Commonwealth v. Champney

J-E03005-16

2017 PA Super 128

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

RONALD GRANT CHAMPNEY

Appellee No. 714 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order April 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001243-1998

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J.,

STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.

OPINION BY MOULTON, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the April 20, 2015

order entered by the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas granting

Ronald Grant Champney’s motion to suppress statements made to police on

May 13, 1998. The trial court concluded that Champney unambiguously

invoked his right to counsel during an interview with police on December 23,

1997 and that, as a result, the statements he made the next May were

obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). While we agree

that Champney successfully invoked his right to counsel, we conclude that,

pursuant to Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), there was a

sufficient break in custody between the invocation and the later questioning

to permit the police to question Champney again after obtaining a proper

J-E03005-16

waiver of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s

suppression of the May 13, 1998 statements.

This case arises from the 1992 shooting death of Roy Bensinger. A

jury convicted Champney of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced him

to death. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of

sentence in 2003. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403 (Pa.

2003), cert. denied, Champney v. Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 939 (2004).

In 2005, Champney filed a timely Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)

petition. On June 3, 2008, the PCRA court granted Champney a new trial,

finding that trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to

seek suppression of statements Champney made to police on May 13, 1998,

and October 8, 1998.1 On April 24, 2013, an evenly divided Pennsylvania

Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s grant of a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 65 A.3d 386 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied,

Pennsylvania v. Champney, 134 S.Ct. 1276 (2014).

Following remand, on February 6, 2015, Champney filed a motion to

suppress statements he gave to Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Sergeant

(“Sgt.”) David Shinskie on November 25, 1997, December 23, 1997, May

13, 1998, and October 8, 1998. On March 13, 2015, the trial court held a

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1

For a discussion of the other grounds on which the PCRA court

granted Champney post-conviction relief, see Commonwealth v.

Champney, 65 A.3d 386, 395-96 (Pa. 2013) (Eakin, J.) (opinion in support

of reversal).

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suppression hearing, after which it set forth the following factual history

regarding these statements:

On October 23, 1997, Champney was arrested and

placed in Schuylkill County Prison in lieu of bail on

unrelated arson charges.[2] Between then and October 8,

1998, Champney had four conversations regarding the

Bensinger case with [Sgt.] Shinskie of the [PSP].

...

On November 25, [1997], Sgt. Shinskie accompanied

[Trooper (“Tpr.”) Denny] Grimm in transporting Champney

from the county prison to his preliminary arraignment [on

the unrelated charges at the Magisterial District Judge’s

(“MDJ”) office.] Tpr. Grimm drove, and Sgt. Shinskie rode

in the backseat with a cuffed Champney.

At the hearing [on Champney’s motion to suppress],

Sgt. Shinskie testified that he was seizing upon every

opportunity to talk with Champney about the Bensinger

case. Sgt. Shinskie allowed Champney to read the arson

complaint[3] and then advised him of his Miranda rights.

____________________________________________

2

In his brief, Champney states that he was first detained in the

Schuylkill County Prison on October 23, 1997 pursuant to charges unrelated

to the Bensinger homicide. A review of the relevant docket – CP-54-CR-

0001206-1997 – shows that on October 23, 1997, Champney was

preliminarily arraigned on a number of charges, including burglary, robbery,

criminal attempt (theft by unlawful taking – moveable property), simple

assault, terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person, and

criminal conspiracy, but not arson. The magisterial district judge set bail at

$100,000 cash, and based on the docket it does not appear that Champney

made bail on those charges.

3

While Champney was charged with additional offenses on November

25, 1997, those charges do not appear to have included arson. The docket

at CP-54-CR-0001277-1997 reveals that Champney was charged with theft

by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and conspiracy. He was not

charged with arson until June of 1998. See CP-54-CR-0000980-1998 and

CP-54-CR-0000981-1998. However, this discrepancy does not change our

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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[Sgt. Shinskie]’s approach to Champney was to engage in

low key conversation, giving Champney information that

he had received during the investigation, and inviting

Champney to comment. On the way back from the MDJ

office, Champney was asked to return with the officers to

the police station to make a statement. Champney

responded that he would have to speak to an attorney

before doing so. Instead of taking him to the police

station, he was returned to the prison. The Commonwealth

has referenced . . . no incriminating statements during this

conversation.

Champney’s preliminary hearing on the arson charges

occurred on December 23, 1997. He was again transported

there by [Sgt.] Shinskie and [Tpr.] Grimm in the same

manner as before. Sgt. Shinskie again advised Champney

of his Miranda rights. After some light conversation,

Champney said, “I see you caught David Blickley.” Sgt.

Shinskie testified that Blickley was an associate of

Champney and was suspected of committing burglaries

and home invasions in the Philadelphia area. Blickley’s ex-

girlfriend was married to Bensinger at the time he was

shot.

Sgt. Shinskie responded to Champney by

acknowledging that Blickley had been caught and telling

Champney that Blickley was giving information regarding

the homicide and Champney’s possible involvement.

Champney said that he knew someone would have to take

the blame. Shinskie asked if Beth Bensinger was involved,

and Champney responded that there was no reason for her

to be involved.

On the return trip to the prison, about one hour later,

Sgt. Shinskie asked Champney if he shot Bensinger.

Champney responded, “Before I make any kind of

statement, I think I should talk to Frank Cori.” Sgt.

Shinskie knew that Frank Cori was an attorney who had

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

analysis, as the timeline relevant to Champney’s statements remains the

same. While the charges may be different, Champney was still charged on

November 25, 1997, preliminarily arraigned that same day, and had a

preliminary hearing on December 23, 1997.

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represented Champney. He was returned to the prison with

no more conversation of note.

The next contact by [Sgt.] Shinskie with Champney

occurred on May 13, 1998. Sgt. Shinskie accompanied

Detective Pummer of the Lehigh County District Attorney’s

Office to see Champney at the prison. Detective Pummer

wanted to question Champney about an arson in

Allentown. They met with Champney in a prison

conference room. Champney was advised of his Miranda

rights and signed a waiver form.

After some questions regarding arsons in Allentown and

Tremont, Sgt. Shinskie told Champney that he believed he

could put together probable cause for homicide charges

against Champney. In response, Champney asked what he

was looking at. When [Sgt.] Shinskie replied that he did

not know, because he could not make deals, Champney

told him to go get Cal Shields, who was then the

[Schuylkill County] District Attorney. After an unsuccessful

attempt to locate Mr. Shields, [Sgt.] Shinskie returned to

the conversation with Champney.

When Sgt. Shinskie noted that a .30 caliber firearm was

used to kill Bensinger, Champney said “Yeah. The guns are

kept in a locker in the basement of the home.” [Sgt.]

Shinskie told Champney that he understood the gun was

destroyed. Champney responded, “That’s a lie. The gun is

not destroyed. I know who has the gun. And they might

have sold it or have it somewhere. But that’s a lie. It was

not destroyed.” When [Sgt.] Shinskie told Champney that

Chris Reber was involved, Champney replied, “No he’s not

involved. He only dropped me off.”

The last conversation between Sgt. Shinskie and

Champney occurred on October 8, 1998. On that date,

Champney was arrested in the instant case. [Sgt.]

Shinskie and [Tpr.] Grimm transported Champney from

the county prison to their barracks. Along the way, [Sgt.]

Shinskie commented that Beth Bensinger had made some

interesting statements concerning Champney’s

involvement in the Roy Bensinger shooting. [Sgt.] Shinskie

testified that his goal was to get Champney to comment.

Champney replied that she probably got immunity.

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Also on the way, [Champney] was given the affidavit of

probable cause to read and thereafter stated that it did not

matter because he was going to die anyway. When [Sgt.]

Shinskie asked what Champney meant, he said he had

tuberculosis and was going to tell his attorney not to

appeal so his death would come sooner. Once they arrived

at the barracks, Champney was read his Miranda rights

and signed the waiver form.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/15, at 1-5.

On April 20, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting the motion

to suppress in part. It suppressed the statements made on May 13 and

October 8, 1998,4 but denied the motion with respect to the statements

made on December 23, 1997. On April 21, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a

timely notice of appeal, certifying that the suppression order “will terminate

or substantially handicap the prosecution.”5 See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). On June

23, 2016, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court. The Commonwealth

filed a petition for reargument en banc, which this Court granted on

September 2, 2016.

The Commonwealth raises two6 issues on appeal:

____________________________________________

4

The trial court found that neither the Commonwealth nor Champney

identified a statement from the November 25, 1997 conversation that the

Commonwealth would want to offer as evidence. Trial Ct. Op. at 6.

5

In its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, the

trial court adopted in full its April 20, 2015 opinion. See Opinion of Court

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, 5/28/15.

6

In its Rule 1925(b) statement, the Commonwealth also challenged

the suppression of Champney’s October 8, 1998 statements. However, the

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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1. Did the lower court err in granting the motion to

suppress statements made to law enforcement

authorities on May 13, 1998 where Champney failed

to make a clear and unambiguous invocation of his

right to counsel?

2. Did the lower court err in granting the motion to

suppress statements made to law enforcement

authorities on May 13, 1998 when there was a

sufficient break in Champney’s custody to end the

presumption of involuntariness established in

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)?

Cmwlth.’s Br. at 4 (trial court answers omitted). Both issues address the

suppression of Champney’s statements on May 13, 1998. Our standard of

review on such matters is well-settled:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression

order, this Court follows a clearly defined scope and

standard of review. We consider only the evidence from

the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of

the prosecution that, when read in the context of the

entire record, remains uncontradicted. This Court must

first determine whether the record supports the factual

findings of the suppression court and then determine the

reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions

drawn from those findings. In appeals where there is no

meaningful dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, our

duty is to determine whether the suppression court

properly applied the law to the facts of the case.

Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 427 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

Commonwealth has voluntarily abandoned this issue. See Cmwlth.’s Br. at

4 n.1.

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Invocation of the Right to Counsel

In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that Champney did not

effectively invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on December 23,

1997 and, therefore, the May 13, 1998 statements are admissible.

According to the Commonwealth, Champney’s statement, “Before I make

any kind of statement, I think I should talk to Frank Cori,” was equivocal and

ambiguous. Cmwlth.’s Br. at 23-24. The Commonwealth relies on Davis v.

United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), in which the United States Supreme

Court upheld the decision of lower courts that the suspect’s use of the

phrase, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was not sufficiently clear to

constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.7 Cmwlth.’s Br. at 23. The

Commonwealth asserts that Champney’s use of the words “think” and

“should” indicated that Champney was considering whether he should

discuss the matter with his attorney before making a statement, rather than

actually requesting to speak with his attorney. Id. Further, the

Commonwealth states “Champney’s words must be considered along with

the description of his body language, demeanor, and voice intonation,” id. at

25, suggesting implicitly that the trial court failed to do so.

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7

The issue before us concerns Champney’s Fifth Amendment right to

counsel under Miranda, as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel that attaches when the Commonwealth initiates adversary judicial

proceedings. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Romine, 682 A.2d 1296, 1298-

99 (Pa.Super. 1996) (discussing differences between right to counsel under

Fifth and Sixth Amendments).

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In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court established that an

accused has the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogations

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. 384 U.S. at 474. This right to counsel is part of “a set of

prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee

against self-incrimination.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269

(2011).

In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed the

consequences of a suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel. The

Edwards court held that “when an accused has invoked his right to have

counsel present during custodial interrogation,” police may not conduct

further interrogations “until counsel has been made available to him, unless

the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or

conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484-85. If police conduct

further interrogations outside the presence of counsel, “the suspect’s

statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as

substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and

his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.”

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991).

To trigger these protections, a defendant’s request for counsel must be

sufficiently clear “that a reasonable police officer would understand the

statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. In

Davis, police officers were investigating a murder that occurred after the

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victim lost a pool-game bet and refused to pay. Id. at 454. Naval criminal

investigators focused on Davis when they discovered that he had been at the

bar on the evening in question and owned a pool cue that was stained with

blood. Id. Davis was brought in for questioning, provided his rights, 8 and

waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. Id. at 454-55. During the

interview, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Id. at 455. In

response, the criminal investigator reminded him of his right to counsel and

asked Davis to clarify whether he wanted a lawyer. Id. Davis responded

that he was not asking for a lawyer and did not want one. Id. However,

one hour later, Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything

else,” at which point investigators ended the interrogation. Id.

The Davis Court declined to disturb the conclusion of the lower courts

that Davis’s “maybe” statement was insufficiently clear to invoke his right to

counsel. Id. at 462. The Court rejected the argument that an equivocal or

ambiguous reference to counsel requires the police to stop questioning a

suspect:

We decline petitioner’s invitation to extend Edwards

and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning

immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or

equivocal reference to an attorney. The rationale

underlying Edwards is that the police must respect a

suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an attorney

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8

Because Davis was an active military service member and the killing

took place on a naval base, Davis was given his rights under Article 31 of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 831.

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present during custodial interrogation. But when the

officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know

whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring

the immediate cessation of questioning “would transform

the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to

legitimate police investigative activity,” Michigan v.

Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 . . . (1975), because it would

needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in

the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to

have a lawyer present. Nothing in Edwards requires the

provision of counsel to a suspect who consents to answer

questions without the assistance of a lawyer.

Id. at 459-60 (some internal citations omitted). The Court went on to

conclude that while “it will often be good police practice for the interviewing

officers to clarify whether or not [a suspect] actually wants an attorney,” the

officers need not do so; instead, they “may continue questioning until and

unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461.

The inquiry into whether or not a suspect has invoked the right to

counsel is an objective one. Id. at 459. The Davis Court explained that a

suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently

clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would

understand the statement be a request for an attorney.” Id.

(emphasis added). However, if the statement is “ambiguous or equivocal in

that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood

only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” police are not

required to cease questioning. Id. (emphasis in original).

Our task, then, is to determine whether Champney “articulate[d] his

desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police

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officer in [Sgt. Shinskie’s] circumstances would understand the statement be

a request for an attorney.” Id. In undertaking that task, we look not only

to the specific words used by Champney, but also at the surrounding

circumstances.9

The first interaction between Champney and Sgt. Shinskie took place

on November 25, 1997, while Champney was detained in county prison on

unrelated charges. N.T., 3/13/15, at 3-4 (“N.T.”); see also note 2, supra.

In an effort to gain information about the Bensinger homicide, Sgt. Shinskie

went with another state trooper to the prison to serve Champney with a

warrant on other unrelated charges and then rode with Champney in a police

cruiser to his preliminary arraignment on those charges.10 N.T. at 4-5. Sgt.

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9

Because context matters, various federal and state appellate courts

have reached different results when analyzing language similar to that used

in Davis and here. Compare United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1146

(8th Cir. 2014) (defendant’s statement “I think I should get [a lawyer]” was

not an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel) and State v. Carter, 172

So.3d 538, 539-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (defendant’s statement that “I

think I should wait to talk with my public defender,” followed by statement

that he wanted to tell “the whole truth” was not unambiguous invocation of

right to counsel) with People v. Romero, 953 P.2d 550, 557 (Colo. 1998)

(defendant’s statement that “I think I should talk to a lawyer” in response to

question about self-defense rationale was sufficient invocation) and Wood

v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 87, 90-92 (2d Cir. 2011) (defendant’s statement “I

think I should get a lawyer,” made before giving videotaped statement was

sufficient to invoke right to counsel).

10

The Commonwealth does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that

Champney was subject to custodial interrogation on November 25, 1997

during the rides from prison to the arraignment and back, as Champney was

questioned by Sgt. Shinskie while “[hand]cuffed, riding in a moving police

vehicle, and in the company of two armed officers.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

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Shinskie wanted Champney to confirm some statements that he had

received from other witnesses. Id. at 5-6. Eventually, Sgt. Shinskie asked

Champney if he would be willing to come to the PSP barracks and give a

statement, to which Champney responded that he would have to speak to an

attorney before going to the barracks. At that point the interrogation ended

and Champney was returned to prison. Id. at 6-7.

On December 23, 1997, Tpr. Grimm and Sgt. Shinskie transported

Champney from the prison to his preliminary hearing on the charges filed in

November. Id. at 7-8. Sgt. Shinskie again sat in the backseat of the PSP

cruiser with Champney while Tpr. Grimm drove. Id. at 8. After Sgt.

Shinskie gave Champney his Miranda warnings, Sgt. Shinskie and

Champney engaged in small talk until Champney said, “I see you caught

Dave Blickley.” Id. at 9. Because Blickley was loosely connected to the

Bensinger investigation,11 Shinskie responded by acknowledging that Blickley

was in custody and that “he was giving information concerning the Roy

Bensinger homicide and also Mr. Champney’s possible involvement.” Id. at

9-10. Champney then said that “he knew somebody was going to have to

take the blame for this.” Id. at 10. When Sgt. Shinskie then asked whether

____________________________________________

11

Sgt. Shinskie testified that Blickley was a “friend or associate of . . .

Champney” who had prior contacts with law enforcement and whose “ex-

wife was married to . . . Bensinger, prior to his demise.” N.T. at 9.

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Beth Bensinger was involved, Champney said “that’s ridiculous” and/or

“there’s no reason for her to be involved in it.” Id.

After reviewing the history of Champney’s relationship with Beth

Bensinger, Sgt. Shinskie told Champney that Dave Blickley appeared to be

“clearing . . . his slate by offering information concerning the Bensinger

homicide” and urged Champney to “step up” and discuss his involvement.

Id. at 12. Sgt. Shinskie then asked Champney, “Did you shoot Roy

Bensinger?” Id. at 14. Champney “mumbled or stammered, hesitated a

little bit, and then said, ‘Before I make any kind of statement, I think I

should talk to Frank Cori.’” Id. Sgt. Shinskie, who knew Cori was an

attorney, then stopped the interrogation. Id. at 55.12

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12

Before the trial court, Champney argued that his statements on

December 23, 1997 should be suppressed because he invoked his right to

counsel on November 25, 1997, and, therefore, the Edwards presumption

applied to his December statements. The trial court rejected this argument,

finding that while Champney may have invoked his right to counsel on

November 25, 1997, on December 23, 1997 Champney initiated the

conversation about the homicide, thus eliminating, albeit temporarily, the

Edwards presumption. Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9. Because Champney re-initiated

the discussion of the homicide on December 23, any earlier invocation of his

right to counsel on November 25 no longer barred Sgt. Shinskie from further

interrogation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (after the right to counsel

had been asserted by an accused, further interrogation of the accused

should not take place “unless the accused himself initiates further

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 712 (Pa. 2015) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hubble, 504 A.2d 168, 175 (Pa. 1986)) (“[A]

confession given after a defendant invokes his right to counsel need not be

suppressed where the defendant: ‘(1) initiated further communication,

exchanges, or conversations with the police, and (2) knowingly and

intelligently waived the right to counsel.’”). As a result, the admissibility of

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The trial court, noting that Sgt. Shinskie knew “Frank Cori was an

attorney,” concluded that “[t]his request by Champney for counsel before

giving any further statements was clear and unambiguous.” Trial Ct. Op. at

12.13 We agree with the trial court and conclude that Champney’s statement

was “sufficiently clear[] that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would

understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S.

at 459. In other words, Champney’s request to speak to Frank Cori, in

context, was sufficiently “unequivocal” and “unambiguous” to satisfy Davis

and secure the protections of Edwards.14

At the time of Champney’s request, Sgt. Shinskie knew that Frank Cori

was an attorney.15 N.T. at 28, 38, 55. Sgt. Shinskie also knew that when

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

Champney’s statements on May 13, 1998 turns first on whether Champney

effectively invoked his right to counsel later on December 23, 1997, after he

re-initiated his discussion with Sgt. Shinskie.

13

The court further observed that Champney’s statement was similar

to the defendant’s second reference to counsel in Davis, and “in both

instances, the agents in Davis and Sgt. Shinskie had no trouble construing

the suspect’s statement that he ‘thinks’ he wants to see an attorney as a

request for counsel.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12. We note that the Davis Court

did not discuss the second statement made by the defendant except to note

that it ended the interrogation. Rather, its analysis focused on Davis’s

equivocal “maybe” statement. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.

14

We agree with Champney and the Commonwealth that Sgt.

Shinskie’s questioning on December 23, 1997 was a “custodial interrogation”

under Miranda.

15

In its suppression ruling, the trial court found that “Sgt. Shinskie

was aware that Frank Cori was an attorney who was associated with

Champney.” Trial Ct. Op. at 12. However, Sgt. Shinskie only testified that

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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he had earlier asked Champney to give a statement about the Bensinger

homicide on November 25, 1997, Champney stated that he would have to

speak to an attorney before going to the police barracks to do so. Id. at 6-

7. Under these circumstances, where Champney was in custody, was asked

directly whether he had committed a murder,16 and identified a particular

lawyer known to his interrogator, a reasonable officer would conclude that

Champney “actually invoked his right to counsel,” Davis at 458 (emphasis in

original) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)), rather than

merely making what “might be a request for an attorney,” id. at 461

(emphasis in original).

The Commonwealth emphasizes Champney’s use of the words “think”

and “should,” arguing that his statement was, as a result, “a communication

fraught with indetermination.” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 24. This focus is too

narrow. Rather, the question is whether, under these specific

circumstances, including his prior request for counsel and his reference to a

particular attorney with whom Sgt. Shinskie was familiar, Champney’s

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

he knew that Frank Cori was an attorney. When asked by the

Commonwealth if he knew “whether or not Mr. Cori was representing Mr.

Champney,” he said “No, I did not.” N.T. at 55. Nevertheless, our

conclusion that Champney sufficiently invoked his right to counsel depends

only on Sgt. Shinskie’s knowledge that Cori was a lawyer, not on whether he

knew Cori’s relationship to Champney.

16

The Commonwealth does not dispute that Champney was subject to

custodial interrogation at the time he made the statement.

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statement “can reasonably be construed to be an expression of desire for

the assistance of an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil,

501 U.S. at 178.) Underscoring that “a suspect need not speak with the

discrimination of an Oxford don,” id. at 459 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), we have little trouble concluding that Champney, despite

his use of arguably qualifying language, “actually request[ed] an attorney.”

Id. at 462; see also id. at 459 (“a statement either is such an assertion of

the right to counsel or it is not”) (quotation omitted).17

The Commonwealth’s suggestion that the trial court did not adequately

consider Champney’s “body language, demeanor and voice intonation,”

Cmwlth.’s Br. at 25, is unavailing. The trial court heard testimony about the

circumstances surrounding Champney’s statement, including body language,

demeanor, and tone. See N.T. at 14-15, 29-30. While the trial court may

not have mentioned these facts in its opinion, it was undoubtedly aware of

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17

The Commonwealth also asks us to consider Champney’s

statements in light of Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173 (Pa.Super.

2013), in which a panel of this Court concluded that a defendant’s phone call

to her attorney’s office (her attorney was unavailable), made with the

assistance of her interrogator, was not a “sufficient articulation of her desire

to have counsel present for the interview such that her statements require

suppression.” Id. at 1185. Kunkle, however, is inapposite. There, when

the defendant was brought to the police barracks, “she asked if she could

contact an attorney” prior to being given her Miranda warnings. Id. at

1184. We concluded that the appellant’s statement was equivocal because it

was not a “sufficient articulation of her desire to have counsel present for

the interview such that her statements require suppression.” Id. at 1185

(emphasis added). In contrast, Champney’s request was to speak with an

attorney before answering any further questions.

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their possible relevance,18 and nothing in the record or the opinion suggests

that the trial court disregarded them in rendering its decision. We decline

the Commonwealth’s invitation to give more weight to these factors than did

the trial court.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court

impermissibly relied on Sgt. Shinskie’s “elect[ion] to cease his questioning of

Champney,” arguing that “that fact is irrelevant to the analysis.” Cmwlth.’s

Br. at 28. The Commonwealth argues that Sgt. “Shinskie’s personal belief

as to the meaning of Champney’s ambiguous statement does not dictate the

outcome” and, were we to affirm the trial court, such a ruling would “operate

to punish those law enforcement officers who take a conservative approach

by ceasing further questioning when faced with an equivocal request for

counsel.” Id. at 30.

While we agree with the Commonwealth that the Davis inquiry is

objective, see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, the Commonwealth’s argument

appears to conflate Sgt. Shinskie’s knowledge of relevant facts with Sgt.

Shinskie’s subjective belief as to what Champney meant by his statement.

Davis requires us to make an objective determination as to whether a

____________________________________________

18

In a 2013 opinion in support of reversal of the grant of a new trial in

this case, three Justices suggested that examination of tone, demeanor,

emphasis, and body language would assist in assessing the ambiguity or

equivocality of Champney’s statements. See Champney, 65 A.3d at 404

(Eakin, J., joined by Castille, C.J., and McCaffery, J.).

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reasonable police officer, under the circumstances, would construe

Champney’s statement as a request for counsel. While Sgt. Shinskie’s

subjective belief as to whether Champney’s statement was sufficiently clear

to invoke his right to counsel may not be relevant to that inquiry, his

knowledge of relevant facts, such as that Frank Cori was a lawyer possibly

associated with Champney, and that Champney had earlier invoked his right

to counsel, plainly is relevant. Those facts are part of the circumstances

under which Champney gave his statement. The trial court’s observation

that Sgt. Shinskie “had no trouble construing [Champney’s] statement . . .

as a request for counsel,” Trial Ct. Op. at 12, was no more than a

confirmation of its appropriately objective analysis.

Break in Custody

In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues that, even if Champney

had invoked his Fifth Amendment protection on December 23, 1997, by May

13, 1998 he had experienced a sufficient “break in custody” under

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), that the police were permitted

to approach him again despite that earlier invocation. In other words, the

Commonwealth contends that because Edwards operates as a bar to further

interrogation only so long as the suspect remains in Miranda custody, and

because Shatzer holds that ordinary incarceration is not the same as

Miranda custody, there was no constitutional bar to the May 13, 1997

interrogation.

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The trial court rejected this argument and concluded that because

Champney was a pre-trial detainee and not serving a sentence for a prior

conviction, the rationale of Shatzer does not apply. Surprisingly,

Champney’s brief does not address the Shatzer break-in-custody analysis,

or discuss or even cite Shatzer.19 Champney instead contends, in apparent

conflict with the time limit adopted in Shatzer, that “[t]here is no proper

length of time permitted to allow an officer to keep using tactics to elicit a

confession.” Champney’s Br. at 21. Champney concludes that the Edwards

presumption therefore applies to his May 13, 1998 statements. Id. at 18-

21. Proper evaluation of these arguments requires a discussion of the

rationale for the rule in Edwards, the meaning of Miranda custody, and the

distinction between Miranda custody and ordinary incarceration.

As noted above, the Edwards Court held that “when an accused has

invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation,”

police may not conduct further interrogations “until counsel has been made

available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484-85. The

purpose of the Edwards rule is to prevent police from “tak[ing] advantage

____________________________________________

19

Champney’s lack of a response to the Commonwealth’s Shatzer

argument is particularly perplexing given the discussion of the issue by the

trial court and the emphasis placed on the case by the Commonwealth in its

initial brief as the appellant in this matter.

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of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody . . . by

repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested

counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Shatzer, 559 U.S.

at 105 (internal quotations omitted). In other words, Edwards and its

progeny are designed to protect against “the continued pressure that begins

when the individual is taken into custody as a suspect and sought to be

interrogated—pressure likely to ‘increase as custody is prolonged.’” Id.

(quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)). In cases

following Edwards, the Court concluded that a police officer could not

question a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel and been held in

interrogative custody for three days, even though the re-interrogation

concerned a separate incident, see Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675

(1988), and could not re-interrogate a custodial suspect without counsel two

days after the suspect had invoked his right to counsel, even though he had

consulted with counsel in the interim, see Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153. In

both Roberson and Minnick, the Court concluded that the defendants were

still in Miranda custody because they were unable to “regain a sense of

control or normalcy after they were initially taken into custody for the crime

under investigation.” Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 107.

In Shatzer, the Supreme Court directly addressed both the meaning

of “custody” for Miranda purposes and how long it would take a defendant

to “regain[] a sense of control or normalcy” after his initial custody. Id.

Acting on allegations that Shatzer had sexually abused his three-year-old

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son, a police detective went to interview Shatzer at the prison where he was

serving a sentence on unrelated charges. Id. at 100-01. Shatzer waived

his Miranda rights and the detective began to question him about the

allegations. Id. at 101. Once Shatzer understood that the detective was

asking about the sexual-abuse allegations, not the crime for which he was

already serving time, Shatzer invoked his right to counsel. Id. The

detective then ended the interview and Shatzer returned to general prison

population. Id.

Two years and six months later, the police received more specific

allegations about the same sexual-abuse allegations and a different

detective went to re-interrogate Shatzer. Id. Shatzer waived his Miranda

rights and eventually made incriminating statements. Id. at 101-02. After

being charged with various sexual offenses, Shatzer filed a pre-trial motion

to suppress his statements to the police. Id. at 102. The trial court denied

Shatzer’s motion, reasoning that he “had experienced a break in custody for

Miranda purposes” between interrogations. Id. The Court of Appeals of

Maryland reversed and remanded, holding that there was no break-in-

custody exception to Edwards and, even if such an exception existed,

“Shatzer’s release back into the general prison population did not constitute

a break in custody.” Id. at 103.

The Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court first examined the

circumstances in the “paradigm Edwards case[,]” where a suspect is

“coerced or badgered into abandoning his earlier refusal to be questioned

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without counsel[,]” and “he remains cut off from his normal life and

companions, thrust into and isolated in an unfamiliar, police-dominated

atmosphere, . . . where his captors appear to control his fate.” Id. at 106

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Then the Court considered

a scenario where a suspect is released from pretrial custody and is “returned

to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation.”

Id. at 107. In contrast to the situations presented by Edwards, Roberson,

and Minnick, where the suspects did not “regain[] a sense of control of

normalcy after they were initially taken into custody for the crime under

investigation,” id. at 107, the Court found that its hypothetical scenario did

not require the extension of the protections afforded by Edwards. The

Court reasoned:

When, unlike what happened in [Edwards, Roberson,

and Minnick], a suspect has been released from his

pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for

some time before the later attempted interrogation, there

is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding

interrogation without counsel has been coerced. He has no

longer been isolated. He has likely been able to seek

advice from an attorney, family members, and friends. And

he knows from his earlier experience that he need only

demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt; and

that investigative custody does not last indefinitely. In

these circumstances, it is far fetched to think that a police

officer’s asking the suspect whether he would like to waive

his Miranda rights will any more “wear down the

accused,” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 . . . (1984)

(per curiam), than did the first such request at the original

attempted interrogation—which is of course not deemed

coercive. His change of heart is less likely attributable to

“badgering” than it is to the fact that further deliberation in

familiar surroundings has caused him to believe (rightly or

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wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his

interest. Uncritical extension of Edwards to this situation

would not significantly increase the number of genuinely

coerced confessions excluded. The “justification for a

conclusive presumption disappears when application of the

presumption will not reach the correct result most of the

time.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 . . .

(1991).

Id. at 107-08 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court determined that the

Miranda protections alone, without the conclusive Edwards presumption,

adequately protected the rights of a suspect who requested counsel but was

“reinterrogated after a break in custody . . . of sufficient duration to

dissipate its coercive effects.” Id. at 109.

The Court then addressed the question of what constitutes a break in

custody of “sufficient duration” to permit the police to approach the suspect

again for further questioning. Recognizing the risk of police abuse if

Edwards could be evaded by a brief release and prompt re-arrest, the Court

concluded that “14 days . . . provides plenty of time for the suspect to get

reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to

shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.” Id. at 110.

The Court next examined whether Shatzer’s break between

interrogations constituted a break in Miranda custody. Shatzer was

incarcerated for the entire time between interrogations, so in one sense he

was plainly in “custody.” Id. at 112. The Court made clear, however, that

incarceration and Miranda custody are not one and the same:

Interrogated suspects who have previously been

convicted of crime live in prison. When they are released

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back into the general prison population, they return to

their accustomed surroundings and daily routine—they

regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior

to the interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to

the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with their

accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and

workers, and often can receive visitors and communicate

with people on the outside by mail or telephone.

Their detention, moreover, is relatively disconnected

from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an

investigation. The former interrogator has no power to

increase the duration of incarceration, which was

determined at sentencing. And even where the possibility

of parole exists, the former interrogator has no apparent

power to decrease the time served. This is in stark

contrast to the circumstances faced by the defendants in

Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick, whose continued

detention as suspects rested with those controlling their

interrogation, and who confronted the uncertainties of

what final charges they would face, whether they would be

convicted, and what sentence they would receive.

Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to

distinguish the duration of incarceration from the duration

of what might be termed interrogative custody. When a

prisoner is removed from the general prison population

and taken to a separate location for questioning, the

duration of that separation is assuredly dependent upon

his interrogators. For which reason once he has asserted a

refusal to speak without assistance of counsel Edwards

prevents any efforts to get him to change his mind during

that interrogative custody.

Id. at 113 n.8 (emphasis in original).

Based on the foregoing, the Court found that although Shatzer was

incarcerated for the entire period between his invocation of the right to

counsel and the later re-interrogation on the same subject, he nonetheless

experienced a sufficient break in Miranda (or interrogative) custody that the

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Edwards presumption no longer applied. Id. at 112-14. His later

incriminating statements, obtained after fresh Miranda warnings and an

appropriate waiver, were therefore admissible. Id. at 116-17.

Two years after Shatzer, the Supreme Court provided more guidance

on the differences between incarceration on the one hand and Miranda or

interrogative custody on the other. In Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499

(2012), the Court addressed the question whether a prisoner, taken out of

the general prison population for questioning, was in Miranda custody while

being questioned. Id. at 517.20 The Court explained that “[a]s used in our

Miranda case law, ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances

that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion,” id. at

508-09, and that “[n]ot all restraints on freedom of movement amount to

custody for purposes of Miranda,” id. at 509. The Court further observed

that “[w]e have decline[d] to accord talismanic power to the freedom-of-

movement inquiry and have instead asked the additional question whether

the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures

as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). After concluding, based in part on

____________________________________________

20

The Supreme Court uses the term “custody” in conjunction with

Miranda to “specif[y] circumstances that are thought generally to present a

serious danger of coercion.” Fields, 565 U.S. at 508-09. It has also used

the term “interrogative custody” as a synonym for Miranda custody. See,

e.g., Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 n.8.

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Shatzer, that a “prisoner is [not] always in custody for purposes of

Miranda whenever [he] is isolated from the general prison population and

questioned about conduct outside the prison,” id. at 508, the Court

examined “all of the circumstances of the questioning” of Fields and held

that he was “not in custody within the meaning of Miranda,” id. at 517.

Along the way, the Court further explained why “imprisonment alone is

not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.”

Id. at 511.

First, questioning a person who is already serving a prison

term does not generally involve the shock that very often

accompanies arrest. In the paradigmatic Miranda

situation—a person is arrested in his home or on the street

and whisked to a police station for questioning—detention

represents a sharp and ominous change, and the shock

may give rise to coercive pressures. A person who is “cut

off from his normal life and companions,” Shatzer, [559

U.S. at 106], and abruptly transported from the street into

a “police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at

456, may feel coerced into answering questions.

By contrast, when a person who is already serving a

term of imprisonment is questioned, there is usually no

such change. “Interrogated suspects who have previously

been convicted of crime live in prison.” Shatzer, [559 U.S.

at 113]. For a person serving a term of incarceration, we

reasoned in Shatzer, the ordinary restrictions of prison

life, while no doubt unpleasant, are expected and familiar

and thus do not involve the same “inherently compelling

pressures” that are often present when a suspect is

yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside world and

subjected to interrogation in a police station. Id. [at 103].

Second, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been

sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured

into speaking by a longing for prompt release. When a

person is arrested and taken to a station house for

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interrogation, the person who is questioned may be

pressured to speak by the hope that, after doing so, he will

be allowed to leave and go home. On the other hand,

when a prisoner is questioned, he knows that when the

questioning ceases, he will remain under confinement. Id.

[at 113 n.8].

Third, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been

convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement

officers who question him probably lack the authority to

affect the duration of his sentence. Id. [at 113-114]. And

“where the possibility of parole exists,” the interrogating

officers probably also lack the power to bring about an

early release. [Id.] “When the suspect has no reason to

think that the listeners have official power over him, it

should not be assumed that his words are motivated by

the reaction he expects from his listeners.” [Illinois v.]

Perkins, 496 U.S. [292, 297 (1990)]. Under such

circumstances, there is little “basis for the assumption that

a suspect . . . will feel compelled to speak by the fear of

reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of [a] more

lenient treatment should he confess.” Id. at [296-97].

In short, standard conditions of confinement and

associated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily

implicate the same interests that the Court sought to

protect when it afforded special safeguards to persons

subjected to custodial interrogation. Thus, service of a

term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to

constitute Miranda custody.

Id. at 511-12.

Both Shatzer and Fields were serving prison sentences at the time

they were questioned. Champney was not serving a sentence but instead

was being held in county prison while awaiting trial on a host of separate

charges. The question for us is whether this factual distinction makes a

legal difference. We conclude that, under the circumstances before us, it

does not.

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In 2012, our Supreme Court observed that, in light of Fields, the

question whether an unsentenced county prisoner may experience a

Shatzer break in custody is an open one. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45

A.3d 1050, 1068 n.9 (2012). Our research has uncovered very little

decisional law on point. One notable exception is United States v. Ellison,

632 F.3d 727 (1st Cir. 2010), which like Fields involved the issue whether

an inmate questioned in prison was in Miranda custody at the time. Unlike

Fields and Shatzer, however, and like the case before us, the inmate in

Ellison was not a sentenced convict but rather was awaiting trial on

unrelated charges. Writing for a unanimous panel of the United States Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit, retired Justice Souter concluded that the

Shatzer analysis applied and the inmate in question, though not serving a

sentence, was not in Miranda custody. Id. at 730.

Here, in contrast, the trial court concluded that Shatzer was

inapplicable, reasoning that because Champney was a pre-trial detainee, he

was continuously in Miranda custody and the conclusive Edwards

presumption applied. Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16. The trial court stated that

“Champney’s situation was akin to that of the defendant in Roberson,” in

that “Champney was not a sentenced felon serving time[,] . . . was in jail

only because he was awaiting trial on [unrelated] charges, and it was Sgt.

Shinskie to whom Champney had invoked his right to have counsel present.”

Id. According to the trial court, because “Champney had no opportunity to

return to the normalcy of the life he had before being arrested on the

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[unrelated] charges,” the Edwards presumption still applied when Sgt.

Shinskie interrogated Champney on May 13, 1998. Id. at 15-16. The trial

court’s position, embraced by the panel decision in this case, is that the

Shatzer break-in-custody analysis applies only to prisoners who are serving

a sentence upon conviction, and never to prisoners not serving a sentence.

We disagree.

Preliminarily, we note that the question required by Shatzer is not, as

the trial court suggested, whether Champney had the chance to return to

the normalcy of his pre-arrest life outside of prison. Rather, we must ask

whether Champney’s return to prison following the initial interrogation on

December 23, 1997 represented the same sort of “return to normalcy”

experienced by Shatzer after his initial interrogation, when he too was

returned to the general prison population. In other words, when Champney

was in county prison from December 23, 1997 until his re-interrogation on

May 13, 1998, was he continuously subject to the same “inherently

compelling pressures” contemplated by Miranda, or was he instead subject

simply to “the ordinary restrictions of prison life.” If the former, then Sgt.

Shinskie was barred from re-approaching Champney until such time as he

was either released from prison or convicted and sentenced on the pending

charges. If the latter, then Champney experienced the sort of break in

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Miranda custody, well longer than the 14-day minimum, that made the May

13, 1998 re-interrogation entirely lawful.21

After a careful review of Shatzer and Fields, we find no material

difference for purposes of the break-in-custody analysis between the

incarceration described in those cases and that experienced by Champney.

Champney was not detained on the murder charge, but rather on separate

offenses for which he had been held in the Schuylkill County Prison for

failure to post bond or in lieu of bail. Champney’s daily life in county prison

between December 23, 1997 and May 13, 1998, so far as the record reveals,

did not include the sort of coercive pressures inherent in “interrogative

custody,” Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 n.8, that Miranda and Edwards are

meant to deflect.

First, Champney had been held in the prison since at least October 23,

1997. Thus, on May 13, 1998, Champney was not “abruptly transported

from the street into a police-dominated atmosphere.” Fields, 565 U.S. at

511 (internal quotation omitted). Rather, Champney had already been in

the county prison for nearly six months, “liv[ing] among other inmates,

____________________________________________

21

One longstanding criticism of an expansive reading of Edwards,

addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Shatzer, was that it created

the “question-proof inmate,” meaning that suspects who remained

incarcerated after invoking their Miranda rights would be permanently

immune from re-interrogation by authorities as long as they remained

incarcerated. See, e.g., Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof

Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 Ohio. St.

L.J. 883, 895 (1997).

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guards, and workers,” and presumably provided the opportunity to “receive

visitors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone.”

Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. Although we recognize that the “harsh realities”

of prison life may be unpleasant, id. at 113, Champney, much like the

prisoners in Shatzer and Fields, had ample opportunity to adjust to “the

ordinary restrictions of prison life, [which] are expected and familiar.”

Fields, 565 U.S. at 511.22

____________________________________________

22

In concluding that Champney was in interrogative custody from

December 23, 1997 through May 13, 1998, the trial court relied principally

on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675

(1988). There, the Court addressed the applicability of Edwards to

statements made by a burglary suspect who invoked his right to counsel on

arrest and then, after being held in police custody for three days, was

approached by another police officer about a different burglary. Id. at 687-

88. The Roberson court suppressed the resulting statements, declining the

state’s request that it create an exception to Edwards when officers

question a suspect about a crime other than that of arrest. Here, the trial

court found that because Champney was, like the suspect in Roberson, in

custody but not serving a sentence upon conviction, Shatzer was

distinguishable and the Edwards presumption applied to Champney’s May

13, 1998 statements. Trial Ct. Op. at 12-16. We disagree.

While Champney was not serving a sentence, his custody in the county

prison was fundamentally different from the interrogative detention of the

burglary suspect in Roberson, who was in the continuous custody of his

interrogators for three days. Indeed, in Roberson no one argued that the

suspect was not in Miranda custody; instead, the government was asking

for an exception to Edwards that would have permitted re-interrogation of a

suspect still subject to such custody. Champney, in contrast, was awaiting

trial in the county prison for over four months between interrogations, far

removed from Sgt. Shinskie. Roberson, read in light of Shatzer and

Fields, plainly does not cloak every incarcerated suspect with immunity

from questioning simply because the suspect was not serving a sentence

upon conviction.

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Second, nothing in the record suggests that Sgt. Shinskie had the

ability to free Champney from his incarceration on unrelated charges if he

were to talk about the Bensinger homicide, or that Champney believed Sgt.

Shinskie had that ability. Champney was awaiting prosecution on multiple

charges from multiple incidents unrelated to Bensinger’s death, which were

proceeding through the court system. There was little risk that Champney,

unlike a suspect in interrogative custody, felt “pressured to speak by the

hope that, after doing so, he [would] be allowed to leave and go home.”

Fields, 559 U.S. at 511.23 Champney could not rationally expect that

answering questions or giving a statement about Bensinger’s death would

secure his freedom from the multitude of charges pending against him. Like

the sentenced prisoners in Shatzer and Fields, Champney must have

known “that when the questioning cease[d], he [would] remain under

confinement.” Fields, 559 U.S. at 511; see also Ellison, 632 F.3d at 730.

____________________________________________

23

Justice Souter’s analysis for the First Circuit in Ellison applies with

equal force here:

It is true that the condition of someone being held awaiting

trial, like Ellison, is not exactly the same as the convict’s

position, since the suspect might reasonably perceive that

the authorities have a degree of discretion over pretrial

conditions, at least from the point of making

recommendations to a court. But we see nothing in the

facts of this case that would be likely to create the

atmosphere of coercion subject to Miranda concern.

Ellison, 632 F.3d at 730.

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Third, the duration of Champney’s pre-trial detention was based on the

unrelated charges pending against him, for which he either failed to make

bail or was held in lieu of bail. Each time Champney ended a conversation

with Sgt. Shinskie, he returned to the general prison population; nothing in

the record suggests that police possessed the ability to reward Champney

for cooperating in the Bensinger investigation or punish him for exercising

his rights. Because Champney could not rationally believe that Sgt. Shinskie

had power over his detention on the pending charges, he could not be

“motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners” and thus compelled

to avoid “reprisal from remaining silent” or, conversely, “hope [for] more

lenient treatment should he confess.” Fields, 559 U.S. at 512. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that Champney’s incarceration was not the

equivalent of Miranda custody and, therefore, that he experienced a break

in such custody between December 23, 1997 and May 13, 1998.24

Finally, pursuant to Shatzer, we conclude that the nearly five-month

break between Champney’s invocation of his right to counsel and the prison

interrogation removed the Edwards presumption of involuntariness and

permitted Sgt. Shinskie to re-approach Champney, re-read him his rights,

____________________________________________

24

We do not intend to suggest that pre-conviction incarceration can

never be the functional equivalent of Miranda custody. Rather, trial courts

should examine, in light of Shatzer and Fields, the circumstances under

which an unsentenced inmate is being held to determine whether that

detainee is under Miranda custody.

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and secure a valid waiver of those rights. Nothing in the record suggests

that, between December 23, 1997 and May 13, 1998, police attempted to

interrogate or even contact Champney about the Bensinger homicide or any

other crime. This break between interrogations clearly exceeds the 14-day

time bar established in Shatzer. Thus, Champney had ample time “to get

reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to

shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior [Miranda] custody.”

Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110.

As noted above, in his brief Champney does not address the

applicability of Shatzer. He does, however, argue that his May 13, 1998

Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.25 As the

____________________________________________

25

In addition to this general assertion, Champney contends in his brief

to this Court that his May 13, 1998 Miranda waiver was not knowing,

intelligent or voluntary because he waived his Miranda rights only in

relation to the arson investigations in Lehigh and Schuylkill counties and not

with respect to the Bensinger homicide investigation. Champney’s Br. at 15-

18. However, we conclude that Champney has waived this argument, as he

failed to develop it by discussion or analysis of relevant legal authority. See

Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“[A]rguments

which are not appropriately developed are waived . . . includ[ing] those

where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention”).

Further, Champney did not raise this specific argument either in his

suppression motion or before the trial court at the suppression hearing, and

elected not to file a brief in support of his suppression motion.

Even had Champney preserved this argument, we would conclude that

it does not merit relief. First, “a suspect’s awareness of all the possible

subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to

determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564,

577 (1987). Second, Champney cites neither relevant legal authority in

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-E03005-16

Commonwealth accurately observes, however, “the record is devoid of any

evidence that Champney’s will was overborne, that Shinskie was acting

aggressively or relentlessly in order to secure a Miranda waiver, or, that

Champney was threatened in any fashion.” Cmwlth.’s Reply Br. at 7-8. We

agree with the Commonwealth that this alternative argument for affirmance

is without merit.

In sum, we conclude that while Champney invoked his right to counsel

on December 23, 1997, there was a sufficient break in custody between then

and May 13, 1998 that Champney’s May 13, 1998 statements are not

subject to the Edwards presumption, and his Miranda waiver was valid.

Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in suppressing

Champney’s May 13, 1998 statements.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/26/2017

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

support of this argument nor evidence of record that his waiver was in fact

so limited. We note that the standard waiver form signed by Champney and

Sgt. Shinskie referenced no particular offense. Moreover, given that Sgt.

Shinskie had questioned Champney about the Bensinger homicide during

each of their two previous interactions, Champney could hardly have been

surprised that he would raise the same subject on the third occasion.

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