“A public employee's good faith under N.J.S.A. 59:3–3 is to be judged in relation to whether his act violated N.J.S.A. 59:3–14 in that it involved crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.”
How later courts described this case
- “A public employee's good faith under N.J.S.A. 59:3–3 is to be judged in relation to whether his act violated N.J.S.A. 59:3–14 in that it involved crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3717-13T2
N.E., AS LEGAL GUARDIAN
FOR INFANT J.V.,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant, April 4, 2017
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DIVISION
OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES;
NUSSETTE PEREZ, and FELIX UMETITI,
Defendants-Appellants/
Cross-Respondents.
_________________________________________
Argued December 16, 2015 – Decided April 4, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Kennedy.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-
3980-10.
Edward J. Dauber argued the cause for
appellants/cross-respondents (Greenberg
Dauber Epstein & Tucker and Greenbaum Rowe
Smith & Davis, attorneys; Mr. Dauber, Linda
G. Harvey, Kathryn B. Hein and John D.
North, on the brief).
David A. Mazie argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant (Mazie Slater
Katz & Freeman, attorneys; Mr. Mazie, of
counsel and on the brief; David M. Estes,
David M. Freeman and Beth G. Baldinger, on
the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
On January 10, 2012, J.V. pled guilty before the Law
Division, Criminal Part to second degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), and fourth degree child abuse, N.J.S.A.
9:6-1, against his then four-month-old son J.V. ("Baby Jesse").1
As required by Rule 3:9-2, J.V. described under oath the facts
supporting his guilty plea. He testified that on the morning of
July 16, 2009, Baby Jesse's mother, Vivian, "dropped [his] son
off" at his apartment. J.V. admitted that "at this point in
time," he was aware there was an order in effect from the
Division of Youth and Family Services (the Division) prohibiting
him from having "unsupervised contact" with Baby Jesse.
J.V. admitted that when his infant son began to cry, he
shook him with great force, knowingly "disregarding the risk"
that the child would be injured. Baby Jesse "slipped" from his
hands and "fell to the floor . . . [and] hit his head." J.V.
called 911 when he noticed Baby Jesse was not breathing. J.V.
acknowledged that as a direct result of his actions, Baby Jesse
was "seriously injured." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b) defines "[s]erious
bodily injury" as an injury "which creates a substantial risk of
1
Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(b)(9), we use fictitious names when
needed to protect the privacy of the child victim.
2 A-3717-13T2
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ[.]" It is undisputed that Baby Jesse suffered
catastrophic injuries.2
It is also undisputed that after investigating a previous
allegation of abuse, the Division had entered into a case plan
agreement with Baby Jesse's mother, "Vivian," and maternal
grandmother, N.E. (the child's legal guardian). Both women
agreed not to permit J.V. to have unsupervised access to Baby
Jesse. This agreement was in effect at the time J.V. physically
assaulted his son, with one modification. At Vivian's request,
N.E. was replaced by the child's maternal grandfather, U.M.
("Ugo"), and his wife, L.M. ("Linda") as caretakers while Vivian
was at work.
Vivian was on her way home from work when her stepmother,
Linda, asked her for permission to leave Baby Jesse alone with
J.V. to go wash her car. Because Vivian thought she was
approximately twenty minutes away from her home, she told Linda
2
At the time of this civil trial, Baby Jesse was four years old.
A pediatric neurologist testified he is unable to walk or speak,
and has significant visual impairments. "He has an active
seizure disorder, which requires treatment with anti-seizure
medications, is not able to eat, requires a feeding tube, and
requires therapies to allow . . . his development to advance."
A pediatric physiatrist opined these injuries were the result of
"a neurologic insult from the shaken baby syndrome[.]"
3 A-3717-13T2
it was alright. Less than ten minutes later, Ugo called Vivian
to tell her Baby Jesse was in the hospital.
Approximately four months before J.V. pled guilty, Baby
Jesse's maternal grandmother, N.E.,3 filed this civil action
against the State of New Jersey, Department of Children and
Families (the Division); Division caseworker Felix Umetiti; and
Umetiti's supervisor, Nussette Perez. In addition to these
state government parties, plaintiff named as defendants Newark
Beth Israel Medical Center, Overlook Medical Center, and a
number of other professionals who provided medical services to
Baby Jesse. Plaintiff settled her claims against the non-public
defendants for $7,000,000. The net proceeds of the settlement
were used to establish an annuity and special needs trust for
the benefit of Baby Jesse.4 Thus, this appeal concerns only the
Division and its employees.
Plaintiff's claims against the Division are predicated on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Plaintiff argues this
3
N.E. does not have a direct claim in this suit. However,
because she is Baby Jesse's legal guardian, we will refer to her
as "plaintiff."
4
The record includes a copy of the May 29, 2013 Law Division
order, which approved the minor's settlement and created the
special needs trust. Paragraph 11 awards plaintiff's attorneys
25% of "the net monies recovered in excess of $2 million." It
also directs Newark Beth Israel Hospital and an individual
physician to pay $1,769,374.32 in legal fees and $139,169.37 in
costs.
4 A-3717-13T2
court must hold the Division vicariously liable for a series of
discretionary decisions made by Division caseworker Umetiti and
his supervisor while investigating plaintiff's allegations of
child abuse and parental unfitness on May 28, 2009. Plaintiff
alleged Umetiti and Perez negligently failed to remove Baby
Jesse from his parents' custody, despite evidence showing his
father was mentally unstable and physically abusive.
The Division argued before the trial court that the Torts
Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, bars plaintiff's
claims against Umetiti and his supervisor, because the decision
on whether to remove a child from the care and custody of a
parent or legal guardian inherently involves the exercise of
human judgment and discretion. Under these circumstances, the
TCA provides public employees with absolute immunity from civil
liability. N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a). At the charge conference, the
Division also argued it was entitled to qualified immunity under
N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. The trial judge rejected defendants'
application as a matter of law and instructed the jury to
consider the good faith immunity of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 only with
respect to certain aspects of the investigation. The trial
court held the Division was subject to civil liability if it
negligently performed or failed to perform any one of sixteen
"ministerial tasks" while deciding whether to exercise its
5 A-3717-13T2
discretionary authority to remove the child from his parents'
custody.
The trial court also rejected the Division's argument for
absolute immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a), characterizing the
Division's removal of a child from his parents' custody as a
ministerial act that a jury can assess under an ordinary
negligence standard. The court relied on Coyne v. DOT, 182 N.J.
481 (2005), to hold that the caseworker's decision to permit
Baby Jesse to remain with his parents, conditioned upon
plaintiff and the child's mother agreeing not to allow J.V. to
have unsupervised access to the child, was not a discretionary
act under N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a) because "no high level policy
making" was involved. The court noted that none of the Division
employees were "the lead employee in the office, let alone[] the
agency." Finally, the court held the jury was capable of
determining whether the Division's decision was "palpably
unreasonable." N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(d).
The case was tried before a jury for a period of
approximately three weeks, spanning from November 19, 2013 to
December 13, 2013. The jury found that in failing to remove
Baby Jesse from his parents' home, the Division and its
employees acted negligently. The jury further found that the
Division's negligence served as the proximate cause of Baby
6 A-3717-13T2
Jesse's injuries. An interrogatory on the verdict sheet read:
"Did the DYFS defendants prove that leaving [Baby Jesse] in the
home was not palpably unreasonable?" The jury unanimously
responded: "No."
On the question of apportionment under the Comparative
Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.17, the Division
presented evidence showing that on June 12, 2009 (five weeks
before J.V. assaulted Baby Jesse), the Division had in place a
safety plan that involved the voluntary participation of three
key family members. In an effort to keep the family united, Ugo
and Linda voluntarily agreed to care for Baby Jesse during the
time Vivian was at work. The principal purpose of the plan was
to never leave Baby Jesse alone in J.V.'s care.
Immediately after the jury announced its verdict on
liability, the trial judge informed the jury that J.V. had also
been found responsible for the harm to Baby Jesse. After the
judge instructed the jury on the legal concept of apportionment,
the court permitted counsel to present closing arguments limited
to this question. The jury verdict sheet on apportionment
required the jury "to allocate to each of the following the
percentage by which that person or persons contributed to [Baby
Jesse's] injuries:" the DYFS defendants (Umetiti, Perez, and
Powell), J.V., Vivian, Linda, and Ugo.
7 A-3717-13T2
The jury found the Division 100 percent liable and absolved
the remaining parties of all liability. The verdict sheet
reflects the jury specifically wrote "0" next to J.V.'s name,
and crossed out the remaining names. On the question of
damages, the jury awarded $105,000,000 to cover the cost of
providing future medical services to Baby Jesse; $57,670,000 for
pain and suffering; $1,410,343 for lost wages; and $1,892,160,
representing the value of the services plaintiff had provided to
Baby Jesse.
The trial judge thereafter entered judgment against
defendants for $165,972,503, constituting the total damages
described herein, plus $1,432,872.81 for satisfaction of a
Medicaid lien. The judgment credited defendants with
$7,475,000, representing the proceeds of the settlement
plaintiff reached with the medical care providers. Defendants
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
the court denied. The court also denied defendants' motion for
a new trial. The court partially granted defendants' motion for
remittitur, reducing the damages for future medical expenses and
life care to $75,868,321, or, at plaintiff's election, a new
trial. In accordance with its decision on remittitur, the trial
court entered a final judgment against the Division in the
amount of $56,901,240 for future medical expenses; $43,252,500
8 A-3717-13T2
for pain and suffering; $1,057,575.25 for loss of future income;
and $1,419,120 for past services.
In this appeal, we are required to determine whether the
State of New Jersey can be held vicariously liable for the
catastrophic injuries Baby Jesse suffered as the result of his
father's criminal act. The basis of liability is a caseworker's
decision to explore the viability of a voluntarily adopted
safety plan, rather than taking immediate action to remove the
child from his parents' home without their consent. Based on
these uncontested facts, we hold the Division caseworkers were
entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the
qualified immunity afforded to public employees who act in good
faith in the enforcement or execution of any law. See N.J.S.A.
59:3-3.
The decision to remove a child involuntarily from the
custody of a parent or guardian is governed by a comprehensive
statutory scheme. Plaintiff failed to establish, as a matter of
law, that the decision the Division reached here was contrary to
the law or lacking in subjective good faith. An ordinary
negligence standard is an insufficient basis to impose civil
liability on a public employee involved in the execution of the
law. As a matter of public policy, the Legislature adopted the
TCA to insulate the State from civil liability under these
9 A-3717-13T2
circumstances. For these reasons, we reverse the jury's verdict
and vacate the final judgment entered against defendants in the
amount of $165,972,503, as well as the $1,432,872.81 to satisfy
the Medicaid claims.
I
May 28, 2009 Incident and Investigation
Vivian was eighteen years old when she gave birth to Baby
Jesse in 2009. She resided with plaintiff (her mother) and
plaintiff's husband. Vivian moved out of plaintiff's home when
Baby Jesse was one month old. She stayed with J.V. and the
child's paternal grandmother for approximately one month, at
which point she and J.V. found their own apartment. Plaintiff
took care of the child three or four times per week to enable
Vivian to work at a Dunkin Donuts.
When Vivian dropped the baby off on May 28, 2009, plaintiff
noticed he had bloodshot eyes and bruises on both cheeks.
Plaintiff took the child to the Dunkin Donuts where Vivian
worked to show her the injuries. Plaintiff testified that
Vivian began to cry and told her J.V. "was treating the baby
badly." Plaintiff reported the child's bruises and Vivian's
allegations of abuse to the Division when she returned home.
According to plaintiff's testimony, she also told the Division
10 A-3717-13T2
she believed J.V. was "crazy," had "bipolar," was using illegal
drugs, and was physically abusive to Vivian.
Caseworker Felix Umetiti was assigned to the Division's
Union County office when he received the screening summary for
the case on May 28, 2009 at 1:40 p.m. His title at the time was
Family Service Specialist I, which involved "investigating cases
assigned to [him], going out in the field to do the actual
investigation, [and] get[ting] to know [the] collaterals within
the time frame allotted . . . through the policy."
Nussette Perez was Umetiti's direct supervisor. Perez
began working for the Division in 2000. She was in charge of
the Division's Union County office at the time plaintiff called
to report her allegations of abuse against J.V. As a
supervisor, Perez was required to oversee the cases assigned to
five caseworkers. These caseworkers carried a caseload ranging
from twelve to twenty families. Perez's responsibilities
included: (1) conducting pre and post-investigation conferences;
(2) guiding and supervising the caseworkers as they gathered
information; (3) reading and approving all investigation
reports; (4) ensuring investigation reports were electronically
entered into the Division's computer records; (5) ensuring risk
assessments and contact sheets were properly recorded; and (6)
ensuring compliance with Division timeframes.
11 A-3717-13T2
According to procedure at that time, the Division had sixty
days from May 28, 2009 to complete its investigation and make a
determination as to what services it would provide the family
and what legal action, if any, was required to ensure the
family's safety. N.J.A.C. 10:129-5.3(c).5 The initial part of
the investigation was to occur within the first fourteen days.
N.J.A.C. 10:129-2.8(b). The second phase required a formal
investigation where the Division would interview more people,
gather collateral information, and make assessments to determine
what course of action was required. See N.J.A.C. 10:129-2.9.
Umetiti visited plaintiff's home on May 28, 2009. He met
with plaintiff, plaintiff's husband, and Vivian. He also
personally examined and photographed Baby Jesse, confirming the
infant had visible bruises on his face and blood in his eyes.
Plaintiff and Vivian then transported the baby to Newark Beth
Israel Hospital, while Umetiti followed behind in a state-owned
car.
At the hospital, plaintiff told Umetiti that she believed
J.V. suffered from bipolar disorder. Plaintiff claimed J.V. was
not taking any legitimate medication for his illness, relying
instead on illicit drugs to self-medicate. Plaintiff also
5
These regulations have been superseded by N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.1
to -3.3; N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3.
12 A-3717-13T2
claimed J.V. "used to beat up [his] ex-girlfriend[.]" Plaintiff
told Umetiti that Vivian was afraid of J.V., and she showed him
Vivian's bruises.
At the hospital, Umetiti also interviewed Vivian about Baby
Jesse's injuries. Vivian told Umetiti she first noticed Baby
Jesse had blood in his eyes on May 19, 2009. She took him to
his pediatrician, who told her "that it will resolve itself
within a couple of weeks[.]" According to Vivian, the doctor
also told her that infants sometimes have this condition.
However, on May 22, 2009, Vivian took the baby to another
physician for a second opinion. This doctor told her to take
her son to the hospital. Vivian followed the doctor's
instructions and took Baby Jesse to Overlook Hospital in Union
County. The hospital told her that Baby Jesse's condition could
have been caused by sneezing, coughing or straining.
Umetiti also asked Vivian about J.V.'s behavior toward the
baby. Umetiti testified that Vivian told him she had "never
seen [J.V.] getting aggressive or losing patience around the
child[.]" Vivian stressed that "he has never been a problem[.]"
Umetiti asked Vivian about plaintiff's specific allegation that
Vivian had seen J.V. shake the baby. Vivian flatly denied it.
In fact, at no point during the entire investigation did Vivian
13 A-3717-13T2
ever tell Umetiti that she was concerned about J.V. abusing the
baby.
Umetiti also asked Vivian about domestic violence in
connection with the bruise he saw on her arm. She denied any
allegation of domestic violence and attributed the bruises to
"rough sex." Given the seriousness of the allegations, Umetiti
asked Vivian to repeat the responses she had given to him in
front of her mother. Umetiti testified that Vivian again
vehemently denied her mother's allegations. With respect to
J.V.'s mental state, Vivian confirmed that he had been diagnosed
with bipolar disorder "at the age of five." However, she did
not know whether a physician was treating him at the time.
Vivian told Umetiti that J.V. was not taking any medication.
Although he used marijuana as a teenager, she did not know
whether he was currently using drugs. Umetiti accepted Vivian's
account of these events as truthful.6
The physician who examined Baby Jesse at Newark Beth Israel
Hospital told Umetiti that a CT-Scan and other diagnostic tests
showed no fractures or skeletal problems. The doctor's only
6
On direct examination, Vivian admitted she lied to Umetiti
about the nature of her bruises. The bruises were actually
caused by J.V.'s abusive behavior towards her. Vivian also
withheld from the Division that J.V. physically abused her on a
regular basis and at least once threatened to kill her while
holding a knife to her throat.
14 A-3717-13T2
concern was the unexplained injury around the infant's neck
area. Based on this, the doctor told Umetiti he "couldn't rule
out possible child abuse and he suspected child abuse." The
doctor did not testify at trial.
After this initial encounter, Umetiti personally visited
Vivian and Baby Jesse on June 1, 2009, and June 12, 2009. He
also received what he characterized as "regular reports" from
plaintiff and Vivian confirming that Baby Jesse was "doing
okay." Umetiti testified that on June 12, 2009, he met with
Vivian, J.V., plaintiff, and plaintiff's husband at the
Division's conference room to discuss a plan for the family to
consider going forward. The family members agreed to a "case
plan," which required J.V.'s cooperation and plaintiff and
Vivian's active participation. Vivian agreed to care for her
infant son during the day and to never allow J.V. to have
unsupervised access to the child. Plaintiff agreed to care for
her grandson at night when Vivian was at work.
Umetiti testified that he contacted his supervisor, Perez,
to explain the details of the case plan and obtain her input and
approval. Furthermore, he asked Perez to join him in the
Division conference room when he met with the family to explain
the case plan's conditions. Umetiti also wanted some form of
15 A-3717-13T2
medical confirmation and explanation of J.V.'s psychiatric
problems.
The terms of the case plan were memorialized in a document
signed by all of the affected family members. Unfortunately,
this document is not included in the appellate record. As
described by Umetiti, the plan required J.V. and Vivian to
submit to drug assessments. Vivian agreed to "have a
responsible adult . . . supervise her son at all times[,]" and
to allow her mother to babysit. The parties further agreed that
J.V. "must not be left alone with his son . . . unsupervised at
any time." The case plan made clear that if J.V. violated this
condition, the Division would seek judicial authorization to
remove the child from his parents' custody.
The case plan began on June 12, 2009 and was set "to
expire" on June 30, 2009. When asked to explain the reasons for
this eighteen-day limitation, Umetiti stated: "The 6/30 date I
put there just to remind me . . . I have to revisit to see where
we are with . . . the case, what's going on. Because . . . you
can't leave it indefinitely." Umetiti also gave the following
response when asked how this plan addressed the risk of harm to
Baby Jesse.
Q. Now, can you tell us how that addressed
the risk . . . that this baby could be
harmed[?]
16 A-3717-13T2
A. The . . . fact that . . . all the
parties involved voluntarily agreed . . .
they would comply with the . . . plan. And
this [was] . . . [the] last chance to
maintain this child in his own family
environment.
Plaintiff confirmed that Umetiti told all those who signed
the case plan that J.V. was not permitted to be alone with Baby
Jesse. Although not explicitly stated, plaintiff inferred that
as a signatory to the case plan, she was the only adult
authorized to care for the baby while Vivian was at work. Thus,
on the day she signed the case plan, plaintiff called Ugo and
Linda to make sure they knew J.V. was not allowed to be alone
with the baby. On cross-examination, plaintiff also testified
that she told the manager of the Dunkin Donuts where Vivian
worked that the Division was investigating the baby's bruises.
I told [the manager] listen, the baby appear
[sic] with bruises, okay? They investigates
[sic]. DYFS is investigating. If they find
out something they might remove the baby . .
. and I want to try to help her. And [the
manager] told me she haven't come here
[sic]. . . . I don't know what's wrong with
her[;] she's missing some days on the job.
[(Emphasis added).]
At the conclusion of their meeting on Friday, June 12,
2009, Vivian and J.V. left the Division conference room with
Baby Jesse and thereafter refused to permit plaintiff to
babysit. In fact, Vivian cut off all contacts with her mother
17 A-3717-13T2
from this point forward. Plaintiff testified that she
repeatedly attempted to contact Vivian over the weekend and
received no response. Her phone calls rang unanswered without
an automatic call-back message or personalized greeting.
Plaintiff testified she decided to return to the Division's
Union County office to inquire.
Plaintiff claimed she discussed the situation with a
Division representative named Deborah Powell, who assured her
she would investigate and "everything [was] going to be taken
care of[.]" Powell testified to having no recollection of ever
meeting plaintiff or discussing any aspect of the case with her.
Plaintiff finally spoke to Umetiti who told her Vivian and J.V.
had relocated to another apartment and he was not at liberty to
disclose their location. Umetiti also told plaintiff that he
had seen the baby.
Despite Vivian's wishes, plaintiff attempted to obtain
legal custody of the child. Plaintiff also reported the matter
to the Union County Prosecutor's Office (UCPO). Sergeant Joseph
Genna of the UCPO Child Abuse Unit was assigned to investigate
the matter. Genna testified that plaintiff told him "she had
notified [the Division] and had not heard anything." Genna
agreed with plaintiff's counsel that when a doctor believes
"there's a suspicion of child abuse[,]" either the Division or
18 A-3717-13T2
the hospital is required to contact the prosecutor's office.
Genna did not provide any legal basis to support this
contention.7
Sometime between June 17, 2009, and June 23, 2009, Genna
contacted Umetiti, who sent him the Division report documenting
plaintiff's initial allegations. Although the testimony
concerning Genna and Umetiti's conversation is inconsistent, the
record shows the Division had not yet completed its
investigation. The UCPO did not file criminal charges against
J.V. at this time.
On June 18, 2009, plaintiff called Umetiti and told him she
had not seen the baby for six days. Although she did not have
any evidence, she suspected J.V. was babysitting the child.
That same day, Umetiti made a surprise visit to Vivian's
apartment in response to plaintiff's concerns. He found Vivian,
J.V., and the baby in the apartment. "The baby looked fine."
Umetiti asked Vivian to explain why she was not bringing the
baby to her mother as she had agreed to do in the case plan.
7
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10 states: "Any person having reasonable cause
to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or
acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately to the
Division of Child Protection and Permanency by telephone or
otherwise." (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court has construed
this statute to impose a "universal obligation to report child
abuse whenever a person forms a reasonable belief that a child
has been subjected to child abuse." L.A. v. N.J. Div. of Youth
and Family Servs., 217 N.J. 311, 316 (2014).
19 A-3717-13T2
Vivian told him "she [couldn't] trust her mom anymore," because
"she [didn't] know what her intentions [were]." According to
Umetiti, Vivian feared her mother was plotting to take her son
from her. She told Umetiti that plaintiff had gone to the
Dunkin Donuts where she worked and told her manager that the
Division was "in the process of taking her child away." Vivian
told Umetiti that she was using her father and stepmother, who
lived in Jersey City, to babysit while she was in school and at
work.
Umetiti testified that while he was at the apartment, he
asked Vivian to contact her father, Ugo. Umetiti spoke to Ugo
and explained the situation to him. According to Umetiti's
testimony, Ugo told him he had no problem babysitting his
grandson. He also stated his wife Linda was willing to take on
the responsibility when he was unavailable. Umetiti asked to
speak to Linda, but Ugo told him she did not speak English.
Umetiti asked Ugo to explain the situation to her and then
listened while Ugo spoke to his wife in Spanish. During the
phone conversation, Umetiti obtained Ugo and Linda's dates of
birth and social security numbers for the purpose of conducting
a criminal background check.
Umetiti documented the June 18, 2009 visit to Vivian's
apartment in an initial contact sheet he created on June 23,
20 A-3717-13T2
2009. The sheet showed Ugo and Linda's social security numbers
and dates of birth, but did not contain any information
regarding Umetiti's conversation with Ugo. At trial, Umetiti
testified that he wrote this information in his notebook on July
20, 2009, four days after J.V. assaulted Baby Jesse.
On June 22, 2009, Umetiti filed an "urgent" referral
request for a "needs assessment." When asked to explain why he
had marked the request as "urgent," Umetiti stated: "[T]he
thinking that went into that is the fact that [J.V.] was said to
be bipolar." Umetiti also wanted to determine if the child
needed additional services from the Division. On June 24, 2009,
Umetiti reported to Vivian's apartment to perform the needs
assessment. He was accompanied by Lorraine Perkins, a nurse
employed by the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New
Jersey (UMDNJ) and assigned under contract to the Division. The
assessment was not done that day because Vivian had already
taken the baby to her father's house and was preparing to leave
for work.
Umetiti and Nurse Perkins returned to the apartment on June
26, 2009. They found the baby properly dressed. His eyes no
longer exhibited the redness that prompted the hospital visit on
May 28, 2009, and his bruises were barely visible. Nurse
Perkins did not find any signs of injury or mistreatment.
21 A-3717-13T2
Umetiti observed J.V. laying on a mattress and "relaxing." He
did not exhibit any signs of inebriation, anxiety, or
depression. Umetiti found that J.V.'s demeanor did not indicate
any reason for concern. However, Umetiti also noticed J.V.'s
indifference as to what was going on with his son. According to
Umetiti, it was as if "he [didn't] want to be bothered with . .
. what we [were] doing." The visit lasted between thirty to
forty-five minutes.
Umetiti did not receive a written report memorializing
Nurse Perkins's findings. Instead, they discussed their
observations orally. Nurse Perkins noted the baby's eyes were
"tracking[,]" meaning the child moved his eyes to follow items
placed within his field of vision. The only concern Nurse
Perkins raised related to the presence of a caged ferret.
Vivian and J.V. reassured her that the animal was never let out
of its cage.
Plaintiff testified that Umetiti called her to tell her
Baby Jesse was fine. Plaintiff continued to call Umetiti each
day and received the same answer: The investigation was not yet
complete. On June 26, 2009, Umetiti told plaintiff he was going
on vacation, and his supervisor would take over the case.
Umetiti and Nurse Perkins reported their findings to Umetiti's
supervisor that same day. On July 1, 2009, the Division
22 A-3717-13T2
received the report of the drug screening tests performed on
Vivian and J.V.. The results were negative.
II
July 16, 2009 Assault on Baby Jesse
On July 16, 2009, Vivian dropped her son off at her
father's house to report to work. The Division-sponsored case
plan had expired by then. No one from the Division had checked
on Baby Jesse from June 26, 2009 to July 16, 2009. Vivian
testified that she was aware the case plan had expired on June
30, 2009, but she nevertheless continued to follow it as
modified. Ugo and Linda agreed to substitute for plaintiff and
assumed the responsibility to care for Baby Jesse at night while
Vivian was at work. Linda testified that no one from the
Division ever spoke to her about any concerns associated with
leaving the baby with J.V.. Furthermore, Linda also claimed
neither Vivian nor Ugo told her about these concerns.
Vivian's testimony corroborated Linda's understanding of
the role she and her husband Ugo were expected to play in
assisting Vivian with the care of Baby Jesse.
Vivian conceded that she never saw her father or his wife
actually look at the case plan or read its content; she also
never told them why the case plan had been put into place.
23 A-3717-13T2
On July 16, 2009, Vivian was uncharacteristically running
late to pick up her son from Linda's house. She called her
father at his work and told him she would be late because her
relief had not yet arrived. She asked him if Linda could watch
the baby a little longer, until she arrived home. Ugo testified
that after he spoke to his daughter, he called his wife Linda
and told her to "hold the baby until [Vivian] gets there to pick
him up."
A short time thereafter, Vivian received a phone call from
Linda. Vivian testified as to the content of this telephone
conversation and the tragic chain of events that followed it:
VIVIAN: [Linda] told me she wanted to wash
the car, so it was too sunny, since it was
summer outside, and she didn't want to leave
the baby in the sun too much -- too long.
So she asked if she could leave the baby
with [J.V.].
Q. So, she called you back in order to ask
your permission?
VIVIAN: Well, she was letting me know that
if I were to come within a certain amount of
time that she would leave the baby . . . she
was asking me, yes, to leave the baby with
[J.V.].
. . . .
Q. And did you tell her it was okay or not?
VIVIAN: I did tell her it was okay.
Q. And -- how long did you think it was
going to be before you got home?
24 A-3717-13T2
VIVIAN: I hoped within 20 minutes. But I
said a little less than the actual time,
just so it [didn't] seem that long.
Q. All right. And . . . then you received a
subsequent call while you were going home.
Is that right?
VIVIAN: Yes.
Q. From your dad?
VIVIAN: Yes.
Q. He told you to go to the hospital?
VIVIAN: Yes.
Q. Something had happened?
VIVIAN: Yes.
III
The Statutory Framework of The DCPP
The Division's "statutory mission is to protect the health
and welfare of the children of this state." N.J. Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. E.B., 137 N.J. 180, 184 (1994) (citing
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-4). In carrying out this great responsibility,
the Division's paramount concern is the safety of the children
it serves, and its primary consideration is the children's best
interests. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a). The Legislature enacted our
State's child-welfare laws to strike a balance between two
competing public policy interests: a parent's constitutionally
protected right "to raise a child and maintain a relationship
25 A-3717-13T2
with that child, without undue interference by the state," and
"the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the
welfare of children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 18 (2013) (citations omitted).
To safeguard these interests, the Legislature enacted two
parallel statutory schemes: Title 9 and Title 30. Ibid. Title
9 is intended to address cases in which children are abused and
neglected. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205
N.J. 17, 31 (2011). Its "overriding purpose . . . is to assure
that the lives of innocent children are immediately safeguarded
from further injury and possible death and that the legal rights
of such children are fully protected." N.J. Div. of Child Prot.
& Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 187 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a); State v.
P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 96–99 (1997)).
Title 9 also imposes a duty on the State to protect
children "who have had serious injury inflicted upon them by
other than accidental means." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a). Although
the statute authorizes the removal of children from their homes
when such removal is in their best interests, the Division is
also obligated to determine what reasonable efforts can be made
to keep families unified without compromising the children's
safety.
26 A-3717-13T2
In any case in which the division accepts a
child in care or custody, the division shall
make reasonable efforts, prior to placement,
to preserve the family in order to prevent
the need for removing the child from his
home. After placement, the division shall
make reasonable efforts to make it possible
for the child to safely return to his home.
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(b)(2) (emphasis added).]
Thus, whether prior to or after a child's removal, the Division
remains legally bound to explore any reasonable measures that
may accomplish the twin goals of ensuring child safety and
promoting family unity.
Upon receipt of a report of child abuse under N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.10, the Division is obligated to respond and
immediately take such action as shall be
necessary to insure the safety of the child
and to that end may request and shall
receive appropriate assistance from local
and State law enforcement officials. A
representative of the division or other
designated entity shall initiate an
investigation within 24 hours of receipt of
the report, unless the division or other
entity authorizes a delay based upon the
request of a law enforcement official.
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11 (emphasis added).]
Thus, the Division, acting through its caseworkers, has the
statutory authority to take the measures required to ensure the
child's safety, including removing the child involuntarily from
the custody of his or her biological parents or legal
27 A-3717-13T2
guardian(s) on an emergent basis.8 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.18. This form
of protective custodial arrangement cannot "exceed three court
days[]" and can be terminated earlier "at the discretion of the
reporting physician, director or appropriate official of the
Division[,] . . . or upon order of the court." N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.19(c) (emphasis added).
Once the Division involuntarily removes a child from the
custody of a parent or legal guardian, Rule 5:12-1(a) requires
the Division to bring a complaint for removal as a summary
proceeding pursuant to Rule 4:67. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 258–59 (App. Div. 2002).
At this procedural phase, the Division must prove to the Family
Part, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
1) the parent or other person legally
responsible for the child's care is absent
or, though present, was asked and refused to
consent to the temporary removal of the
child and was informed of an intent to apply
any order applicable under this section [of
the statute];
2) the child appears so to suffer from abuse
or neglect of his parent or guardian that
his immediate removal is necessary to avoid
imminent danger to the child's life, safety
or health; [and]
8
The Division's authority to take emergent custody of a child is
known as a "Dodd removal." See P.W.R., supra, 205 N.J. at 26
n.11.
28 A-3717-13T2
3) there is not enough time to hold a
preliminary hearing.
[Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.28).]
Title 30 provides the legal framework for guardianship
proceedings through which the Division may seek to terminate
parental rights. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 110–11 (2011). Our Supreme Court recently
examined the multi-step process the Division must undertake
under Title 30 to "intervene with a family in need of its
assistance[.]" N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. I.S.,
214 N.J. 8, 34, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 529, 187
L. Ed. 2d 380 (2013). That process may also lead to the
involuntary "removal of a child from the custodial parent and
placement in the Division's custody." Ibid. The Court noted
that "the initial step involves a referral to the Division,"
which "must be of a specific sort[.]" Ibid. This initial
complaint may be made by "any person" when it "appear[s]" that a
child's parent or lawful guardian is "unfit" or has failed "to
ensure the health and safety of the child, or is endangering the
welfare of such child[.]" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12).
When the Division receives such a complaint, it is legally
bound to investigate. If circumstances warrant, the Division
must afford the child's parent or guardian an opportunity "to
file an application for care under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11, which
29 A-3717-13T2
would result in converting the matter into a voluntary
placement. On the other hand, if a parent or guardian acts to
impede the Division's investigation, the Division may obtain the
necessary relief from the family court." Ibid. (emphasis added)
(citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12).
Once it has completed the investigation, the Division must
determine whether "the child requires care and supervision by
the [D]ivision or other action to ensure the health and safety
of the child[.]" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12). The
statute also empowers the Division to apply "to the Family Part
of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court in the county
where the child resides for an order making the child a ward of
the court and placing the child under the care and supervision
or custody of the [D]ivision." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
12). The Family Part thereafter may discharge its parens
patriae responsibility while providing the due process of law
necessary to protect both the child and his or her parent or
legal guardian from undue governmental interference.
Here, Umetiti and his supervisor were charged with
determining whether a four-month-old infant was at risk of
continued harm from his father, based on his bruised cheek and
bloodshot eyes. The record shows the infant's parents sought
timely medical attention. The child's eighteen-year-old
30 A-3717-13T2
mother's genuine concern for her baby's well-being was never in
question. Moreover, the father, who was in his early twenties,
cooperated with the Division's investigation. The child's
maternal grandmother alleged the child's father was abusive to
her daughter; she also suspected he was responsible for the
child's injuries and alleged he was suffering from bipolar
disorder.
The medical staff who examined the baby at the hospital
suspected child abuse as a possible cause of the injuries, but
were not definitive in their diagnosis. Umetiti was required to
respond to this situation and apply his training and experience
to make a tentative, inherently discretionary decision on how to
proceed. The first phase of this multi-step process is
investigatory. Umetiti began his investigation by interviewing
the relevant parties and reaching a preliminary conclusion that
Baby Jesse was not at immediate risk of harm from his father.
Umetiti marshalled the family's resources and put in place a
voluntary case plan that expressly relied on the cooperation and
good will of all involved. The Division also convinced the
child's parents to submit to a substance assessment, which
showed negative results for illicit substances.
This investigation shows that Umetiti and Perez's decisions
and the steps they took to address the situation were
31 A-3717-13T2
objectively reasonable. There is also no reason to question
that these two Division employees acted with subjective good
faith.
IV
The Tort Claims Act
The Legislature adopted the TCA in response to the Supreme
Court's abrogation of sovereign immunity under our common law.
See Willis v. Dep't of Conservation & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534,
540–41 (1970). The Legislature intended the TCA "to serve as a
comprehensive scheme that seeks to provide compensation to tort
victims without unduly interfering with governmental functions
and without imposing an excessive burden on taxpayers." Parsons
ex rel. Parsons v. Mullica Twp. Bd. of Educ., 226 N.J. 297, 308
(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bernstein v.
State, 411 N.J. Super. 316, 331 (App. Div. 2010)). Thus, in
reviewing plaintiff's cause of action, we are "guided by the
principle that 'immunity for public entities [under the TCA] is
the general rule and liability is the exception.'" Ibid.
(quoting Kemp by Wright v. State, 147 N.J. 294, 299 (1997)).
The words of Chief Justice Weintraub, written more than
half a century ago, capture the essence of the TCA's underlying
public policy:
A private entrepreneur may readily be held
[liable] for negligent omissions within the
32 A-3717-13T2
chosen ambit of his activity. But the area
within which [the] government has the power
to act for the public good is almost without
limit, and the State has no duty to do
everything that might be done. Rather[,]
there is a political discretion as to what
ought to be done, as to priorities, and as
to how much should be raised by taxes or
borrowed to that end. If [the] government
does act, then, when it acts in a manner
short of ordinary prudence, liability could
be judged as in the case of a private party.
So if a road were constructed of a design
imperiling the user, the issue of fault
would present no novel problem. But whether
a road should have four or six or eight
lanes, or there should be dividers, or
circles or jughandles for turns, or traffic
lights, or traffic policemen, or a speed
limit of 50 or 60 miles per hour -- such
matters involve discretion and revenue and
are committed to the judgment of the
legislative and executive branches. As to
such matters, the question is whether a
judge or jury could review the policy or
political decisions involved without in
effect taking over the responsibility and
power of those other branches.
[Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 109–10
(1966) (citation omitted).]
Thus, the State's immunity from civil liability is not
predicated on a notion of infallibility, but on the judiciary's
inability to enforce any judgment it may render. Id. at 108.
The judiciary does not have the constitutional authority to
order the Legislature to appropriate public funds to pay a
judgment; nor can it issue a writ of execution upon state-owned
property. Ibid. (citations omitted). These fundamental aspects
33 A-3717-13T2
of our system of government form the guiding principles for
determining the applicability of the TCA to this cause of
action.
As our description of the Division's statutory framework
reveals, the circumstances we confront here directly implicate
the immunity the TCA confers on the employees of a governmental
agency whose sole role is to enforce our State's child
protection laws. Umetiti and Perez's authority to investigate
child abuse allegations and/or remove a child from his home are
carefully and expressly circumscribed by the Legislature and
subject to judicial scrutiny. The sole basis upon which these
employees could have removed Baby Jesse was through the legal
authority provided in Title 9 and Title 30.
V
Qualified Immunity
The TCA provides a public employee with immunity for "an
injury caused by his adoption of or failure to adopt any law or
by his failure to enforce any law." N.J.S.A. 59:3-5; see also
Bombace v. Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 366 (1991) (quoting N.J.S.A.
59:3-5). This immunity is absolute, thus requiring the
dismissal of a plaintiff's cause of action. Reaves v. Dep't of
Law & Pub. Safety, Div. on Civil Rights, 303 N.J. Super. 115,
120 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 12 (1997); Bombace,
34 A-3717-13T2
supra, 125 N.J. at 373–74. However, because defendant did not
raise absolute immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-5 as a defense, we
will address the issues under the qualified immunity standard in
N.J.S.A. 59:3-3.
In contrast to N.J.S.A. 59:3-5, N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 provides
qualified immunity with respect to the enforcement of a law: "A
public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the
execution or enforcement of any law." The qualified immunity
afforded by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 has two components. A public
employee is entitled to this immunity if the employee can
establish either that his or her conduct was "objectively
reasonable" or that he or she acted with subjective good faith.
Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 131–32 (1995) (citations
omitted). In determining whether an employee has established
qualified immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, the court applies the
same standards of objective reasonableness that are used in
federal civil rights cases. Id. at 131–32; see also Wildoner v.
Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000). If there are
disputed facts that underlie the claim, the TCA's applicability
may require submission to a jury. Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at
132 (quoting Evans v. Elizabeth Police Dep't, 236 N.J. Super.
115, 117 (App. Div. 1983)).
35 A-3717-13T2
A defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity based on
objectively reasonable conduct "is a question of law to be
decided [as] early in the proceedings as possible, preferably on
a properly supported motion for summary judgment or dismissal."
See Wildoner, supra, 162 N.J. at 387 (referring to qualified
immunity claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and observing that the
same standards apply to questions of objective reasonableness
under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3); Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 131–32
(stating public employees are entitled to summary judgment under
N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 if they can establish that their conduct was
objectively reasonable).
A court must examine whether the actor's allegedly wrongful
conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the facts known
to him or her at the time. State v. Shannon, 222 N.J. 576, 602
(2015) (quoting State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 46–47 (2011), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1657, 194 L. Ed. 2d 800 (2016).
Objective reasonableness will be established if the actor's
conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional or
statutory right. Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113 (2014)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 410 (1982)).
Given the undisputed facts we have described at length, we
are satisfied Umetiti and Perez are covered by the qualified
36 A-3717-13T2
immunity in N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. Umetiti did not fail to enforce
the provisions of Title 9 and Title 30. He undertook a course
of action sanctioned by the statutory authority conferred to the
Division under the circumstances. Given the child's physical
condition on May 28, 2009, and the availability of his family's
support, there was no legal basis to consider, much less
execute, a Dodd removal. Even if the Division had unilaterally
taken such a drastic and legally unwarranted action, we are
satisfied, as a matter of law, that the Family Part would have
ordered the Division to return the child to his parents. The
terms of the case plan mediated by the Division addressed all of
the concerns known to Umetiti at the time.
In the interest of clarity, we also address defendants'
good faith as an alternative basis for applying qualified
immunity. A defendant who cannot establish that his or her
conduct was objectively reasonable may still invoke qualified
immunity if his or her actions were carried out in good faith.
Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 132 (citations omitted).
Ordinarily, the issue of good faith will require a plenary
hearing to assess the claim's subjective elements. Canico v.
Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361, 365 (1996) (citing Fielder, supra, 141
N.J. at 132). Under these circumstances, however, a public
37 A-3717-13T2
employee who establishes he performed his actions in good faith
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Ibid.
This court has previously reviewed the application of
qualified immunity to the conduct of Division caseworkers, based
on the good faith provision in N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. In B.F. v. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs., 296 N.J. Super. 372 (App. Div. 1997),
the plaintiffs sought monetary damages for alleged violations of
the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the New Jersey
Constitution; and various common law torts. Id. at 377. The
factual basis for the plaintiffs' cause of action was not
disputed. The Supreme Court was highly critical of the actions
the Division took during the underlying guardianship case filed
to terminate the plaintiffs' parental rights:
We are compelled to note that much of the
bonding that has taken place in this case
could have been avoided if the [Division]
had correctly followed its mandate to use
due diligence and its best efforts to
reunite children with their natural parents.
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15; [N.J.S.A.] 30:4C-58. When
B.F. requested that K.L.F. be returned to
her custody, the child had been with her
current foster parents for only a month.
When DYFS petitioned for guardianship in
March 1991, the child had been with the
foster parents for ten months. Regrettably,
litigation has extended that period even
more. By encouraging her foster parents to
believe that K.L.F. was on the way to
becoming their child, and to view their
interests and those of the child as being
opposed to her reunification with her
biological parent, DYFS may have increased
38 A-3717-13T2
the amount of bonding that has occurred.
That those in the child welfare system not
tip the scales and encourage a foster
parent-child bond to develop when the
natural parent is both fit and anxious to
regain custody is essential. Indeed, we
suspect that if the [Division] had allowed
visitation and begun a process of reuniting
B.F. with her daughter, it could have helped
create a bond between the daughter and her
mother that would have greatly mitigated any
harm from being removed from foster parents.
[In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32,
45–46 (1992) (emphasis added).]
Despite these highly critical comments by our Supreme
Court, we held the Division caseworkers in B.F. were entitled to
qualified immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 because the Court's
criticism "[did] not amount to charges of 'crime, actual fraud,
actual malice[,] or willful misconduct.' . . . They are at most
assertions of negligence." B.F., supra, 296 N.J. Super. at 385–
86 (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:3-14).9 Relying on
Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 123–25, we reaffirmed "that ordinary
negligence is an insufficient basis for holding liable a public
employee involved in the execution of the law under N.J.S.A.
59:3-3." B.F., supra, 296 N.J. Super. at 386. A public
9
In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 59:3-14(a) provides as follows:
"Nothing in this act shall exonerate a public employee from
liability if it is established that his conduct was outside the
scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud,
actual malice or willful misconduct."
39 A-3717-13T2
employee's good faith under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 is "to be judged in
relation to whether his act violated N.J.S.A. 59:3-14 in that it
involved 'crime, actual fraud, actual malice[,] or willful
misconduct.'" Ibid. (citing Brayshaw v. Gelber, 232 N.J. Super.
99, 110 (App. Div. 1989); Hayes v. Mercer County, 217 N.J.
Super. 614, 619–20 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 643
(1987)).
Here, the devastating physical injuries and permanent
cognitive harm to Baby Jesse were caused by the criminal conduct
of his biological father, not by a Division caseworker's good
faith efforts to carry out his statutory responsibilities.
While serving in the Law Division, Judge Charles E.
Villanueva10 considered the application of good faith immunity to
a convoluted cause of action filed against a number of public
defendants, including Division caseworkers, investigators from
the Attorney General's Office, and sitting Superior Court
judges. The plaintiffs relied on multiple theories of liability
to support the mother's complaint that the father had sexually
abused their four-year-old daughter. Delbridge v. Schaeffer,
238 N.J. Super. 323, 328–29 (Law Div. 1989), aff'd sub. nom.,
A.D. v. Franco, 297 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1993), certif.
10
Judge Villanueva served in the Appellate Division from 1992 to
1996.
40 A-3717-13T2
denied, 135 N.J. 467, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 832, 115 S. Ct.
108, 130 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994).
Judge Villanueva granted summary judgment in favor of the
Division caseworkers based on the qualified immunity provided by
N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. He found the caseworkers' conduct was
objectively reasonable. Id. at 347–50. All of their actions
were carried out in the execution and enforcement of the laws
pertaining to child abuse. Id. at 346–48. Judge Villanueva
provided the following incisive observations that are highly
relevant to the circumstances we face here:
If these defendants were not immune and were
obliged to defend their actions in a civil
trial (and litigate the same issues already
litigated, decided and currently on appeal),
a most chilling effect would be visited upon
them. When others in the field of preventing
child abuse learn of this case, it could
have a catastrophic effect if persons, such
as these defendants, were held not to be
immune. What reasonable DYFS employee, in
deciding whether to pursue an allegation of
child abuse, would fail to ask himself
whether he wants to end up at risk in a
similar lawsuit? What is worse, it is
precisely in those cases (unlike this case)
where the indications of abuse are subtle or
sketchy -- and, thus, most in need of
investigation -- that the chilling effect of
such a decision will be felt most.
[Id. at 348–49.]
Judge Villanueva's admonitions are tragically illustrated
in this case. The potential tort claims arising from a
41 A-3717-13T2
particularly vulnerable class of litigants can be fiscally
ruinous. The Division is uniquely responsible for protecting
the State's children from abuse and neglect. The Legislature
adopted the TCA to protect public funds from being diverted to
underwrite the cost of civil liability in these type of cases.
The Division employees named as defendants in this case are
entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 because the record
shows their conduct was objectively reasonable. Alternatively,
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted
with subjective good faith in carrying out their statutory
responsibilities. Our holding based on qualified immunity under
N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 obviates the need to address defendants'
remaining arguments. For these same reasons, we also deny
plaintiff's cross-appeal. We thus vacate the final judgment
entered against defendants for $165,972,503, plus $1,432,872.81
for satisfaction of Medicaid claims.
Reversed.
42 A-3717-13T2