Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

WASICA FINANCE GMBH,

BLUEARC FINANCE AG,

Appellants

v.

CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, INC.,

SCHRADER-BRIDGEPORT INTERNATIONAL,

INC., SENSATA TECHNOLOGIES HOLDING NV, SI

INTERNATIONAL (TOPCO), INC.,

Cross-Appellants

______________________

2015-2078, 2015-2079, 2015-2093, 2015-2096

______________________

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trade-

mark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos.

IPR2014-00295, IPR2014-00476.

______________________

Decided: April 4, 2017

______________________

MICHAEL J. KANE, Fish & Richardson, PC, Minneap-

olis, MN, argued for appellants. Also represented by

CRAIG E. COUNTRYMAN, San Diego, CA.

GARY M. ROPSKI, Brinks Gilson & Lione, Chicago, IL,

argued for cross-appellant Continental Automotive Sys-

tems, Inc. Also represented by LAURA A. LYDIGSEN,

JOSHUA PATRICK SMITH; JAMES K. CLELAND, JOHN A.

2 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

LINGL, Ann Arbor, MI; THEMI ANAGNOS, Continental

Automotive Systems, Inc., Deer Park, IL.

BRYAN PATRICK COLLINS, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw

Pittman LLP, McLean, VA, argued for cross-appellants

Schrader-Bridgeport International, Inc., Sensata Technol-

ogies Holding NV, SI International (TOPCO), Inc. Also

represented by ROBERT M. FUHRER.

______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit

Judges.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated appeals come to us following two

related inter partes review proceedings before the U.S.

Patent & Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal

Board (“Board”). Both proceedings involve now-expired

U.S. Patent No. 5,602,524 (“the ’524 patent”) owned by

Wasica Finance GmbH and Bluearc Finance AG (“Wasi-

ca”). The ’524 patent has 21 claims. Claim 1 is the sole

independent claim. The first proceeding, IPR2014-00295,

arose from a petition filed by Continental Automotive

Systems, Inc. (“Continental”) (“the ’295 proceeding”). In

the ’295 proceeding, the Board found claims 1–3, 5, 10–19,

and 21 of the ’524 patent unpatentable as anticipated or

obvious and claims 6–9 and 20 patentable. The Board

declined to institute review of claim 4. Cont’l Auto. Sys.,

Inc. v. Wasica Fin. GmbH, No. IPR2014-00295, 2015 WL

3811738, at *1, *19 (June 17, 2015) (“Continental Deci-

sion”). The second proceeding, IPR2014-00476, arose

from a petition filed by Schrader-Bridgeport Internation-

al, Inc., Sensata Technologies Holdings NV, and SI Inter-

national (TOPCO), Inc. (collectively, “Schrader”) (“the ’476

proceeding”). In the ’476 proceeding, the Board found

claims 1–5, 10, 12–19, and 21 of the ’524 patent un-

patentable as anticipated or obvious and claims 6 and 9

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 3

patentable. The Board declined to institute review of

claim 11. 1 Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l v. Wasica Fin.

GmbH, No. IPR2014-00476, 2015 WL 4500655, at *1, *20

(July 22, 2015) (“Schrader Decision”).

Wasica now appeals those portions of the Board’s de-

cisions in the ’295 and ’476 proceedings finding claims 1–

5, 10–19, and 21 unpatentable. For their part, Continen-

tal and Schrader cross-appeal, respectively, those portions

of the Board’s decisions in the ’295 and ’476 proceedings

finding claims 6–9 and 20 patentable.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the deci-

sions of the Board in the ’295 and ’476 proceedings that

claims 1–5, 10–19, and 21 of the ’524 patent are un-

patentable as anticipated or obvious. We also affirm the

decisions of the Board in the ’295 and ’476 proceedings

that claims 6–8 and 20 of the ’524 patent are patentable.

We reverse, however, the decisions of the Board in the

’295 and ’476 proceedings that claim 9 of the ’524 patent

is patentable.

BACKGROUND

I. The ’524 Patent

Wasica owns the ’524 patent, which describes systems

for monitoring tire pressure in vehicles. See ’524 patent,

Abstract. Typically, these systems communicate pressure

readings through electromagnetic signals. Id., 1:52–59.

According to the patent, prior art systems fail to relay

accurate pressure data due to interference from internal

and external sources. Id., 1:59–67. As a result, the

patent asserts, drivers experience under- and over-

reporting of tire pressure warnings. Id., 2:1–10.

1 Schrader’s petition did not challenge the patenta-

bility of claims 7, 8, and 20.

4 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

The ’524 patent purports to address this problem by

synchronizing components of the tire pressure system. As

illustrated below, each tire (R1–R4) includes a pressure

measuring device and a transmitter (S1–S4). The trans-

mitter sends pressure data received from the pressure

measuring device to a corresponding receiver (E1–E4):

Id., Fig.1; see also id., 6:1–2, 6:12–15, Fig.2. To dis-

tinguish signals from different transmitters, transmis-

sions to each receiver include an “identification signal”

specifying the originating transmitter. Id., 6:61–7:9. The

receiver stores this identifying information and processes

pressure data only from the designated transmitter. Id.,

3:4–15. The system can further synchronize its units by

entering a “pairing mode.” Id., 10:1–7. In this mode, a

transmitter couples with the receiver to which it broad-

casts the strongest signal. Id. Tire pressure data is

displayed to the driver of the vehicle by means of a “dis-

play device.” Id., 13:34–38.

As noted, the ’524 patent includes 21 claims. Claim 1

is the sole independent claim and recites as follows:

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 5

1. A device for monitoring the air pressure in

the air chamber of pneumatic tires fitted on vehi-

cle wheels comprising:

a pressure measuring device mounted on a

vehicle wheel which measures the air pressure in

the air chamber of the wheel end outputs an elec-

trical pressure signal representative of the air

pressure in the vehicle wheel;

a transmitter mounted to the vehicle wheel

which receives the electrical pressure signal out-

put from the pressure measuring device and sends

out a pressure transmitting signal corresponding

to said air pressure;

a receiver associated with the transmitter and

mounted at a distance to the vehicle wheel which

receives the pressure transmitting signal trans-

mitted from the associated transmitters[;]

a display device which is connected with the

receiver and displays data as numbers or symbols

which have been taken from the pressure trans-

mitting signal received from the receiver;

wherein the transmitter comprises an emitter-

control device which controls the emittance of the

pressure transmitting signal and a signal-

generating device which generates an identifica-

tion signal which is unique for the transmitter

and clearly identifies same;

the emitter-control device works such that the

identification signal is transmitted at least once

before or after the emittance of the pressure

transmitting signal;

the receiver comprises at least a memory in

which is stored an identification reference signal

6 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

related to the associated transmitter in accord-

ance with a predetermined relationship criteria;

the receiver comprises a comparison device

which checks if an identification signal transmit-

ted from a transmitter has the relationship crite-

ria to identification reference signal stored in the

receiver, and that further processing of the pres-

sure transmission signal taken from the receiver

only takes places if the identification signal re-

ceived by the receiver and the identification refer-

ence signal stored in the receiver fulfill the

relationship criteria;

the identification reference signal stored in

the receiver is changeable in order that the identi-

fication signal from the associated transmitter

matches the identification reference signal of the

receiver; and

the receiver is connected with a switching de-

vice which enables the receiver to switch over

from normal operating mode, in which the air

pressure is monitored, to pairing mode, in which

the receiver collects the identification signal of the

transmitter and stores this as an identification

signal.

Id., 13:19–14:3.

II. Proceedings Before the Board

Continental and Schrader each filed inter partes re-

view (“IPR”) petitions challenging the patentability of the

’524 patent. In the ’295 proceeding, Continental chal-

lenged all 21 claims as anticipated by Italian Patent No.

1,219,753 (“Oselin”) and/or as obvious over some combina-

tion of Oselin and U.S. Patent Nos. 5,109,213 (“Wil-

liams”), 5,803,457 (“Schultz”), 4,067,376 (“Barabino”),

4,912,463 (“Li”), and 4,750,118. In the ’476 proceeding,

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 7

Schrader challenged claims 1–6, 9–19, and 21 as antici-

pated by Oselin and/or as obvious over some combination

of Oselin, Schultz, Barabino, and U.S. Patent No.

5,285,189 (“Nowicki”). The Board subsequently instituted

separate trials on the two petitions.

Both trials focused primarily on the Oselin reference.

That reference, like the ’524 patent, relates to vehicular

systems for monitoring tire pressure. J.A. 939. 2 In their

petitions to the Board, both Continental and Schrader

argued that Oselin discloses or suggests most of the

features in the challenged claims.

Wasica disputed the petitioners’ reading of Oselin,

contending that Oselin does not disclose or suggest all of

the limitations of independent claim 1. Specifically,

Wasica argued that Oselin fails to teach a “pressure

measuring device,” an “electrical pressure signal,” and a

“pressure transmitting signal,” as Wasica construed those

terms. Wasica also separately argued the patentability of

various dependent claims by relying on its constructions

of the terms “bit sequence” and “emittance.”

III. The Board’s Decisions

The ’295 and ’476 proceedings culminated in two Fi-

nal Written Decisions from the Board. In those decisions,

the Board first construed the terms “pressure measuring

device” from independent claim 1, “bit sequence” from

claim 9, and “emittance” from claim 17. Continental

Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *4–7; Schrader Decision,

2015 WL 4500655, at *5–7. Armed with those construc-

tions, the Board found that Oselin anticipated claims 1, 2,

5, 10, 13, 15, 17–19, and 21. Continental Decision, 2015

WL 3811738, at *19–20; Schrader Decision, 2015 WL

2 For ease of reference, our citations to Oselin point

to its certified translation in the Joint Appendix.

8 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

4500655, at *20. The Board also found that Oselin—alone

or in combination with Williams, Schultz, Nowicki, Barab-

ino, and/or Li—rendered claims 3, 4, 10–12, 14, 16, and 17

obvious. 3 The Board further determined, however, that

Continental and Schrader had failed to establish how

Oselin (alone or in combination with Williams) ren-

dered claims 6–9 and 20 unpatentable. Continental

Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *13–14, *17; Schrader

Decision, 2015 WL 4500655, at *10–12 (claims 6 and 9).

Wasica appeals the Board’s decisions that claims 1–5,

10–19, and 21 are unpatentable. Continental and

Schrader each cross-appeal the Board’s decisions that

claims 6–9 and 20 are patentable. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 35 U.S.C. § 141(c).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

In an appeal from an IPR decision, we review the

Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings

for substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Synopsys, Inc.

v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir.

2016). Anticipation is a question of fact reviewed for

substantial evidence. Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1317; In re

Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Obvious-

ness is a question of law based on underlying facts. In re

Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.

Cir. 2016). We thus review the Board’s ultimate obvious-

3 These are the claims that Continental or Schrader

separately argued as being obvious. Because “anticipa-

tion is the epitome of obviousness,” Connell v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the

Board noted that Oselin rendered claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 13,

15, 17–19, and 21 obvious by virtue of its anticipation of

them. Continental Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *19–

20; Schrader Decision, 2015 WL 4500655, at *20.

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 9

ness determination de novo and its underlying factual

findings for substantial evidence. Id.

Claim construction is a question of law with underly-

ing questions of fact. Teva Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. Sandoz,

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015). We review the

Board’s claim constructions de novo and its underpinning

factual determinations involving extrinsic evidence for

substantial evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,

789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If the intrinsic

record fully governs the proper construction of a term, we

review the Board’s claim construction de novo. Id.

As noted, we have before us consolidated appeals from

two IPR proceedings. Wasica appeals some aspects of the

Board’s decisions in the ’295 and ’476 proceedings, while

Continental and Schrader cross-appeal, respectively,

other aspects of those decisions. We turn first to Wasica’s

appeal.

II. Wasica’s Appeal

A. Claims 1–5, 10–16, 18, 19, and 21

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Wasica contends that the Board erred by finding

claims 1–5, 10–19, and 21 unpatentable based upon

Oselin. 4 Oselin discloses a “pressure sensor P” that

detects the air pressure in a tire. J.A. 942. When the

pressure falls outside an acceptable range, a floating

switch closes, causing a signal to pass from a transmitter

4 Wasica does not distinguish between the claims

found unpatentable as anticipated by Oselin (1, 2, 5, 10,

13, 15, 17–19, and 21) and those found unpatentable as

obvious over Oselin alone or in combination with other

references (3, 4, 10–12, 14, 16, and 17). For the sake of

brevity, we therefore refer to the claims at issue simply as

“unpatentable.”

10 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

to a receiver. J.A. 942–43. This signal includes a data bit

(S18) serving as “an alarm message indicating that the

pressure detected by [the] sensor P has reached an anom-

alous level.” J.A. 946. Oselin’s binary signal thus signi-

fies whether a measured pressure is abnormal, but it does

not encode an exact numeric value for that pressure.

In the ’295 and ’476 proceedings, Wasica argued that

Oselin does not contain claim 1’s “pressure measuring

device” because, as properly construed, the claim requires

a numerical representation of the tire’s pressure. Accord-

ing to Wasica, Oselin’s binary alarm bit does not contain

such precision.

The Board disagreed, holding that nothing in the

claims limits the pressure measuring device to numeric

values. Continental Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *4–5;

Schrader Decision, 2015 WL 4500655, at *4–5. In support

of its ruling, the Board pointed to embodiments of the ’524

patent using binary, switch-based pressure sensors like

those described in Oselin. Id. Based upon its claim

construction, the Board found claims 1–5, 10–19, and 21

unpatentable.

On appeal, Wasica shifts its focus from the “pressure

measuring device” to the “electrical pressure signal” and

“pressure transmitting signal” terms of claim 1, but the

thrust of its position remains unchanged. Namely, Wasi-

ca maintains that the claimed signals must contain

numerical values of pressure. Wasica Opening Br. 13.

Wasica acknowledges that the ’524 patent discloses using

switch-based sensors like Oselin as part of the invention,

but it urges that these devices are used in addition to, not

in lieu of, quantitative measuring devices. Id. 15–17.

Therefore, argues Wasica, the Board misconstrued the

signal terms of claim 1 and erred in finding claims 1–5,

10–19, and 21 unpatentable over Oselin and other refer-

ences. Id. 17–18.

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 11

Continental and Schrader respond that the Board cor-

rectly construed the signal and pressure measuring device

limitations of claim 1. In their view, the claims describe

these limitations in broad language, and nothing confines

them to purely numerical values. Continental Response

Br. 25–28; Schrader Response Br. 22–23. The ’524 pa-

tent’s specification further supports the Board’s construc-

tion, they contend, because it discloses using non-numeric

pressure sensors within the claimed invention. Continen-

tal Response Br. 28–35; Schrader Response Br. 17–21.

2. Analysis

Wasica does not dispute that claims 1–5, 10–16, 18,

19, and 21 are unpatentable under the Board’s construc-

tion of claim 1. Therefore, the only question before us

with respect to these claims is whether the Board erred in

construing “electrical pressure signal” and “pressure

transmitting signal” to encompass non-numeric represen-

tations of pressure. For the reasons discussed below, we

hold that the Board did not err in construing these terms.

The Board construes claims of an expired patent in

accordance with Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v.

Sipnet EU S.R.O., 806 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Under that standard, words of a claim are generally given

their ordinary and customary meaning. Phillips, 415 F.3d

at 1312. The claims themselves often provide significant

guidance as to the meaning of a particular term. Id. at

1314. Claims also are read in light of the patent’s specifi-

cation, of which they are a part. Id. at 1315. “[T]he

specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim con-

struction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive . . . .’” Id.

(quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d

1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

In this case, the claim language indicates that the

signal terms are not limited to numeric values. Claim 1

recites displaying data “as numbers or symbols which

12 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

have been taken from the pressure transmitting signal.”

’524 patent, 13:35–38 (emphases added). Using the

disjunctive “or” as in “numbers or symbols” designates

numbers and symbols as distinct alternatives to one

another. See SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d

1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly

designates that a series describes alternatives.”); Schumer

v. Lab. Comput. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir.

2002) (“We have consistently interpreted the word ‘or’ to

mean that the items in the sequence are alternatives to

each other.”) (citing cases). And because these “numbers

or symbols” are “taken from the pressure transmitting

signal” directly, claim 1 plainly contemplates a pressure

transmitting signal that encodes only non-numerical

“symbols.” Wasica concedes the point in its briefing,

acknowledging that the pressure transmitting signal

includes “the numerical value of the pressure verbatim

and/or symbols that inform the driver which tire has low

pressure.” Wasica Reply Br. 3 (emphasis added).

We also see no reason to limit the “electrical pressure

signal” to numerical values. Claim 1 requires the electri-

cal pressure signal to be only “representative of the air

pressure.” ’524 patent, 13:22–25 (emphasis added). The

ordinary and customary meaning of “representative” is

“serving to . . . symbolize” or “standing for.” 13 THE

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 660 (2d ed. 1989). We think

that a non-numeric signal can be “representative of” air

pressure in much the same way as a vehicle’s gas warning

light might “serve to symbolize” a low fuel level (without

specifying a precise volume) or a picture of a sun may

“stand for” a hot day (without indicating an exact temper-

ature). See Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys.

Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing to

construe “signals representative of” various items as

confined to numerical values of those items).

The specification of the ’524 patent confirms this con-

struction. The patent includes an embodiment in which a

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 13

sensor monitors a tire’s pressure and outputs a pressure

signal “as is described in EP-A-0417712 or in EP-A-

0417704.” ’524 patent, 5:1–9. The Board found, and

Wasica does not dispute, that this family of European

applications discloses switch-based pressure sensors and

non-numeric pressure signals. 5 Continental Decision,

2015 WL 3811738, at *5; Schrader Decision, 2015 WL

4500655, at *5. The ’524 patent thus uses non-numeric

expressions of pressure to practice the purported inven-

tion. See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,

503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We normally do not

interpret claim terms in a way that excludes disclosed

examples in the specification.”). On appeal, Wasica

contends only that these switch-based pressure sensors

supplement other sensors measuring the pressure quanti-

tatively. We see no merit to this argument, however. The

pertinent passage of the specification describes monitor-

ing tire pressures with “a mechanical device” that “causes

transmission of the pressure signal” under certain condi-

tions. ’524 patent, 5:1–9. Nothing in the description of

this embodiment suggests that the pressure signal comes

from a secondary, undisclosed sensor.

Accordingly, we hold that the Board did not err in

construing the signal terms broadly enough to encompass

non-numeric representations of air pressure. Because

Wasica does not challenge the Board’s findings that

claims 1–5, 10–16, 18, 19, and 21 are unpatentable under

that construction, we affirm the Board’s decision that

those claims are unpatentable.

5 For example, EP-A-0417712 discloses a membrane

that “activate[s] a switch when the tire pressure is exces-

sively high or low.” J.A. 2853. When this occurs, a “sig-

nal-generating device” outputs an “alarm impulse” to a

receiver. Id.; J.A. 2855.

14 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

B. Claim 17

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Wasica separately argues the patentability of depend-

ent claim 17. Claim 17 depends from claim 13, which

depends from claim 1. Claim 13 recites “[a] device accord-

ing to claim 1 wherein a pressure measuring device and a

transmitter are provided on at least two of the wheels of a

vehicle.” ’524 patent, 14:59–61. Claim 17 then recites:

17. A monitoring device according to claim 13

wherein each transmitter comprises a detector

device which recognizes emittance of a predeter-

mined switching signal and, therefore, switches

the transmitter into a pairing mode in which the

identification signal and an additional signal indi-

cating the pairing mode is emitted.

Id., 15:11–16 (emphasis added). The claim thus puts a

transmitter in “pairing mode” with a receiver after detect-

ing a “switching signal” sent from an unspecified source.

The Board construed “emittance of a predetermined

switching signal” to include both wired and wireless

transmissions. Continental Decision, 2015 WL 3811738,

at *7; Schrader Decision, 2015 WL 4500655, at *6–7.

Wasica disputes this construction, arguing that the

claimed “emittance” must be limited to wireless communi-

cations. Wasica Opening Br. 18–19. According to Wasica,

the ordinary meaning of “emit” in the context of the

specification connotes only wireless signals. Id. In Wasi-

ca’s view, the prior art references successfully cited

against claim 17 do not disclose or suggest such a wireless

transmission of the switching signal. Wasica Opening

Br. 20. Wasica acknowledges, however, that claim 17 is

unpatentable under the Board’s construction. Wasica

Opening Br. 20.

Continental and Schrader respond that “emit” means

“to send out,” which does not preclude wired transmis-

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 15

sions. Continental Response Br. 40–41; Schrader Re-

sponse Br. 26. They also contend that the specification

includes embodiments where the switching signal passes

via wired components. Continental Response Br. 41–43;

Schrader Response Br. 27–28.

2. Analysis

Because Wasica accepts that claim 17 is unpatentable

under the Board’s construction of “emittance,” the sole

issue before us is whether the Board erred by construing

“emittance” to include wired transmissions. We conclude

that the Board did not err.

“It is axiomatic that we will not narrow a claim term

beyond its plain and ordinary meaning unless there is

support for the limitation in the words of the claim, the

specification, or the prosecution history.” 3M Innovative

Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed.

Cir. 2013). If the intrinsic record supports several defini-

tions of a term, the term may be construed to encompass

all such consistent meanings. See Rexnord Corp. v.

Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Therefore, absent a clear disavowal or alternative lexicog-

raphy by a patentee, he or she “is free to choose a broad

term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and

ordinary meaning.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am.

LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

We conclude that, in the context of the ’524 patent,

the word “emittance” includes both wired and wireless

transmissions. As Wasica itself recognizes, the plain and

ordinary meaning of “emit” is simply “to send out.” Wasi-

ca Opening Br. 18; see also 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY 181 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “emit” as “to send

forth”). Wasica does not dispute that electrical signals

can be “sent out” over wired connections. Nor does Wasi-

ca urge that any special definition or disavowal applies to

the term “emittance.” Thus, “emittance of a predeter-

mined switching signal” should be granted its full scope

16 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

and construed to encompass both hardwired and wireless

transmissions, as either mode of communication “sends

out” the switching signal. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367;

Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1347–

48 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to construe a broad claim

term narrowly because “[t]he patentee is entitled to the

full scope of his claims”).

The specification supports this construction. The ’524

patent is rife with exemplary embodiments where the

switching signal propagates in both wireless and wired

form. See, e.g., ’524 patent, 12:46–67 (wireless transmis-

sions), 13:13–17 (wired transmissions). “We normally do

not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes disclosed

examples in the specification,” Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1305,

and Wasica has not provided us a compelling reason to

depart from such guidance here.

Furthermore, the specification and claims use the

words “emit” and “transmit” interchangeably. 6 This

drafting choice equates the two terms for claim construc-

tion purposes. See Bid for Position, LLC v. AOL, LLC,

601 F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (construing “bid” and

“value of the bid” identically because the claim used the

terms interchangeably); Edwards Lifesciences LLC v.

Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The

6 For example, claim 1 includes a “transmitter” that

not only “emit[s]” a pressure transmitting signal to a

receiver, but also “transmit[s]” an identification signal to

the same receiver. ’524 patent, 13:31–43. This equivoca-

tion is prevalent throughout the claims. See id., 14:4–6,

14:21–24, 14:28–39, 16:4–7. Similarly, the written de-

scription at times conflates “transmitter” and “emitter.”

See id., 4:43–47, 6:50–52. Further, the specification uses

“transmit” to refer to wireless communications, suggest-

ing that it has not reserved the term “emit” for this pur-

pose. See id., 12:28–33.

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 17

interchangeable use of the two terms is akin to a defini-

tion equating the two.”). The word “transmit” can mean

“to send out electric signals.” 18 THE OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY 415 (2d ed. 1989). Unquestionably, electric

signals may be “transmitted” or “sent out” through wired

circuitry.

We therefore see no error in the Board’s conclusion

that “emittance” in claim 17 includes both wired and

wireless transmissions. As noted, Wasica does not argue

that claim 17 is patentable under this construction.

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision in the ’295

and ’476 proceedings that claim 17 is unpatentable.

III. Continental and Schrader’s Cross-Appeals

The appeals from cross-appellants Continental and

Schrader involve claims 6–9 and 20. In the ’295 and ’476

proceedings, the Board found these claims patentable over

Oselin and other references. Continental Decision, 2015

WL 3811738, at *11, *13–14, *17; Schrader Decision, 2015

WL 4500655, at *10–11 (claims 6 and 9). Continental and

Schrader appeal those decisions. We turn first to claim 6.

A. Claim 6

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Claim 6 depends from claim 2, which depends from

claim 1. Claim 2 recites “[a] monitoring device according

to claim 1, additionally comprising a converter device

which converts and digitally codes the signals transmitted

from the transmitter.” ’524 patent, 14:4–6. Claim 6 then

recites:

6. A monitoring device according to claim 2

wherein transmission of the signals from the

transmitter to the receiver is carried out with

electromagnetic waves of constant frequency act-

ing as carrier waves.

18 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

Id., 14:21–24 (emphasis added). As claimed, the signals

passing from the transmitter to the receiver have a con-

stant, unchanging frequency. 7

Oselin explains that its “transmissions from the sen-

sors 10 use structurally analogous signals, on a frequency

that is the working frequency common to the oscilla-

tors 11 of all transmitters 10 of the group of the receiv-

er 20.” J.A. 945. In the ’295 and ’476 proceedings, both

Continental and Schrader argued that this embodiment

discloses the constant frequency limitation of claim 6,

thus rendering claim 6 unpatentable over Oselin.

J.A. 204, 2089. The Board rejected this contention, hold-

ing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have under-

stood Oselin’s “common” working frequency to allow for

carrier waves of changing frequencies. In doing so, the

Board accepted Wasica’s evidence to this effect. Continen-

tal Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *10; Schrader Decision,

2015 WL 4500655, at *10. The Board also dismissed the

petitioners’ obviousness arguments, finding them conclu-

sory and unsubstantiated, Continental Decision, 2015 WL

3811738, at *13–14, or omitted entirely, Schrader Deci-

sion, 2015 WL 4500655, at *14.

Continental and Schrader each appeal the Board’s de-

cision, but they do so on different grounds. Schrader

argues that Oselin discloses transmitting signals at “a”

frequency, suggesting that this frequency must be con-

stant. Schrader Response Br. 34–38. For its part, Conti-

nental contends that the Board overlooked pertinent

evidence. Continental Response Br. 49–53. According to

Continental, Oselin discloses how it can work with “any

7 The “frequency” of a wave is the number of cycles

of the wave in a unit of time. A wave has a “constant

frequency” when the number of cycles per unit of time

does not change—i.e., it is “constant.”

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 19

modulating scheme,” which could include the constant

frequency signals of claim 6. Id.

Wasica defends the Board’s decisions. With respect to

the ’476 proceeding, Wasica argues that the Board rea-

sonably relied on Wasica’s expert testimony concerning

Oselin’s disclosure, particularly because Schrader offered

no such testimony of its own. Wasica Response Br. 15–17.

As for the ’295 proceeding, Wasica asserts that Oselin

discloses a broad genus of all modulating schemes, but not

the constant-frequency species recited in claim 6. Id. 18–

20. Wasica additionally argues that Continental’s obvi-

ousness position is waived for failing to adequately devel-

op it before the Board. Id. 21–24.

2. Analysis

After reviewing the record, we find that substantial

evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that claim 6 is

patentable over Oselin. We therefore affirm the Board’s

decisions as to this claim. Because the cross-appellants’

arguments differ in material respects, we address their

contentions in turn, beginning with Schrader.

a. Schrader’s Cross-Appeal

Anticipation requires that a single reference “describe

the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail

to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior

art.” Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). For this reason, it has

long been understood that ambiguous references do not,

as a matter of law, anticipate a claim. See, e.g., W.L. Gore

& Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed.

Cir. 1983) (refusing to find claims anticipated when the

prior art references were “unacceptably vague”); see also

In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 188 (CCPA 1965); In re

Turlay, 304 F.2d 893, 899 (CCPA 1962) (“It is well estab-

lished that an anticipation rejection cannot be predicated

on an ambiguous reference.”).

20 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

As noted, claim 6 requires its carrier waves to have a

constant frequency. Oselin discloses that its transmitters

are all tuned to a “common” working frequency, but as the

Board found in the ’476 proceeding, this statement does

not necessarily suggest that the frequency of each trans-

mitted signal is constant. Schrader Decision, 2015 WL

4500655, at *10. Crediting Wasica’s expert on this point,

the Board determined that Oselin’s “common” working

frequency could represent an average frequency for sig-

nals whose frequency in fact fluctuated over time. Id.

For example, Oselin’s signals might vary in frequency due

to “frequency shift keying” 8 but maintain a “common”

working frequency across the transmitters. Id. Thus, the

Board concluded, Oselin was at best “unclear” whether its

transmissions occurred at an unchanging, fixed frequen-

cy. Id.

We see no error in the Board’s conclusion. Record ev-

idence suggests that Oselin could use signals of either

constant or nonconstant frequency. Oselin is thus ambig-

uous as to whether it discloses the pertinent features of

claim 6. Ambiguous references do not anticipate a claim.

E.g., In re Turlay, 304 F.2d at 899.

Schrader’s arguments on appeal fail to show where

the Board erred. Schrader relies on attorney argument in

urging that Oselin’s transmitters must use a constant

frequency, but this contention misses the point. Anticipa-

tion is an inquiry viewed from the perspective of one

skilled in the art. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Con-

tainment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

8 Frequency shift keying is the process of embed-

ding information into a signal by changing (modulating)

the signal’s frequency. See ’524 patent, 7:36–40. In one

simple example, a signal might encode binary data by

representing 0s and 1s with different frequencies. See id.,

7:36–42.

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 21

(“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation is

whether one skilled in the art would reasonably under-

stand or infer from the prior art reference’s teaching that

every claim element was disclosed in that single refer-

ence.” (internal alterations and quotation marks omit-

ted)). The Board found that one of ordinary skill in the

art would not have read Oselin to disclose what Schrad-

er’s counsel urges. That finding is supported by record

evidence, and Schrader did not adduce any evidence to the

contrary. We thus think it was reasonable for the Board

to accept Wasica’s expert testimony over Schrader’s bare

attorney argument. See Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain

Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reasoning

that a party’s “unsworn attorney argument . . . is not

evidence” and thus cannot rebut record evidence); Enzo

Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Attorney argument is no substitute for

evidence.”).

As far as the obviousness of claim 6 is concerned,

Schrader’s briefing does not advance a separate argument

on this ground, nor did its petition to the Board do so. See

Schrader Decision, 2015 WL 4500655, at *14. According-

ly, we deem Schrader to have waived any obviousness

argument with respect to claim 6. See Smithkline Bee-

cham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed.

Cir. 2006) (“Our law is well established that arguments

not raised in the opening brief are waived.”); see also

Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821

F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Fresenius USA, Inc.

v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(“If a party fails to raise an argument before the trial

court, or presents only a skeletal or undeveloped argu-

ment to the trial court, we may deem that argument

waived on appeal.”).

22 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

b. Continental’s Cross-Appeal

Like Schrader, Continental argues that Oselin ren-

ders claim 6 unpatentable. In so doing, however, it ad-

vances a different theory. Continental contends that

Oselin can employ “any modulation scheme,” see J.A. 943,

and that any modulation scheme so employed can include

constant-frequency signals. The Board rejected this

argument in the ’295 proceeding, finding it insufficiently

precise and underdeveloped. Continental Decision, 2015

WL 3811738, at *10, *13–14.

We see no error in the Board’s conclusion. “It is well

established that disclosure of a genus in the prior art is

not necessarily a disclosure of every species that is a

member of that genus.” Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem.

Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Eli Lilly

& Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369,

1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab.

Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir.

2004) (“A prior art reference that discloses a genus still

does not inherently disclose all species within that broad

category.”). Here, the Board determined that Oselin’s

broad invocation of “any modulation scheme” (a genus)

does not disclose with sufficient particularity the con-

stant-frequency modulation scheme of claim 6 (a species).

Continental Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *10. This

factual determination was reasonably drawn from record

evidence and concessions by Continental’s counsel. Id.

(relying on material found at, for example, J.A. 531,

1608–11 ¶¶ 58–59). Because the Board’s findings are

reasonable on this record, they are supported by substan-

tial evidence. See In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed.

Cir. 2002) (“If the evidence in record will support several

reasonable but contradictory conclusions, we will not find

the Board’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence

simply because the Board chose one conclusion over

another plausible alternative.”).

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 23

To be sure, we have recognized instances where a pri-

or art genus may anticipate a later species, see, e.g.,

Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d

1376, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir. 2015), but Continental has not

shown how that situation exists here. For example, we

have explained that a disclosed genus may anticipate a

claimed species when the genus is so small that one of

ordinary skill in the art would “at once envisage each

member of this limited class.” AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda &

Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Tr., 764 F.3d

1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted). But in the ’295 proceeding, Continental’s peti-

tion failed to set forth the necessary “factual compo-

nent[s]” needed to advance this legal theory. See OSRAM

Sylvania, Inc. v. Am. Induction Techs., Inc., 701 F.3d 698,

705–06 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,

550 F.3d 1075, 1083–84 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Continental’s

petition did not identify the “any modulating scheme”

genus, did not establish its size, and did not name any of

its modulation scheme species. See J.A. 204. In fact, the

petition relied solely on Oselin’s “common” working fre-

quency embodiment that we now conclude is too ambigu-

ous to anticipate claim 6. Id.

Continental’s obviousness contentions suffer from

similar infirmities. As we have stated, obviousness

determinations “cannot be sustained by merely conclusory

statements; instead, there must be some articulated

reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the

legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d

977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In its petition to the Board,

Continental offered only a conclusory and sweeping

allegation that “to the extent that any of the variances in

claim scope are not necessarily shown in the above [antic-

ipation analysis], such variances would have been obvious

to a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” J.A. 209. The

Board found this assertion lacking the factual substantia-

tion necessary for an obviousness evaluation. Continental

24 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *13–14. We see no error

in the Board’s ruling. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere

Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (“[D]ifferences between the

prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained.”).

We also are unpersuaded by Continental’s attempts to

cure the petition’s deficiencies in its subsequent briefing

to the Board and to us. See J.A. 435–36; Continental

Response Br. 50–59. As we explained in Illumina:

It is of the utmost importance that petitioners

in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement

that the initial petition identify with particularity

the evidence that supports the grounds for the

challenge to each claim. . . . Unlike district court

litigation—where parties have greater freedom to

revise and develop their arguments over time and

in response to newly discovered material—the ex-

pedited nature of IPRs bring with it an obligation

for petitioners to make their case in their petition

to institute.

821 F.3d at 1369 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Here, Continental did not make out its obviousness

case in its petition. It merely pointed to Oselin’s “com-

mon” working frequency embodiment and presented a

conclusory allegation that any differences between Oselin

and claim 6 would have been obvious. J.A. 204, 209.

After Wasica pointed out the flaws of this position, Conti-

nental’s ensuing arguments to the Board and to us effec-

tively abandoned its petition in favor of a new argument.

Instead of relying on Oselin’s “common” working frequen-

cy to challenge claim 6, Continental’s new position was

that one of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to a

different passage of Oselin (teaching encoding binary data

“using any modulating scheme”) and would then have

modified Oselin to use a constant-frequency modulation

scheme as taught in other references. Compare J.A. 204,

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 25

with J.A. 435–36, and Continental Response Br. 49–59.

Rather than explaining how its original petition was

correct, Continental’s subsequent arguments amount to

an entirely new theory of prima facie obviousness absent

from the petition. Shifting arguments in this fashion is

foreclosed by statute, our precedent, and Board guide-

lines. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring petitions to

identify “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the

challenge to each claim is based”); Illumina, 821 F.3d at

1369–70; Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating a finding of unpatentability

when the Board relied on an argument first made during

oral hearing); Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756,

48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012) (prohibiting parties from submit-

ting evidence necessary for a prima facie showing of

obviousness in a reply). We therefore see no error in the

Board declining to engage such an argument here.

Accordingly, we hold that the Board did not err in

finding claim 6 patentable over Oselin. We therefore

affirm the Board’s decision on the patentability of claim 6.

B. Claims 7, 8, and 20

Claims 7, 8, and 20 depend directly or indirectly from

claim 6 and limit the transmitted signals to a particular

frequency range (claim 7) or designate particular schemes

for modulating those signals (claims 8 and 20). Schrader

did not challenge these claims in the ’476 proceeding, and

thus we have nothing to review as to Schrader’s cross-

appeal. In the ’295 proceeding, the Board rejected Conti-

nental’s assertion that Oselin in view of Williams ren-

dered claims 7, 8, and 20 obvious. Continental Decision,

2015 WL 3811738, at *17. In doing so, the Board relied in

part on the deficiencies of Oselin with respect to claim 6

just described. Id.

26 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

On appeal, Continental does not separately argue the

unpatentability of claims 7, 8, and 20. 9 We therefore

deem these claims as standing or falling with claim 6.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

Board’s decision on the nonobviousness of claims 7, 8, and

20.

C. Claim 9

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Both cross-appellants argue that the Board erred in

ruling that dependent claim 9 is patentable. Claim 9

depends from claim 1 via claims 5 and 2. Claim 5 recites

“[a] monitoring device according to claim 2 wherein the

identification signal in the transmitter is stored as a

digital sequence having n bits and that the identification

reference signal in the associated receiver is also stored as

a digital sequence having n bits.” ’524 patent, 14:16–20.

Claim 9 then recites:

9 In its arguments on claim 6, Continental mentions

in passing that the Board overlooked evidence with re-

spect to claims 7, 8, and 20. Continental Response Br. 58.

Even if we were to construe this statement as sufficiently

challenging the Board’s decision as to those claims, we do

not see how the Board erred. Continental’s petition

attacked claims 7, 8, and 20 by relying on Williams’s use

of frequency key shifting and by summarily asserting that

the claims were obvious. J.A. 213–14. Not only would

frequency key shifting directly contravene claim 6’s

“constant frequency” requirement by creating waves of a

nonconstant frequency, the petition offers no explanation

or reasoning as to why the claims would be obvious. Id.

It was incumbent on Continental to elaborate on these

positions in its “initial petition,” Illumina, 821 F.3d at

1369–70. We thus see no error in the Board’s analysis.

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 27

9. A monitoring device according to claim 5

wherein every transmission from transmitter to

receiver is completed with a transmission of at

least a 4 bit sequence having a respective prede-

termined bit-count whereby the first bit sequence

is a preamble, which enables the synchronization

of the receiver with the transmitter, the second, or

third bit sequence is a data sequence which repre-

sents the measured pressure signal and respec-

tively contains the identification signal, and a

fourth and final bit sequence as a post-amble.

Id., 14:31–39 (emphases added). In common parlance,

claim 9 requires the transmitter to send data to the

receiver through “at least a 4 bit sequence” having four

smaller “bit sequence[s]” of information. Id.

As they did before the Board, the parties dispute the

meaning of the term “bit sequence.” Continental and

Schrader contend that “bit sequence” should be construed

as a sequence of “one or more bits.” Continental Response

Br. 65; Schrader Response Br. 43. Wasica disagrees,

arguing that the plain meaning of “sequence” implies two

or more items, so that a “bit sequence” must contain “two

or more bits.” Wasica Response Br. 25–26. In the ’295

and ’476 proceedings, the Board agreed with Wasica,

ruling that a “bit sequence” must include “two or more

bits.” Continental Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *6–7;

Schrader Decision, 2015 WL 4500655, at *6. Because

Oselin’s pressure alarm bit S18 is a single bit, the Board

concluded, Oselin does not disclose or suggest using

claim 9’s sequences of “two or more bits.” Continental

Decision, 2015 WL 3811738, at *11; Schrader Decision,

2015 WL 4500655, at *11.

2. Analysis

We must determine whether the Board erred in its

construction of “bit sequence.” We conclude that it did.

28 WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS

Claim 9 recites transmitting “at least a 4 bit se-

quence” having four component “bit sequence[s].” ’524

patent, 14:31–39. Because none of the component bit

sequences may be empty, the only way to fit four of them

into “a 4 bit sequence” is for each constituent bit sequence

to comprise a single bit. 10 Thus, a “bit sequence” in the

context of claim 9 must be broad enough to include single-

bit sequences.

The Board’s construction of “bit sequence” as “two or

more bits” conflicts with the plain import of claim 9. The

claim describes its transmission as including “at least”

four bits, indicating that the signal may, in some instanc-

es, span only four bits. Under the Board’s construction,

however, the transmitted signal must include at least

eight bits—two for each component bit sequence. Not only

does this approach rewrite “at least 4” to mean “at

least 8,” but it also excludes signals comprising four, five,

six, or seven bits that are expressly covered by the claim.

Moreover, “the context of the surrounding words of

the claim also must be considered in determining the

ordinary and customary meaning” of terms in a claim.

ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088, 1090

(Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, the context of the words surround-

ing “bit sequence” requires them to encompass single-bit

10 Construing “bit sequence” to allow for an empty,

zero-bit sequence would effectively remove the “first bit

sequence,” “second, or third bit sequence,” and “fourth and

final bit sequence” limitations from the claim, as it would

make them optional or potentially nonexistent. See In re

Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2006). It is

highly disfavored to construe terms in a way that renders

them void, meaningless, or superfluous. See Bicon, Inc. v.

Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950–51 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(refusing to construe claim terms in a way that made

other limitations meaningless).

WASICA FINANCE v. CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 29

sequences. Indeed, the specification confirms the use of

“bit sequence” in this context by providing an embodiment

where a bit sequence can contain only a single bit. See

’524 patent, 5:1–9 (incorporating by reference a patent

that employs a switch-based membrane signaling when

the tire pressure is excessively high or low). Therefore,

we construe the term “bit sequence” to include single-bit

sequences.

Wasica does not dispute that Oselin anticipates

claim 9 if “bit sequence” is construed to cover single-bit

sequences. Accordingly, we reverse the Board’s decisions

that claim 9 is patentable over Oselin.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Board

did not err in finding claims 1–5, 10–19, and 21 unpatent-

able. We also hold that substantial evidence supports the

Board’s findings that claims 6–8 and 20 are patentable.

We hold that the Board did err, however, in finding

claim 9 patentable. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s

decisions in the ’295 and ’476 proceedings as to claims 1–8

and 10–21 but reverse its decisions as to claim 9.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.