Kruger v. Grauer

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NATHAN KRUGER v. AVERY GRAUER

(AC 38263)

Lavine, Prescott and Mullins, Js.

Argued December 12, 2016—officially released June 6, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, Wilson, J.)

Daniel P. Scholfield, with whom were Miruna C.

Popescu Voiculescu and, on the brief, Hugh F. Keefe,

for the appellant (defendant).

John R. Williams, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

MULLINS, J. The defendant, Avery Grauer, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion

for summary judgment.1 The issue in this appeal is

whether the court properly concluded that the defen-

dant was not entitled to absolute immunity on the basis

of the litigation privilege for reports of child sexual

abuse that she made to the Department of Children and

Families (department). We conclude that, even if we

were to assume, without deciding, that individuals who

make such reports were entitled to absolute immunity

at common law, the legislature has abrogated that com-

mon-law immunity by affording only qualified immunity

to those who report abuse or neglect pursuant to Gen-

eral Statutes § 17a-101e (b).2 Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

A review of the pleadings and the documents submit-

ted in conjunction with the motion for summary judg-

ment reveals the following undisputed facts and

procedural history. The plaintiff, a cardiologist, and the

defendant, a psychiatrist, formerly were married and

are the parents of two minor children. On January 24,

2011, the trial court rendered a judgment dissolving the

parties’ marriage. As a result of the divorce, the parties

had shared custody of their two children. On February

20, 2011, the parties’ four year old son purportedly

informed the defendant that the plaintiff had ‘‘hurt’’

his ‘‘tushie’’ and had ‘‘put a stick’’ in his ‘‘tushie.’’ The

defendant did not take any immediate action.

The next day, on February 21, 2011, the parties’ son

purportedly repeated the allegations to the defendant.

The son also told the defendant’s boyfriend, Adam

Joshua Watsky, about this alleged abuse. Watsky sur-

reptitiously recorded the allegations on his cell phone.

The defendant informed Watsky that her son had made

similar allegations the day before. Watsky and the

defendant thereafter discussed what course of action

they should take. Watsky wanted to ‘‘make a report to

a state agency.’’ The defendant, however, convinced

Watsky that they would instead have the parties’ son

repeat the allegations to his therapist, David Meyers,

at his next therapy appointment. They would then seek

Meyers’ opinion as to whether filing a report was neces-

sary. Later that day, the defendant composed an e-mail

describing the son’s purported allegations and sent it

to Meyers.

The next day, February 22, 2011, at the son’s therapy

appointment, Meyers conducted an evaluation of the

child. The defendant was not present for the evaluation.

After the evaluation, however, Watsky, Meyers, and the

defendant had a conversation regarding the allegations.

As a result of that conversation, Watsky believed that

Meyers thought that ‘‘follow-up with a state agency was

required.’’ Acting on this belief, Watsky filed a report

of suspected child abuse with the department later

that day.3

Due to the report of suspected abuse, the department

scheduled an evaluation of the parties’ two children

for February 24, 2011. The evaluation consisted of an

interview and physical examination of the children,

both of which were attended by the defendant at the

department’s request. In the course of the interview

and physical examination, the defendant repeated the

son’s allegations to department personnel, a police offi-

cer, and personnel from Yale-New Haven Hospital’s

Child Sexual Abuse Clinic (Yale Clinic).

After the department evaluation, the defendant

sought a restraining order against the plaintiff on her

children’s behalf for the pendency of the department’s

investigation. A three day hearing concerning the

restraining order took place between March 9 and

March 11, 2011. At the hearing, the defendant testified

as to the allegations made by the son. The court, Abery-

Wetstone, J., however, dismissed the restraining order

application after concluding that the defendant’s testi-

mony was not credible.

After the March, 2011 restraining order hearing, the

department closed its investigation. The department

concluded that the allegations against the plaintiff were

unsubstantiated.

Thereafter, on February 13, 2013, the plaintiff com-

menced the present action, seeking damages from the

defendant for ‘‘falsely and maliciously accus[ing] the

plaintiff of sexually assaulting their four year old son.’’

The plaintiff’s operative complaint contains four differ-

ent causes of action, all of which arise from the report

of sexual abuse that the defendant made to department

and Yale Clinic personnel during the department’s

investigation.4 Specifically, the complaint sounds in (1)

vexatious litigation, (2) defamation, (3) intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and (4) negligent inflic-

tion of emotional distress.

The defendant filed an answer and a special defense

alleging qualified immunity with respect to the claims

for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. As

to the defamation claim, she also alleged that the state-

ments ‘‘were made in truth.’’ The plaintiff filed a reply

denying the allegations of the defendant’s special

defenses.

On December 15, 2014, the defendant filed a motion

for summary judgment. The court heard oral argument

on the motion on March 30, 2015. The defendant argued

that she is entitled to summary judgment on the counts

sounding in defamation, intentional infliction of emo-

tional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional dis-

tress. She contended that those causes of action are

barred because she is entitled to absolute immunity

from suit by virtue of the litigation privilege. According

to the defendant, she is entitled to absolute immunity

for her statements regarding her son’s abuse accusa-

tions pursuant to the litigation privilege because those

statements were made to ‘‘appropriate authorities in

the course of investigating [the son’s] claims of sex-

ual abuse.’’

The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. In his objection, he

argued that ‘‘the public policy of the state of Connecti-

cut manifestly does not afford immunity, either absolute

or qualified, to those who make false reports of child

abuse.’’

In a memorandum of decision filed July 28, 2015,

the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. It rejected the defendant’s argument that she

was entitled to absolute immunity from suit pursuant

to the litigation privilege. The court concluded that the

legislature ‘‘has made clear that a report of suspected

child abuse is entitled to only a conditional or qualified

privilege . . . .’’ In so concluding, it cited § 17a-101e

(b), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person . . .

[who] in good faith, makes, or in good faith does not

make . . . [a report of suspected child abuse to the

department] . . . shall be immune from any liability,

civil or criminal, which might otherwise be incurred or

imposed . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, in light of

this statute, the court stated that it would ‘‘[decline]

the defendant’s invitation to undermine the existing

conditional statutory immunity by recognizing an abso-

lute [immunity] under the common law.’’5 This interloc-

utory appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly determined that the litigation privilege does

not entitle her to common-law absolute immunity for

the statements that she made to department and Yale

Clinic personnel in connection with the department’s

investigation of her son’s alleged sexual abuse. The

crux of the defendant’s claim is that she is entitled

to absolute immunity because affording her absolute

immunity advances the policy underlying that doctrine.

According to the defendant, the policy underlying abso-

lute immunity ‘‘is that in certain situations the public

interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk

that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege

by making false and malicious statements.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)

Thus, she argues that the factual circumstances

underlying this appeal, i.e., a department investigation

of suspected child abuse, presents a situation where

the law encourages people to speak freely, even at the

expense of immunizing individuals who make false and

malicious statements. As support for this argument, the

defendant posits that this state has a ‘‘robust’’ policy

of protecting children from abuse, which is best effectu-

ated by encouraging individuals to speak freely when

reporting suspected child abuse to the department. Con-

sequently, the defendant contends, affording absolute

immunity to individuals who report child abuse to the

department will encourage individuals to speak freely

when making such reports and, therefore, advance the

overarching goal of protecting children.

Additionally, the defendant asserts that the trial court

erred in concluding that § 17a-101e abrogates the abso-

lute immunity that she contends the common law

affords her. Specifically, she argues that the legislature

did not intend to abrogate such common-law immunity

because the statute fails to state in explicit language

that it is abrogating common-law absolute immunity.

We are unpersuaded by the defendant’s arguments.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and

the relevant law. ‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-49,

summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the

pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Such questions of law are subject

to plenary appellate review. . . . In deciding a motion

for summary judgment, the trial court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. . . . The test is whether a party would be enti-

tled to a directed verdict on the same facts.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Lega Siciliana Social Club,

Inc. v. St. Germaine, 77 Conn. App. 846, 848, 825 A.2d

827, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901, 838 A.2d 210 (2003).

‘‘[T]he doctrine of absolute immunity originated in

response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes

from suing their accusers for defamation. . . . The

doctrine then developed to encompass and bar defama-

tion claims against all participants in judicial proceed-

ings, including judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses.

. . . [T]he purpose of affording absolute immunity to

those who provide information in connection with judi-

cial and quasi-judicial proceedings is that in certain

situations the public interest in having people speak

freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasion-

ally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious

statements. . . . Put simply, absolute immunity fur-

thers the public policy of encouraging participation and

candor in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. This

objective would be thwarted if those persons whom

the common-law doctrine [of absolute immunity] was

intended to protect nevertheless faced the threat of

suit.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-

ted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 627,

79 A.3d 60 (2013).

‘‘At common law, communications uttered or pub-

lished in the course of judicial proceedings are [pro-

tected by the litigation privilege] so long as they are in

some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy.

. . . [Although] the [litigation] privilege . . . is gener-

ally applied to pertinent statements made in formal

judicial proceedings, [it] also attaches to relevant state-

ments made during administrative proceedings which

are quasi-judicial in nature. . . . Once it is determined

that a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, the [litiga-

tion] privilege that is granted to statements made in

furtherance of it extends to every step of the proceeding

until final disposition.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-

tation marks omitted.) Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford

Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 787–88, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005).

If asked to decide whether a person is entitled to

absolute immunity on the basis of the litigation privi-

lege, ‘‘[w]e must first determine whether the proceed-

ings [in question] were [judicial or] quasijudicial in

nature. The judicial proceeding to which [absolute]

immunity attaches has not been defined very exactly.

It includes any hearing before a tribunal which performs

a judicial function, ex parte or otherwise, and whether

the hearing is public or not. It includes for example,

lunacy, bankruptcy, or naturalization proceedings, and

an election contest. It extends also to the proceedings

of many administrative officers, such as boards and

commissions, so far as they have powers of discretion

in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as

judicial or quasi-judicial, in character.’’ (Internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549,

566, 606 A.2d 693 (1992).

‘‘[Once we have] concluded that the statements of

the defendant were made in the context of a judicial or

quasi-judicial process, we must next determine whether

the alleged defamatory statements were made in the

course of that proceeding and whether they related to

its subject matter. . . . In making [the] determination

[of whether a particular statement is made in the course

of a judicial proceeding], the court must decide as a

matter of law whether the . . . statements [at issue]

are sufficiently relevant to the issues involved in a pro-

posed or ongoing judicial [or quasi-judicial] proceeding,

so as to qualify for the privilege. The test for relevancy

is generous . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) Mercer v. Blanchette, 133 Conn.

App. 84, 93–94, 33 A.3d 889 (2012).

Importantly, even if the litigation privilege affords

individuals common-law absolute immunity for state-

ments made in the course of a quasi-judicial proceeding,

the legislature may abrogate such absolute immunity

by statute. See, e.g., Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford

Hospital, supra, 272 Conn. 787–98. In Chadha, the plain-

tiff, a physician, sued several other physicians for sub-

mitting affidavits expressing concerns to the

Department of Public Health about his ability to safely

practice medicine. Id., 780. The trial court denied the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, in which

they argued that, because the statements in their affida-

vits were made in the course of a quasi-judicial proceed-

ing, they were entitled to absolute immunity at common

law. Id., 781–82. Upon granting review of the defen-

dants’ interlocutory appeal, our Supreme Court first

determined that the physicians generally would be enti-

tled to absolute immunity at common law because their

affidavits were made in the course of a quasi-judicial

proceeding. Id., 787.

The court, however, then considered what effect Gen-

eral Statutes §§ 19a-17b and 19a-20 had on such com-

mon-law absolute immunity. Id., 790. The court stated:

‘‘General Statutes § 19a-17b (b) provides in relevant part

that [t]here shall be no monetary liability on the part

of, and no cause of action for damages shall arise

against, any person who provides testimony, informa-

tion, records, documents, reports, proceedings, minutes

or conclusions to any . . . professional licensing

board . . . when such communication is intended to

aid in the evaluation of the qualifications, fitness or

character of a health care provider and does not repre-

sent as true any matter not reasonably believed to be

true. . . . General Statutes § 19a-20 provides in rele-

vant part that [n]o member of any board or commission

. . . including a member of a medical hearing panel

. . . and no person making a complaint or providing

information to any of such boards or commissions or

the Department of Public Health as part of an investiga-

tion . . . or a disciplinary action . . . shall, without

a showing of malice, be personally liable for damage

or injury to a practitioner arising out of any proceeding

of such boards and commissions or department.’’ (Cita-

tions omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 789–90.

On the basis of that statutory language, the court

concluded that there is ‘‘no dispute that the immunity

afforded under §§ 19a-17b and 19a-20 is qualified, rather

than absolute, because those provisions expressly

except from their purview conduct and statements that

are motivated by malice.’’ Id., 790. The court further

determined that ‘‘the only reasonable interpretation’’;

id.; of ‘‘the plain language’’ in §§ 19a-17b and 19a-20 is

that the legislature ‘‘intended to abrogate the common-

law absolute immunity applicable to statements made

in connection with board proceedings.’’ Id., 796. The

court reasoned that there is ‘‘no way to give effect both

to the qualified immunity that those provisions provide,

on the one hand, and to the absolute immunity existing

at common law, on the other. . . . To do so would

require us to ignore the clear legislative mandate of

§§ 19a-17b and 19a-20 that the immunity applicable to

statements falling within the ambit of those provisions

is qualified and not absolute.’’ (Citation omitted; empha-

sis omitted.) Id., 790–91.

Critically, the court in Chadha also rejected the

defendants’ contention that ‘‘the legislature should not

be deemed to have abrogated the common-law absolute

immunity . . . in the absence of express language

accomplishing that end.’’ Id., 796. The Supreme Court

observed that ‘‘[it] never has held that the legislature

cannot implicitly supersede the common law.’’ Id. Not-

withstanding the fact that the statutes at issue did not

expressly abrogate common-law absolute immunity,

the court stated that ‘‘the plain language of §§ 19a-17b

and 19a-20 compels the conclusion that the legislature

intended to abrogate the common-law absolute immu-

nity applicable to statements made in connection with

board proceedings.’’ Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed

the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment. Id., 798.

With the appropriate legal framework in mind, we

now turn to the present case to determine whether the

defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for the report

of child abuse she made to the department. Pursuant

to that framework, our analysis normally consists of

determining whether a department investigation of

child abuse allegations is a quasi-judicial proceeding,

and, if a department investigation is a quasi-judicial

proceeding, whether the defendant’s report was a state-

ment made in the course of that proceeding. See, e.g.,

Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 566. For purposes

of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that the

defendant has satisfied these requirements and that she

generally would have been entitled to absolute immu-

nity at common law for her report to the department.

We also conclude, however, that the absolute immu-

nity we have assumed to exist at common law for indi-

viduals making reports to the department has been

legislatively abrogated by § 17a-101e. Accordingly, by

virtue of this statute, the common-law absolute immu-

nity to which individuals making such reports may have

been entitled has been replaced with qualified

immunity.6

Our determination that § 17a-101e (b) abrogates the

absolute immunity that the common law may have

afforded to individuals reporting abuse to the depart-

ment is guided by well established principles.

‘‘[Although] the legislature’s authority to abrogate the

common law is undeniable, we will not lightly impute

such an intent to the legislature. . . . In determining

whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a com-

mon law rule the construction must be strict, and the

operation of a statute in derogation of the common law

is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its

scope. . . . Although the legislature may eliminate a

common law right by statute, the presumption that the

legislature does not have such a purpose can be over-

come only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly

expressed. . . . The rule that statutes in derogation of

the common law are strictly construed can be seen to

serve the same policy of continuity and stability in the

legal system as the doctrine of stare decisis in relation

to case law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 272

Conn. 788–89.

Despite the presumption that legislative action is not

in derogation of the common law, we conclude that

§ 17a-101e (b) expresses a clear legislative intent to

abrogate the absolute immunity that the common law

may have afforded to individuals who report child abuse

to the department. In reaching this resolution, we are

guided by our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chadha.

Here, as in Chadha, we begin our analysis with a

review of the language of the relevant statutory provi-

sions. General Statutes § 17a-103 (a) provides in rele-

vant part that any person ‘‘having reasonable cause to

suspect or believe that any child under the age of eigh-

teen is in danger of being abused, or has been abused

or neglected . . . may cause a written or oral report

to be made to the Commissioner of Children and Fami-

lies or the commissioner’s representative or a law

enforcement agency. . . .’’ Section 17a-101e (b) pro-

vides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny person . . . [who] in

good faith, makes . . . the report pursuant to [section]

. . . 17a-103 shall be immune from any liability, civil

or criminal, which might otherwise be incurred or

imposed and shall have the same immunity with

respect to any judicial proceeding which results from

such report . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

The parties do not dispute that this language clearly

expresses the legislature’s intent that individuals who

make statements that fall within the purview of § 17a-

101e (b) are entitled to qualified immunity rather than

absolute immunity. Indeed, it is well established that

conditioning immunity on the exercise of good faith is

consistent with qualified immunity, not absolute immu-

nity. See, e.g., Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166 Conn. App.

685, 702–703, 142 A.3d 1162 (2016) (statute granting

immunity to municipal officials ‘‘acting in good faith’’

plainly ‘‘affords qualified immunity, rather than abso-

lute immunity’’ [emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted]). Given that the meaning of the plain

language of the statute is not disputed, the issue we

must decide is how that language affects the absolute

immunity that we have assumed the common law

afforded to individuals reporting child abuse to the

department. See Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hos-

pital, supra, 272 Conn. 790 (‘‘The issue presented . . .

is not what [the statutes] say; at least with respect to the

nature of the immunity provided thereunder, namely,

qualified immunity, the pertinent statutory language is

unambiguous. The issue that we must decide, rather,

is the effect of that language, if any, on the common-

law absolute immunity . . . .’’ [Emphasis omitted.]).

To start, we agree with the trial court’s general obser-

vation that continuing to recognize absolute immunity

at common law ‘‘could make an end run around the

existing good faith statutory immunity.’’ Put another

way, the statutory immunity and common-law immunity

are irreconcilable when applied to persons making

reports to the department. It is impossible to give effect

both to the qualified immunity provided by § 17a-101e

(b) and any purported absolute immunity that may have

existed at common law. See Chadha v. Charlotte Hun-

gerford Hospital, supra, 272 Conn. 790 (‘‘only reason-

able interpretation’’ of statutes affording qualified

immunity to individuals who give statements to state

medical boards is that they abrogate absolute immunity

that common law afforded to such individuals).

Furthermore, affording absolute immunity to individ-

uals who make reports to the department when the

legislature has stated expressly that such individuals

are entitled to qualified immunity for those reports

undoubtedly would thwart the legislature’s intent to

except from protection individuals who make bad faith

reports. ‘‘It is axiomatic that we do not interpret a stat-

ute in a way that would so blatantly thwart its purpose.’’

Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 287 Conn. 706, 727,

949 A.2d 1189 (2008). If the legislature wanted to pro-

vide protection to all reporters of abuse, then it cer-

tainly could have done so. As the statute’s plain

language indicates, however, it did not. See Chadha v.

Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 272 Conn. 793

(‘‘[H]ad the legislature wanted to provide absolute

immunity to those [whose statements] fall within the

ambit of §§ 19a-20 or 19a-17b, it could have done so. It

chose not to.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

The fact that § 17a-101e (d) also prescribes criminal

penalties for anyone who ‘‘knowingly makes a false

report of child abuse or neglect’’ is further evidence of

the legislature’s intent to abrogate any absolute immu-

nity that may have existed at common law. See General

Statutes § 17a-101e (d) (imposing $2000 fine, maximum

jail sentence of one year, or both, for false report).

Our Supreme Court has observed that ‘‘it is illogical

to punish someone criminally for engaging in certain

conduct but protect them civilly absolutely and under

all circumstances for the same behavior.’’ (Emphasis

in original.) Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 844,

925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘‘we reasonably cannot give effect

both to the imposition of criminal liability that [the

statute] explicitly provides, on the one hand, and to the

absolute immunity existing at common law, on the

other’’).

Finally, we disagree with the defendant’s contention

that the legislature did not abrogate common-law immu-

nity because it failed to use express language accomp-

lishing that end. As discussed previously, in rejecting

a similar argument in Chadha, our Supreme Court

observed that it ‘‘never has [been] held that the legisla-

ture cannot implicitly supersede the common law.’’

Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 272

Conn. 796. Indeed, the statutes at issue in Chadha did

not state expressly that the legislature was abrogating

absolute immunity. See id.; General Statutes § 19a-17b;

General Statutes § 19a-20. However, the only ‘‘reason-

able interpretation’’; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford

Hospital, supra, 790; of ‘‘the plain language of [those

statutes compelled] the conclusion that the legislature

intended to abrogate the common-law absolute immu-

nity . . . .’’ Id., 796.

In the present case, we similarly are compelled to

conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of

§ 17a-101e is that it expresses a clear legislative intent

to abrogate the absolute immunity that the common

law may have afforded to individuals who report child

abuse to the department. Thus, as the defendant’s state-

ments constitute reports of abuse falling within the

purview of § 17a-101e, the trial court properly deter-

mined that the defendant was entitled to only the quali-

fied immunity provided by that statute.

Although our interpretation of the plain language in

§§ 17a-101e and 17a-103 has led us to conclude that the

legislature intended to abrogate the absolute immunity

that the common-law immunity may have afforded to

individuals reporting abuse to the department, the

defendant’s public policy arguments are not lost on us.

Rather, we ultimately recognize that, by enacting these

statutes, the legislature already has performed a careful

evaluation and balancing of the important policy consid-

erations surrounding the reporting of suspected child

abuse.

Indeed, as the defendant highlights, the legislature

has stated expressly: ‘‘The public policy of this state is

. . . [t]o protect children whose health and welfare

may be adversely affected through injury and neglect;

to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for

children by enhancing the parental capacity for good

child care; to provide a temporary or permanent nurtur-

ing and safe environment for children when necessary;

and for these purposes to require the reporting of sus-

pected child abuse or neglect, investigation of such

reports by a social agency, and provision of services,

where needed, to such child and family.’’ General Stat-

utes § 17a-101 (a).

Affording absolute immunity in this context surely

would, as the defendant suggests, encourage individuals

to speak freely in reporting suspected child abuse and,

therefore, aid in the overarching goal of protecting the

welfare of children. The legislature, however, did not

afford such immunity when enacting § 17a-101e.

Instead, it determined, as a matter of policy, that there

are limits on the methods to be used in pursuing the

goal of child protection. Clearly, immunizing individuals

who make bad faith reports exceeds the limitations that

the legislature has imposed on achieving the goal of

child protection.

To be sure, § 17a-101e reflects the determination that,

although child protection is an important goal, its

achievement does not outweigh the harms resulting

from reports of child abuse that are made in bad faith.

That is, by excepting reports made in bad faith from

its purview, the statute contemplates and accounts for

(1) the harm likely inuring to an individual falsely and

maliciously accused of child abuse, and (2) the extent to

which false reports waste limited department resources

and detract from the investigation of real cases of child

abuse. Cf. Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 473–76, 935

A.2d 103 (2007) (‘‘Although some states have concluded

that the statements of complaining witnesses [made to

law enforcement] are subject to absolute immunity

. . . we disagree that an absolute privilege for such

statements is warranted. . . . Although the detection

of crime and the apprehension of criminals are

extremely important goals, their achievement does not

outweigh the harm that is likely to inure to an individual

who is falsely and maliciously accused of criminal mis-

conduct. . . . [Moreover] because the reporting of

false information [to law enforcement] necessarily

interferes with the intelligent exercise of official discre-

tion . . . false reports invariably waste limited law

enforcement resources and deflect police time and

resources away from the investigation and detection

of real crime.’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.]).

Thus, in deciding that individuals who report abuse to

the department are entitled to only qualified immunity

rather than absolute immunity, it is clear that the legisla-

ture already weighed the pertinent policy considera-

tions in this context. We must follow that legislative

mandate. It is well settled that ‘‘[our appellate courts]

lack the authority to override [such a] valid expression

of legislative will . . . .’’ Chadha v. Charlotte Hun-

gerford Hospital, supra, 272 Conn. 797. ‘‘[T]he primary

responsibility for formulating public policy resides in

the legislature . . . [and] so, too, does the responsibil-

ity for determining, within constitutional limits, the

methods to be employed in achieving those policy

goals.’’ (Citations omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group

One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 715, 802 A.2d 731

(2002). ‘‘[Our appellate] court[s] [are] precluded from

substituting [their] own ideas of what might be a wise

provision in place of a clear expression of legislative

will.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skindzier v.

Commissioner of Social Services, 258 Conn. 642, 661,

784 A.2d 323 (2001). Accordingly, we agree with the

trial court’s conclusion that ‘‘it is not for a court to

second-guess the legislature’s [express] determination

[in § 17a-101e] that a qualified [immunity] adequately

advances the relevant public policy.’’

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

‘‘The denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily is an interlocu-

tory ruling and, accordingly, not a final judgment for purposes of appeal.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal,

288 Conn. 646, 653, 954 A.2d 816 (2008). ‘‘A denial of a motion for summary

judgment, however, which had been filed on the basis of a colorable claim

of absolute immunity, constitutes an appealable final judgment.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn. App. 603, 608, 975

A.2d 59 (2009).

2

General Statutes § 17a-101e (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

. . . [who], in good faith, makes . . . the report pursuant to . . . [section]

. . . 17a-103 shall be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, which

might otherwise be incurred or imposed and shall have the same immunity

with respect to any judicial proceeding which results from such report

provided such person did not perpetrate or cause such abuse or neglect.’’

General Statutes § 17a-103 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]ny . . . per-

son having reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any child under the

age of eighteen is in danger of being abused, or has been abused or neglected

. . . may cause a written or oral report to be made to the Commissioner

of Children and Families or the commissioner’s representative or a law

enforcement agency. . . .’’

3

The record reflects that Meyers never contacted the department himself.

4

Although the defendant presented evidence of her additional statements

to two purported mandated reporters, Watsky and Meyers, the plaintiff’s

complaint does not seek recovery on the basis of these statements. Instead,

the plaintiff refers only to the statements that the defendant made to the

department and to Yale Clinic personnel on February 24, 2011, which is

undisputedly the date on which the defendant was interviewed by such

personnel. Accordingly, we address as a basis for recovery only the state-

ments made to department personnel and the Yale Clinic in connection with

the department’s investigation of the abuse allegations.

5

The defendant asserted both absolute immunity and qualified immunity

as grounds for summary judgment. The court denied the motion for summary

judgment on both grounds. On appeal, however, the defendant challenges

the trial court’s ruling only with respect to its conclusion regarding abso-

lute immunity.

6

At oral argument before this court, the defendant contended that her

statements did not fall within the scope of § 17a-101e. Specifically, she

argued that her statements did not constitute a ‘‘report’’ because she was

not the person who initially related the abuse allegations to the department.

We are unpersuaded.

First, it is clear that the defendant’s statements constituted a ‘‘report.’’ Our

Supreme Court has construed ‘‘report’’ in this context to have its ordinary

dictionary definition. Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 421–22 n.12, 862

A.2d 292 (2004) (defining report as ‘‘[a]n account presented usu[ally] in

detail,’’ ‘‘[t]o make or present an often official, formal, or regular account

of,’’ ‘‘[t]o relate or tell about; present,’’ and ‘‘to carry back and repeat to

another’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, we conclude that

the defendant’s act of relating her son’s abuse allegations to the department

fits squarely within the definition of ‘‘report.’’ See id., 421 (‘‘[physician’s]

act of describing the result of his examination of the children orally to [a

department social worker], followed by his provision of a written account

of that examination, clearly falls within the common usage of the term

‘report’ ’’).

Second, our Supreme Court has rejected the contention that § 17a-101e

applies only to initial reporters of child abuse. Id., 422, 424 (§ 17a-101e

provides immunity ‘‘to secondary reporters of abuse’’ because statute does

not ‘‘contain any language that . . . limits [its] application to initial report-

ers of child abuse’’ [emphasis omitted]).

The defendant also contended at oral argument that, because Yale Clinic

personnel interviewed her at the department’s request, they were the depart-

ment’s ‘‘agents.’’ On that basis, the defendant claims that her entitlement

to absolute immunity applies not only to her statements to department

personnel, but also to her statements to Yale Clinic personnel. With this

in mind, we conclude that in the limited circumstances of this case, the

defendant’s statements to Yale Clinic personnel constitute a ‘‘report’’ falling

within the scope of § 17a-101e. In other words, because this was a department

investigation and Yale Clinic personnel spoke to the defendant only at the

behest of the department during its investigation, a report to the Yale Clinic

in this very limited context was tantamount to a report to the department.

It logically follows, then, that statements made to Yale Clinic personnel

under these limited circumstances should be subject to the same strictures

that § 17a-101e imposes on statements made to the department. Neverthe-

less, notwithstanding the defendant’s contention, nothing in this opinion

is intended to suggest that Yale Clinic personnel are in fact ‘‘agents’’ of

the department.