police officer entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right
How later courts described this case
- police officer entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right
- plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting presumption of independent judgment, and “must provide more than an account of the incident in question that conflicts with the account of the officers involved”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KARL D. HUBER, No. 15-55392
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03293-GHK-
JEM
v.
CHRISTOPHER COULTER, individual MEMORANDUM*
and official capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Karl D. Huber appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest, excessive force, and malicious
prosecution claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2006). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Huber’s false
arrest claim because it would not have been clear to every reasonable officer that
the conduct violated a clearly established right. See Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4
(2013) (police officer entitled to qualified immunity unless the conduct at issue
violated a clearly established constitutional right).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Huber’s
excessive force claim because defendants’ limited use of force during the course of
Huber’s arrest did not violate a clearly established right. See id. We therefore do
not consider whether the force used during the arrest violated a constitutional right.
Further, Huber failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants’ use of handcuffs after Huber’s arrest was unreasonable. See Arpin v.
Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
summary judgment proper on an excessive force claim where plaintiff failed to
provide specific facts that the force used by the application of handcuffs was
unreasonable or that she sustained actual injuries).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Huber’s malicious
prosecution claim because Huber failed to rebut the presumption that the
2 15-55392
prosecutor exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause
existed. See Newman, 457 F.3d at 993-95 (plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting
presumption of independent judgment, and “must provide more than an account of
the incident in question that conflicts with the account of the officers involved”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Huber’s contention that the district
court did not consider his objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation.
AFFIRMED.
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