Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FRY ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F. v.

NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 15–497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal

funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a “free ap-

propriate public education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabili-

ties, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes formal administrative

procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools con-

cerning the provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also protect

the interests of children with disabilities, including Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and §504 of the Rehabilitation

Act. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court considered the

interaction between those other laws and the IDEA, holding that the

IDEA was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disa-

bility could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009.

Congress responded by passing the Handicapped Children’s Protec-

tion Act of 1986, overturning Smith’s preclusion of non-IDEA claims

and adding a carefully defined exhaustion provision. Under that

provision, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation

Act, or similar laws “seeking relief that is also available under [the

IDEA]” must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.

§1415(l).

Petitioner E. F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy; a

trained service dog named Wonder assists her with various daily life

activities. When E. F.’s parents, petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry,

sought permission for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, officials

at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. The officials reasoned that

the human aide provided as part of E. F.’s individualized education

program rendered the dog superfluous. In response, the Frys re-

moved E. F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also

2 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Syllabus

filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for Civil

Rights (OCR), claiming that the exclusion of E. F.’s service animal vi-

olated her rights under Title II and §504. OCR agreed, and school of-

ficials invited E. F. to return to Ezra Eby with Wonder. But the Frys,

concerned about resentment from school officials, instead enrolled

E. F. in a different school that welcomed the service dog. The Frys

then filed this suit in federal court against Ezra Eby’s local and re-

gional school districts and principal (collectively, the school districts),

alleging that they violated Title II and §504 and seeking declaratory

and monetary relief. The District Court granted the school districts’

motion to dismiss the suit, holding that §1415(l) required the Frys to

first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. The Sixth Cir-

cuit affirmed, reasoning that §1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff’s

alleged harms are “educational” in nature.

Held:

1. Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unneces-

sary where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other

than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 9–18.

(a) The language of §1415(l) compels exhaustion when a plaintiff

seeks “relief” that is “available” under the IDEA. Establishing the

scope of §1415(l), then, requires identifying the circumstances in

which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress or access a bene-

fit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a FAPE in the

statutory scheme. The IDEA’s stated purpose and specific commands

center on ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the

IDEA’s administrative procedures test whether a school has met this

obligation: Any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substan-

tive relief “shall” be “based on a determination of whether the child

received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Ac-

cordingly, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit

seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a de-

nial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing the suit

under a statute other than the IDEA. But if the remedy sought in a

suit brought under a different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE,

then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. Pp. 9–13.

(b) In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial

of a FAPE, what matters is the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint,

setting aside any attempts at artful pleading. That inquiry makes

central the plaintiff’s own claims, as §1415(l) explicitly requires in

asking whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief available under the

IDEA. But examination of a plaintiff’s complaint should consider

substance, not surface: §1415(l) requires exhaustion when the gra-

vamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide a

FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way. In ad-

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Syllabus

dressing whether a complaint fits that description, a court should at-

tend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons

with disabilities. The IDEA guarantees individually tailored educa-

tional services for children with disabilities, while Title II and §504

promise nondiscriminatory access to public institutions for people

with disabilities of all ages. That is not to deny some overlap in cov-

erage: The same conduct might violate all three statutes. But still,

these statutory differences mean that a complaint brought under Ti-

tle II and §504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination, ir-

respective of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. One clue to the gravamen

of a complaint can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions.

First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if

the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a

school? Second, could an adult at the school have pressed essentially

the same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a

complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also

unlikely to be truly about that subject. But when the answer is no,

then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of

the gravamen of a suit can emerge from the history of the proceed-

ings. Prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies may pro-

vide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns

the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that

term. Pp. 13–18.

2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper anal-

ysis of whether the gravamen of E. F.’s complaint charges, and seeks

relief for, the denial of a FAPE. The Frys’ complaint alleges only dis-

ability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the

adequacy of the special education services E. F.’s school provided.

Instead, the Frys have maintained that the school districts infringed

E. F.’s right to equal access—even if their actions complied in full

with the IDEA’s requirements. But the possibility remains that the

history of these proceedings might suggest something different. The

parties have not addressed whether the Frys initially pursued the

IDEA’s administrative remedies, and the record is cloudy as to the

relevant facts. On remand, the court below should establish whether

(or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute resolution

process before filing suit. And if the Frys started down that road, the

court should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of

their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating

further exhaustion. Pp. 18–20.

788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.

4 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Syllabus

ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–497

_________________

STACY FRY, ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F.,

PETITIONERS v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY

SCHOOLS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[February 22, 2017]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA

or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq.,

ensures that children with disabilities receive needed

special education services. One of its provisions, §1415(l),

addresses the Act’s relationship with other laws protecting

those children. Section 1415(l) makes clear that nothing

in the IDEA “restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or] remedies”

that other federal laws, including antidiscrimination

statutes, confer on children with disabilities. At the same

time, the section states that if a suit brought under such a

law “seek[s] relief that is also available under” the IDEA,

the plaintiff must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative

procedures. In this case, we consider the scope of that

exhaustion requirement. We hold that exhaustion is not

necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff ’s suit is

something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guar­

antee—what the Act calls a “free appropriate public edu­

cation.” §1412(a)(1)(A).

2 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

I

A

The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for

a commitment: to furnish a “free appropriate public educa­

tion”—more concisely known as a FAPE—to all children

with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. Ibid.; see

§1401(3)(A)(i) (listing covered disabilities). As defined in

the Act, a FAPE comprises “special education and related

services”—both “instruction” tailored to meet a child’s

“unique needs” and sufficient “supportive services” to

permit the child to benefit from that instruction.

§§1401(9), (26), (29); see Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson

Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S.

176, 203 (1982). An eligible child, as this Court has ex­

plained, acquires a “substantive right” to such an educa­

tion once a State accepts the IDEA’s financial assistance.

Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1010 (1984).

Under the IDEA, an “individualized education pro­

gram,” called an IEP for short, serves as the “primary

vehicle” for providing each child with the promised FAPE.

Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 311 (1988); see §1414(d).

(Welcome to—and apologies for—the acronymic world of

federal legislation.) Crafted by a child’s “IEP Team”—a

group of school officials, teachers, and parents—the IEP

spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child’s

“educational needs.” §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb), (d)(1)(B).

Most notably, the IEP documents the child’s current “lev­

els of academic achievement,” specifies “measurable an-

nual goals” for how she can “make progress in the general

education curriculum,” and lists the “special education and

related services” to be provided so that she can “advance

appropriately toward [those] goals.” §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I),

(II), (IV)(aa).

Because parents and school representatives sometimes

cannot agree on such issues, the IDEA establishes formal

procedures for resolving disputes. To begin, a dissatisfied

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3

Opinion of the Court

parent may file a complaint as to any matter concerning

the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational

agency (as state law provides). See §1415(b)(6). That

pleading generally triggers a “[p]reliminary meeting”

involving the contending parties, §1415(f )(1)(B)(i); at their

option, the parties may instead (or also) pursue a full-

fledged mediation process, see §1415(e). Assuming their

impasse continues, the matter proceeds to a “due pro­

cess hearing” before an impartial hearing officer.

§1415(f )(1)(A); see §1415(f )(3)(A)(i). Any decision of the

officer granting substantive relief must be “based on a

determination of whether the child received a [FAPE].”

§1415(f )(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at

the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency.

See §1415(g). Finally, a parent unhappy with the outcome

of the administrative process may seek judicial review by

filing a civil action in state or federal court. See

§1415(i)(2)(A).

Important as the IDEA is for children with disabilities,

it is not the only federal statute protecting their interests.

Of particular relevance to this case are two antidiscrimi­

nation laws—Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA), 42 U. S. C. §12131 et seq., and §504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. §794—which cover both

adults and children with disabilities, in both public schools

and other settings. Title II forbids any “public entity”

from discriminating based on disability; Section 504 ap­

plies the same prohibition to any federally funded “pro­

gram or activity.” 42 U. S. C. §§12131–12132; 29 U. S. C.

§794(a). A regulation implementing Title II requires a

public entity to make “reasonable modifications” to its

“policies, practices, or procedures” when necessary to avoid

such discrimination. 28 CFR §35.130(b)(7) (2016); see,

e.g., Alboniga v. School Bd. of Broward Cty., 87 F. Supp.

3d 1319, 1345 (SD Fla. 2015) (requiring an accommodation

to permit use of a service animal under Title II). In simi­

4 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

lar vein, courts have interpreted §504 as demanding cer­

tain “reasonable” modifications to existing practices in

order to “accommodate” persons with disabilities. Alexan-

der v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 299–300 (1985); see, e.g.,

Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., 731 F. Supp.

947, 961–962 (ED Cal. 1990) (requiring an accommodation

to permit use of a service animal under §504). And both

statutes authorize individuals to seek redress for viola­

tions of their substantive guarantees by bringing suits for

injunctive relief or money damages. See 29 U. S. C.

§794a(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. §12133.

This Court first considered the interaction between such

laws and the IDEA in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992.1

The plaintiffs there sought “to secure a ‘free appropriate

public education’ for [their] handicapped child.” Id., at

994. But instead of bringing suit under the IDEA alone,

they appended “virtually identical” claims (again alleging

the denial of a “free appropriate public education”) under

§504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 1009; see

id., at 1016. The Court held that the IDEA altogether

foreclosed those additional claims: With its “comprehen­

sive” and “carefully tailored” provisions, the Act was “the

exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability

(or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his educa­

tion. Id., at 1009; see id., at 1013, 1016, 1021.

Congress was quick to respond. In the Handicapped

Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 796, it over­

turned Smith’s preclusion of non-IDEA claims while also

adding a carefully defined exhaustion requirement. Now

codified at 20 U. S. C. §1415(l), the relevant provision of

——————

1 At

the time (and until 1990), the IDEA was called the Education of

the Handicapped Act, or EHA. See §901(a), 104 Stat. 1141–1142

(renaming the statute). To avoid confusion—and acronym overload—

we refer throughout this opinion only to the IDEA.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 5

Opinion of the Court

that statute reads:

“Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict

or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Re­

habilitation Act [including §504], or other Federal

laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,

except that before the filing of a civil action under

such laws seeking relief that is also available under

[the IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures]

shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be re­

quired had the action been brought under [the

IDEA].”

The first half of §1415(l) (up until “except that”) “reaf­

firm[s] the viability” of federal statutes like the ADA or

Rehabilitation Act “as separate vehicles,” no less integral

than the IDEA, “for ensuring the rights of handicapped

children.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–296, p. 4 (1985); see id., at 6.

According to that opening phrase, the IDEA does not

prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under such laws

even if, as in Smith itself, those claims allege the denial of

an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim

would). But the second half of §1415(l) (from “except that”

onward) imposes a limit on that “anything goes” regime, in

the form of an exhaustion provision. According to that

closing phrase, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA,

the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws must in certain

circumstances—that is, when “seeking relief that is also

available under” the IDEA—first exhaust the IDEA’s

administrative procedures. The reach of that requirement

is the issue in this case.

B

Petitioner E. F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral

palsy, which “significantly limits her motor skills and

6 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

mobility.” App. to Brief in Opposition 6, Complaint ¶19.2

When E. F. was five years old, her parents—petitioners

Stacy and Brent Fry—obtained a trained service dog for

her, as recommended by her pediatrician. The dog, a

goldendoodle named Wonder, “help[s E. F.] to live as

independently as possible” by assisting her with various

life activities. Id., at 2, ¶3. In particular, Wonder aids

E. F. by “retrieving dropped items, helping her balance

when she uses her walker, opening and closing doors,

turning on and off lights, helping her take off her coat,

[and] helping her transfer to and from the toilet.” Id., at 7,

¶27.

But when the Frys sought permission for Wonder to join

E. F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary

School refused the request. Under E. F.’s existing IEP, a

human aide provided E. F. with one-on-one support

throughout the day; that two-legged assistance, the school

officials thought, rendered Wonder superfluous. In the

words of one administrator, Wonder should be barred from

Ezra Eby because all of E. F.’s “physical and academic

needs [were] being met through the services/programs/

accommodations” that the school had already agreed to.

Id., at 8, ¶33. Later that year, the school officials briefly

allowed Wonder to accompany E. F. to school on a trial

basis; but even then, “the dog was required to remain in

the back of the room during classes, and was forbidden

from assisting [E. F.] with many tasks he had been specifi­

cally trained to do.” Ibid., ¶35. And when the trial period

concluded, the administrators again informed the Frys

that Wonder was not welcome. As a result, the Frys re­

moved E. F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her.

——————

2 Because this case comes to us on review of a motion to dismiss

E. F.’s suit, we accept as true all facts pleaded in her complaint. See

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination

Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164 (1993).

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 7

Opinion of the Court

In addition, the Frys filed a complaint with the U. S.

Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR),

charging that Ezra Eby’s exclusion of E. F.’s service ani­

mal violated her rights under Title II of the ADA and §504

of the Rehabilitation Act. Following an investigation,

OCR agreed. The office explained in its decision letter

that a school’s obligations under those statutes go beyond

providing educational services: A school could offer a

FAPE to a child with a disability but still run afoul of the

laws’ ban on discrimination. See App. 30–32. And here,

OCR found, Ezra Eby had indeed violated that ban, even if

its use of a human aide satisfied the FAPE standard. See

id., at 35–36. OCR analogized the school’s conduct to

“requir[ing] a student who uses a wheelchair to be carried”

by an aide or “requir[ing] a blind student to be led [around

by a] teacher” instead of permitting him to use a guide dog

or cane. Id., at 35. Regardless whether those—or Ezra

Eby’s—policies denied a FAPE, they violated Title II and

§504 by discriminating against children with disabilities.

See id., at 35–36.

In response to OCR’s decision, school officials at last

agreed that E. F. could come to school with Wonder. But

after meeting with Ezra Eby’s principal, the Frys became

concerned that the school administration “would resent

[E. F.] and make her return to school difficult.” App. to

Brief in Opposition 10, ¶48. Accordingly, the Frys found a

different public school, in a different district, where ad­

ministrators and teachers enthusiastically received both

E. F. and Wonder.

C

The Frys then filed this suit in federal court against the

local and regional school districts in which Ezra Eby is

located, along with the school’s principal (collectively, the

school districts). The complaint alleged that the school

districts violated Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Re­

8 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

habilitation Act by “denying [E. F.] equal access” to Ezra

Eby and its programs, “refus[ing] to reasonably accommo­

date” E. F.’s use of a service animal, and otherwise “dis­

criminat[ing] against [E. F.] as a person with disabilities.”

Id., at 15, ¶68, 17–18, ¶¶82–83. According to the com­

plaint, E. F. suffered harm as a result of that discrimina­

tion, including “emotional distress and pain, embarrass­

ment, [and] mental anguish.” Id., at 11–12, ¶51. In their

prayer for relief, the Frys sought a declaration that the

school districts had violated Title II and §504, along with

money damages to compensate for E. F.’s injuries.

The District Court granted the school districts’ motion

to dismiss the suit, holding that §1415(l) required the Frys

to first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.

See App. to Pet. for Cert. 50. A divided panel of the Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same

ground. In that court’s view, §1415(l) applies if “the inju­

ries [alleged in a suit] relate to the specific substantive

protections of the IDEA.” 788 F. 3d 622, 625 (2015). And

that means, the court continued, that exhaustion is neces­

sary whenever “the genesis and the manifestations” of the

complained-of harms were “educational” in nature. Id., at

627 (quoting Charlie F. v. Board of Ed. of Skokie School

Dist. 68, 98 F. 3d 989, 993 (CA7 1996)). On that under­

standing of §1415(l), the Sixth Circuit held, the Frys’ suit

could not proceed: Because the harms to E. F. were gener­

ally “educational”—most notably, the court reasoned,

because “Wonder’s absence hurt her sense of independence

and social confidence at school”—the Frys had to exhaust

the IDEA’s procedures. 788 F. 3d, at 627. Judge Daugh­

trey dissented, emphasizing that in bringing their Title II

and §504 claims, the Frys “did not allege the denial of a

FAPE” or “seek to modify [E. F.’s] IEP in any way.” Id., at

634.

We granted certiorari to address confusion in the courts

of appeals as to the scope of §1415(l)’s exhaustion re­

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 9

Opinion of the Court

quirement. 579 U. S. ___ (2016).3 We now vacate the

Sixth Circuit’s decision.

II

Section 1415(l) requires that a plaintiff exhaust the

IDEA’s procedures before filing an action under the ADA,

the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws when (but only

when) her suit “seek[s] relief that is also available” under

the IDEA. We first hold that to meet that statutory

standard, a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE,

because that is the only “relief ” the IDEA makes “avail­

able.” We next conclude that in determining whether a

suit indeed “seeks” relief for such a denial, a court should

look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff ’s

complaint.4

A

In this Court, the parties have reached substantial

agreement about what “relief ” the IDEA makes “avail-

able” for children with disabilities—and about how the

——————

3 See Payne v. Peninsula School Dist., 653 F. 3d 863, 874 (CA9 2011)

(en banc) (cataloguing different Circuits’ understandings of §1415(l)).

In particular, the Ninth Circuit has criticized an approach similar to

the Sixth Circuit’s for “treat[ing] §1415(l) as a quasi-preemption provi­

sion, requiring administrative exhaustion for any case that falls within

the general ‘field’ of educating disabled students.” Id., at 875.

4 In reaching these conclusions, we leave for another day a further

question about the meaning of §1415(l): Is exhaustion required when

the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy

she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—is not one

that an IDEA hearing officer may award? The Frys, along with the

Solicitor General, say the answer is no. See Reply Brief 2–3; Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae 16. But resolution of that question

might not be needed in this case because the Frys also say that their

complaint is not about the denial of a FAPE, see Reply Brief 17—and,

as later explained, we must remand that distinct issue to the Sixth

Circuit, see infra, at 18–20. Only if that court rejects the Frys’ view of

their lawsuit, using the analysis we set out below, will the question

about the effect of their request for money damages arise.

10 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

Sixth Circuit went wrong in addressing that question.

The Frys maintain that such a child can obtain remedies

under the IDEA for decisions that deprive her of a FAPE,

but none for those that do not. So in the Frys’ view,

§1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement can come into play only

when a suit concerns the denial of a FAPE—and not, as

the Sixth Circuit held, when it merely has some articula­

ble connection to the education of a child with a disability.

See Reply Brief 13–15. The school districts, for their part,

also believe that the Sixth Circuit’s exhaustion standard

“goes too far” because it could mandate exhaustion when a

plaintiff is “seeking relief that is not in substance avail-

able” under the IDEA. Brief for Respondents 30. And in

particular, the school districts acknowledge that the IDEA

makes remedies available only in suits that “directly

implicate[ ]” a FAPE—so that only in those suits can

§1415(l) apply. Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. For the reasons that

follow, we agree with the parties’ shared view: The only

relief that an IDEA officer can give—hence the thing a

plaintiff must seek in order to trigger §1415(l)’s exhaus­

tion rule—is relief for the denial of a FAPE.

We begin, as always, with the statutory language at

issue, which (at risk of repetition) compels exhaustion

when a plaintiff seeks “relief ” that is “available” under the

IDEA. The ordinary meaning of “relief ” in the context of a

lawsuit is the “redress[ ] or benefit” that attends a favor­

able judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary 1161 (5th ed. 1979).

And such relief is “available,” as we recently explained,

when it is “accessible or may be obtained.” Ross v. Blake,

578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 8) (quoting Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 150 (1993)). So to

establish the scope of §1415(l), we must identify the cir­

cumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain

redress (or, similarly, to access a benefit).

That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a

FAPE in the statutory scheme. In its first section, the

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 11

Opinion of the Court

IDEA declares as its first purpose “to ensure that all

children with disabilities have available to them a free

appropriate public education.” §1400(d)(1)(A). That prin­

cipal purpose then becomes the Act’s principal command:

A State receiving federal funding under the IDEA must

make such an education “available to all children with

disabilities.” §1412(a)(1)(A). The guarantee of a FAPE to

those children gives rise to the bulk of the statute’s more

specific provisions. For example, the IEP—“the center­

piece of the statute’s education delivery system”—serves

as the “vehicle” or “means” of providing a FAPE. Honig,

484 U. S., at 311; Rowley, 458 U. S., at 181; see supra, at

2. And finally, as all the above suggests, the FAPE re­

quirement provides the yardstick for measuring the ade­

quacy of the education that a school offers to a child with a

disability: Under that standard, this Court has held, a

child is entitled to “meaningful” access to education based

on her individual needs. Rowley, 458 U. S., at 192.5

The IDEA’s administrative procedures test whether a

school has met that obligation—and so center on the Act’s

FAPE requirement. As noted earlier, any decision by a

hearing officer on a request for substantive relief “shall”

be “based on a determination of whether the child received

a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i); see

supra, at 3.6 Or said in Latin: In the IDEA’s administra­

tive process, a FAPE denial is the sine qua non. Suppose

that a parent’s complaint protests a school’s failure to

provide some accommodation for a child with a disability.

——————

5A case now before this Court, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School

Dist. RE–1, No. 15–827, presents unresolved questions about the

precise content of the FAPE standard.

6 Without finding the denial of a FAPE, a hearing officer may do noth­

ing more than order a school district to comply with the Act’s various

procedural requirements, see §1415(f )(3)(E)(iii)—for example, by

allowing parents to “examine all records” relating to their child,

§1415(b)(1).

12 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

If that accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA’s

FAPE requirement, the hearing officer must order relief.

But if it is not, he cannot—even though the dispute is

between a child with a disability and the school she at­

tends. There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE,

for the school to make the requested accommodation.

Indeed, another federal law (like the ADA or Rehabilita­

tion Act) might require the accommodation on one of those

alternative grounds. See infra, at 15. But still, the hear­

ing officer cannot provide the requested relief. His role,

under the IDEA, is to enforce the child’s “substantive

right” to a FAPE. Smith, 468 U. S., at 1010. And that is

all.7

For that reason, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges on

whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free

appropriate public education. If a lawsuit charges such a

denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by

bringing her suit under a statute other than the IDEA—as

when, for example, the plaintiffs in Smith claimed that a

school’s failure to provide a FAPE also violated the Reha­

bilitation Act.8 Rather, that plaintiff must first submit her

case to an IDEA hearing officer, experienced in addressing

exactly the issues she raises. But if, in a suit brought

under a different statute, the remedy sought is not for the

denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s proce­

dures is not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get

any relief from those procedures: A hearing officer, as just

——————

7 Similarly, a court in IDEA litigation may provide a substantive

remedy only when it determines that a school has denied a FAPE. See

School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S.

359, 369 (1985). Without such a finding, that kind of relief is (once

again) unavailable under the Act.

8 Once again, we do not address here (or anywhere else in this opin­

ion) a case in which a plaintiff, although charging the denial of a FAPE,

seeks a form of remedy that an IDEA officer cannot give—for example,

as in the Frys’ complaint, money damages for resulting emotional

injury. See n. 4, supra.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 13

Opinion of the Court

explained, would have to send her away empty-handed.

And that is true even when the suit arises directly from a

school’s treatment of a child with a disability—and so

could be said to relate in some way to her education. A

school’s conduct toward such a child—say, some refusal to

make an accommodation—might injure her in ways unre­

lated to a FAPE, which are addressed in statutes other

than the IDEA. A complaint seeking redress for those

other harms, independent of any FAPE denial, is not

subject to §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule because, once again,

the only “relief ” the IDEA makes “available” is relief for

the denial of a FAPE.

B

Still, an important question remains: How is a court to

tell when a plaintiff “seeks” relief for the denial of a FAPE

and when she does not? Here, too, the parties have found

some common ground: By looking, they both say, to the

“substance” of, rather than the labels used in, the plaintiff ’s

complaint. Brief for Respondents 20; Reply Brief 7–8.

And here, too, we agree with that view: What matters

is the crux—or, in legal-speak, the gravamen—of the

plaintiff ’s complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful

pleading.

That inquiry makes central the plaintiff ’s own claims,

as §1415(l) explicitly requires. The statutory language

asks whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief available

under the IDEA—not, as a stricter exhaustion statute

might, whether the suit “could have sought” relief avail-

able under the IDEA (or, what is much the same, whether

any remedies “are” available under that law). See Brief

for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (contrasting

§1415(l) with the exhaustion provision in the Prison Liti­

gation Reform Act, 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a)). In effect,

§1415(l) treats the plaintiff as “the master of the claim”:

She identifies its remedial basis—and is subject to exhaus­

14 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

tion or not based on that choice. Caterpillar Inc. v. Wil-

liams, 482 U. S. 386, 392, and n. 7 (1987). A court decid­

ing whether §1415(l) applies must therefore examine

whether a plaintiff ’s complaint—the principal instrument

by which she describes her case—seeks relief for the de­

nial of an appropriate education.

But that examination should consider substance, not

surface. The use (or non-use) of particular labels and

terms is not what matters. The inquiry, for example, does

not ride on whether a complaint includes (or, alternatively,

omits) the precise words(?) “FAPE” or “IEP.” After all,

§1415(l)’s premise is that the plaintiff is suing under a

statute other than the IDEA, like the Rehabilitation Act;

in such a suit, the plaintiff might see no need to use the

IDEA’s distinctive language—even if she is in essence

contesting the adequacy of a special education program.

And still more critically, a “magic words” approach would

make §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule too easy to bypass. Just

last Term, a similar worry led us to hold that a court’s

jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

turns on the “gravamen,” or “essentials,” of the plaintiff ’s

suit. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. ___,

___, ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6, 8, 9). “[A]ny other ap­

proach,” we explained, “would allow plaintiffs to evade the

Act’s restrictions through artful pleading.” Id., at ___ (slip

op., at 8). So too here. Section 1415(l) is not merely a

pleading hurdle. It requires exhaustion when the grava­

men of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to

provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely

that way.

In addressing whether a complaint fits that description,

a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the

statutes covering persons with disabilities—the IDEA on

the one hand, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (most nota­

bly) on the other. The IDEA, of course, protects only

“children” (well, really, adolescents too) and concerns only

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 15

Opinion of the Court

their schooling. §1412(a)(1)(A). And as earlier noted, the

statute’s goal is to provide each child with meaningful

access to education by offering individualized instruction

and related services appropriate to her “unique needs.”

§1401(29); see Rowley, 458 U. S., at 192, 198; supra, at 11.

By contrast, Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabili­

tation Act cover people with disabilities of all ages, and do

so both inside and outside schools. And those statutes aim

to root out disability-based discrimination, enabling each

covered person (sometimes by means of reasonable ac­

commodations) to participate equally to all others in pub­

lic facilities and federally funded programs. See supra, at

3–4. In short, the IDEA guarantees individually tailored

educational services, while Title II and §504 promise non­

discriminatory access to public institutions. That is not to

deny some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might

violate all three statutes—which is why, as in Smith, a

plaintiff might seek relief for the denial of a FAPE under

Title II and §504 as well as the IDEA. But still, the statu­

tory differences just discussed mean that a complaint

brought under Title II and §504 might instead seek relief

for simple discrimination, irrespective of the IDEA’s FAPE

obligation.

One clue to whether the gravamen of a complaint

against a school concerns the denial of a FAPE, or instead

addresses disability-based discrimination, can come from

asking a pair of hypothetical questions. First, could the

plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the

alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was

not a school—say, a public theater or library? And second,

could an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—

have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the

answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not

expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be

truly about that subject; after all, in those other situations

there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same basic suit

16 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

could go forward. But when the answer is no, then the

complaint probably does concern a FAPE, even if it does

not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all that

explains why only a child in the school setting (not an

adult in that setting or a child in some other) has a viable

claim.

Take two contrasting examples. Suppose first that a

wheelchair-bound child sues his school for discrimination

under Title II (again, without mentioning the denial of a

FAPE) because the building lacks access ramps. In some

sense, that architectural feature has educational conse­

quences, and a different lawsuit might have alleged that it

violates the IDEA: After all, if the child cannot get inside

the school, he cannot receive instruction there; and if he

must be carried inside, he may not achieve the sense of

independence conducive to academic (or later to real-

world) success. But is the denial of a FAPE really the

gravamen of the plaintiff ’s Title II complaint? Consider

that the child could file the same basic complaint if a

municipal library or theater had no ramps. And similarly,

an employee or visitor could bring a mostly identical com­

plaint against the school. That the claim can stay the

same in those alternative scenarios suggests that its

essence is equality of access to public facilities, not ade­

quacy of special education. See supra, at 7 (describing

OCR’s use of a similar example). And so §1415(l) does not

require exhaustion.9

——————

9 The school districts offer another example illustrating the point.

They suppose that a teacher, acting out of animus or frustration,

strikes a student with a disability, who then sues the school under a

statute other than the IDEA. See Brief for Respondents 36–37. Here

too, the suit could be said to relate, in both genesis and effect, to the

child’s education. But the school districts opine, we think correctly,

that the substance of the plaintiff’s claim is unlikely to involve the

adequacy of special education—and thus is unlikely to require exhaus­

tion. See ibid. A telling indicator of that conclusion is that a child

could file the same kind of suit against an official at another public

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 17

Opinion of the Court

But suppose next that a student with a learning disabil­

ity sues his school under Title II for failing to provide

remedial tutoring in mathematics. That suit, too, might

be cast as one for disability-based discrimination, grounded

on the school’s refusal to make a reasonable accommo­

dation; the complaint might make no reference at all to a

FAPE or an IEP. But can anyone imagine the student

making the same claim against a public theater or library?

Or, similarly, imagine an adult visitor or employee suing

the school to obtain a math tutorial? The difficulty of

transplanting the complaint to those other contexts sug­

gests that its essence—even though not its wording—is

the provision of a FAPE, thus bringing §1415(l) into play.10

A further sign that the gravamen of a suit is the denial

of a FAPE can emerge from the history of the proceedings.

In particular, a court may consider that a plaintiff has

previously invoked the IDEA’s formal procedures to han­

dle the dispute—thus starting to exhaust the Act’s reme­

dies before switching midstream. Recall that a parent

——————

facility for inflicting such physical abuse—as could an adult subject to

similar treatment by a school official. To be sure, the particular cir­

cumstances of such a suit (school or theater? student or employee?)

might be pertinent in assessing the reasonableness of the challenged

conduct. But even if that is so, the plausibility of bringing other vari­

ants of the suit indicates that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint

does not concern the appropriateness of an educational program.

10 According to JUSTICE ALITO, the hypothetical inquiries described

above are useful only if the IDEA and other federal laws are mutually

exclusive in scope. See post, at 1 (opinion concurring in part and

concurring in judgment). That is incorrect. The point of the questions

is not to show that a plaintiff faced with a particular set of circum­

stances could only have proceeded under Title II or §504—or, alterna­

tively, could only have proceeded under the IDEA. (Depending on the

circumstances, she might well have been able to proceed under both.)

Rather, these questions help determine whether a plaintiff who has

chosen to bring a claim under Title II or §504 instead of the IDEA—and

whose complaint makes no mention of a FAPE—nevertheless raises a

claim whose substance is the denial of an appropriate education.

18 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

dissatisfied with her child’s education initiates those

administrative procedures by filing a complaint, which

triggers a preliminary meeting (or possibly mediation) and

then a due process hearing. See supra, at 2–3. A plain-

tiff ’s initial choice to pursue that process may suggest that

she is indeed seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE—with

the shift to judicial proceedings prior to full exhaustion

reflecting only strategic calculations about how to maxim­

ize the prospects of such a remedy. Whether that is so

depends on the facts; a court may conclude, for example,

that the move to a courtroom came from a late-acquired

awareness that the school had fulfilled its FAPE obliga­

tion and that the grievance involves something else entirely.

But prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative reme-

dies will often provide strong evidence that the substance

of a plaintiff ’s claim concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if

the complaint never explicitly uses that term.11

III

The Court of Appeals did not undertake the analysis we

have just set forward. As noted above, it asked whether

E. F.’s injuries were, broadly speaking, “educational” in

nature. See supra, at 8; 788 F. 3d, at 627 (reasoning that

the “value of allowing Wonder to attend [school] with E. F.

was educational” because it would foster “her sense of

independence and social confidence,” which is “the sort of

interest the IDEA protects”). That is not the same as

asking whether the gravamen of E. F.’s complaint charges,

and seeks relief for, the denial of a FAPE. And that differ­

ence in standard may have led to a difference in result in

——————

11 The point here is limited to commencement of the IDEA’s formal

administrative procedures; it does not apply to more informal requests

to IEP Team members or other school administrators for accommoda­

tions or changes to a special education program. After all, parents of a

child with a disability are likely to bring all grievances first to those

familiar officials, whether or not they involve the denial of a FAPE.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 19

Opinion of the Court

this case. Understood correctly, §1415(l) might not re­

quire exhaustion of the Frys’ claim. We lack some im­

portant information on that score, however, and so we

remand the issue to the court below.

The Frys’ complaint alleges only disability-based dis­

crimination, without making any reference to the ade-

quacy of the special education services E. F.’s school provided.

The school districts’ “refusal to allow Wonder to act as a

service dog,” the complaint states, “discriminated against

[E. F.] as a person with disabilities . . . by denying her

equal access” to public facilities. App. to Brief in Opposi­

tion 15, Complaint ¶68. The complaint contains no allega­

tion about the denial of a FAPE or about any deficiency in

E. F.’s IEP. More, it does not accuse the school even in

general terms of refusing to provide the educational in­

struction and services that E. F. needs. See 788 F. 3d, at

631 (acknowledging that the Frys do not “state that Won­

der enhances E. F.’s educational opportunities”). As the

Frys explained in this Court: The school districts “have

said all along that because they gave [E. F.] a one-on-one

[human] aide, that all of her . . . educational needs were

satisfied. And we have not challenged that, and it would

be difficult for us to challenge that.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

The Frys instead maintained, just as OCR had earlier

found, that the school districts infringed E. F.’s right to

equal access—even if their actions complied in full with

the IDEA’s requirements. See App. to Brief in Opposition

15, 18–19, Complaint ¶¶ 69, 85, 87; App. 34–37; supra, at

7–8.

And nothing in the nature of the Frys’ suit suggests any

implicit focus on the adequacy of E. F.’s education. Con­

sider, as suggested above, that the Frys could have filed

essentially the same complaint if a public library or thea­

ter had refused admittance to Wonder. See supra, at 16.

Or similarly, consider that an adult visitor to the school

could have leveled much the same charges if prevented

20 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

from entering with his service dog. See ibid. In each case,

the plaintiff would challenge a public facility’s policy of

precluding service dogs (just as a blind person might

challenge a policy of barring guide dogs, see supra, at 7) as

violating Title II’s and §504’s equal access requirements.

The suit would have nothing to do with the provision of

educational services. From all that we know now, that is

exactly the kind of action the Frys have brought.

But we do not foreclose the possibility that the history of

these proceedings might suggest something different. As

earlier discussed, a plaintiff ’s initial pursuit of the IDEA’s

administrative remedies can serve as evidence that the

gravamen of her later suit is the denial of a FAPE, even

though that does not appear on the face of her complaint.

See supra, at 17–18. The Frys may or may not have

sought those remedies before filing this case: None of the

parties here have addressed that issue, and the record is

cloudy as to the relevant facts. Accordingly, on remand,

the court below should establish whether (or to what

extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute resolution

process before bringing this suit. And if the Frys started

down that road, the court should decide whether their

actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is

indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further

exhaustion.

With these instructions and for the reasons stated,

we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and re­

mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1

Opinion of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–497

_________________

STACY FRY, ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F.,

PETITIONERS v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY

SCHOOLS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[February 22, 2017]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join all of the opinion of the Court with the exception of

its discussion (in the text from the beginning of the first

new paragraph on page 15 to the end of the opinion) in

which the Court provides several misleading “clue[s],”

ante, at 15, for the lower courts.

The Court first instructs the lower courts to inquire

whether the plaintiff could have brought “essentially the

same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public

facility that was not a school—say, a public theater or

library.” Ibid. Next, the Court says, a court should ask

whether “an adult at the school—say, an employee or

visitor—[could] have pressed essentially the same griev-

ance.” Ibid. These clues make sense only if there is no

overlap between the relief available under the following

two sets of claims: (1) the relief provided by the Individu-

als with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and (2) the

relief provided by other federal laws (including the Consti-

tution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The Court does not

show or even claim that there is no such overlap—to the

contrary, it observes that “[t]he same conduct might vio-

2 FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS

Opinion of ALITO, J.

late” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA. Ibid.

And since these clues work only in the absence of overlap,

I would not suggest them.

The Court provides another false clue by suggesting that

lower courts take into account whether parents, before

filing suit under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, began

to pursue but then abandoned the IDEA’s formal proce-

dures. Ante, at 17–18. This clue also seems to me to be

ill-advised. It is easy to imagine circumstances under

which parents might start down the IDEA road and then

change course and file an action under the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act that seeks relief that the IDEA cannot

provide. The parents might be advised by their attorney

that the relief they were seeking under the IDEA is not

available under that law but is available under another.

Or the parents might change their minds about the relief

that they want, give up on the relief that the IDEA can

provide, and turn to another statute.

Although the Court provides these clues for the purpose

of assisting the lower courts, I am afraid that they may

have the opposite effect. They are likely to confuse and

lead courts astray.