County of Los Angeles v. Mendez

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v.

MENDEZ ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–369. Argued March 22, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017

The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department received word from a

confidential informant that a potentially armed and dangerous parol-

ee-at-large had been seen at a certain residence. While other officers

searched the main house, Deputies Conley and Pederson searched

the back of the property where, unbeknownst to the deputies, re-

spondents Mendez and Garcia were napping inside a shack where

they lived. Without a search warrant and without announcing their

presence, the deputies opened the door of the shack. Mendez rose

from the bed, holding a BB gun that he used to kill pests. Deputy

Conley yelled, “Gun!” and the deputies immediately opened fire,

shooting Mendez and Garcia multiple times. Officers did not find the

parolee in the shack or elsewhere on the property.

Mendez and Garcia sued Deputies Conley and Pederson and the

County under 42 U. S. C. §1983, pressing three Fourth Amendment

claims: a warrantless entry claim, a knock-and-announce claim, and

an excessive force claim. On the first two claims, the District Court

awarded Mendez and Garcia nominal damages. On the excessive

force claim, the court found that the deputies’ use of force was rea-

sonable under Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, but held them liable

nonetheless under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which makes

an officer’s otherwise reasonable use of force unreasonable if (1) the

officer “intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation”

and (2) “the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment viola-

tion,” Billington v. Smith, 292 F. 3d 1177, 1189. On appeal, the

Ninth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immun-

ity on the knock-and-announce claim and that the warrantless entry

violated clearly established law. It also affirmed the District Court’s

2 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ

Syllabus

application of the provocation rule, and held, in the alternative, that

basic notions of proximate cause would support liability even without

the provocation rule.

Held: The Fourth Amendment provides no basis for the Ninth Circuit’s

“provocation rule.” Pp. 5–10.

(a) The provocation rule is incompatible with this Court’s excessive

force jurisprudence, which sets forth a settled and exclusive frame-

work for analyzing whether the force used in making a seizure com-

plies with the Fourth Amendment. See Graham, supra, at 395. The

operative question in such cases is “whether the totality of the cir-

cumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.” Tennes-

see v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8–9. When an officer carries out a seizure

that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant circumstances,

there is no valid excessive force claim. The provocation rule, howev-

er, instructs courts to look back in time to see if a different Fourth

Amendment violation was somehow tied to the eventual use of force,

an approach that mistakenly conflates distinct Fourth Amendment

claims. The proper framework is set out in Graham. To the extent

that a plaintiff has other Fourth Amendment claims, they should be

analyzed separately.

The Ninth Circuit attempts to cabin the provocation rule by defin-

ing a two-prong test: First, the separate constitutional violation must

“creat[e] a situation which led to” the use of force; and second, the

separate constitutional violation must be committed recklessly or in-

tentionally. 815 F. 3d 1178, 1193. Neither limitation, however,

solves the fundamental problem: namely, that the provocation rule is

an unwarranted and illogical expansion of Graham. In addition, each

limitation creates problems of its own. First, the rule relies on a

vague causal standard. Second, while the reasonableness of a search

or seizure is almost always based on objective factors, the provocation

rule looks to the subjective intent of the officers who carried out the

seizure.

There is no need to distort the excessive force inquiry in this way in

order to hold law enforcement officers liable for the foreseeable con-

sequences of all their constitutional torts. Plaintiffs can, subject to

qualified immunity, generally recover damages that are proximately

caused by any Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483. Here, if respondents cannot recover

on their excessive force claim, that will not foreclose recovery for in-

juries proximately caused by the warrantless entry. Pp. 5–10.

(b) The Ninth Circuit’s proximate-cause holding is similarly taint-

ed. Its analysis appears to focus solely on the risks foreseeably asso-

ciated with the failure to knock and announce—the claim on which

the court concluded that the deputies had qualified immunity—

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Syllabus

rather than the warrantless entry. On remand, the court should re-

visit the question whether proximate cause permits respondents to

recover damages for their injuries based on the deputies’ failure to

secure a warrant at the outset. Pp. 10–11.

815 F. 3d 1178, vacated and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-

bers joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration

or decision of the case.

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–369

_________________

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. ANGEL MENDEZ, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 30, 2017]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

If law enforcement officers make a “seizure” of a person

using force that is judged to be reasonable based on a

consideration of the circumstances relevant to that deter-

mination, may the officers nevertheless be held liable for

injuries caused by the seizure on the ground that they

committed a separate Fourth Amendment violation that

contributed to their need to use force? The Ninth Circuit

has adopted a “provocation rule” that imposes liability in

such a situation.

We hold that the Fourth Amendment provides no basis

for such a rule. A different Fourth Amendment violation

cannot transform a later, reasonable use of force into an

unreasonable seizure.

I

A

In October 2010, deputies from the Los Angeles County

Sheriff ’s Department were searching for a parolee-at-large

named Ronnie O’Dell. A felony arrest warrant had been

issued for O’Dell, who was believed to be armed and dan-

gerous and had previously evaded capture. Findings of

2 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ

Opinion of the Court

Fact and Conclusions of Law, No. 2:11–cv–04771 (CD

Cal.), App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a, 64a. Deputies Christo-

pher Conley and Jennifer Pederson were assigned to assist

the task force searching for O’Dell. Id., at 57a–58a. The

task force received word from a confidential informant

that O’Dell had been seen on a bicycle at a home in Lan-

caster, California, owned by Paula Hughes, and the offic-

ers then mapped out a plan for apprehending O’Dell. Id.,

at 58a. Some officers would approach the front door of the

Hughes residence, while Deputies Conley and Pederson

would search the rear of the property and cover the back

door of the residence. Id., at 59a. During this briefing, it

was announced that a man named Angel Mendez lived in

the backyard of the Hughes home with a pregnant woman

named Jennifer Garcia (now Mrs. Jennifer Mendez). Ibid.

Deputy Pederson heard this announcement, but at trial

Deputy Conley testified that he did not remember it. Ibid.

When the officers reached the Hughes residence around

midday, three of them knocked on the front door while

Deputies Conley and Pederson went to the back of the

property. Id., at 63a. At the front door, Hughes asked if

the officers had a warrant. Ibid. A sergeant responded

that they did not but were searching for O’Dell and had a

warrant for his arrest. Ibid. One of the officers heard

what he thought were sounds of someone running inside

the house. Id., at 64a. As the officers prepared to open

the door by force, Hughes opened the door and informed

them that O’Dell was not in the house. Ibid. She was

placed under arrest, and the house was searched, but

O’Dell was not found. Ibid.

Meanwhile, Deputies Conley and Pederson, with guns

drawn, searched the rear of the residence, which was

cluttered with debris and abandoned automobiles. Id., at

60a, 65a. The property included three metal storage sheds

and a one-room shack made of wood and plywood. Id., at

60a. Mendez had built the shack, and he and Garcia had

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

lived inside for about 10 months. Id., at 61a. The shack

had a single doorway covered by a blue blanket. Ibid.

Amid the debris on the ground, an electrical cord ran into

the shack, and an air conditioner was mounted on the

side. Id., at 62a. A gym storage locker and clothes and

other possessions were nearby. Id., at 61a. Mendez kept a

BB rifle in the shack for use on rats and other pests. Id.,

at 62a. The BB gun “closely resembled a small caliber

rifle.” Ibid.

Deputies Conley and Pederson first checked the three

metal sheds and found no one inside. Id., at 65a. They

then approached the door of the shack. Id., at 66a. Unbe-

knownst to the officers, Mendez and Garcia were in the

shack and were napping on a futon. Id., at 67a. The

deputies did not have a search warrant and did not knock

and announce their presence. Id., at 66a. When Deputy

Conley opened the wooden door and pulled back the blan-

ket, Mendez thought it was Ms. Hughes and rose from the

bed, picking up the BB gun so he could stand up and place

it on the floor. Id., at 68a. As a result, when the deputies

entered, he was holding the BB gun, and it was “point[ing]

somewhat south towards Deputy Conley.” Id., at 69a.

Deputy Conley yelled, “Gun!” and the deputies immediately

opened fire, discharging a total of 15 rounds. Id., at 69a–

70a. Mendez and Garcia “were shot multiple times and

suffered severe injuries,” and Mendez’s right leg was later

amputated below the knee. Id., at 70a. O’Dell was not in

the shack or anywhere on the property. Ibid.

B

Mendez and his wife (respondents here) filed suit under

Rev. Stat. §1976, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against petitioners,

the County of Los Angeles and Deputies Conley and Ped-

erson. As relevant here, they pressed three Fourth

Amendment claims. First, they claimed that the deputies

executed an unreasonable search by entering the shack

4 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ

Opinion of the Court

without a warrant (the “warrantless entry claim”); second,

they asserted that the deputies performed an unreason-

able search because they failed to announce their presence

before entering the shack (the “knock-and-announce

claim”); and third, they claimed that the deputies effected

an unreasonable seizure by deploying excessive force in

opening fire after entering the shack (the “excessive force

claim”).

After a bench trial, the District Court ruled largely in

favor of respondents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 135a–136a.

The court found Deputy Conley liable on the warrantless

entry claim, and the court also found both deputies liable

on the knock-and-announce claim. But the court awarded

nominal damages for these violations because “the act of

pointing the BB gun” was a superseding cause “as far as

damage [from the shooting was] concerned.” App. 238.

The District Court then addressed respondents’ exces-

sive force claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a–127a. The

court began by evaluating whether the deputies used

excessive force under Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386

(1989). The court held that, under Graham, the deputies’

use of force was reasonable “given their belief that a man

was holding a firearm rifle threatening their lives.” App.

to Pet. for Cert. 108a. But the court did not end its exces-

sive force analysis at this point. Instead, the court turned

to the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which holds that

“an officer’s otherwise reasonable (and lawful) defensive

use of force is unreasonable as a matter of law, if (1) the

officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent re-

sponse, and (2) that provocation is an independent consti-

tutional violation.” Id., at 111a. Based on this rule, the

District Court held the deputies liable for excessive force

and awarded respondents around $4 million in damages.

Id., at 135a–136a.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in

part. 815 F. 3d 1178 (CA9 2016). Contrary to the District

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

Court, the Court of Appeals held that the officers were

entitled to qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce

claim. Id., at 1191–1193. But the court concluded that

the warrantless entry of the shack violated clearly estab-

lished law and was attributable to both deputies. Id., at

1191, 1195. Finally, and most important for present

purposes, the court affirmed the application of the provo-

cation rule. The Court of Appeals did not disagree with

the conclusion that the shooting was reasonable under

Graham; instead, like the District Court, the Court of

Appeals applied the provocation rule and held the depu-

ties liable for the use of force on the theory that they had

intentionally and recklessly brought about the shooting by

entering the shack without a warrant in violation of clearly

established law. 815 F. 3d, at 1193.

The Court of Appeals also adopted an alternative ra-

tionale for its judgment. It held that “basic notions of

proximate cause” would support liability even without the

provocation rule because it was “reasonably foreseeable”

that the officers would meet an armed homeowner when

they “barged into the shack unannounced.” Id., at 1194–

1195.

We granted certiorari. 580 U. S. ___ (2016).

II

The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule permits an exces-

sive force claim under the Fourth Amendment “where an

officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent con-

frontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth

Amendment violation.” Billington v. Smith, 292 F. 3d

1177, 1189 (CA9 2002). The rule comes into play after a

forceful seizure has been judged to be reasonable under

Graham. Once a court has made that determination, the

rule instructs the court to ask whether the law enforce-

ment officer violated the Fourth Amendment in some

other way in the course of events leading up to the seizure.

6 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ

Opinion of the Court

If so, that separate Fourth Amendment violation may

“render the officer’s otherwise reasonable defensive use of

force unreasonable as a matter of law.” Id., at 1190–1191.

The provocation rule, which has been “sharply ques-

tioned” outside the Ninth Circuit, City and County of San

Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2015) (slip

op., at 14, n. 4), is incompatible with our excessive force

jurisprudence. The rule’s fundamental flaw is that it uses

another constitutional violation to manufacture an exces-

sive force claim where one would not otherwise exist.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable

searches and seizures.” “[R]easonableness is always the

touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis,” Birchfield v.

North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 37),

and reasonableness is generally assessed by carefully

weighing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify

the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8 (1985)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Our case law sets forth a settled and exclusive frame-

work for analyzing whether the force used in making a

seizure complies with the Fourth Amendment. See Gra-

ham, 490 U. S., at 395. As in other areas of our Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence, “[d]etermining whether the

force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ ”

requires balancing of the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against the relevant government interests. Id.,

at 396. The operative question in excessive force cases is

“whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a

particular sort of search or seizure.” Garner, supra, at 8–9.

The reasonableness of the use of force is evaluated

under an “objective” inquiry that pays “careful attention to

the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”

Graham, supra, at 396. And “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a

particular use of force must be judged from the perspective

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Ibid. “Excessive force claims

. . . are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon

the information the officers had when the conduct oc-

curred.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 207 (2001). That

inquiry is dispositive: When an officer carries out a seizure

that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant cir-

cumstances, there is no valid excessive force claim.

The basic problem with the provocation rule is that it

fails to stop there. Instead, the rule provides a novel and

unsupported path to liability in cases in which the use of

force was reasonable. Specifically, it instructs courts to

look back in time to see if there was a different Fourth

Amendment violation that is somehow tied to the eventual

use of force. That distinct violation, rather than the force-

ful seizure itself, may then serve as the foundation of the

plaintiff ’s excessive force claim. Billington, supra, at 1190

(“The basis of liability for the subsequent use of force is

the initial constitutional violation . . . ”).

This approach mistakenly conflates distinct Fourth

Amendment claims. Contrary to this approach, the objec-

tive reasonableness analysis must be conducted separately

for each search or seizure that is alleged to be unconstitu-

tional. An excessive force claim is a claim that a law

enforcement officer carried out an unreasonable seizure

through a use of force that was not justified under the

relevant circumstances. It is not a claim that an officer

used reasonable force after committing a distinct Fourth

Amendment violation such as an unreasonable entry.

By conflating excessive force claims with other Fourth

Amendment claims, the provocation rule permits excessive

force claims that cannot succeed on their own terms. That

is precisely how the rule operated in this case. The Dis-

trict Court found (and the Ninth Circuit did not dispute)

that the use of force by the deputies was reasonable under

Graham. However, respondents were still able to recover

8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ

Opinion of the Court

damages because the deputies committed a separate

constitutional violation (the warrantless entry into the

shack) that in some sense set the table for the use of force.

That is wrong. The framework for analyzing excessive

force claims is set out in Graham. If there is no excessive

force claim under Graham, there is no excessive force

claim at all. To the extent that a plaintiff has other

Fourth Amendment claims, they should be analyzed

separately.*

The Ninth Circuit’s efforts to cabin the provocation rule

only undermine it further. The Ninth Circuit appears to

recognize that it would be going entirely too far to suggest

that any Fourth Amendment violation that is connected to

a reasonable use of force should create a valid excessive

force claim. See, e.g., Beier v. Lewiston, 354 F. 3d 1058,

1064 (CA9 2004) (“Because the excessive force and false

arrest factual inquiries are distinct, establishing a lack of

probable cause to make an arrest does not establish an

excessive force claim, and vice-versa”). Instead, that court

has endeavored to limit the rule to only those distinct

Fourth Amendment violations that in some sense “pro-

voked” the need to use force. The concept of provocation,

——————

* Respondents do not attempt to defend the provocation rule. In-

stead, they argue that the judgment below should be affirmed under

Graham itself. Graham commands that an officer’s use of force be

assessed for reasonableness under the “totality of the circumstances.”

490 U. S., at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). On respondents’

view, that means taking into account unreasonable police conduct prior

to the use of force that foreseeably created the need to use it. Brief for

Respondents 42–43. We did not grant certiorari on that question, and

the decision below did not address it. Accordingly, we decline to ad-

dress it here. See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, ante, at 11 (“[W]e are a

court of review, not of first view” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

All we hold today is that once a use of force is deemed reasonable under

Graham, it may not be found unreasonable by reference to some sepa-

rate constitutional violation. Any argument regarding the District

Court’s application of Graham in this case should be addressed to the

Ninth Circuit on remand.

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

in turn, has been defined using a two-prong test. First,

the separate constitutional violation must “creat[e] a

situation which led to” the use of force; second, the sepa-

rate constitutional violation must be committed recklessly

or intentionally. 815 F. 3d, at 1193 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Neither of these limitations solves the fundamental

problem of the provocation rule: namely, that it is an

unwarranted and illogical expansion of Graham. But in

addition, each of the limitations creates problems of its

own. First, the rule includes a vague causal standard. It

applies when a prior constitutional violation “created a

situation which led to” the use of force. The rule does not

incorporate the familiar proximate cause standard. In-

deed, it is not clear what causal standard is being applied.

Second, while the reasonableness of a search or seizure is

almost always based on objective factors, see Whren v.

United States, 517 U. S. 806, 814 (1996), the provocation

rule looks to the subjective intent of the officers who car-

ried out the seizure. As noted, under the Ninth Circuit’s

rule, a prior Fourth Amendment violation may be held to

have provoked a later, reasonable use of force only if the

prior violation was intentional or reckless.

The provocation rule may be motivated by the notion

that it is important to hold law enforcement officers liable

for the foreseeable consequences of all of their constitu-

tional torts. See Billington, 292 F. 3d, at 1190 (“[I]f an

officer’s provocative actions are objectively unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment, . . . liability is established,

and the question becomes . . . what harms the constitu-

tional violation proximately caused”). However, there is

no need to distort the excessive force inquiry in order to

accomplish this objective. To the contrary, both parties

accept the principle that plaintiffs can—subject to quali-

fied immunity—generally recover damages that are prox-

imately caused by any Fourth Amendment violation. See,

10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ

Opinion of the Court

e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483 (1994) (§1983

“creates a species of tort liability” informed by tort princi-

ples regarding “damages and the prerequisites for their

recovery” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Memphis

Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 306

(1986) (“[W]hen §1983 plaintiffs seek damages for viola-

tions of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordi-

narily determined according to principles derived from the

common law of torts”). Thus, there is no need to dress up

every Fourth Amendment claim as an excessive force

claim. For example, if the plaintiffs in this case cannot

recover on their excessive force claim, that will not fore-

close recovery for injuries proximately caused by the war-

rantless entry. The harm proximately caused by these

two torts may overlap, but the two claims should not be

confused.

III

The Court of Appeals also held that “even without rely-

ing on [the] provocation theory, the deputies are liable for

the shooting under basic notions of proximate cause.” 815

F. 3d, at 1194. In other words, the court apparently con-

cluded that the shooting was proximately caused by the

deputies’ warrantless entry of the shack. Proper analysis

of this proximate cause question required consideration of

the “foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the

predicate conduct,” and required the court to conclude that

there was “some direct relation between the injury asserted

and the injurious conduct alleged.” Paroline v. United

States, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 7) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals’ proximate cause

analysis appears to have been tainted by the same errors

that cause us to reject the provocation rule. The court

reasoned that when officers make a “startling entry” by

“barg[ing] into” a home “unannounced,” it is reasonably

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

Opinion of the Court

foreseeable that violence may result. 815 F. 3d, at 1194–

1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). But this ap-

pears to focus solely on the risks foreseeably associated

with the failure to knock and announce, which could not

serve as the basis for liability since the Court of Appeals

concluded that the officers had qualified immunity on that

claim. By contrast, the Court of Appeals did not identify

the foreseeable risks associated with the relevant constitu-

tional violation (the warrantless entry); nor did it explain

how, on these facts, respondents’ injuries were proximately

caused by the warrantless entry. In other words, the

Court of Appeals’ proximate cause analysis, like the provo-

cation rule, conflated distinct Fourth Amendment claims

and required only a murky causal link between the war-

rantless entry and the injuries attributed to it. On re-

mand, the court should revisit the question whether prox-

imate cause permits respondents to recover damages for

their shooting injuries based on the deputies’ failure to

secure a warrant at the outset. See Bank of America Corp.

v. Miami, ante, at 12 (declining to “draw the precise

boundaries of proximate cause” in the first instance). The

arguments made on this point by the parties and by the

United States as amicus provide a useful starting point for

this inquiry. See Brief for Petitioners 42–56; Brief for

Respondents 20–31, 51–59; Reply Brief 17–24; Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae 26–32.

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceed-

ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.