Sherlyn Brown v. Milwaukee Board of School Dire

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 16-1971

SHERLYN BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MILWAUKEE BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13-C-747 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2016 — DECIDED MAY 4, 2017

____________________

Before BAUER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal under the Americans

with Disabilities Act addresses a disabled employee’s obliga-

tion to participate in identifying reasonable accommodations

for her condition.

Plaintiff Sherlyn Brown was an assistant principal for de-

fendant Milwaukee Public Schools until she badly injured her

knee while restraining a student. When she returned to work

2 No. 16-1971

following surgery, she and her doctor told Milwaukee Schools

that she could not be “in the vicinity of potentially unruly stu-

dents.” Since virtually all students are “potentially” unruly,

Milwaukee Schools understood that limit to bar virtually all

contact with students. It repeatedly communicated that un-

derstanding to Brown as it tried to accommodate her disabil-

ity by finding her a new position. When Brown’s three-year

leave of absence expired before a suitable position was found,

Milwaukee Schools fired her. Brown sued under the Ameri-

cans with Disabilities Act, claiming that her disability had

never prevented interaction with students and that Milwau-

kee Schools failed to accommodate her disability. The district

court granted summary judgment for Milwaukee Schools,

and Brown has appealed.

We affirm. Because Brown and her doctors repeatedly told

Milwaukee Schools that she could not be “in the vicinity of

potentially unruly students,” Milwaukee Schools is not liable

for failing to move her to a position requiring such proximity.

All but one of the other jobs Brown identifies as reasonable

accommodations would have required such proximity. The

lone exception would have been a promotion for which

Brown was not the most qualified candidate. The Act did not

require Milwaukee Schools to promote her as an accommoda-

tion.

I. Legal Framework

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment. Our account of the facts views the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, but we must affirm

if no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-

moving party. White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th

Cir. 2016).

No. 16-1971 3

Our account of the facts will be easier to follow with a brief

outline of the reasonable accommodation duty under the

Americans with Disabilities Act. The Act requires employers

to make “reasonable accommodations that will allow a ‘qual-

ified individual with a disability’ to perform the essential

functions of his or her job.” Miller v. Illinois Dep’t of Transpor-

tation, 643 F.3d 190, 197 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A). “Reassigning disabled employees to vacant

positions that they can perform is a reasonable accommoda-

tion.” Emerson v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 515

(7th Cir. 2001), citing Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154

F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (reasonable

accommodation “may include … reassignment to a vacant

position”).

A disabled employee need not be the most qualified appli-

cant for a vacant position, but she must be qualified for it.

EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012)

(holding that deviation from a best-qualified selection policy

does not always represent an undue hardship for the em-

ployer); Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir.

2005) (“The employer need only transfer the employee to a

position for which the employee is otherwise qualified.”),

quoting Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir.

2000). The Act does not, however, require employers to pro-

mote employees to accommodate them. Malabarba v. Chicago

Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 699 (7th Cir. 1998), citing Shiring v.

Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1996).

Identifying reasonable accommodations for a disabled

employee requires both employer and employee to engage in

a flexible, interactive process. See Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health

4 No. 16-1971

Center, 788 F.3d 276, 292 (7th Cir. 2015), citing Kauffman v. Pe-

tersen Health Care VII, LLC, 769 F.3d 958, 963 (7th Cir. 2014).

Both parties are responsible for that process. If a reasonable

accommodation was available but the employer prevented its

identification by failing to engage in the interactive process,

that failure is actionable. Id. On the other hand, if the em-

ployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-

ployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-

ployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the

disabled employee.” Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores,

Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2014), citing Beck v. University

of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

In light of these principles, the critical facts here concern

(1) the communications between Brown and Milwaukee

Schools about the extent of her restrictions, especially her abil-

ity to be in the vicinity of potentially unruly students; and (2)

the potential reassignments she discussed with Milwaukee

Schools as accommodations for her disability.

A. Brown’s Injuries

In 2006, Brown was an assistant principal for Milwaukee

Schools. She began to experience severe knee pain while per-

forming the duties of that position. Her doctor diagnosed her

with severe arthritis and recommended that she be moved to

a job with limited mobility requirements. For the next few

years, Milwaukee Schools accommodated her by changing

the location of her work and modifying her job duties. It ex-

cused her from breaking up fights and physically intervening

with students, which would normally be an assistant princi-

pal’s responsibility. She arranged those accommodations with

No. 16-1971 5

James Gorton, Milwaukee School’s employment specialist

who continued to work on her case for the remainder of her

employment. During that time, Brown underwent knee re-

placement surgery.

Despite these precautions, Brown injured her knee again

in 2009, not long after her surgery, while restraining an unruly

student. She had another surgery. Her doctor then restricted

her to sedentary work with no student interaction until fur-

ther notice. A few months after her return to work, in May

2010, her doctor clarified that incidental or one-on-one contact

with students “should not be a problem,” but that contact

with out-of-control children or potentially combative stu-

dents should be avoided.

B. Brown’s Leave of Absence

In late July 2010, Brown clarified her medical restriction

again. She had been assigned to a new school building as an

assistant principal. She found that she was expected to “patrol

the halls, [and] be involved in student contact.” She called

Gorton and told him that she still needed to “avoid interaction

with volatile students.” Gorton said he thought her doctor

had changed that limit, and he asked her to have her doctor

confirm that she had that restriction. Two days later, her doc-

tor told Gorton that Brown “should not be in the vicinity of

potentially unruly students.” That restriction, he said, was

“permanent”—it would not be removed for at least three to

four years, if ever. Gorton immediately told Brown that she

could not continue working as an assistant principal and that

she would be on sick pay while he worked with her to find a

new position. He discussed the scope of the search for a re-

placement position with her. She said she was interested in

6 No. 16-1971

positions at or above her pay grade, salary, and number of

working days, and would prefer to remain in her union.

A week later, Gorton sent Brown a list of eight vacant po-

sitions he had considered, including a Student Achievement

Supervisor position, but he explained that he did not believe

any was suitable. For six of the positions, he listed “the job

duties require being in the vicinity of potentially unruly stu-

dents” among the reasons they were unsuitable. For four of

the positions, that was the only listed reason. The Student

Achievement Supervisor position was unsuitable solely be-

cause it required being in the vicinity of potentially unruly

students. Brown did not dispute Gorton’s characterization of

her restriction.

Later that week, Brown expressed interest in two other po-

sitions, including a Charter School Program Officer position.

Gorton told her she was not physically qualified for those po-

sitions because she would “need to be in the schools to inter-

act with students and staff.” Again, Brown did not dispute his

characterization of her restriction.

The next month, Gorton received a letter from an attorney

for Brown’s union. That letter did dispute his understanding

of her restrictions, saying that she was able to “interact[] with

students and staff” but not able to “serve in a position of au-

thority … over potentially unruly students.” Gorton wrote

back disagreeing with the attorney’s characterization and of-

fering to show the attorney the doctor’s specific restrictions.

No one followed up with him, and the conversation ended

there.

Brown had another surgery in late 2010 and was cleared

to return to work in early 2011 with restrictions, including a

No. 16-1971 7

doctor’s instruction to “avoid/no student discipline situa-

tions.” Gorton asked again for clarification and emailed

Brown a questionnaire for her doctor to complete. He also

asked her to review the factual background provided in the

questionnaire, and to let him know if she saw inaccuracies.

That background section quoted the doctor’s earlier statement

that “Ms. Brown should not be in the vicinity of potentially unruly

students.” (Emphasis in original.) It asked the doctor if he was

lifting that restriction and what he meant by “avoid student

discipline situations.” It added parenthetically that “Ms.

Brown does not believe that she should be in the vicinity of

unruly students.”

Brown evidently did not receive that email; two weeks

later, she emailed Gorton to ask why she had not heard from

him to arrange her return to work. He re-sent the email and

asked her to confirm receipt. He then did not hear from

Brown for three weeks, during which he left two voicemails,

sent a certified letter, and finally sent an email indicating he

would deactivate his file if she did not reply. Brown eventu-

ally did reply, and her doctor sent him a response to the ques-

tionnaire. The doctor said that the July 2010 restriction, which

forbade Brown being “in the vicinity of potentially unruly

students,” remained in place. He added that “she should not

be put in a position” to injure her knee “in attempting to sub-

due an unruly student.”

Brown later applied for two positions with Milwaukee

Schools: a GE Grant Administrator Position and a Title I Co-

ordinator position. She was not selected for either position.

She met with Gorton about the reassignment process on Oc-

tober 14, 2011. Each of them later summarized the meeting in

an email to the other. According to Gorton, Brown asked why

8 No. 16-1971

she still had not been given a position, and Gorton told her

that her work restrictions left very few positions with Mil-

waukee Schools available to her: “most jobs in the district re-

quire interaction with students who may be unruly.” Brown’s

account is similar. According to her, Gorton told her that

“every job in the district required individuals to work with

students, except highly specific positions,” and that she

“could not be around potentially unruly students.” Brown

did not disagree with that characterization of her restriction.

Around the same time, Brown was evaluated by a physi-

cian in connection with her disability benefits. That doctor

also imposed “permanent work restrictions,” including in-

structions to “avoid circumstances where unruly behavior

may occur. Avoid contact with unruly individuals and situa-

tions where potentially unruly behavior may occur.” One

month later, in November 2011, Brown asked Gorton about a

Student Achievement Supervisor position, which he ex-

plained involved “working in the presence of potentially un-

ruly students.” A similar conversation occurred in early 2012:

Brown called Gorton to ask about a Student Services Coordi-

nator position, and he said she was not physically qualified

for the position.

C. Brown’s Termination

About two and a half years later, Milwaukee Schools sent

Brown a letter warning her that she had nearly exhausted the

three years of leave of absence to which she was entitled.

Brown’s doctor then called Gorton to ask for a list of the es-

sential functions of the Assistant Principal position. Gorton

replied with a list, adding that the job included “working in

the vicinity of potentially unruly students” and asking for an

update on Brown’s work restrictions. Brown’s doctor replied

No. 16-1971 9

that Brown could return to work with restrictions. He ex-

plained that Brown “should not be put in a position where she

is responsible for monitoring and controlling students that

may become uncontrollable.” The doctor added: “I see no rea-

son why she could not be around students; she just must not

be responsible for controlling those students and it would

seem that Security should be available to handle such things.”

After receiving that evaluation, Milwaukee Schools

searched its available positions and identified four vacant lat-

eral positions, including a Charter School Program Officer

and a Student Services Coordinator position. It concluded

that Brown was not medically qualified to perform either of

those positions because they would involve being around po-

tentially unruly students and potentially monitoring or con-

trolling those students. Because Milwaukee Schools con-

cluded that Brown could not perform the essential functions

of any available position, it terminated her employment.

Brown filed suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Fol-

lowing amendments, her complaint claimed that Milwaukee

Schools had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by failing to accommodate her disability

and then terminating her. After conducting discovery, both

parties moved for summary judgment. The district court

granted Milwaukee Schools’ motion and denied Brown’s.

III. Analysis

Brown contends on appeal that Milwaukee Schools should

have accommodated her disability by reinstating her as Assis-

tant Principal or by reassigning her to any one of five vacant

positions: Student Achievement Supervisor, Student Services

10 No. 16-1971

Coordinator, Charter School Program Officer, GE Grant Ad-

ministrator, and Title I Coordinator. Milwaukee Schools ar-

gues that because Brown could not be in the vicinity of poten-

tially unruly students, she was not qualified to perform the

essential functions of either her Assistant Principal position or

the first four vacant positions. It argues that the final vacant

position would have been a promotion for which she was not

the most qualified candidate.

The undisputed facts show that Brown told Milwaukee

Schools that she could not work in the presence of students.

They also show that all but one of the identified vacant posi-

tions required work in the presence of students. Brown there-

fore did not give Milwaukee Schools the information it

needed to accommodate her in those positions, and it is not

liable for not assigning her to them. As for the last possible

position, we agree with Milwaukee Schools that it would have

been a promotion it was not required to offer Brown.

A. Qualified to Perform Essential Functions

Milwaukee Schools believes that, with or without reason-

able accommodation, Brown was not qualified for either the

Assistant Principal position or four of the alternative vacant

positions because those positions required her to be in the vi-

cinity of potentially unruly children, which she was unable to

do. Brown disagrees, arguing that she was able to be near po-

tentially unruly students, and that, in any case, none of the

positions required such contact.

1. Brown’s Restrictions

As noted above, identifying reasonable accommodations

for a disabled employee requires both employer and em-

ployee to engage in a flexible, interactive process. See Stern,

No. 16-1971 11

788 F.3d at 292. The key principle for purposes of this case is

that if the employee “does not provide sufficient information

to the employer to determine the necessary accommodations,

the employer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate

the disabled employee.” Reeves, 759 F.3d at 702.

Such a situation occurred in Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d

1070 (7th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff in that case had a condition

that restricted her breathing. It was dangerous for her to be

exposed to certain chemicals, which limited the jobs she could

perform at the chemical company where she worked. She in-

itially gave her employer a doctor’s note ordering that she not

be exposed to chemicals, a restriction “the company took …

seriously.” Id. at 1072. “Given the blanket nature” of that re-

striction, “the obligation fell” to the plaintiff “to update or fur-

ther clarify the kinds of work she could do.” Id. She did not

do so.

When the company offered Steffes a reassignment condi-

tioned on her doctor’s approval, her doctor’s reply “failed to

address the exposure issues” the company asked about, and

“displayed a poor understanding” of the company’s opera-

tions. Id. at 1072–73. The company explained that to the plain-

tiff and did not offer her the reassignment, but asked her to

update it if her condition changed. The plaintiff “did not pro-

vide any further information to the company,” and thereby

“failed to hold up her end of the interactive process.” Id. at

1073.

Brown’s case parallels Steffes. She repeatedly presented

Milwaukee Schools with a broad restriction for a school sys-

tem: she needed to avoid proximity to potentially unruly stu-

dents. Essentially all students are potentially unruly. Milwau-

kee Schools was always clear about its understanding of her

12 No. 16-1971

restrictions, and Brown never challenged that understanding.

Gorton repeatedly told Brown that she could not perform po-

sitions that required being “in the vicinity of potentially un-

ruly students.” He said that she was not qualified for a posi-

tion because she would “need to be in the schools to interact

with students and staff.” In Brown’s retelling of one meeting,

Gorton told her (not surprisingly, we must add) that almost

“every job in the district required individuals to work with

students.” Nowhere in the record did Brown tell him he had

misunderstood her abilities and limitations. 1

She points out that on four occasions, other people acting

on her behalf challenged Milwaukee School’s understanding.

On three of those occasions, however, the undisputed facts

show that Milwaukee Schools sought clarification and either

did not receive any or was again told that she could not be

near students. On the fourth and final occasion, Milwaukee

1Two points in the record, both in Brown’s deposition, ambiguously

suggest such a correction, but neither would justify denying summary

judgment. In the first, Brown described her 2012 conversation with Gorton

about the Student Services Coordinator position. She said that he told her

she was not physically qualified and that “there was a disagreement … in

the conversation … I told him that I would not be controlling the stu-

dents.” Later in the deposition, discussing a different position, Brown said

that she agreed “at that particular time” that the job duties required being

in the vicinity of potentially unruly students, but that that “has changed

to the degree that I had to explain to him at a later date that not knowing

how he was coming up with it and the information that he was getting in

terms of me not being qualified because of my medical condition, it did

not change, but my interpretation of what he was telling me changed. And

I began—and I challenged him after that in terms of the positions that he

offered me.” It is unclear from those comments what she communicated

to Gorton, and neither comment addressed Brown’s medical restrictions,

focusing instead on the duties of particular positions.

No. 16-1971 13

Schools appropriately interpreted the comment in the context

of earlier exchanges.

The first instance began in May 2010. In that month,

Brown’s doctor modified her work restrictions, which had

previously prohibited student interaction, to allow incidental

contact between Brown and students. But when Milwaukee

Schools assigned Brown to a school where, in her words, she

was expected to “patrol the halls, [and] be involved in student

contact,” she immediately called Gorton and told him that her

restriction had not changed: she still needed to “avoid inter-

action with volatile students.” Two days later, her doctor con-

firmed that, sending Milwaukee Schools a much more restric-

tive letter. The letter said Brown was permanently unable to

be “in the vicinity of potentially unruly students.” It enclosed

the doctor’s recent examination notes, which said Brown

needed to be in a position “that doesn’t require her to deal

with children with lots of movement.”

On the second occasion, Brown’s union’s attorney sent

Gorton a letter explaining that Brown was able to “interact[]

with students and staff” and that Gorton’s contrary belief was

“at best, in error.” If that were correct, that would be im-

portant, of course. Gorton wrote back, disagreeing and offer-

ing to show the attorney the doctor’s letter with its greater re-

strictions. There is no evidence that the union attorney or any-

one else followed up with Gorton.

The third occasion was Brown’s 2011 return to work fol-

lowing a surgery. Her work restrictions did not include the

earlier broad ban on working “in the vicinity of potentially

unruly students,” but instead instructed her to avoid “student

discipline situations.” Gorton asked for clarification, quoting

14 No. 16-1971

the earlier restriction and asking whether the doctor was lift-

ing it. The doctor replied that the earlier restriction “remains

in place.”

The fourth and final occasion was in August 2014, four

days before Brown’s leave of absence expired. Brown’s doctor

sent Gorton a fitness-for-duty certificate. The attached patient

examination notes said that there was “no reason why she

could not be around students; she just must not be responsible

for controlling those students.” They said that she, “as before,

should not be put in a position where she is responsible for

monitoring and controlling students.” The notes did not claim

to change Brown’s restrictions. Some of the language is broad

and ambiguous, referring to situations “where there could be

some question” of controlling a student and noting that secu-

rity should be available to control students.

By then, Milwaukee Schools had believed for four years

that Brown could not be near “potentially unruly” students.

It had been told that restriction was permanent. The 2014 doc-

tor’s note did not say Milwaukee Schools had been wrong,

and it did not say the situation had changed. Milwaukee

Schools had twice before been given doctor’s notes that ap-

peared to loosen the restrictions on Brown, only to be told

later that the strict restriction remained in place. Given that

history, we do not believe a reasonable jury could find that the

last-minute and ambiguous doctor’s note, which did not ad-

dress that history, adequately informed Milwaukee Schools

that Brown’s limitations were no longer as restrictive.

The undisputed facts show that Milwaukee Schools acted

consistently with the restrictions imposed by Brown’s doctors,

which said that Brown simply could not work in the vicinity

of potentially unruly students. To the extent Brown is arguing

No. 16-1971 15

that her restrictions were less severe than Milwaukee Schools

believed, the undisputed facts show that Brown “failed to

hold up her end of the interactive process by clarifying the

extent of her medical restrictions.” Steffes, 144 F.3d at 1073.

Milwaukee Schools accordingly cannot be held liable for fail-

ing to put her in a position it believed would exceed those re-

strictions.

2. Essential Functions

Brown argues that being in the vicinity of potentially un-

ruly students was not an essential function of any of the posi-

tions she requested, for two reasons. First, she asserts, citing

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), that being in such proximity is a

description of work environment, not a description of a job

function. Second, she argues that such proximity is not an es-

sential function according to any of the factors courts usually

consider: it is not listed on any job descriptions, for example,

nor do any of the positions exist to perform it. See Dunderdale

v. United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d 849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2015)

(courts should examine several factors to determine essential

functions, including the employer’s judgment and the written

job description), citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(n)(1)-(3).

Brown’s rigid distinction between work environment and

job functions is not realistic. Some job functions can be per-

formed without regard to some aspects of work environment.

In many office environments, for example, it may be possible

to change the temperature, lighting, or desk arrangements to

accommodate someone’s needs. But sometimes a job function

requires a specific work environment. Lawn maintenance

cannot be performed indoors; a jockey must often work atop

a horse; receptionists must be near office visitors. Section

16 No. 16-1971

1630.2(o)(1)(ii) does not say otherwise. It simply lists changes

to work environment as one possible way of accommodating

a disabled employee. Neither Brown’s evidence nor her argu-

ments suggest that the positions she wanted could have been

modified to avoid student contact.

Brown’s second argument is similarly artificial. She fo-

cuses on a narrow framing of her restriction, ignoring the log-

ical consequences of that restriction. If Brown could not be

near students, then she could not meet with students, could

not walk down school hallways during the school day, could

not sit in on classes, etc. Milwaukee Schools argues this means

she could not perform: (1) the Assistant Principal position, be-

cause it would require her to be in schools overseeing their

day-to-day operations; (2) the GE Grant Administrator posi-

tion, because it would require her to attend and lead meetings

at which students were present and in schools in which stu-

dents were present; (3) the Student Achievement Supervisor

position, because it would require her to conduct classroom

observations and work daily in schools; (4) the Charter School

Program Officer, because it would require in-school compli-

ance checks and classroom observations; and (5) the Student

Services Coordinator position, because it would require in-

school meetings with students with serious disciplinary prob-

lems. To support these points, Milwaukee Schools relies on

job descriptions, affidavits from human resources employees,

and Brown’s deposition testimony. Brown offers nothing to

contradict these points, so we must agree with Milwaukee

Schools. See Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487,

490 (7th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner

Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (non-moving

No. 16-1971 17

party must identify “with reasonable particularity the evi-

dence upon which the party relies”), citing Johnson v. Cam-

bridge Industries, Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003).

B. Promotion

Our discussion so far has eliminated from consideration

four of the five positions Brown requested. The remaining po-

sition, the Title I Coordinator position, did not require prox-

imity to students. Milwaukee Schools contends that it was a

promotion and that Brown was not the most qualified candi-

date, and therefore it was not obligated to give her the posi-

tion. See Malabarba, 149 F.3d at 699 (“[A]n employer does not

have to accommodate a disabled employee by promoting him

or her to a higher level position.”). Brown does not contend

that she was the most qualified candidate but instead argues

that the position would not have been a promotion.

Milwaukee Schools advances three reasons that the Title I

Coordinator position would have been a promotion: (1)

Brown’s pay grade would increase; (2) her salary would in-

crease because of the pay grade change and because she

would be working twelve months per year rather than ten;

and (3) the position involved substantially increased respon-

sibilities. Brown disagrees because she did not consider the

position a promotion when she applied because the position’s

salary range included her salary as an assistant principal and

because Milwaukee Schools had previously moved her be-

tween pay grades without classifying the change as a promo-

tion.

Even accepting these factual assertions, as we must on

summary judgment, they do not present a genuine issue of

material fact. Whether a reassignment would be a promotion,

18 No. 16-1971

demotion, or lateral transfer is not determined by the em-

ployee’s perceptions. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d

492, 497 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Employers should reassign the indi-

vidual to an equivalent position, in terms of pay, status, etc.”),

quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). And while Milwaukee

Schools once moved Brown between pay grades without clas-

sifying the change as a promotion, her salary remained the

same despite the change in grade. Brown does not explain

why that happened, nor does she point to evidence that Mil-

waukee Schools could do that again. Most important, Brown

does not dispute that her salary would have increased by

about $20,000 per year if she had taken the Title I Coordinator

position. Cf. Office of the Architect of the Capitol v. Office of Com-

pliance, 361 F.3d 633, 640–41 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding substan-

tial evidence that moving an employee into a position nor-

mally accorded a higher wage grade classification was not a

promotion: the employer “frequently move[d] employees be-

tween positions without changing their pay or wage grade

classification”). Brown does not deny that the Coordinator

position involved twelve months of work rather than the As-

sistant Principal’s ten. Cf. Emerson, 256 F.3d at 515 (“NSP did

not simply transfer Emerson into the available full-time posi-

tion because it would have been a promotion from part-time

status to full-time status.”). Nor does she deny that the posi-

tion involved increased responsibilities. A reasonable jury

would be, and we are, forced to conclude that the Coordinator

position would have been a promotion that the Americans

with Disabilities Act did not require be offered to Brown.

This is an unusual case, and our holding is correspond-

ingly narrow. If Milwaukee Schools, rather than Brown’s doc-

tor, had decided that she could not be near students, we

would have a different case. So too if Milwaukee Schools had

No. 16-1971 19

not communicated its understanding of Brown’s restrictions

to her or if it had not sought clarification when it received con-

tradictory information. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417

F.3d 789, 808 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment

where employer “did not actively engage in the interactive

process by suggesting possible accommodations or request-

ing information that would help it do so”); Bultemeyer v. Fort

Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)

(reversing summary judgment where employer could have

called to clarify potentially ambiguous doctor’s note but did

not). But the undisputed facts show here Milwaukee Schools

acted on the basis of restrictions imposed by Brown’s doctors

and that no reasonable accommodation of her disability was

possible. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.