Gatz v. Brown

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Appellate Court Date: 2017.05.09

13:32:59 -05'00'

Gatz v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160579

Appellate Court RANDALL GATZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOROTHY BROWN, in

Caption Her Official Capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County,

and MARIA PAPPAS, in Her Official Capacity as Treasurer of Cook

County, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division

Docket No. 1-16-0579

Filed March 16, 2017

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-CH-7270; the

Review Hon. Rodolfo Garcia, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Siprut PC, of Chicago (Joseph J. Siprut, Todd L. McLawhorn, and

Appeal John S. Marrese, of counsel), for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Donald J. Pechous,

Sisavanh Baker, and Margarett Zilligan, Assistant State’s Attorneys,

of counsel), for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Randall Gatz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brought

this putative class action lawsuit against defendants Dorothy Brown, in her capacity as clerk of

the circuit court of Cook County, and Maria Pappas, in her capacity as treasurer of Cook

County, challenging the constitutionality of the $10 children’s waiting room fee (Room Fee)

assessed to all civil litigants who file an initial pleading in the circuit court. The trial court

granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice pursuant to section

2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)). For the reasons

stated below, we affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On January 13, 2013, plaintiff filed a civil case in which he was the sole plaintiff at the

Rolling Meadows courthouse. At that time, plaintiff paid a filing fee of $567, which included

the $10 Room Fee. On May 4, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for class certification to file an

action on behalf of himself and “All persons who paid the Children’s Waiting Room Fee to the

Cook County Clerk’s Office or Treasurer’s Office.” That same day, plaintiff filed his class

action complaint. In his complaint, plaintiff contended that the Room Fee is actually a

litigation tax because it is not related to the service being provided, which is courtroom

administration. Plaintiff asserted that the Room Fee therefore violated the free access and due

process clauses of the Illinois Constitution because it imposes the burden on funding the

children’s waiting room on all civil litigants, rather than on those who actually use the waiting

room. Plaintiff further contended that the Room Fee violated the uniformity and equal

protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution because the fee is over-inclusive. Plaintiff finally

contended that defendants had been unjustly enriched by collecting the Room Fee from all

civil litigants. Plaintiff requested relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the Room

Fee is invalid, an injunction prohibiting the clerk from assessing the Room Fee, and a return of

the Room Fees paid by all civil litigants within the past five years.

¶4 In response, defendants filed a motion pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice contending that the Room Fee does not violate the Illinois

Constitution because the children’s waiting room improves the overall administration of

justice. Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial

court found that the Room Fee did not violate the Illinois Constitution because the children’s

waiting room is part of the operation and maintenance of the courts. The court noted that

although the courthouse where plaintiff filed his 2013 civil case did not have a children’s

waiting room, plaintiff could request that his case be transferred to a courthouse that did have a

waiting room. This appeal follows.

¶5 II. ANALYSIS

¶6 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in granting defendants’ motion to

dismiss, finding the Room Fee constitutional. Plaintiff maintains that the Room Fee violates

the free access and due process clauses because it functions as a tax that does not relate to the

necessary operation and maintenance of the courts. Plaintiff further asserts that the Room Fee

violates the uniformity and equal protection clauses because it is over-inclusive given that the

vast majority of litigants who pay the fee will never use the children’s waiting room or benefit

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from the service.

¶7 A. Section 2-615

¶8 “A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based

on defects apparent on its face.” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463,

473 (2009); 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012). The question presented by a section 2-615 motion

is “whether the allegations of the complaint, when taken as true and viewed in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be

granted.” Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (2009). In ruling on a

section 2-615 motion, we may consider only those facts apparent from the face of the

pleadings, matters of which this court may take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the

record. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473 (citing Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v.

Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 115 (1995)). We review de novo the

circuit court’s order granting defendants’ section 2-615 motion and dismissing plaintiff’s

complaint. Performance Electric, Inc. v. CIB Bank, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1039 (2007).

¶9 B. Presumption of Constitutionality

¶ 10 At the outset, we note that we presume that statutes are constitutional. Arangold Corp. v.

Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003). “The party challenging a statute carries the burden of

rebutting that presumption and ‘clearly establishing’ its unconstitutionality.” Id. (quoting

Russell v. Department of National Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998)). A reviewing court

should uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever reasonably possible. Id. We review

the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Id.

¶ 11 C. Facial or As-Applied Challenge

¶ 12 In their brief, defendants contend that plaintiff is presenting a facial challenge to the Room

Fee statute. In his reply brief, plaintiff contends that his challenge is “both a facial challenge

and an as-applied challenge.” Plaintiff acknowledges that he contends that the Room Fee is

unconstitutional on its face but, in the alternative, asks this court to find that the statute is

unconstitutional with respect to plaintiff and all litigants who filed cases in courthouses that do

not have a children’s waiting room. Plaintiff’s argument, however, does not reflect this

alternative as-applied challenge.

¶ 13 “An as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it

applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL

118151, ¶ 36 (citing People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 117 (2006)). Here, plaintiff contends

that the Room Fee is unconstitutional because, inter alia, it is in actuality a litigation tax

because it is not related to the service being provided, courtroom administration. This is

substantively a facial challenge, which requires a showing that the “statute is unconstitutional

under any set of facts, i.e., the specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant.” Id.;

see also Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442 (2006). This is reflected in plaintiff’s prayer for

relief in his complaint where he requested that the treasurer refund all Room Fees paid by the

class, which consisted of all persons who paid the Room Fee in the last five years, not just

those who filed in courthouses without a children’s waiting room. We, therefore, limit our

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constitutional analysis to plaintiff’s facial challenge to the Room Fee statute.1

¶ 14 1. Facial Challenge

¶ 15 As defendants point out “[a] facial challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative

enactment is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully [citation], because an

enactment is facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be

valid.” Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-06 (2008); see also In re M.T., 221

Ill. 2d 517, 536 (2006) (“Successfully making a facial challenge to a statute’s constitutionality

is extremely difficult, requiring a showing that the statute would be invalid under any

imaginable set of circumstances.” (Emphasis in original.)). Since a successful facial challenge

will void the statute for all parties in all contexts, “[f]acial invalidation is, manifestly, strong

medicine that has been employed by the court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Pooh-Bah Enterprises, 232 Ill. 2d at 473 (quoting National

Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998)). “The invalidity of the statute in

one particular set of circumstances is insufficient to prove its facial invalidity.” In re M.T., 221

Ill. 2d at 536-37.

¶ 16 D. The Room Fee Statute

¶ 17 The Room Fee statute provides:

“The expense of establishing and maintaining a children’s waiting room for children

whose parents or guardians are attending a court hearing as a litigant, witness, or for

other court purposes as determined by the court may be borne by the county. To defray

that expense in any county having established a children’s waiting room or that elects

to establish such a system, the county board may require the clerk of the circuit court in

the county to charge and collect a children’s waiting room fee of not more than $10

through December 31, 2021 and not more than $8 on and after January 1, 2022. The fee

shall be paid at the time of filing the first pleading, paper, or other appearance filed by

each party in all civil cases. No additional fee shall be required if more than one party is

presented in a single pleading, paper, or other appearance. The fee shall be collected in

the manner in which all other fees or costs are collected.” Pub. Act 99-859, § 5 (eff.

Aug. 19, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 105/27.7).

¶ 18 E. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Challenges

¶ 19 1. Free Access and Due Process Clauses

¶ 20 Plaintiff first contends that the Room Fee violates the free access and due process clauses

of the Illinois Constitution because it is a court filing fee that does not relate to the necessary

operation and maintenance of the courts. Plaintiff maintains that a minority of litigants use, or

even benefit from, the children’s waiting room, and that half of the courthouses in Cook

County do not even have a children’s waiting room. Plaintiff asserts that a children’s waiting

room is, therefore, unnecessary to the overall operation and maintenance of the court system

1

Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, we would find plaintiff’s purported as-applied

challenge to the Room Fee statute meritless.

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and the Room Fee should be charged only to those who use the services provided by the

waiting room, rather than to all civil litigants.

¶ 21 The free access clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[e]very person shall find a

certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs” and “shall obtain justice by law, freely,

completely, and promptly.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12. The free access clause serves to

protect litigants from the imposition of fees that interfere with their rights to a remedy in the

law or impede the administration of justice. Rose v. Pucinski, 321 Ill. App. 3d 92, 99 (2001).

The free access clause qualifies the due process standard by imposing the additional

requirement that court filing fees must be related to the operation and maintenance of the court

system. Id. If legislation is found constitutional under the free access clause, it is also

constitutional under the broader due process standard. Id.; see also Lipe v. O’Connor, 2014 IL

App (3d) 130345, ¶ 11.

¶ 22 In contending that the Room Fee violates the free access clause, plaintiff relies on Crocker

v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444 (1984), and Boynton v. Kusper, 112 Ill. 2d 356 (1986). In Crocker, the

supreme court found that a $5 filing fee imposed on petitioners for dissolution of marriage to

fund shelters and services for victims of domestic violence was unconstitutional. Crocker, 99

Ill. 2d at 457. The court found that the fee violated the due process and equal protection clauses

of the Illinois Constitution because there was no rational relationship between the imposition

of the fee and court operations. Id. at 455. The court determined that the fee amounted to a

litigation tax because it served the purpose of funding general revenue from a select group of

court users. Id. The court recognized that the domestic violence shelters and programs were

available to all adults and their dependents who were the subjects of domestic violence, and

there was no relationship between dissolution petitioners and those who could use the

programs. Id. at 456. The court determined that court filing fees and litigation taxes may be

imposed only for purposes “relating to the operation and maintenance of the courts.” Id. at 454.

¶ 23 In Boynton, the supreme court struck down a similar fee imposed upon those who applied

for marriage licenses. The statute at issue in that case required county clerks to pay $10 of the

fee collected for issuing a marriage license into the Domestic Violence Shelter and Service

Fund. Boynton, 112 Ill. 2d at 361. The supreme court determined that the charge violated the

Illinois Constitution’s due process clause because the charge was a tax that bore no

relationship to the county clerk’s service of issuing and recording licenses. Id. at 365. The

supreme court noted that “[i]n considering the reasonableness of a classification from a due

process point of view, under either the police power or the taxing power of the State, ‘it must

appear that the particular classification is based upon some real and substantial difference in

kind, situation or circumstance in the persons or objects on which the classification rests, and

which bears a rational relation to the evil to be remedied and the purpose to be attained by the

statute.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 366-67 (quoting Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412

Ill. 179, 193-94 (1952)). The supreme court held that the relationship between the purchase of

a marriage license and domestic violence was too remote to satisfy the rational basis test. Id. at

367-68.

¶ 24 Plaintiff contends that like in Crocker and Boynton, there is no rational relation between

charging the Room Fee to all civil litigants who file an initial pleading and the administration

of the court system. However, we find plaintiff’s reliance on these cases misplaced. In

Crocker, the fee was imposed only on parties applying for a marriage license or seeking

dissolution of their marriage, excluding others who could also benefit from domestic violence

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services. Crocker, 99 Ill. 2d at 450. The court found that there was no significant connection

between the parties who paid the fee and use of the domestic violence shelters and that the fee

ultimately went into the state treasury to fund a general welfare program. Id. at 450-51.

Accordingly, the supreme court determined the fee was in fact a tax and explained that a fee

was compensation for services rendered by public officers, while a tax was for general revenue

purposes. Id. at 452. The court determined that the relationship between marital parties and

domestic violence was too remote to support validity of the fee. Similarly, in Boynton, the

court found that the tax on marriage license applicants was arbitrary because there was only a

remote relationship between those who were being taxed and those who were benefitting from

that tax. Boynton, 112 Ill. 2d at 367-68.

¶ 25 Here, in contrast, the Room Fee is assessed on all civil litigants and supports ancillary court

services. The fee is used to compensate the court for services that allow parents and guardians

who are visiting the courthouse to use the children’s waiting room while they conduct court

business. As the supreme court stated in Crocker, court filing fees and litigation taxes may be

imposed for purposes “relating to the operation and maintenance of the courts.” Crocker, 99

Ill. 2d at 454. Establishing and maintaining a children’s waiting room in the courthouse for use

only by those parents or guardians with court business is plainly “relat[ed] to the operation and

maintenance of the courts.” Id. Thus, the concerns that the supreme court voiced in Boynton

and Crocker regarding the remoteness between those being taxed and those benefitting from

the tax are not present here.

¶ 26 Rather, in the instant case, the creation and funding of the children’s waiting room benefits

the overall administration of justice by easing the burden on court personnel and giving

children a safe environment within the court house. In presenting Public Act 89-717,2 the

proponent stated that the children’s waiting room was a “response to a need that has been

observed by all of the people who use those courthouses particularly the judges and attorneys

that many people come to court, involved in litigation, who have small children. They bring the

children with them, but the children have no place to go and they have no one to look after

them and many times they are apparently not only bothersome to court personnel, but certainly

that is not the best environment for the children.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,

Jan. 7, 1997, at 3 (statements of Representative Cowlishaw). Further, Representative

Cowlishaw observed that “it seems to me that everyone who uses the court system and

everyone who serves in this Body has an obligation to the children of Illinois who through no

fault of their own, become involved in something that takes them into a courthouse which for

them is a very unfriendly environment. All this is, is a means of making our legal system a

friendly place for children.” Id. at 12.

¶ 27 Despite the intended purpose of the General Assembly to benefit the overall administration

of justice by establishing a children’s waiting room, plaintiff maintains that a children’s

waiting room is not necessary to the court system. Plaintiff compares the Room Fee to a

parking fee, lunch fee, or transportation fee, contending that charging such fees could arguably

help the administration of justice, but are too remote to bear a rational relation to the court

system. Plaintiff further asserts that the best “proof of the role of the children’s waiting room in

the court system *** is that it is not necessary.” Plaintiff maintains that not every Cook County

2

Initially, the Room Fee was charged in only two Illinois counties, Du Page and Lake, but was later

expanded to all Illinois counties. See Pub. Act 90-117, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1998).

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courthouse has a children’s waiting room and matters such as parking, food, transportation,

and child care are services that should be provided by the private sector, rather than by the

courthouse.

¶ 28 Despite plaintiff’s protestations, the creation of the children’s waiting room benefits the

overall administration of justice and is akin to the fees found constitutional in Ali v. Danaher,

47 Ill. 2d 231 (1970), Rose, 321 Ill. App. 3d 92, Mellon v. Coffelt, 313 Ill. App. 3d 619 (2000)

(upholding an arbitration fee because it benefits the overall administration of justice),

Zamarron v. Pucinski, 282 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1996) (upholding a fee to fund court automation

because it benefits the entire court system), and Wenger v. Finley, 185 Ill. App. 3d 907 (1989)

(upholding a fee assessed to fund dispute resolution centers because it was related to the

operation and maintenance of the court). For instance, in Ali, the supreme court determined

that a $1 law library fee did not violate the free access clause because the library was available

to all litigants and was “conducive to a proper and even improved administration of justice,

which benefits every litigant.” Ali, 47 Ill. 2d at 237. The court determined this was the case

whether the litigant used the law library or not. Id. Thus, plaintiff’s contention that the Room

Fee is not related to the operation and maintenance of the court because not every litigant will

use the children’s waiting room and not every courthouse has a children’s waiting room is

unpersuasive. As this court recognized in Rose, “[b]oth Zamarron and Crocker stand for the

proposition that, within the parameters of the Illinois Constitution, funds obtained via the civil

justice system may be used to pay for expenses incurred by the court system as a whole.” Rose,

321 Ill. App. 3d at 98. We thus find unpersuasive plaintiff’s contentions that the Room Fee

violates the Illinois Constitution because funds obtained by the Room Fee are used to pay for

court services that are not associated with the children’s waiting room. We further note that

“[c]ourts have held that all other statutory fees designated for support of the clerk’s office or

the court system *** to be constitutional.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rose, 321 Ill.

App. 3d at 100. Accordingly, funds obtained via the Room Fee may be used to pay for the

court’s expenses in maintaining and operating a children’s waiting room across the court

system as whole.

¶ 29 In addition, the Room Fee is thus unlike a parking fee or lunch fee, as plaintiff suggests, as

neither food nor parking are related to the operation and maintenance of the courthouse. The

children’s waiting room is maintained for the sole use of parents or guardians who are

“attending a court hearing as a litigant, witness, or for other court purposes.” Thus, the waiting

room is intrinsically tied to the operation and maintenance of the courts, unlike plaintiff’s

proposed parking, lunch, and transportation fees. As the General Assembly recognized, the

purpose of the Room Fee is to make “our legal system a friendly place for children.” We thus

find that the Room Fee satisfies the requirements of the free access clause and the due process

clause because the fee serves solely to improve the overall administration of the court system.

Rose, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 99.

¶ 30 2. Uniformity and Equal Protection Clauses

¶ 31 Plaintiff next contends that the Room Fee violates the uniformity and equal protection

clauses because it is nonuniform and overinclusive because the majority of litigants who pay

the Room Fee will not use or benefit from the service. Plaintiff maintains that in the vast

majority of civil cases, most litigants, witnesses, and others associated with the case will never

use the children’s waiting room. Plaintiff asserts that this is particularly true when a

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corporation is a party to the litigation because corporations will never use the children’s

waiting room. In support of his contention, plaintiff cites figures from the County Board in

2012 which show that approximately 15,000 children used the children’s waiting room, but the

fee was paid by nearly 300,000 litigants.

¶ 32 The uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution provides “[i]n any law classifying the

subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the

subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed uniformly. Exemptions, deductions,

credits, refunds and other allowances shall be reasonable.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 2. The

uniformity clause encompasses the equal protection clause and adds even more limitations on

government. Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 247

(1992) (citing Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 117 Ill. 2d 454, 466-68

(1987)). Thus, “[i]f a tax is constitutional under the uniformity clause, it inherently fulfills the

requirements of the equal protection clause.” Id. Accordingly, we will address plaintiff’s

contention with regard to the uniformity clause.

¶ 33 “To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must (1)

be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and

(2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.”

Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 153 (citing Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance Co. v. Selcke, 179 Ill. 2d

94, 98 (1997)). A party challenging a nonproperty tax classification has the burden of showing

that it is arbitrary or unreasonable, and if the legislative body presents facts that can reasonably

sustain the classification, it must be upheld. Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 248.

¶ 34 Here, plaintiff contends that although the individuals in his proposed class may use the

court system, they may not avail themselves of the children’s waiting room because they either

do not have children or the particular courthouse in which they have chosen to file their action

does not have a children’s waiting room. Defendants respond that plaintiff and the proposed

members of the class are benefitted because parents or guardians who bring their children to

court can leave their children in the waiting room and the children will not cause a distraction

in the courtroom or distract court personnel. We find support for defendants’ rationale in

comments from Representative Cowlishaw who noted when presenting the bill that when

parents or guardians bring their children to the courthouse, “the children have no place to go

and *** have no one to look after them” and that children are often “bothersome to court

personnel.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Jan. 7, 1997, at 3 (statements of

Representative Cowlishaw). Plaintiff has not introduced evidence rebutting these facts, but

merely contends that many of the children in the waiting room are not “needed in court” but are

merely there for the “convenience” of whoever decided to bring their child to court that day.

This argument misses the point and fails to rebut defendants’ and the General Assembly’s

justification. See Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 248-49.

¶ 35 Moreover, there is a real and substantial difference between those who pay the Room Fee

and those who do not. Only civil litigants who file in the circuit court pay the Room Fee. Those

who do not use the services of the court system do not pay the fee. As to the second prong of

the uniformity clause analysis, as discussed above, there is a reasonable relationship between

the tax classification and the object of the legislation, the operation and maintenance of the

court system. It is reasonable to charge the Room Fee only to civil litigants who make use of

the court system to fund a service that benefits only those who use the court system.

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¶ 36 Plaintiff, nonetheless, relies on Primeco Personal Communications v. Illinois Commerce

Comm’n, 196 Ill. 2d 70 (2001), for the proposition that the Room Fee violates the uniformity

clause because it is being charged to many litigants who do not use the children’s waiting

room. Primeco, however, involved a very narrow factual circumstance and the supreme court

has since declined to extend the holding in that case. The supreme court has recognized that

“Primeco involved a factual anomaly that distinguishes it from *** virtually every other of this

court’s uniformity decisions.” Grand Chapter, Order of the Eastern Star of the State of Illinois

v. Topinka, 2015 IL 117083, ¶ 16. In Grand Chapter, the supreme court recognized that

“Primeco does not stand for the broad proposition that the State may impose a tax or fee only

on those who either directly benefit or directly necessitate that tax or fee.” Id. ¶ 17. Instead, the

court noted that “Primeco stands for the very narrow proposition that, when a ‘tax’ or ‘fee’ is

operating effectively and exclusively as a rent payment, it may be charged only to those

actually enjoying the leasehold.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Plaintiff’s contention that the Room

Fee is “a rent payment” is meritless as the Room Fee is not charged in exchange for the use of

anything, but, like other court filing fees “defrays” the costs associated with maintaining and

operating the court system. See id. Despite the narrow holding in Primeco, the supreme court

has repeatedly held that a fee is not unconstitutional merely because all who pay the fee do not

directly benefit. Id. (citing Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 151, and Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v.

Giannoulias, 231 Ill. 2d 62, 71-72 (2008))

¶ 37 We, therefore, find that defendants and the General Assembly have submitted a legally

sufficient justification for imposing the fee on plaintiff and the members of his proposed class,

and plaintiff has failed to rebut that justification. The classification is based on a real and

substantial difference between those who pay the fee and those who do not, and there is a

reasonable relationship between the classification and the objective of the legislation. Where

plaintiff fails to persuade the court that the defendants’ explanation is insufficient as a matter of

law, or unsupported by the facts, the judgment is proper as a matter of law. Geja’s Cafe, 153

Ill. 2d at 248-49. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion

to dismiss where the imposition of the fee does not violate the uniformity clause.3

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 40 Affirmed.

3

In his complaint, plaintiff contended that defendants were unjustly enriched by collecting the

Room Fee. Plaintiff did not raise this argument on appeal but in his reply brief recognizes that this claim

is premised on his constitutional claims. As we find that his constitutional claims fail, his claim for

unjust enrichment must also fail.

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