Opinion

Aliments Krispy Kernels, Inc. v. Nichols Farms

  • 851 F.3d 283
  • 92 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 201
  • 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4991
  • 2017 WL 1055569
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Mar 21, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Fuentes
On the bench
Ambro, Shwartz, Fuentes
Cited by
64 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.0%

stating that courts “look to applicable state law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate’

How later courts described this case

  • stating that courts “look to applicable state law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate’
  • to the extent prior decisions interpreted this as “a substantive standard that applies to the determination of an arbitration agreement’s enforceability as a general matter,” such standard is “no longer valid after the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan”
  • “[W]e repeatedly made clear that . . . ‘when determining whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties . . . we apply ordinary state-law principles of contract law,’ and no more.” (quoting Century Indemnity Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 584 F.3d 513, 532 (3d Cir. 2009))
  • “Because we look to applicable state law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we begin with a choice-of-law analysis.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 16-1975

_______________

ALIMENTS KRISPY KERNELS, INC.,

Appellant

v.

NICHOLS FARMS a/k/a NICHOLS FAMILY FARMS a/k/a

NICHOLS PISTACHIOS

___

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 3:13-cv-5995)

District Judge: The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

_______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 18, 2016

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit

Judges

(Opinion Filed: March 21, 2017)

Andrea L. D’Ambra, Esq.

John F. Tully, Esq.

Norton Rose Fulbright

1301 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Jami M. Vibbert, Esq.

Venable

1270 Avenue of the Americas

24th Floor, Rockefeller Center

New York, NY 10020

Counsel for Appellant

Samuel Feldman, Esq.

Orloff Lowenbach Stifelman & Siegel

101 Eisenhower Parkway

Suite 400

Roseland, NJ 07068

Counsel for Appellee

_______________

OPINION

_________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Aliments Krispy Kernels, brought this

suit to enforce an arbitration award it received against the

defendant, Nichols Farms, in a contract dispute. The award,

2

based on an alleged breach of contract, was in the sum of

$222,100. Claiming that the parties never agreed to arbitrate,

Nichols Farms did not attend the arbitration. Aliments filed a

petition to confirm the arbitration award and Nichols cross-

petitioned to vacate it. The District Court denied Aliments’

petition to confirm and granted Nichols’s petition to vacate.

Because we find that an issue of material fact exists as to

whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we will vacate the

District Court’s judgment and remand for further

proceedings.

I. Background

In August 2012, Aliments, a Canadian snack purveyor,

contacted its American broker, Sterling Corporation, to

purchase thousands of pounds of raw pistachios. Sterling, in

turn, contacted Pacific/Atlantic Crop Exchange, another

agricultural commodities broker. Learning of Aliments’

interest in purchasing pistachios, Pacific called Nichols, a

pistachio grower in California. Nichols agreed to the

proposed quantity and price. One month later, in September

2012, Sterling contacted Pacific with a second order of

pistachios from Aliments. Pacific reached out to Nichols

once again. Nichols agreed to the proposed quantity and

price of this second order.

To confirm the two orders, Sterling issued sales

confirmations for the August and September orders and sent

copies to Aliments and Pacific. Pacific did not forward the

Sterling sales confirmations to Nichols, however, and instead

issued its own set of sales confirmations, which were sent to

3

Nichols and Sterling. 1 Neither Aliments nor Nichols was

aware that two sets of sales confirmations existed. The two

sets contained the same terms, including a thirty-day credit

term. However, while Sterling’s sales confirmations

contained arbitration clauses, it appears that some but not all

of the sales confirmations generated by Pacific contained

arbitration clauses.2

Aliments evidently believed that the Sterling sales

confirmations, though unsigned by either party, represented a

binding contract to purchase pistachios from Nichols, on

credit with payment due thirty days from delivery, “as

usual.”3 Nichols, on the other hand, thought that the thirty-

day credit term was but a placeholder, as were all the terms in

the Pacific sales confirmations except for the price and

quantity terms. In support, the president of Nichols submitted

a declaration explaining that “[w]hen Nichols receives a

request from a customer to purchase product on credit, [it]

obtain[s] a credit report and then [he, the president of

Nichols, is] the one who makes the decision about whether to

1

A 257-58 (Pacific never forwarded the sales confirmations

from Sterling to Nichols because it is its business practice “to

not forward to the seller unsigned confirmations. Instead, [it]

wait[s] to receive (and pass on) either a written purchase

order or a signed confirmation from the buyer, which [it] then

forward[s] to the seller, and/or a written contract or sales

acknowledgement from the seller, reflecting a firm offer to

purchase product.”); A 47 (president of Nichols declaring that

he had never seen the Sterling sales confirmations).

2

There is a dispute as to which versions of the sales

confirmations were sent to Nichols and Sterling.

3

A 101-02.

4

sell product on credit and on what terms and conditions.”4

The president of Pacific corroborated this practice, and

submitted a separate declaration, stating that he had no

authority from Nichols “to commit to any credit terms or to

bind Nichols to any credit terms.” 5 He avers that he created

the sales confirmations based on a “template,” changing only

the amount and price to reflect this particular transaction,

leaving “product description, packaging, addresses, and

terms” as-is from a prior transaction.6 “Based on [his] many

years in the commodity brokerage business,” the president of

Pacific “understood that Nichols, in response to [Aliments’]

offer, had the right to perform a credit check on [Aliments],

and require security or advance payment if it thought it to be

necessary.”7

After the sales confirmations were created, Nichols

requested, and Aliments submitted, a credit application. This

credit application was denied due to Aliments’ previous late

payments to Nichols, its involvement in a lawsuit with

another farmer, and the increased difficulty of collection with

any foreign corporation. In short, Nichols would not deliver

its pistachios until it received payment from Aliments first.

Aliments protested that advance payment is a highly

irregular request that is inconsistent with Nichols’s past

practices with Aliments and with industry standards.

Nonetheless, it continued to attempt to work with Nichols to

come to an amiable resolution. However, the parties were

4

A 45.

5

A 74.

6

Id.

7

Id.

5

ultimately unable to come to an agreement on a payment

method. Finally, Aliments bought pistachios from another

vendor at a higher price. Seeking to recoup the extra cost,

Aliments initiated arbitration proceedings in accordance with

the arbitration clauses contained in the Sterling sales

confirmations that were unseen and unsigned by Nichols.

Despite being notified of the arbitration, Nichols

elected not to attend. Aliments was awarded $222,100 in

damages against Nichols by the arbitration panel. Sent a copy

of this award, Nichols refused to satisfy it. Finally, Aliments

filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award in the District

of New Jersey. In response, Nichols cross-petitioned to

vacate the arbitration award.

After months of discovery, the District Court denied

Aliments’ petition and granted Nichols’s cross-petition to

vacate because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to

whether the parties failed to enter into “an express

unequivocal agreement” to arbitrate.8 We disagree, and for

the reasons set forth below we will vacate and remand for

further proceedings.9

8

A 9.

9

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and 9 U.S.C. § 9. We have jurisdiction

to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C.

§ 16(a). “On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion

to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, we review its legal

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”

Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir.

2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Sutter v. Oxford Health

6

II. Discussion

On appeal, Aliments argues that the District Court

made two legal errors: first, the Court “erred in using a legal

standard requiring ‘an express unequivocal agreement’ to

arbitrate prior to binding a party to arbitration”;10 and second,

it erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the parties did not

enter into such an agreement to arbitrate. We will address

each of these arguments in turn.

A. Legal Standard

The parties’ dispute regarding the proper legal

standard for determining whether the parties have made an

agreement to arbitrate is the result of courts’ changing attitude

towards the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). In 1980, we

held in Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co. that

“[b]efore a party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate and

thus be deprived of a day in court, there should be an express,

unequivocal agreement to that effect.”11 In 1994, we

reiterated this standard in Kaplan v. First Options.12 That

case was appealed to the Supreme Court; and, in a decision

affirming on other grounds, the Court held that, “[w]hen

deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain

matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-

Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S.

Ct. 2064 (2013)).

10

Appellant’s Br. at 2

11

636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980).

12

19 F.3d 1503, 1512 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations

omitted).

7

law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”13

Though the Court’s holding appears to be a departure from

our express and unequivocal standard, that standard was

never expressly overruled.

Over a decade later, we reexamined the express and

unequivocal standard in Century Indemnity Company v.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.14 We reviewed

how we have used the express and unequivocal standard in

the past, and acknowledged that the express and unequivocal

language has been used, confusingly, to establish two

different standards:

On the one hand, we have stated the “express”

and “unequivocal” requirement to explain that

genuine issues of fact as to whether there is an

agreement to arbitrate preclude compelling a

party to submit to arbitration; on the other, we

have used this language to state a substantive

standard that applies to the determination of an

arbitration agreement’s enforceability as a

general matter.15

In Century Indemnity, we held that the latter use of

express and equivocal as a substantive standard is no longer

valid after the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options of

Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan held that courts should generally look

to the relevant state contract law to determine whether a valid

13

First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944

(1995).

14

584 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2009).

15

Id. at 530 (footnote omitted).

8

agreement to arbitrate exists.16 But we did not strike down

the use of the express and unequivocal requirement to the

extent that it “requires that there not be a genuine issue of

material fact as to an arbitration agreement’s existence before

a district court may determine whether the agreement exists

as a matter of law.”17 Furthermore, in Century Indemnity, we

repeatedly made clear that, despite the express and

unequivocal language, “when determining whether there is a

valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties . . . we apply

ordinary state-law principles of contract law,” and no more.18

Here, the District Court clearly used the express and

unequivocal standard to explain that it will decide the petition

to confirm the arbitration award and motion to vacate as a

matter of law only if there is no “genuine issue of fact

concerning the formation of the contract.”19 Therefore, to the

extent that the District Court meant to impose no more

stringent standard on the arbitration agreement than that

permissible under state law, it did not err. However,

Aliments’ confusion on this matter is understandable, and we

recommend that district courts avoid using the “express and

16

Id. at 531 (citations omitted).

17

Id. at 530.

18

Id. at 532; see also id. at 531 (“When deciding whether the

parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts

generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that

govern the formation of contracts. The relevant state law

here, for example, would require the court to see whether the

parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the

arbitrability issue to arbitration.” (quoting First Options, 514

U.S. at 944)).

19

A 10.

9

unequivocal” language. The legal standard is simply that we

apply the relevant state contract law to questions of

arbitrability, which may be decided as a matter of law only if

there is no genuine issue of material fact when viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.20

Having established that the District Court, despite

unclear language, used the correct standard, we turn next to

Aliments’ second question on appeal: whether the District

Court correctly determined that the parties did not enter into

an agreement to arbitrate as a matter of law.

B. Analysis

As previously stated, the ultimate inquiry of whether

the parties agreed to arbitrate is governed by the applicable

state law. In this case, the question of which state law should

apply is muddled. Aliments is a Canadian company seeking

to confirm an arbitration award issued in New Jersey by an

arbitration panel that used New York law against Nichols

Farms, a California company, for breach of a contract to

deliver goods in California that was largely negotiated by a

broker based in Georgia and a broker based in California.

Before the District Court, Aliments argued for New York law

to apply, and Nichols argued for California law to apply. The

District Court, however, made no findings about which state

law applied. Instead, based solely on general principles of

contract law, it granted Nichols’s petition to vacate the

20

See Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 219-20 (3d

Cir. 2014); In re Nortel Networks Inc., 737 F.3d 265, 270 (3d

Cir. 2013); Invista S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 F.3d 75, 84

(3d Cir. 2010).

10

arbitration award due to “a lack of evidence that any

agreement or sales confirmation was ever entered,” and

because “there is nothing to demonstrate that Nichols Farms

intended to arbitrate the matter.”21 We disagree with this

terse analysis.

Because we look to applicable state law to determine

whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we begin with a

choice-of-law analysis. To determine the applicable state

law, we use the forum state’s choice-of-law rule. The first

step in any choice-of-law inquiry under New Jersey law

requires the court to determine whether there is an actual

conflict between the laws of the potential forums.22 “That is

done by examining the substance of the potentially applicable

laws to determine whether there is a distinction between

them.”23 If there is no actual conflict, “the inquiry is over

and, because New Jersey would apply its own law in such a

case, a federal court sitting in diversity must do the same.”24

If there is an actual conflict, then the court must determine

“which forum has the most significant relationship with the

parties and the contract.”25

21

A 9.

22

Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp., 709 F.3d 202,

206 (3d Cir. 2013).

23

P. V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 460 (N.J.

2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

24

Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424, 428 (3d Cir. 2006).

25

Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395,

401 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 488, 491 (N.J. 1980)).

11

On appeal, the parties continue to rely on different

state laws: Aliments relies on New York law and Nichols

relies on New Jersey law.26 Both parties, however, agree that

there is no actual conflict between New York law and New

Jersey law.27 Consequently, we will apply New Jersey law on

contract formation.

Under New Jersey law, “[a]n enforceable agreement

requires mutual assent, a meeting of the minds based on a

common understanding of the contract terms.”28 A party who

assents to a contract, however, is bound by all the terms of a

contract, even those terms that the party did not read or

specifically discuss.29 In addition to mutual assent, the New

Jersey Uniform Commercial Code requires that “a contract

for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more” be set

forth in writing and “signed by the party against whom

enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.”30

But where the sales agreement is between merchants, the

signature requirement is satisfied “if within a reasonable time

a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against

the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to

know its contents,” and the receiving party does not give a

26

Appellant Supp. Ltr. Br. at 2; Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 1.

27

Appellant Supp. Ltr. Br. at 2; Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 2.

28

Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 137 A.3d 1168, 1180 (N.J.

2016) (citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d

306, 312-13 (N.J. 2014)).

29

See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69,

84 (N.J. 1960).

30

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(1).

12

“written notice of objection to its contents . . . within ten days

after it is received.”31

Here, neither party has persuaded us that, under New

Jersey law, no issues of material fact exist as to whether the

parties agreed to arbitrate. We turn to appellant Aliments’

arguments first. Aliments asserts that Nichols “clearly

intended to be bound by the [Pacific sales confirmations] and

never mentioned any dispute regarding the arbitration clause”

contained therein.32 Specifically, Aliments points to evidence

in the record suggesting that Nichols acted as though it were

under a contractual obligation to sell the pistachios to

Aliments. For example, during the negotiations that took

place in an effort to resolve their dispute, Nichols suggested

that Aliments “void[] the existing purchase orders issued by

Pacific Atlantic”33 and sign a new agreement with

substantially similar sales terms but requiring pre-payment.

Separately, in an internal email from the CEO of Nichols, the

sales team was told to “delete the contract obligation.”34

Aliments’ argument fails due to at least two issues of

material fact. First, as Nichols points out, there is a factual

dispute as to whether the Pacific sales confirmations that were

actually emailed to Nichols and Aliments contained

arbitration clauses.35 The record contains versions of the

Pacific sales confirmations that do include the arbitration

31

Id. § 12A:2-201(2).

32

Appellant’s Br. at 18.

33

A 210.

34

A 213

35

See Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 3.

13

clauses,36 and versions that do not.37 Second, the record

suggests that even though Nichols may have referred to the

sales confirmations as “purchase orders” or “contract

obligation[s],”38 that does not necessarily mean that Nichols

viewed the Pacific sales confirmations as binding contractual

agreements. For example, Nichols’s Regional Sales Manager

stated that it is his understanding that Nichols does not

“accept” buyers’ offers to purchase until they pass a credit

check.39 Indeed, after Nichols received the Pacific sales

confirmations, it continued to request a credit application

from Aliments. Furthermore, the president of Pacific

corroborated the fact that, to the best of his knowledge based

on industry standards, the parties did not enter into a binding

contract because neither party ultimately signed the sales

confirmations.40 In sum, we cannot hold definitively that

Nichols assented to binding sales agreements containing

arbitration clauses.

At the same time, Nichols’s arguments asking us to

affirm the District Court’s grant of its petition to vacate the

arbitration award also fail. Nichols makes three categories of

arguments. First, it relies on the fact that neither party signed

any of the sales confirmations and that the rules imposed by

the Association of Food Industries, the chosen arbitrator,

required “the presence of signatures by both parties.”41 This

reliance is misplaced. As reiterated above, under New Jersey

36

A 29; A 31.

37

A 237; A 243.

38

A 210; A 213.

39

A 84.

40

A 75.

41

Appellee’s Br. at 11.

14

state law, bills of sale between two merchants need not be

signed in order to be binding as long as certain other

conditions are met. The arbitrator’s own procedural rules,

such as requiring both parties’ signatures, are to be decided

by the arbitrator, rather than the court, unless otherwise

provided for in the contract.42 The lack of signatures clearly

did not prevent the arbitrator in this case from concluding that

Aliments and Nichols entered into a binding sales contract,

and that is not a conclusion that we have been asked to

review. Thus, our review is limited to examining whether,

within the bounds of New Jersey state law, the parties made

an agreement to arbitrate, and under New Jersey law, a lack

of a signature in an agreement between two merchants is

simply not dispositive.

Second, Nichols argues that the Pacific sales

confirmations “fail to satisfy the merchant’s exception to the

general signature requirement”43 because they are not

42

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84

(2002) (While, generally, “a gateway dispute about whether

the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a

question of arbitrability for a court to decide . . . .

[P]rocedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear

on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge,

but for an arbitrator, to decide.”(internal quotations and

citations omitted)); see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of

Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1207 (2014) (“[C]ourts presume that

the parties intend arbitrators, not courts, to decide disputes

about the meaning and application of particular procedural

preconditions for the use of arbitration.”).

43

Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 4.

15

writings “in confirmation of the contract[s].”44 Specifically,

Nichols argues that the Pacific sales confirmations fail

because they “bear blank signature lines for the buyer and

seller and still require sales confirmation numbers from

Nichols Farms.”45 We disagree with Nichols’s proposition

that these deficiencies rendered the Pacific sales

confirmations incomplete as a matter of law where the sales

confirmations included all the essential terms of a sales

contract: price, quantity, delivery, and payment method.46

44

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2).

45

Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 4.

46

Cf. Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, Inc., 346 A.2d

419, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (“[P]arties may

effectively bind themselves by an informal memorandum

where they agree upon the essential terms of the contract and

intend to be bound by the memorandum, even though they

contemplate the execution of a more formal document.”).

Nichols also argued that we should not address any arguments

relying on the Pacific sales confirmations because “Aliments

did not rely on the [Pacific] sales confirmations in its petition

to confirm” before the District Court. Appellee’s Br. at 12.

This is simply a misrepresentation of the facts. Aliments, in

its original petition to confirm arbitration award, specifically

referenced, and attached, the Pacific sales confirmations as

bases for confirming the award. Mem. of Law in Support of

Petition to Confirm Final Arbitration Award, Aliments Krispy

Kernels v. Nichols Farms, No. 3:13-cv-5995 (D.N.J. Oct. 8,

2013), ECF No. 1-1. There may, however, exist a question as

to whether the Pacific sales confirmations satisfy the

merchant’s exception to the general statute of frauds as

writings “in confirmation of the contract[s]” because they

may not sufficiently make reference to prior oral agreements.

16

Third and last, Nichols argues that the merchant’s

exception does not apply because Nichols “advised [Pacific]

before and after the confirmations issued that it wanted

payment terms not reflected therein and, the day before the

second confirmation, told [Pacific] to have ‘[its] buyer’

comply with the terms Nichols Farms wanted.”47 The

merchant’s exception applies to unsigned written

See Trilco Terminal v. Prebilt Corp., 400 A.2d 1237, 1240

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (holding that the merchant’s

exception in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2) is satisfied only

if the written confirmation indicates “that a binding or

completed transaction has been made”). Nichols did not

make this argument, however, and has thereby conceded that

the Pacific sales confirmations sufficiently reference a prior

oral agreement between the parties. Moreover, New Jersey’s

interpretation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2) is in direct

conflict with New York’s interpretation of the same Uniform

Commercial Code provision. In Bazak International Corp. v.

Mast Indus., Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633, 636 (N.Y. 1989), the New

York Court of Appeals explicitly “reject[ed] the exacting

standard proposed by Trilco and Norminjil [a subsequent

federal case applying Trilco] as inconsistent with the letter

and spirit of the relevant UCC sales provisions.” Instead, the

Court of Appeals held that written confirmations are

sufficient to satisfy the merchant’s exception so long as “they

afford a basis for believing that they reflect a real transaction

between the parties.” Id. at 638. Here, Nichols explicitly

conceded that “there is no conflict between the applicable

New York and New Jersey rules,” and so we can only

surmise that Nichols does not wish to apply Trilco to this

case. Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 1.

47

Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 7.

17

confirmations “unless written notice of objection to [their]

contents is given within ten days after [they are] received.”48

Nichols posits that its repeated requests for Aliments to

complete a credit application satisfy, as a matter of law, the

exception to the exception. We cannot so find because the

record before us lacks evidence of any written notice of

objection. Instead, we have an email from Nichols to Pacific,

dated one day before the September Pacific sales

confirmation was sent, requesting Pacific to “remember to

send the credit application to [its] buyer at the same time [it]

sends [Nichols] the P[urchase] O[rder].”49 In deposition

testimony, the president of Nichols stated that he assumes that

“there would either have been something in writing or

something over the phone” to inform Pacific that, though

Nichols had agreed to the quantity and price as reflected in

the sales confirmations, it did not agree to sell the pistachios

on credit with payment due in 30 days.50 He then added that

“[q]uite often it’s done verbally.”51 However, he also

testified that there was correspondence “from the beginning

of August into the end of November about Aliments [and] the

credit process with Aliments,” suggesting that, perhaps, there

may have been writings between the parties but it is not clear

from this testimony that any of them embody the “written

objection” required under New Jersey law.52 In short, there

remains an issue of material fact as to whether Nichols sent a

written notice of objection regarding the Pacific sales

confirmations within ten days after they were received.

48

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2).

49

A 89.

50

A 183.

51

Id.

52

A 184.

18

* * *

In sum, contrary to the District Court’s analysis that

there is “a lack of evidence that any agreement or sales

confirmation was ever entered,” we find that multiple issues

of material fact exist, precluding us from entering judgment

in favor of either party.53

53

A 9.

19

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand

to the District Court for further proceedings.

20

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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