Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY

GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–54. Argued February 27, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident of the

United States, pleaded no contest in a California court to a statutory

rape offense criminalizing “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor

who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator.” Cal.

Penal Code Ann. §261.5(c). For purposes of that offense, California

defines “minor” as “a person under the age of 18.” §261.5(a). Based

on this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated

removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA), which makes removable “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an ag-

gravated felony,” 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), including “sexual

abuse of a minor,” §1101(a)(43)(A). An Immigration Judge ordered

petitioner removed to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals

agreed that petitioner’s crime constituted sexual abuse of a minor

and dismissed his appeal. A divided Court of Appeals denied his pe-

tition for review.

Held: In the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual

intercourse based solely on the ages of the participants, the generic

federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires the age of the

victim to be less than 16. Pp. 2–12.

(a) Under the categorical approach employed to determine whether

an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, the Court asks

whether “ ‘the state statute defining the crime of conviction’ categori-

cally fits within the ‘generic’ federal definition of a corresponding ag-

gravated felony.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 190. Petition-

er’s state conviction is thus an “aggravated felony” only if the least of

the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic fed-

eral definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Johnson v. United States,

2 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Syllabus

559 U. S. 133, 137. Pp. 2–3.

(b) The least of the acts criminalized by Cal. Penal Code §261.5(c)

would be consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is al-

most 18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. Regardless of the ac-

tual facts of the case, this Court presumes that petitioner’s conviction

was based on those acts. Pp. 3–4.

(c) In the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual

intercourse based solely on the ages of the participants, the generic

federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires that the vic-

tim be younger than 16. The Court begins, as always, with the text.

Pp. 4–7.

(1) Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA in 1996.

At that time, the ordinary meaning of “sexual abuse” included “the

engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a specified age

or who is incapable of giving consent because of age or mental or

physical incapacity.” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 454. By

providing that the abuse must be “of a minor,” the INA focuses on

age, rather than mental or physical incapacity. Accordingly, to quali-

fy as sexual abuse of a minor, the statute of conviction must prohibit

certain sexual acts based at least in part on the age of the victim.

Statutory rape laws, which are one example of this category of

crimes, generally provide that an older person may not engage in

sexual intercourse with a younger person under the “age of consent.”

Reliable dictionaries indicate that the “generic” age of consent in

1996 was 16, and it remains so today. Pp. 4–6.

(2) The Government argues that sexual abuse of a minor includes

any conduct that is illegal, involves sexual activity, and is directed at

a person younger than 18. For support, it points to the 1990 Black’s

Law Dictionary, which defined sexual abuse of a minor as “[i]llegal

sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or

acquaintance” and defined “[m]inor” as “[a]n infant or person who is

under the age of legal competence,” which in “most states” was “18.”

But the generic federal offense does not correspond to the Govern-

ment’s definition, for three reasons. First, the Government’s defini-

tion is inconsistent with its own dictionary’s requirement that a spe-

cial relationship of trust exist between the victim and offender.

Second, in the statutory rape context, “of a minor” refers to the age of

consent, not the age of legal competence. Third, the Government’s

definition turns the categorical approach on its head by defining the

generic federal offense as whatever is illegal under the law of the

State of conviction. Pp. 6–7.

(d) The structure of the INA, a related federal statute, and evi-

dence from state criminal codes confirm that, for a statutory rape of-

fense based solely on the age of the participants to qualify as sexual

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Syllabus

abuse of a minor under the INA, the victim must be younger than 16.

The INA lists sexual abuse of a minor as an “aggravated” felony,

§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and lists it in the same subparagraph as “murder”

and “rape,” §1101(a)(43)(A), suggesting that it encompasses only es-

pecially egregious felonies. A different statute, 18 U. S. C. §2243,

criminalizes “[s]exual abuse of a minor or ward.” Section 2243 was

amended to protect anyone under age 16 in the same omnibus law

that added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA, suggesting that Con-

gress understood that phrase to cover victims under (but not over)

age 16. Finally, a significant majority of state criminal codes set the

age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively

on the age of the participants. Pp. 7–11.

(e) This Court does not decide whether the generic crime of sexual

abuse of a minor requires a particular age differential between the

victim and the perpetrator or whether it encompasses sexual inter-

course involving victims over 16 that is abusive because of the nature

of the relationship between the participants. P. 11.

(f) Because the statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses

the Board’s interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor, neither the rule

of lenity nor Chevron deference applies. Pp. 11–12.

810 F. 3d 1019, reversed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other

Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-

tion or decision of the case.

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–54

_________________

JUAN ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA, PETITIONER v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III,

ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[May 30, 2017]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat.

163, as amended, provides that “[a]ny alien who is con-

victed of an aggravated felony after admission” to the

United States may be removed from the country by the

Attorney General. 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of

the many crimes that constitutes an aggravated felony

under the INA is “sexual abuse of a minor.”

§1101(a)(43)(A). A conviction for sexual abuse of a minor

is an aggravated felony regardless of whether it is for a

“violation of Federal or State law.” §1101(a)(43). The INA

does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor.

We must decide whether a conviction under a state

statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse be-

tween a 21-year-old and a 17-year-old qualifies as sexual

abuse of a minor under the INA. We hold that it does not.

I

Petitioner Juan Esquivel-Quintana is a native and

citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States

as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he

2 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

pleaded no contest in the Superior Court of California to a

statutory rape offense: “unlawful sexual intercourse with a

minor who is more than three years younger than the

perpetrator,” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §261.5(c) (West 2014);

see also §261.5(a) (“Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act

of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is

not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a mi-

nor”). For purposes of that offense, California defines

“minor” as “a person under the age of 18 years.” Ibid.

The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal

proceedings against petitioner based on that conviction.

An Immigration Judge concluded that the conviction

qualified as “sexual abuse of a minor,” 8 U. S. C.

§1101(a)(43)(A), and ordered petitioner removed to Mexico.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissed his

appeal. 26 I. & N. Dec. 469 (2015). “[F]or a statutory rape

offense involving a 16- or 17-year-old victim” to qualify as

“ ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ ” it reasoned, “the statute must

require a meaningful age difference between the victim

and the perpetrator.” Id., at 477. In its view, the 3-year

age difference required by Cal. Penal Code §261.5(c) was

meaningful. Id., at 477. Accordingly, the Board concluded

that petitioner’s crime of conviction was an aggravated

felony, making him removable under the INA. Ibid. A

divided Court of Appeals denied Esquivel-Quintana’s

petition for review, deferring to the Board’s interpretation

of sexual abuse of a minor under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837

(1984). 810 F. 3d 1019 (CA6 2016); see also id., at 1027

(Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We

granted certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2016), and now reverse.

II

Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) makes aliens removable based

on the nature of their convictions, not based on their

actual conduct. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U. S. ___, ___

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

(2015) (slip op., at 7). Accordingly, to determine whether

an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony

under that section, we “employ a categorical approach by

looking to the statute . . . of conviction, rather than to the

specific facts underlying the crime.” Kawashima v. Holder,

565 U. S. 478, 483 (2012); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas-

Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, 186 (2007) (applying the categori-

cal approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S.

575 (1990), to the INA). Under that approach, we ask

whether “ ‘the state statute defining the crime of convic-

tion’ categorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal defini-

tion of a corresponding aggravated felony.” Moncrieffe v.

Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 190 (2013) (quoting Duenas-

Alvarez, supra, at 186). In other words, we presume that

the state conviction “rested upon . . . the least of th[e] acts”

criminalized by the statute, and then we determine

whether that conduct would fall within the federal defini-

tion of the crime. Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133,

137 (2010); see also Moncrieffe, supra, at 191 (focusing “on

the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute”).1

Petitioner’s state conviction is thus an “aggravated felony”

under the INA only if the least of the acts criminalized by

the state statute falls within the generic federal definition

of sexual abuse of a minor.

A

Because Cal. Penal Code §261.5(c) criminalizes “unlaw-

ful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than

——————

1 Where a state statute contains several different crimes that are

described separately, we employ what is known as the “modified

categorical approach.” See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183,

187 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that approach,

which is not at issue here, the court may review the charging docu-

ments, jury instructions, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and similar

sources to determine the actual crime of which the alien was convicted.

See ibid.

4 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

three years younger than the perpetrator” and defines a

minor as someone under age 18, the conduct criminalized

under this provision would be, at a minimum, consensual

sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 18 and

a perpetrator who just turned 21. Regardless of the actual

facts of petitioner’s crime, we must presume that his

conviction was based on acts that were no more criminal

than that. If those acts do not constitute sexual abuse of a

minor under the INA, then petitioner was not convicted of

an aggravated felony and is not, on that basis, removable.

Petitioner concedes that sexual abuse of a minor under

the INA includes some statutory rape offenses. But he

argues that a statutory rape offense based solely on the

partners’ ages (like the one here) is “ ‘abuse’ ” “only when

the younger partner is under 16.” Reply Brief 2. Because

the California statute criminalizes sexual intercourse

when the victim is up to 17 years old, petitioner contends

that it does not categorically qualify as sexual abuse of a

minor.

B

We agree with petitioner that, in the context of statutory

rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based

solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal

definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the

victim be younger than 16. Because the California statute

at issue in this case does not categorically fall within that

definition, a conviction pursuant to it is not an aggravated

felony under §1101(a)(43)(A). We begin, as always, with

the text.

1

Section 1101(a)(43)(A) does not expressly define sexual

abuse of a minor, so we interpret that phrase using the

normal tools of statutory interpretation. “Our analysis

begins with the language of the statute.” Leocal v. Ash-

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

croft, 543 U. S. 1, 8 (2004); see also Lopez v. Gonzales, 549

U. S. 47, 53 (2006) (“The everyday understanding of ” the

term used in §1101 “should count for a lot here, for the

statutes in play do not define the term, and so remit us to

regular usage to see what Congress probably meant”).

Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA in

1996, as part of a comprehensive immigration reform act.

See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-

bility Act of 1996, §321(a)(i), 110 Stat. 3009–627. At that

time, the ordinary meaning of “sexual abuse” included “the

engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a

specified age or who is incapable of giving consent because

of age or mental or physical incapacity.” Merriam-

Webster’s Dictionary of Law 454 (1996). By providing that

the abuse must be “of a minor,” the INA focuses on age,

rather than mental or physical incapacity. Accordingly, to

qualify as sexual abuse of a minor, the statute of convic-

tion must prohibit certain sexual acts based at least in

part on the age of the victim.

Statutory rape laws are one example of this category of

crimes. Those laws generally provide that an older person

may not engage in sexual intercourse with a younger

person under a specified age, known as the “age of con-

sent.” See id., at 20 (defining “age of consent” as “the age

at which a person is deemed competent by law to give

consent esp. to sexual intercourse” and cross-referencing

“statutory rape”). Many laws also require an age differen-

tial between the two partners.

Although the age of consent for statutory rape purposes

varies by jurisdiction, see infra, at 9, reliable dictionaries

provide evidence that the “generic” age—in 1996 and

today—is 16. See B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern

Legal Usage 38 (2d ed. 1995) (“Age of consent, usu[ally] 16,

denotes the age when one is legally capable of agreeing . . .

to sexual intercourse” and cross-referencing “statutory

rape”); Black’s Law Dictionary 73 (10th ed. 2014) (noting

6 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

that the age of consent is “usu[ally] defined by statute as

16 years”).

2

Relying on a different dictionary (and “sparse” legisla-

tive history), the Government suggests an alternative

“ ‘everyday understanding’ ” of “sexual abuse of a minor.”

Brief for Respondent 16–17 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary

1375 (6th ed. 1990)). Around the time sexual abuse of a

minor was added to the INA’s list of aggravated felonies,

that dictionary defined “[s]exual abuse” as “[i]llegal sex

acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian,

relative, or acquaintance,” and defined “[m]inor” as “[a]n

infant or person who is under the age of legal competence,”

which in “most states” was “18.” Id., at 997, 1375. “ ‘Sex-

ual abuse of a minor,’ ” the Government accordingly con-

tends, “most naturally connotes conduct that (1) is illegal,

(2) involves sexual activity, and (3) is directed at a person

younger than 18 years old.” Brief for Respondent 17.

We are not persuaded that the generic federal offense

corresponds to the Government’s definition. First, the

Government’s proposed definition is flatly inconsistent

with the definition of sexual abuse contained in the very

dictionary on which it relies; the Government’s proposed

definition does not require that the act be performed “by a

parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). In any

event, as we explain below, offenses predicated on a spe-

cial relationship of trust between the victim and offender

are not at issue here and frequently have a different age

requirement than the general age of consent. Second, in

the context of statutory rape, the prepositional phrase “of

a minor” naturally refers not to the age of legal compe-

tence (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to a

contract, for example), but to the age of consent (when a

person is legally capable of agreeing to sexual intercourse).

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

Third, the Government’s definition turns the categorical

approach on its head by defining the generic federal of-

fense of sexual abuse of a minor as whatever is illegal

under the particular law of the State where the defendant

was convicted. Under the Government’s preferred ap-

proach, there is no “generic” definition at all. See Taylor,

495 U. S., at 591 (requiring “a clear indication that . . .

Congress intended to abandon its general approach of

using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate

offenses”); id., at 592 (“We think that ‘burglary’ in §924(e)

must have some uniform definition independent of the

labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes”).

C

The structure of the INA, a related federal statute, and

evidence from state criminal codes confirm that, for a

statutory rape offense to qualify as sexual abuse of a

minor under the INA based solely on the age of the partic-

ipants, the victim must be younger than 16.

1

Surrounding provisions of the INA guide our interpreta-

tion of sexual abuse of a minor. See A. Scalia & B. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167

(2012). This offense is listed in the INA as an “aggravated

felony.” 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).

“An ‘aggravated’ offense is one ‘made worse or more seri-

ous by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a

deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime.’ ”

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U. S. 563, 574 (2010)

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 75 (9th ed. 2009)). More-

over, the INA lists sexual abuse of a minor in the same

subparagraph as “murder” and “rape,” §1101(a)(43)(A)—

among the most heinous crimes it defines as aggravated

felonies. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The structure of the INA

therefore suggests that sexual abuse of a minor encom-

8 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

passes only especially egregious felonies.

A closely related federal statute, 18 U. S. C. §2243,

provides further evidence that the generic federal defini-

tion of sexual abuse of a minor incorporates an age of

consent of 16, at least in the context of statutory rape

offenses predicated solely on the age of the participants.

Cf. Leocal, 543 U. S., at 12–13, n. 9 (concluding that Con-

gress’ treatment of 18 U. S. C. §16 in an Act passed “just

nine months earlier” provided “stron[g] suppor[t]” for our

interpretation of §16 as incorporated into the INA); Pow-

erex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224,

232 (2007). Section 2243, which criminalizes “[s]exual

abuse of a minor or ward,” contains the only definition of

that phrase in the United States Code. As originally

enacted in 1986, §2243 proscribed engaging in a “sexual

act” with a person between the ages of 12 and 16 if the

perpetrator was at least four years older than the victim.

In 1996, Congress expanded §2243 to include victims who

were younger than 12, thereby protecting anyone under

the age of 16. §2243(a); see also §2241(c). Congress did

this in the same omnibus law that added sexual abuse of a

minor to the INA, which suggests that Congress under-

stood that phrase to cover victims under age 16.2 See

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, §§121(7),

321,110 Stat. 3009–31, 3009–627.

Petitioner does not contend that the definition in

§2243(a) must be imported wholesale into the INA, Brief

for Petitioner 17, and we do not do so. One reason is that

the INA does not cross-reference §2243(a), whereas many

other aggravated felonies in the INA are defined by cross-

reference to other provisions of the United States Code,

——————

2 To eliminate a redundancy, Congress later amended §2243(a) to

revert to the pre-1996 language. See Protection of Children From

Sexual Predators Act of 1998, §301(b), 112 Stat. 2979. That amend-

ment does not change Congress’ understanding in 1996, when it added

sexual abuse of a minor to the INA.

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

see, e.g., §1101(a)(43)(H) (“an offense described in section

875, 876, 877, or 1202 of Title 18 (relating to the demand

for or receipt of ransom)”). Another is that §2243(a) re-

quires a 4-year age difference between the perpetrator and

the victim. Combining that element with a 16-year age of

consent would categorically exclude the statutory rape

laws of most States. See Brief for Respondent 34–35; cf.

Taylor, 495 U. S., at 594 (declining to “constru[e] ‘burglary’

to mean common-law burglary,” because that “would come

close to nullifying that term’s effect in the statute,” since

“few of the crimes now generally recognized as burglaries

would fall within the common-law definition”). Accordingly,

we rely on §2243(a) for evidence of the meaning of sexual

abuse of a minor, but not as providing the complete or

exclusive definition.

2

As in other cases where we have applied the categorical

approach, we look to state criminal codes for additional

evidence about the generic meaning of sexual abuse of a

minor. See Taylor, 495 U. S., at 598 (interpreting “‘bur-

glary’” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 accord-

ing to “the generic sense in which the term is now used in

the criminal codes of most States”); Duenas-Alvarez, 549

U. S., at 190 (interpreting “theft” in the INA in the same

manner). When “sexual abuse of a minor” was added to

the INA in 1996, thirty-one States and the District of

Columbia set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape

offenses that hinged solely on the age of the participants.

As for the other States, one set the age of consent at 14;

two set the age of consent at 15; six set the age of consent

at 17; and the remaining ten, including California, set the

age of consent at 18. See Appendix, infra; cf. ALI, Model

Penal Code §213.3(1)(a) (1980) (in the absence of a special

relationship, setting the default age of consent at 16 for

10 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

the crime of “[c]orruption of [m]inors”).3 A significant

majority of jurisdictions thus set the age of consent at 16

for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively on the

age of the participants.

Many jurisdictions set a different age of consent for

offenses that include an element apart from the age of the

participants, such as offenses that focus on whether the

perpetrator is in some special relationship of trust with

the victim. That was true in the two States that had

offenses labeled “sexual abuse of a minor” in 1996. See

Alaska Stat. §11.41.438 (1996) (age of consent for third-

degree “sexual abuse of a minor” was 16 generally but 18

where “the offender occupie[d] a position of authority in

relation to the victim”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A,

§254(1) (1983), as amended by 1995 Me. Laws p. 123 (age

of consent for “[s]exual abuse of minors” was 16 generally

but 18 where the victim was “a student” and the offender

was “a teacher, employee or other official in the . . . school

. . . in which the student [was] enrolled”). And that is true

in four of the five jurisdictions that have offenses titled

“sexual abuse of a minor” today. Compare, e.g., D. C. Code

§§22–3001 (2012), 22–3008 (2016 Cum. Supp.) (age of

consent is 16 in the absence of a significant relationship)

with §22–3009.01 (age of consent is 18 where the offender

“is in a significant relationship” with the victim); see also

Brief for Respondent 31 (listing statutes with that title).

Accordingly, the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor

may include a different age of consent where the perpetra-

tor and victim are in a significant relationship of trust. As

——————

3 The Government notes that this sort of multijurisdictional analysis

can “be useful insofar as it helps shed light on the ‘common understand-

ing and meaning’ of the federal provision being interpreted,” but that it

is not required by the categorical approach. Brief for Respondent 23–25

(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 45 (1979)). We agree. In

this case, state criminal codes aid our interpretation of “sexual abuse of

a minor” by offering useful context.

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

Opinion of the Court

relevant to this case, however, the general consensus from

state criminal codes points to the same generic definition

as dictionaries and federal law: Where sexual intercourse

is abusive solely because of the ages of the participants,

the victim must be younger than 16.

D

The laws of many States and of the Federal Government

include a minimum age differential (in addition to an age

of consent) in defining statutory rape. We need not and do

not decide whether the generic crime of sexual abuse of a

minor under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(A) includes an addi-

tional element of that kind. Petitioner has “show[n] some-

thing special about California’s version of the doctrine”—

that the age of consent is 18, rather than 16—and needs

no more to prevail. Duenas-Alvarez, supra, at 191. Ab-

sent some special relationship of trust, consensual sexual

conduct involving a younger partner who is at least 16

years of age does not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor

under the INA, regardless of the age differential between

the two participants. We leave for another day whether

the generic offense requires a particular age differential

between the victim and the perpetrator, and whether the

generic offense encompasses sexual intercourse involving

victims over the age of 16 that is abusive because of the

nature of the relationship between the participants.

III

Finally, petitioner and the Government debate whether

the Board’s interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor is

entitled to deference under Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. Peti-

tioner argues that any ambiguity in the meaning of this

phrase must be resolved in favor of the alien under the

rule of lenity. See Brief for Petitioner 41–45. The Gov-

ernment responds that ambiguities should be resolved by

deferring to the Board’s interpretation. See Brief for

12 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

Respondent 45–53. We have no need to resolve whether

the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case

because the statute, read in context, unambiguously fore-

closes the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither the

rule of lenity nor Chevron applies.

* * *

We hold that in the context of statutory rape offenses

focused solely on the age of the participants, the generic

federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” under

§1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less

than 16. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly,

is reversed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 13

Opinion

Appendix of the of

to opinion Court

the Court

APPENDIX

These tables list offenses criminalizing sexual intercourse

solely because of the age of the participants. The tables

are organized according to the statutory age of consent as

of September 30, 1996—the date “sexual abuse of a minor”

was added to the INA.

14 Years

Haw. Rev. Stat.

Hawaii

§707–730(1)(b) (1993)

15 Years

Colo. Rev. Stat.

Colorado

§18–3–403(1)(e) (1997)

S. C. Code Ann.

South Carolina

§16–3–655(2) (1985)

16 Years

Ala. Code §§13A–6–62(a)(1),

Alabama

13A–6–70(c)(1) (1994)

Alaska Stat.

Alaska

§11.41.436(a)(1) (1996)

Ark. Code Ann. §§5–14–

Arkansas

106(a), 5–14–107(a) (1997)

Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a–

Connecticut

71(a)(1) (1995)

Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11,

Delaware

§773(2) (1995)

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D. C. Code §§22–4101(3),

District of Columbia

22–4108 (1996)

Ga. Code Ann. §16–6–3(a)

Georgia

(1996)

Indiana 1998 Ind. Acts §8, p. 774

Iowa Code §709.4(2) (1987),

Iowa as amended by 1994 Iowa

Acts p. 290

Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–

Kansas

3504(a)(1) (1995)

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

Kentucky §§510.020(3)(a),

510.060(1)(b) (Lexis 1990)

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit.

17–A, §254(1) (1983), as

Maine

amended by 1995 Me. Laws

p. 123

Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27,

Maryland §§464B(a)(4), (5),

464C(a)(2), (3) (1996)

Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 265,

Massachusetts

§23 (1992)

Mich. Comp. Laws

§750.520d(1)(a) (1991), as

Michigan

amended by 1996 Mich.

Pub. Acts p. 393

Minn. Stat. §609.344.1(b)

Minnesota

(1996)

Mont. Code Ann. §§45–5–

Montana 501(1)(b)(iii), 45–5–

503(3)(a) (1995)

Neb. Rev. Stat. §28–319(1)

Nebraska

(1994 Cum. Supp.)

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Nev. Rev. Stat.

Nevada §§200.364(3), 200.368

(1997)

N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §632–

New Hampshire

A:3(II) (1986)

N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:14–

New Jersey

2(c)(5) (West 1995)

N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–

North Carolina

27.7A (1998 Cum. Supp.)

Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

Ohio

§2907.04(A) (Lexis 1996)

Okla. Stat., Tit. 21,

§1111(A)(1) (1983), as

Oklahoma

amended by 1995 Okla.

Sess. Laws ch. 22, §1, p. 119

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3122.1,

Pennsylvania added by 1995 Pa. Laws

985, §5, p. 987

R. I. Gen. Laws §11–37–6

Rhode Island

(1994)

S. D. Codified Laws §22–

South Dakota

22–1(5) (1998)

Utah 1983 Utah Laws ch. 88, §16

Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13,

Vermont

§3252(a)(3) (1998)

Wash. Rev. Code

Washington

§9A.44.079 (1994)

W. Va. Code Ann. §§61–8B–

West Virginia 2(c)(1), 61–8B–5(a)(2) (Lexis

1997)

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6–2–

Wyoming

304(a)(i) (1997)

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17 Years

Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720,

Illinois §§5/12–15(b)–(c), 5/12–16(d)

(West 1996)

La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§14:80(A)(1) (West 1986), as

Louisiana

amended by 1995 La. Acts

no. 241, p. 670

Mo. Rev. Stat. §566.034

Missouri

(1994)

N. M. Stat. Ann. §30–9–

New Mexico 11(F), as amended by 1995

N. M. Laws ch. 159, p. 1414

N. Y. Penal Law Ann.

New York §§130.05(3)(a), 130.20(1),

130.25(2) (West 1998)

Tex. Penal Code Ann.

Texas §§22.011(a)(2), (c)(1) (West

1994)

18 Years

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–

Arizona

1405(A) (1989)

Cal. Penal Code Ann.

California

§261.5(a) (West Supp. 1998)

Florida Fla. Stat. §794.05(1) (1991)

Idaho Code Ann.

Idaho

§18–6101(1) (Supp. 1996)

Miss. Code Ann. §97–3–67

Mississippi

(Supp. 1993)

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N. D. Cent. Code Ann.

North Dakota §12.1–20–05 (Supp. 1983);

§14–10–01 (1997)

Ore. Rev. Stat.

Oregon §§163.315(1), 163.435(1),

163.445(1) (1997)

Tenn. Code Ann.

Tennessee

§39–13–506(a) (Supp. 1996)

Va. Code Ann. §18.2–371

Virginia

(1996)

Wis. Stat. §§948.01(1),

Wisconsin

948.09 (1993–1994)