For

the privilege to apply, the document needs to meet two

requirements. Id. at 138. First, an agency must prove that a

document is "'pre-decisional,' i.e., 'generated before the

adoption of an agency's policy or decision.'" Ibid. (quoting

Integrity, supra, 165 N.J. at 84). Second, the document must be

deliberative, meaning it "contain[s] opinions, recommendations,

or advice about agency policies." Ibid. (alteration in

26 A-2573-15T2

original) (quoting Integrity, supra, 165 N.J. at 84-85).

Deliberative material may include material involved in the

exercise of "policy-oriented judgment," Educ. Law Ctr., supra,

198 N.J. at 295, or "policy-infused decision[s,]" Ciesla,

supra, 429 N.J. Super. at 142. "A court must assess such fact-

based documents against the backdrop of an agency's deliberative

efforts in order to determine a document's nexus to that

process, and its capacity to expose the agency's deliberative

thought-processes." Educ. Law Ctr., supra, 198 N.J. at 299-300.

The documents in question undoubtedly expose the OSC's pre-

decisional opinions, recommendations, or advice about its

policies and thought-processes.

Here, plaintiff withheld an internal OSC audit proposal,

planning memorandum, and risk/priority evaluation. The audit

proposal memorialized the OSC's preliminary analysis, applied

certain objective criteria established by the State Comptroller,

and contained the OSC's recommendations. The planning

memorandum revealed the OSC's strategic pre-decisional risk

analysis, and provided the State Comptroller with the OSC's

risk/priority evaluation.

These documents implicitly reflected the OSC's internal

deliberative pre-decisional process and policy recommendations

to the State Comptroller as to whether to audit certain school

27 A-2573-15T2

districts. The documents demonstrated, from a pre-decisional

policy perspective, not only what school districts to audit, but

also what conduct to audit. And the documents showed the OSC's

pre-decisional policy determinations as to how to perform the

audits. In addition, the documents included consideration of

additional objective criteria, beyond those mentioned in

N.J.S.A. 52:15C-8(c)(3).

Such internal policy communication within the OSC is vital

to the State Comptroller's ability to safeguard efficient and

independent public financial control and accountability

statewide. And such OSC communication enables the State

Comptroller to perform his independent statutory oversight

functions designed to fundamentally strengthen governmental

fiscal responsibility and accountability. Furthermore,

production of such information would arm auditees with the

ability to hinder performance audits.

We conclude that defendants' remaining argument, that the

judge abused his discretion by failing to perform an in camera

inspection of the documents, is without sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We add the following brief comments.

The record, which contains numerous certifications, shows

the judge could readily determine that the documents were not

28 A-2573-15T2

subject to disclosure. Like in cases involving OPRA, courts

must balance the need for confidentiality against the public

interest for information before determining whether to conduct

an in camera review of documents. See Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102

N.J. 98, 112-13 (1986). Documents exempt from access are not

subject to in camera review. Paff v. N.J. Dep't of Labor, Bd.

of Review, 379 N.J. Super. 346, 355 (App. Div. 2005). Here, the

trial court found correctly that "public interest favored [the

OSC]," and there was no need for an in camera review. As such,

they are exempt from disclosure.

Affirmed.

29 A-2573-15T2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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