Opinion

Colleen Reilly v. City of Harrisburg

  • 858 F.3d 173
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9105
  • 2017 WL 2272114
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
May 25, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Ambro
On the bench
Ambro, Jordan, Roth
Cited by
733 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.3%

finding that, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: “(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably injured if relief is not granted. In addition, the district court, in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: “(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably injured if relief is not granted. In addition, the district court, in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest”
  • explaining that where a prior panel’s precedential opinion has not been “overruled by a decision of this Court en banc,” a subsequent panel is left with no “discretion to rule otherwise absent a contrary ruling by the Supreme Court”
  • explaining that Opticians Ass’n of Am. began “an inconsistent line of cases” but did not overrule the Circuit Court’s prior precedent according to which a court should balance all four factors if the first two are met
  • holding that a “movant for preliminary equitable relief” must demonstrate “that it can win on the merits” and that it is “more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 16-3722

________________

COLLEEN REILLY; BECKY BITER;

ROSALIE GROSS

v.

CITY OF HARRISBURG;

HARRISBURG CITY COUNSEL;

MAYOR ERIC PAPENFUSE, In his Official capacity as

Mayor of Harrisburg

Colleen Reilly; Becky Biter,

Appellants

________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-00510)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

________________

Argued March 21, 2017

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

Mary E. McAlister, Esquire

Liberty Counsel

P.O. Box 11108

Lynchburg, VA 24506

Mathew D. Staver, Esquire

Horatio G. Mihet, Esquire (Argued)

Liberty Counsel

P.O. Box 540774

Orlando, FL 32854

Counsel for Appellants

Joshua M. Autry, Esquire (Argued)

Frank J. Lavery, Jr., Esquire

Lavery Faherty Petterson

225 Market Street

Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appellees

(Opinion filed: May 25, 2017)

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

The case before us is a familiar one: a constitutional

challenge to a city ordinance that Plaintiffs Colleen Reilly and

2

Becky Biter allege impermissibly restricts their right to

protest in the vicinity of abortion clinics.1 In addition to

challenging the ordinance, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary

injunction to enjoin its enforcement, which was denied.

Because the claims are still before the District Court, we need

not review their merit. However, we clarify the analysis

needed in considering requests for preliminary injunctions,

and thus we remand.

I. BACKGROUND

The City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, issued an

ordinance that prohibits persons to “knowingly congregate,

patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending 20 feet from

any portion of an entrance to, exit from, or driveway of a

health care facility.” Harrisburg, Pa. Mun. Code § 3-371.4A.

The stated purpose of the ordinance is to “promote the health

and welfare of [Harrisburg] residents and visitors to [its]

health care facilities, as well as the health and welfare of

those who may wish to voice their constitutionally protected

speech outside of such health care facilities . . . .” Id. § 3-

371.2C. But for those exempted (e.g., police and employees

of the health care facility), the ordinance “appl[ies] to all

persons equally regardless of the intent of their conduct or the

content of their speech.” Id. § 3-371.4.

Plaintiffs are individuals purporting to provide

“sidewalk counseling” to those entering abortion clinics by

way of leafletting, prayer, and conversation in attempts to

dissuade patients from getting abortions. Plaintiffs argue that

the ordinance creates unconstitutional “buffer zones” that

render impossible their ability to engage effectively in

1

Rosalie Gross was also a Plaintiff in the action

below, but has voluntarily dismissed her claims without

prejudice and does not join this appeal.

3

counseling. They claim that the ordinance violates their First

Amendment rights to speak freely, exercise their religion, and

assemble, as well as their Fourteenth Amendment due process

and equal protection rights. As noted, they also sought a

preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the

ordinance.

Plaintiffs made several facial and as-applied

challenges to the ordinance, some dismissed by the District

Court though most remain. The Court determined that the

ordinance was content-neutral because it did not define or

regulate speech by subject-matter or purpose, and thus

intermediate scrutiny applied. Under this tier of scrutiny, the

Court reasoned that it must accept as true (for the purposes of

a motion to dismiss) Plaintiffs’ claims that the City did not

consider less restrictive alternatives to the ordinance, and thus

it allowed their claims to proceed to discovery. However, in

considering whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, the

Court ruled that Plaintiffs did not bear their burden of

demonstrating that they were likely to succeed on the merits,

and for that reason alone it denied the temporary relief

sought.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had federal question subject matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). We have

jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of a district court

granting or denying a preliminary injunction per 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1). “When reviewing a district court’s [denial] of a

preliminary injunction, we review the court’s findings of fact

for clear error, its conclusions of law de novo, and the

ultimate decision . . . for an abuse of discretion.” Bimbo

Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir.

2010).

4

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs request that we decide the merits of their

attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance. As those

claims are still before the District Court, it should evaluate

them in the first instance.

Thus we turn to the denial of Plaintiffs’ preliminary

injunction request. Because the Court did not provide a full

analysis of whether to grant that request and misallocated the

burden of demonstrating narrow tailoring, we remand for its

further consideration. To assist in that effort and to clear up

confusion caused by opinions in our Court that are in tension,

we clarify how the analysis should proceed.

A. Standard for Preliminary Injunctions

Over four decades ago we held that to obtain a

preliminary injunction the moving party must show as a

prerequisite

(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success

in the litigation, and (2) that it will be

irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted . .

. . [In addition,] the district court, in

considering whether to grant a preliminary

injunction, should take into account, when they

are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other

interested persons from the grant or denial of

the injunction, and (4) the public interest.

Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport,

Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).

This standard for preliminary equitable relief remains; we

have repeated that a district court—in its sound discretion—

5

should balance those four factors so long as the party seeking

the injunction meets the threshold on the first two. See, e.g.,

Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975) (“[W]hile

the burden rests upon the moving party to make [the first] two

requisite showings, the district court should take into account,

when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other

interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction,

and (4) the public interest.”) (quotation omitted); In re Arthur

Treacher’s Franchisee Lit., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir.

1982) (same) (quotation omitted)); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd.

of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990) (“In order to

support a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show both a

likelihood of success on the merits and a probability of

irreparable harm. Additionally, the district court should

consider the effect of the issuance of a preliminary injunction

on other interested persons and the public interest.” (citations

omitted)); Campbell Soup Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86,

90-91 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa

Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A

District Court . . . balances these four factors to determine if

an injunction should issue.” (citation omitted)).2

We are aware there is an inconsistent line of cases

within our Court holding that all four factors must be

established by the movant and the “failure to establish any

element in its favor renders a preliminary injunction

inappropriate.” See, e.g., Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson

Pharms, Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014); NutraSweet

Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir.

1999). As best we can tell, this conflicting standard began

2

In the parallel stay-pending-appeal context, where the

factors are the same as for the preliminary injunctions, we

also follow the analytical path noted above. In re Revel AC,

Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 2015).

6

with Opticians Association of America v. Independent

Opticians of America, in which we held that a district court

“must consider four factors” and that “[o]nly if the movant

produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that

all four factors favor preliminary relief should the injunction

issue.” 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations

omitted). The panel in that case purported to glean this

standard from our holding in ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., in

which we stated that the movant bears the burden of showing

the stated factors. 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted). ECRI in turn attributed its guiding principle to SI

Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, where we specified that

“[i]n considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a

court must carefully weigh [the] four factors . . . .” 753 F.2d

1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985). Heisley was not out of line with

our precedent that the factors are to be balanced so long as the

first two factors (likelihood of success on the merits and

irreparable harm) are satisfied. Thus the conflicting line of

cases and corresponding confusion in our Court appear to be

the product of compounded subtle misinterpretations of our

longstanding jurisprudence.

In our Court “the holding of a panel in a precedential

opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no

subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential

opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration is

required to do so.” Policy of Avoiding Intra-circuit Conflict

of Precedent, Internal Operating Procedures of the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals § 9.1; see, e.g., Kossler v. Crisanti,

564 F.3d 181, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Pardini v.

Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir.

2008); United States v. Rivera, 365 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004).

Our precedent in Transamerican Trailer was never overruled

by a decision of this Court en banc, leaving no subsequent

panel the discretion to rule otherwise absent a contrary ruling

by the Supreme Court.

7

We also are aware that, significantly later than this

confusion arose, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] plaintiff

seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is

in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). At first blush that statement would

lend support to the divergent standard articulated in Opticians

Association of America almost twenty years earlier. But for

four reasons we think Winter did not overrule our balancing-

of-the-factors standard.

First, the Supreme Court in Winter explained that “[i]n

each case . . . courts must balance the competing claims of

injury and must consider the effect on each party of the

granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555

U.S. at 24 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). It

concluded that “[a]n injunction is a matter of equitable

discretion” that requires “the balance of equities.” Id. at 32

(emphasis added). That is why Justice Ginsburg determined

that the “Court has never rejected [the balancing] formulation,

and [did] not believe it [did] so” in Winter. Id. at 51

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

That reading of Winter comports with the Supreme

Court’s following opinion on temporary equitable orders,

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), decided in the same

term just five months later (with both opinions written by

Chief Justice Roberts). There the Court explained that a

district court must undertake “consideration of [the] four

factors.” Id. at 434. “Once an applicant satisfies the first two

factors, the traditional [equitable relief] inquiry calls for

assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the

public interest.” Id. at 435. Though Nken dealt with the

issuance of a stay pending appeal, the Court explained that

8

the same factors apply as in the preliminary injunction

context “not because the two are one and the same, but

because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may

allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that

action has been conclusively determined.” Id. at 434. Read

together, these companion cases promote the traditional

flexibility to granting interim equitable relief in which the

district court has full discretion to balance the four factors

once gateway thresholds are met. See id.; Winter, 555 U.S. at

32.

Second, other circuits have agreed with our reading of

Winter and Nken. For instance, the Seventh Circuit, citing

Winter, has held that a preliminary injunction may issue if the

movant demonstrates it will face irreparable harm and has a

“plausible claim on the merits,” after which “the ‘balance of

equities’ favors” the movant. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec.

Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725

(7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, C.J.). “How strong a claim on

the merits is enough depends on the balance of the harms: the

more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the

plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still supporting

some preliminary relief.” Id. Similarly, citing Winter, the

D.C. Circuit has declined “to abandon the so-called ‘sliding

scale’ approach to weighing the four preliminary injunction

factors” and held that a “party seeking a preliminary

injunction must make a clear showing that [the] four factors,

taken together, warrant relief . . . .” League of Women Voters

of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). The Second

Circuit also has interpreted Winter and Nken as permitting a

district court to continue a “flexible approach” in granting

preliminary equitable relief, and that if those cases meant “to

abrogate the more flexible standard for a preliminary

injunction, one would expect some reference to the

considerable history of the flexible standards applied in [the

9

Second Circuit], seven [other] sister circuits, and the Supreme

Court itself.” Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special

Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 37-38 (2d Cir.

2010). We find that reasoning persuasive.

Third, no test for considering preliminary equitable

relief should be so rigid as to diminish, let alone disbar,

discretion. District courts have the freedom to fashion

preliminary equitable relief so long as they do so by

“exercising their sound discretion.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24

(quotation omitted). Because those courts are on the frontline

and are much more familiar with the unique facts of a

particular case, we apply a deferential standard in reviewing

their decisions on preliminary equitable relief—abuse of

discretion. See Campbell Soup Co., 977 F.2d at 91 (quotation

omitted). Indeed, “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has

been the power of the [court] to do equity and to mould each

decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility

rather than rigidity has distinguished it.” Weinberger v.

Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quotations

omitted).

Fourth, disallowing a district court from balancing the

four factors is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s post-

Winter instruction in Nken that, when evaluating whether

interim equitable relief is appropriate, “[t]he first two factors

of the traditional standard are the most critical.” 556 U.S. at

434. An Opticians Association of America standard—in

which all four factors are effectively critical in equal

recourse—is logically incompatible with Nken’s

unambiguous holding. What would be the point of creating

two gateway factors by placing elevated value on them if all

are equally imperative? There would be none. And to

require a moving party to prevail on all factors reads out

balancing when not all factors favor that party.

10

Accordingly, we follow our precedent that a movant

for preliminary equitable relief must meet the threshold for

the first two “most critical” factors: it must demonstrate that

it can win on the merits (which requires a showing

significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more

likely than not3) and that it is more likely than not to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief4. If

these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the

remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion

3

We do not require at the preliminary stage a more-

likely-than-not showing of success on the merits because a

“‘likelihood’ [of success on the merits] does not mean more

likely than not.” Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram,

650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); cf. Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (“It is not enough that the chance

of success on the merits be better than negligible[,]” and

“more than a mere ‘possibility’ of relief is required.”

(quotations omitted)). Of historical note, not only did

Transamerican Trailer require nothing more than “a

reasonable probability of eventual success,” 501 F.2d at 919-

20, cases of our Court before Transamerican Trailer did the

same. A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440

F.3d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1971) (Seitz, C.J.); Ikirt v. Lee Nat’l

Corp., 358 F.2d 726, 727 (3d Cir. 1966). Also of interest is

that neither of the latter two cases spoke of any showing

needed for a preliminary injunction beyond a reasonable

chance of success on the merits and irreparable harm to the

movant.

4

For example, the availability of money damages for

an injury typically will preclude a finding of irreparable harm.

See, e.g., Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988).

11

if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting

the requested preliminary relief. In assessing these factors,

Judge Easterbrook’s observation bears repeating: “How

strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance

of the harms: the more net harm an injunction can prevent,

the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while

still supporting some preliminary relief.” Hoosier Energy,

582 F.3d at 725.

B. The District Court Erred in Its Preliminary

Injunction Analysis

In considering whether to grant preliminary injunctive

relief, the District Court observed that Defendants failed to

produce evidence that “made a clear showing” the ordinance

was narrowly tailored. J.A. at 35. Yet it determined that

Plaintiffs bore the burden of demonstrating their likelihood of

success on the merits, and they failed to do so on the scant

record before it. Plaintiffs contend that the District Court

erred in placing this burden on them. We agree.

In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction,

plaintiffs normally bear the burden of demonstrating a

sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits. However, in

First Amendment cases where “the Government bears the

burden of proof on the ultimate question of [a statute’s]

constitutionality, [plaintiffs] must be deemed likely to prevail

[for the purpose of considering a preliminary injunction]

unless the Government has shown that [plaintiffs’] proposed

less restrictive alternatives are less effective than [the

statute].” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). This

is because “the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage

track the burdens at trial,” and for First Amendment purposes

they rest with the Government. Gonzales v. O Centro

Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 546 U.S. 418,

12

429 (2006). That was not done here, as the District Court

applied the usual standard of placing the burden on Plaintiffs.

Defendants argue that neither party had alerted the

Court of this narrow exception to the burden-shifting

framework applied to requests for preliminary injunctions in

First Amendment cases. They insist that, had Plaintiffs raised

this issue, Defendants “would have requested a full hearing”

to present more fully their case as to the likelihood of success

on the merits. Appellees’ Br. 26. Because, as determined at

oral argument, neither party was aware of the applicable

burden-shifting standard in this case, on remand Defendants

are afforded the opportunity to bear their burden of showing

that the ordinance is narrowly tailored. The District Court

can then consider anew the request for preliminary injunctive

relief in the clarified context noted above. We thus vacate

and remand.

13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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